Pesquera Mares Australes Ltda. v. United States , 24 Ct. Int'l Trade 443 ( 2000 )

Slip Op. 00-65
UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
BEFORE: RICHARD W. GOLDBERG, JUDGE
PESQUERA MARES AUSTRALES LTDA.,
Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant, Court No. 98-08-02680
and
COALITION FOR FAIR ATLANTIC
SALMON TRADE,
Defendant-Intervenor.
[Contested portion of Defendant's Final Determination sustained.]
Dated: June 5, 2000
Arnold & Porter, (Michael T. Shor and Kevin T. Traskos) for
plaintiff Pesquera Mares Australes.
David W. Ogden, Acting Assistant Attorney General; David M.
Cohen, Director, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division,
United States Department of Justice; Lucius B. Lau, Attorney,
Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States
Department of Justice; Office of the Chief Counsel for Import
Administration, United States Department of Commerce (Ann Talbot
and Stacy J. Ettinger), of counsel, for defendant.
Collier, Shannon, Rill & Scott, PLLC, (Michael J. Coursey, and
David C. Smith, Jr.)for defendant-intervenor Coalition for Fair
Atlantic Salmon Trade.
OPINION
GOLDBERG, Judge: In this action, the Court reviews a challenge to
the Department of Commerce’s (“Commerce”) Notice of Final
Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Fresh Atlantic
Salmon From Chile, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,411 (June 9, 1998) (“Final
Determination”). Plaintiff Pesquera Mares Australes Ltda.
(“Pesquera”) argues that Commerce’s Final Determination is
neither in accordance with law nor supported by substantial
evidence because Commerce failed to distinguish between super-
premium and premium grade fresh Atlantic salmon (“salmon”).
The Court exercises jurisdiction over this matter pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c)(1994). The Court sustains Commerce’s
determination to treat super-premium and premium grade salmon as
identical merchandise.
I.
BACKGROUND
On July 2, 1997, Commerce initiated an antidumping duty
investigation to determine whether imports of salmon were being
or were likely to be sold in the United States at less-than-fair-
value. See Initiation of Antidumping Duty Investigation: Fresh
Atlantic Salmon From Chile, 62 Fed. Reg. 37,027 (July 10, 1997).
After determining that it would be impracticable to examine all
Chilean producers and exporters of salmon, Commerce decided to
limit its investigation to the five largest Chilean exporters.
See Notice of Preliminary Determination of Sales at Less Than
Fair Value and Postponement of Final Determination: Fresh
Atlantic Salmon From Chile, 63 Fed. Reg. 2,664, 2,664-66 (Jan.
16, 1998)(“Preliminary Determination”). Commerce published its
Final Determination on June 9, 1998. See 63 Fed. Reg. at 31,411.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Commerce’s Final Determination will be sustained if it is
supported by substantial evidence on the record and is otherwise
in accordance with law. See 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(1994).
To determine whether Commerce’s interpretation of a statute
is in accordance with law, the Court applies the two-prong test
set forth in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Chevron first directs the
Court to determine “whether Congress has directly spoken to the
precise question at issue.” See id. at 842. To do so, the Court
must look to the statute’s text to ascertain “Congress’s purpose
and intent.” Timex V.I., Inc. v. United States, 157 F.3d 879,
881 (1998) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43 & n.9). If the
plain language of the statute is not dispositive, the Court must
then consider the statute’s structure, canons of statutory
interpretation, and legislative history. See id. at 882 (citing
Dunn v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 519 U.S. 465, 470-80
(1997)); Chevron 467 U.S. at 859-63; Oshkosh Truck Corp. v.
