Marvin Furniture (Shanghai) Co., Ltd. v. United States , 899 F. Supp. 2d 1352 ( 2013 )


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  •                           Slip Op. 13- 3
    UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
    Before: Nicholas Tsoucalas, Senior Judge
    MARVIN FURNITURE (SHANGHAI) CO.     :
    LTD.,                               :
    :
    Plaintiff,               :
    :
    v.                             :      Court No.: 12-00100
    :
    UNITED STATES,                      :
    :
    Defendant,               :
    :
    and                            :
    :
    AMERICAN FURNITURE MANUFACTURERS    :
    COMMITTEE FOR LEGAL TRADE and       :
    VAUGHAN-BASSETT FURNITURE           :
    COMPANY, INC.,                      :
    :
    Defendant-Intervenors.   :
    :
    OPINION
    Held: Marvin Furniture (Shanghai) Co. Ltd.’s motion for rehearing
    is denied.
    Dated: January 7, 2013
    Neville Peterson, LLP, (John M. Peterson and Richard F.
    O’Neill) for Marvin Furniture (Shanghai) Co. Ltd., Plaintiff.
    Stuart F. Delery, Acting Assistant Attorney General; Jeanne E.
    Davidson, Director, Patricia M. McCarthy, Assistant Director, Civil
    Division, United States Department of Justice, (Carrie A.
    Dunsmore); Shana Hofstetter, Of Counsel, Office of the Chief
    Counsel for Import Administration, United States Department of
    Commerce, for the United States, Defendant.
    King & Spalding, LLP, (Joseph W. Dorn, J. Michael Taylor, and
    P. Lee Smith) for American Furniture Manufacturers Committee for
    Legal Trade and Vaughan-Bassett Furniture Company, Inc., Defendant-
    Intervenors.
    Court No. 12-00100                                           Page 2
    TSOUCALAS, Senior Judge: Plaintiff Marvin Furniture (Shanghai)
    Co. Ltd. (“Marvin”) seeks reconsideration of Marvin Furniture
    (Shanghai) Co. v. United States, 36 CIT     , 
    867 F. Supp. 2d 1302
    (2012) (“Marvin I”) under USCIT R. 59.    Marvin I upheld defendant
    Department of Commerce’s (“Commerce”) decision to rescind a new
    shipper review as a consequence of Marvin’s failure to disclose the
    first entry of its subject exports in the manner prescribed in 
    19 C.F.R. § 351.214
    (b)(2)(iv) (2012).   Marvin I, 36 CIT at   , 867 F.
    Supp. 2d at 1307–09; see Wooden Bedroom Furniture From the People’s
    Republic of China: Final Rescission of Antidumping New Shipper
    Review, 
    77 Fed. Reg. 21,536
    , 21,537–38 (Apr. 10, 2012).    Commerce
    and   defendant-intervenors    American   Furniture   Manufacturers
    Committee for Legal Trade and Vaughan-Bassett Furniture Company,
    Inc. oppose the motion.    The court assumes familiarity with the
    record and proceedings to date.
    Reconsideration under USCIT R. 59 is within the court’s
    discretion.   Dorsey v. U.S. Sec’y of Agric., 
    32 CIT 270
    , 270 (2008)
    (not reported in the Federal Supplement). Although it may exercise
    such discretion “to rectify ‘a significant flaw in the conduct of
    the original proceeding,’” 
    id.
     (quoting W.J. Byrnes & Co. v. United
    States, 
    68 Cust. Ct. 358
    , 358 (1972)), “a court should not disturb
    its prior decision unless it is ‘manifestly erroneous.’”        
    Id.
    (citing Starkey Labs., Inc. v. United States, 
    24 CIT 504
    , 505, 
    110 F. Supp. 2d 945
    , 946–47 (2000); Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. United
    Court No. 12-00100                                           Page 3
    States, 
    22 CIT 280
    , 282, 
    4 F. Supp. 2d 1259
    , 1261 (1998)).      “The
    purpose of a rehearing is not to relitigate the case . . . .”     NEC
    Corp. v. Dep’t of Commerce, 
    24 CIT 1
    , 2, 
    86 F. Supp. 2d 1281
    , 1282
    (2000) (quoting Asociacion Colombiana de Exportadores de Flores v.
    United States, 
    22 CIT 2
    , 2, 
    994 F. Supp. 393
    , 394 (1998)).