United States, 123 F.3d 1477, 1481 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). If, after
this analysis, Congress’s intent is unambiguous, the Court must
give it effect. See id.If the statute is either silent or ambiguous on the question
at issue, however, “the question for the court is whether the
agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the
statute.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 (footnote omitted). Thus,
the second prong of the Chevron test directs the Court to
consider the reasonableness of Commerce’s interpretation. See
id.With respect to Commerce’s factual findings, the Court will
sustain Commerce's determinations if they are supported by
substantial evidence. “Substantial evidence is something more
than a ‘mere scintilla,’ and must be enough reasonably to support
a conclusion.” Ceramica Regiomontana, S.A. v. United States, 10
CIT 399, 405, 636 F. Supp. 961, 966 (1986) (citations omitted),
aff’d, 5 Fed. Cir. (T) 77, 810 F.2d 1137 (1987). In applying
this standard, the Court must sustain Commerce’s factual
determinations so long as they are reasonable and supported by
the record as a whole, even if there is some evidence that
detracts from the agency’s conclusions. See Atlantic Sugar, Ltd.
v. United States, 2 Fed. Cir. (T) 130, 137, 744 F.2d 1556, 1563
(1984).
III.
DISCUSSION
The Court reviews Commerce’s decision to treat super-premium
and premium salmon as “identical in physical characteristics.”
The Court finds that Commerce’s determination is in accordance
with law and supported by substantial evidence.
A. Commerce Acted in Accordance with Law in Treating Super-
Premium and Premium Salmon Sold in Japan as “Identical in
Physical Characteristics” with Premium Salmon Sold in the
United States.
Under U.S. antidumping law, Commerce determines dumping
margins "by comparing the weighted average of the normal values
to the weighted average of the export prices (and constructed
export prices) for comparable merchandise.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-
1(d)(1)(A)(i)(1994). “Export price” and “constructed export
price” are the prices at which the subject merchandise is sold in
the United States. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(a),(b)(1994). In this
case, normal value is “the price at which the foreign like
product is sold . . . for consumption in a country other than the
exporting country or the United States.” 19 U.S.C. §
1677b(a)(1)(B)(ii)(1994)(emphasis added). To determine “foreign
like product,” Commerce follows the directive of the antidumping
statute:
The term “foreign like product” means
merchandise in the first of the following
categories in respect of which a determination
for the purposes of part II of this subtitle
can be satisfactorily made:
(A) The subject merchandise and other
merchandise which is identical in
physical characteristics with, and was
produced in the same country by the same
person as, that merchandise.
(B) Merchandise-
(i) produced in the same country and
by the same person as the subject
merchandise,
(ii) like that merchandise in
component materials and in the
purposes for which used, and
(iii) approximately equal in
commercial value to that
merchandise.
(C) Merchandise-
(i) produced in the same country and
by the same person and of the same
general class or kind as the
merchandise which is the subject of
the investigation
(ii) like that merchandise in the
purposes for which used, and
(iii) which the administrating
authority determines may reasonably
be compared with that merchandise.
19 U.S.C. §1677(16) (1994).
In this case, pursuant to the statute, Commerce evaluated
whether Chilean exporters were dumping salmon in the United
States by comparing salmon prices in the United States to salmon
prices in Japan. See id. For purposes of the Preliminary
Determination, Commerce accepted Pesquera’s suggestion that a
physical distinction existed between super-premium and premium
grade salmon sold in Japan. See 63 Fed. Reg. at 2,666 n.3. If
such a distinction existed, Commerce presumably would not be able
to treat the two grades of salmon as "identical in physical
characteristics" to the premium grade salmon sold in the United
States.
In the Final Determination, however, Commerce declined to
recognize a distinction between super-premium and premium grade
salmon sold in Japan. See 63 Fed. Reg. at 31,414. Commerce
determined “that the differences between super-premium and
premium salmon are so minor as to not warrant separate
classification in an antidumping analysis.” Id. at 31,414.
Thus, Commerce treated the super-premium and premium salmon sold
in Japan as “identical in physical characteristics” with the
premium salmon sold in the United States. See Final
Determination, 63 Fed. Reg. at 31,415.
Pesquera maintains that the two grades of salmon are
physically distinct, see Initial Br. of Pl. Pesquera Mares
Australes, Ltda. in Supp. of Rule 56.2 Mot. for J. on the Agency
R. (“Pesquera’s Br.”), at 32-35, 41-42, and therefore that, under
the statute, Commerce is prohibited from treating super-premium
grade salmon as identical in physical characteristics with
premium salmon. See id. at 24-37. According to Pesquera, the
premium salmon sold in Japan alone falls under Section
1677(16)(A) of the statute, while the super-premium salmon sold
in Japan falls under Section 1677(16)(B) or Section 1677(C). See
id.
Pesquera reasons that Commerce cannot treat merchandise as
“identical in physical characteristic” unless the merchandise is
exactly alike. See id. at 29. Further, Pesquera argues that if
merchandise has commercially distinct characteristics that cause
material price differences, the merchandise cannot have
“identical physical characteristics.” See id. at 32. Pesquera
claims that the statutory structure compels such a conclusion
because it provides for an alternative designation of similar,
but not identical, merchandise. See id.
The Court does not agree. Under a Chevron analysis,
“identical in physical characteristics,” as used in the statute,
is an ambiguous term. See 467 U.S. at 842-43. Pesquera is
correct that the literal meaning of “identical” is “the very
same” or “exactly alike or equal.” See Webster’s New World
Dictionary 696 (2d College ed. 1984). Yet, such an
interpretation of the term would frustrate the purpose of the
statute. The statute states that Commerce should consider “[t]he
subject merchandise and other merchandise which is identical in
physical characteristics.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677(16)(A)(emphasis
added). Since “subject merchandise” is defined by the statute to
mean “the class or kind of merchandise that is within the scope
of an investigation,” 19 U.S.C. § 1677(25), Congress’s inclusion
of “other merchandise” in Section 1677(16)(A) suggests that
Congress intended to include merchandise that was not “exactly
the same.” Further, the statute does not direct Commerce how to
decide whether merchandise is identical in physical
characteristics. Additionally, the Court of International Trade
has implicitly indicated that the phrase "identical in physical
characteristics" does not mean exactly alike. See Rautauruukki
Oy v. United States, 1998 WL 465219 at *5.
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and Commerce
have previously recognized the ambiguity in this statutory
provision. See Koyo Seiko Co. v. United States, 66 F.3d 1204,
1209 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (finding that Congress delegated authority
to Commerce because of a “gap” in the statute); Roller Chain,
Other Than Bicycle From Japan: Final Results and Partial
Recission of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 63 Fed. Reg.
63,671-78 (November 16, 1998) (antidumping statute does not
detail the methodology to be used by Commerce). Accordingly,
because the statute is ambiguous, the Court will affirm
Commerce’s interpretation of the statute as long as it is
reasonable. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
In practice, Commerce conducts a case-by-case evaluation to
determine whether merchandise is identical in physical
characteristics. See, e.g., RHP Bearings Ltd., NSK v. United
States, 83 F.Supp.2d 1322(1999); AK Steel Corp. v. United States,
No. 970-152, 96-05-01312, 1997 WL 728284, *11-13 (CIT Nov. 14,
1997); Notice of Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair
Value: Certain Cut-To-Length Carbon-Quality Steel Plate Products
from Korea, 64 Fed. Reg. 73,196, 73,200-01 (Dec. 29, 1999).
Under this evaluation, Commerce utilizes various methods of
analysis, taking into account the specific characteristics of the
merchandise and the relevant market.1 See id. Therefore, to
determine the reasonableness of Commerce’s statutory
interpretation, the Court must look at the specific methods used
here by Commerce.
The Court finds that in this case, Commerce’s determination
regarding the identical nature of super-premium and premium grade
1
Commerce's asserts that it analyzes only "commercially
meaningful characteristics" to determine if merchandise is
identical. See Def.'s Mem. in Opp'n to the Rule 56.2 Mot. for J.
Upon the Agency R. Filed by Pesquera Mares Australes Ltda.
("Commerce's Br."), at 28-30. It is the Court's view that the
phrase "commercially meaningful characteristics," as used by
Commerce in its prior determinations and in its briefs in this
case, has no independent substantive meaning. Rather, as noted,
Commerce appears to conduct an ad hoc analysis each time it
analyzes whether merchandise is identical.
salmon is “a reasonable means of effectuating the statutory
purpose” and is thus in accordance with law. See Ceramica
Regiomontana, 636 F.Supp. at 966. Before issuing the Preliminary
Determination, Commerce solicited and received comments from the
parties regarding the physical characteristics of different
salmon grades. See 63 Fed. Reg. at 2,664. Pesquera asserted
that super-premium and premium salmon were two distinct grades.