    Marvin claims that “the [c]ourt found, as a fact, that Marvin
    was the importer of the unreported . . . entries which formed the
    basis for the rescission.” Pl.’s Mot. Recons. at 2 (“Pl.’s Br.”).
    In support of this assertion, Marvin quotes portions of Marvin I
    where the court joined the words “Marvin” and “entry” using phrases
    like “Marvin’s entries” and “Marvin made entries.”        Id. at 6
    (quoting Marvin I, 36 CIT at   , 867 F. Supp. 2d at 1305–06, 1308).
    Marvin alleges that “[e]very single one of the [c]ourt’s findings
    ascribing the September 2010 entries to Marvin is incorrect, as a
    matter of fact,” because a third party, Triple Play Services, Inc.,
    acted as the importer of record for the September 2010 entries.
    Id. at 2 (emphasis omitted).   Marvin seeks reconsideration “to the
    extent Marvin’s involvement with, or knowledge of, the 2010 Triple
    Play entries is material to the Court’s decision.”    Id. at 5.
    Marvin grossly mischaracterizes the language in Marvin I —
    the court did not in any way state or imply that Marvin was the
    importer of record for the September 2010 entries.     Marvin I, 36
    CIT at   , 867 F. Supp. 2d at 1305–09.   The court attached the term
    “entries” to Marvin so as to communicate the undisputed fact that
    Court No. 12-00100                                                        Page 4
    the entries described goods that Marvin produced. Id.               Marvin I is
    not the first judicial opinion to assign grammatical ownership of
    the term “entries” to an exporter so as to convey its relationship
    to an entered good.         See, e.g., American Signature, Inc. v. United
    States, 
    598 F.3d 816
    , 819–22 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (discussing exporter
    “Dare Group’s 2006 entries” even though another company acted as
    the importer of record); United States v. Great Am. Ins. Co. of
    N.Y., 35 CIT        ,     , 
    791 F. Supp. 2d 1337
    , 1343–46, 1349, 1361–68
    (2011) (repeatedly attaching grammatical ownership of the term
    “entry” to the names of various exporters even though none acted as
    the importer of record); Viraj Forgings Ltd. v. United States, 
    26 CIT 513
    , 513–14, 516, 
    206 F. Supp. 2d 1288
    , 1289–90, 1292 (2002)
    (attaching grammatical ownership of the word “entries” to the
    exporter in one instance, and to both the exporter and the importer
    of   record    in       another).      Consequently,     Marvin’s   request     to
    reconsider on the basis of factual error must be denied for want of
    any such error.
    Marvin’s      remaining       three   arguments   repeat   those   it   made
    earlier in support of its motion for judgment on the agency
    record.1   Because it “has failed to establish an appropriate basis
    1
    Specifically, Marvin argued that (1) the purpose of new
    shipper review initiation documents is solely to determine whether
    a shipper is in fact a “new” shipper, Pl.’s Mot. J. Agency R. at
    18–21, 29–34 (“Pl.’s MJAR”); (2) its subsequent responses to
    Commerce’s questionnaires effectively corrected the deficient
    initiation request pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1677m(d), Pl.’s MJAR at
    6–8, 25–27, 33–34; Pl.’s Reply Supp. MJAR at 11–13; and (3) “[a]s
    Court No. 12-00100                                             Page 5
    for granting a rehearing,” see Xerox Corp. v. United States, 
    20 CIT 823
    , 823–24 (1996) (not reported in the Federal Supplement); Ford
    Motor Co. v. United States, 34 CIT    ,    , 
    751 F. Supp. 2d 1316
    ,
    1318 (2010), Marvin’s motion for reconsideration on its remaining
    arguments must be denied.
    ORDER
    In accordance with the foregoing, it is hereby
    ORDERED that plaintiff Marvin Furniture (Shanghai) Co. Ltd.’s
    motion for rehearing is denied.
    /s/NICHOLAS TSOUCALAS
    Nicholas Tsoucalas
    Senior Judge
    Dated: January 7, 2013
    New York, New York
    a matter of law, [new shipper reviews] are not initiated until
    Commerce has published the notice of the review in the Federal
    Register,” meaning that “Commerce had all the information it
    requested on or before the [initiation] date.” Pl.’s Reply Supp.
    MJAR at 14–16. The court considered and rejected each of these
    arguments in Marvin I. Marvin I, 36 CIT at   , 867 F. Supp. 2d at
    1306–09; see Pl.’s Br. at 6–15 (seeking reconsideration of the
    same).