See id. at 2,666 n.3. In the Preliminary Determination, Commerce
tentatively adopted Pesquera’s assertion. See id. At
verification, however, Commerce determined that the evidence on
the record demonstrated that both super-premium and premium grade
salmon sold in Japan were “identical” in grade to premium grade
salmon sold in the United States. See Final Determination, 63
Fed. Reg. at 31,413-15. Therefore, Commere treated this
merchandise as identical. See id. In reaching such a
conclusion, Commerce reasoned that nominal differences in the
merchandise did not prevent the merchandise from being identical
under the statute. See id. In this case, Commerce's procedures
were a "reasonable means of effectuating the statutory purpose"
because Commerce's intent and effect was to identify what, if
any, merchandise was identical under the statute.
Because Commerce took comments from interested parties and
investigated the evidentiary basis for the claims, Commerce’s
analysis was evenhanded and well informed. Moreover, because the
statute is ambiguous and because the statutory language and
structure indicate that Congress likely intended Commerce to
consider merchandise that was not exactly the same as identical,
the Court finds that Commerce’s methodology was a reasonable
interpretation of the statute. Because Commerce’s actions were a
reasonable interpretation of the statute, Commerce’s decision was
in accordance with law. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
B. Commerce’s Determination that Super-Premium and Premium
Salmon Sold in Japan were Identical to Premium Salmon Sold
in the United States is Supported by Substantial Evidence.
Commerce determined, based on evidence in the record, that
any differences between super-premium and premium salmon were
“nominal.” See Final Determination, 63 Fed. Reg. at 31,414.
Because any physical differences between the grades were nominal,
Commerce reasoned that the merchandise was identical for purposes
of the statute. See id.
Pesquera claims that the evidence on the record does not
support Commerce’s decision. See Pesquera’s Br., at 41-48.
Specifically, Pesquera claims that (1) Commerce ignored physical
differences between super-premium and premium grade salmon,(2)
Commerce misinterpreted evidence concerning meat color, and (3)
evidence concerning salmon production in other countries was
improperly considered and irrelevant. See id. at 8-16, 41-48;
Reply Br. of Pesquera Mares Australes, Ltda. in Supp. of Rule
56.2 Mot. for J. on the Agency R. (“Pesquera’s Reply Br.”), at
15-41. The Court considers each argument in turn and holds that,
while other conclusions might be drawn from the record,
Commerce’s determination is supported by substantial evidence.
1. Commerce did Not Ignore Evidence on the Record.
Pesquera argues that Commerce ignored evidence of physical
differences between super-premium and premium salmon. See
Pesquera’s Br., at 41-42. Commerce, however, acknowledged that
physical differences existed between super-premium and premium
grade salmon. See Final Determination, 63 Fed. Reg. at 31,414.
Commerce explained that “[d]epartment verifiers observed that
there were in fact minor differences between salmon classified as
premium and salmon classified as super-premium, such as small
scale loss or light lacerations. These minor differences,
however, do not establish a different grade of salmon for
purposes of our analysis.” Id. Thus, Commerce did not ignore
physical differences, but chose to consider these differences to
be so minor as to be irrelevant to the analysis. Because
“identical” does not necessarily mean “exactly alike,” see supra,
Section III.A., this reasoning is well within Commerce’s
discretion. Cf. Steel from Germany, 60 Fed. Reg. 65,264, 65,271
(December 19, 1995) (considering products as identical when
merchandise dimensions were different).
2. Commerce’s Finding That Meat Color is Not a
Distinction Between Grade is Supported by
Substantial Evidence.
In its pre-verification filing, Pesquera claimed that salmon
meat color was the “single most important” distinction between
super-premium grade and premium salmon. See Final Determination,
63 Fed. Reg. at 31,414. At verification, Commerce determined
that in practice salmon classified as super-premium had the same
meat color as salmon classified as premium. See id. Based on
this evidence, Commerce concluded that super-premium and premium
salmon should be considered to have identical physical
characteristics for purposes of the statute. See id. at 31,415.
Pesquera claims that Commerce erroneously found that super-
premium and premium grades had the same meat color. See
Pesquera’s Br., at 42 n.89; Pesquera’s Reply Br., at 30, 31-40.
Moreover, Pesquera asserts that it never claimed that meat color
was the primary distinction between super-premium and premium
grade salmon. See Pesquera’s Br., at 42-43.
The Court finds that Commerce marshaled substantial evidence
that in practice super-premium and premium grade salmon were not
distinguished based on meat color.2 See Final Determination, 63
Fed. Reg. at 31,415; Commerce’s App., Ex. 20 (Internal Commerce
Mem. (inspection of Eicomar processing plant), dated Apr. 7,
1998), 2-3. Specifically, Commerce marshaled evidence (1) that
all salmon grades were fed the same amount and type of pigmented
food pellets, (2) that these food pellets resulted in a uniform
meat color regardless of grade, and (3) that meat color was only
occasionally checked during processing. See Final Determination,
63 Fed. Reg. at 31,415.
Moreover, during the comment period, Pesquera did, in fact,
claim that meat color was one of the factors distinguishing
2
Commerce contends that it discovered at verification that
all super-premium and premium grade salmon were fed the same
amount and type of pigmented food pellets. See Final
Determination, 63 Fed. Reg. at 31414. Pesquera claims that
Commerce had that information before verification. See
Pesquera’s Reply Br., at 32-33. The timing is irrelevant.
Commerce did not claim that discovering the pigment pellet
evidence at the verification, rather than earlier, changed or
otherwise affected its position.
super-premium and premium grade salmon. See App. to Commerce's
Br., Vol. II, at Ex. 10 (Letter from Michael T. Shor to William
M. Daley on Nov. 3, 1997, at 14) (“Of all the grading
differences, the difference in color is perhaps the most
important and most significant.”).3 And Pesquera submitted
documentary evidence of a purported color distinction between the
grades to Commerce.4 See, e.g., App. to Commerce's Br., Vol. II,
at Ex. 9 (Letter from Michael T. Shor to William M. Daley on Oct.
10, 1997, Attach. 1 (Asociacíon Standards)). Based on this
evidence, Commerce concluded that the physical characteristic --
meat color -- Pesquera claimed distinguished super-premium from
3
Pesquera claims that this statement was made concerning
filleted salmon only. See Pesquera’s Reply Br., at 32.
Pesquera, however, mischaracterizes its prior position. The
statement was made in a general discussion of the differences
between super-premium and premium grade salmon. See App. to
Commerce's Br., Vol. II, at Ex. 10 (Letter from Michael T. Shor
to William M. Daley on Nov. 3, 1997, at 14-15). Following the
statement, Pesquera offered an example using filleted salmon to
illustrate its general contention. See id.
4
Pesquera blatantly mischaracterizes the record evidence
by arguing that the Asociación de Productores de Salmón y Trucha
de Chile (A.G.) standards do not distinguish between super-
premium and premium grade salmon based, in part, on meat color.
See Pesquera’s Reply Br., at 34-37. In fact, the Asociación
standards require a meat color of fourteen for premium salmon and
a meat color above fourteen for super-premium salmon. See App.
to Commerce's Br., Vol. II, at Ex. 9 (Letter from Michael T. Shor
to William M. Daley on Oct. 10, 1997, Attach. 1 (Asociacíon
Standards)).
premium grade salmon was in practice not a distinction. See
Final Determination, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,414. This evidence supports
Commerce’s conclusion that the distinction between super-premium
and premium grade salmon is either non-existent or nominal.
3. Commerce’s Determination is Properly Supported by
Substantial Evidence of the Classification
Standards of the General Industry.
In the Final Determination, Commerce referred to salmon
industry classification standards to support its determination
that super-premium and premium grade salmon were identical. See
63 Fed. Reg. at 31,414-15. Commerce stated that industry
standards in Norway, Scotland, Canada, and the United States make
no distinction between super-premium and premium grade salmon.
See id. Commerce claimed that these standards support the
conclusion that super-premium and premium grade salmon must be
treated as identical merchandise under the statute. See id.
Pesquera claims that Commerce improperly considered evidence
of industry practice when its analysis concerning grade should
have been restricted to Pesquera’s practice only. See Pesquera’s
Br., at 43-48. Pesquera bases this argument on the “same person”
language of the statute. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(16); Pesquera’s
Br., at 43-48. Pesquera also claims that the record does not
contain evidence of industry standards supporting Commerce’s
determination. See Pesquera’s Br., at 43-48.
The Court does not agree. The statute on its face does not
prohibit Commerce's evaluation of industry standards when
determining whether particular products are identical. See 19
U.S.C. § 1677(16). The “same person” language of the statute
applies only to the origin of the merchandise, not to whether
particular merchandise is identical. See id. Moreover, the
Court cannot find, and Pesquera does not supply, any authority
which restricts evidence to the individual producer’s standards.5
Under Chevron, Commerce’s use of industry standards to
evaluate whether merchandise is identical is a reasonable
5
Pesquera does offer three Commerce decisions to support
its argument. See Certain Pasta from Italy, 61 Fed. Reg. 30,
326, 30,346 (June 14, 1996); Certain Corrosion-Resistant Carbon
Steel Flat Products and Certain Cut-to-Length Carbon Steel Plate
from Canada, 61 Fed. Reg. 13,815, 13,821 (March 28, 1996);
Certain Cut-to-Length Steel Plate from Finland, 63 Fed. Reg.
2,952, 2,954-55 (Jan. 20, 1998). These Commerce decisions,
however, do not support Pesquera’s position. Certain Pasta from
Italy and Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel from Canada concern
the selection of product matching criteria. See Certain Pasta
from Italy, 61 Fed. Reg. at 30,346; Corrosion-Resistant Carbon
Steel from Canada, 61 Fed. Reg. at 13,821. These determinations
do not analyze whether the merchandise is identical under such
criteria. See id. Certain Cut to Length Steel Plate from
Finland is even more inappropriately cited, as this decision
concerns an adverse inference of a missing conversion factor.
See 63 Fed. Reg. at 2,954-55.
interpretation of the statue. See 467 U.S. at 843. As discussed
above, the statute does not direct Commerce in regard to the term
identical. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(16). Thus, Commerce is free to
employ reasonable methodology to determine whether merchandise is
identical. See Chevron 467 U.S. at 843. Commerce’s
consideration of industry standards is reasonable because
industry standards indicate what most salmon producers consider
to be identical merchandise.
Further, the record contains substantial evidence of the
industry standards of several countries. The Final Determination
refers to direct evidence of Scottish standards. See 63 Fed. Reg.
at 31,414 n.2. And, contrary to Pesquera’s claims, the
administrative record contains evidence concerning the industry
standards of Norway, Canada, and the United States. See App. to
Commerce’s Br., Vol. I., at Ex. 8 (Letter of Aug. 14, 1997 from
Michael J. Coursey, et al. to Sec. of Commerce, 3); App. to
Commerce’s Br., Vol. II, at Ex. 10 (Letter of Nov. 3, 1997 from
Michael T. Shor to William M. Daley, 20); App. to Commerce’s Br.,
Vol. II, at Ex. 12 (Letter of Dec. 11, 1997 from Collier,
Shannon, et al. to Sec. of Commerce, Ex. 2 at 3)(affidavit of
Canadian industry participant); App. to Commerce’s Br., Vol. III,
at Ex. 19 (Mem. Of Apr. 7, 1998 from Gabriel Adler and David
Dirstine to Gary Taverman, 13); App. To Commerce’s Br., Vol III,
at Ex. 22 (Pet.’s Case Br. at 17, 21). Such information,
although not dispositive, is evidence supporting Commerce’s
conclusion.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court sustains the
portions of the Final Determination pertaining to Commerce’s
decision to treat super-premium and premium grade salmon as
identical merchandise. A separate order will be entered
accordingly.
_______________________
Richard W. Goldberg
JUDGE
Date: June 5, 2000
New York, New York
ERRATA
Pesquera Mares Australes Ltda., v. United States, Slip Op. 00-65, dated June 5, 2000
Page 7, line 8, following the word "investigation" insert a comma
Page 12, line 14, delete "Commre" and substitute "Commerce"