Deacero S.A.P.I. De C v. v. United States , 2019 CIT 99 ( 2019 )


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  •                                      Slip Op. 19-99
    UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
    DEACERO S.A.P.I. DE C.V. and DEACERO
    USA, INC.,
    Plaintiffs,
    v.
    Before: Claire R. Kelly, Judge
    UNITED STATES,
    Court No. 17-00183
    Defendant,
    and
    NUCOR CORPORATION,
    Defendant-Intervenor.
    OPINION AND ORDER
    [Remanding the U.S. Department of Commerce’s remand redetermination in the
    administrative review of carbon and certain alloy steel wire rod from Mexico.]
    Dated: August 1, 2019
    Rosa S. Jeong and Irwin P. Altschuler, Greenberg Traurig, LLP, of Washington, DC, for
    plaintiffs, Deacero S.A.P.I. de C.V. and Deacero USA, Inc.
    Elizabeth Anne Speck, Senior Trial Counsel, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division,
    U.S. Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, for defendant. With her on the brief were
    Tara K. Hogan, Assistant Director, Jeanne E. Davidson, Director, and Joseph H. Hunt,
    Assistant Attorney General. Of Counsel on the brief was Emma Thomson Hunter,
    Attorney, Office of the Chief Counsel for Trade Enforcement and Compliance, U.S.
    Department of Commerce, of Washington, DC.
    Alan Hayden Price, Daniel Brian Pickard, and Derick G. Holt, Wiley Rein, LLP, of
    Washington, DC, for defendant-intervenor, Nucor Corporation.
    Court No. 17-00183                                                               Page 2
    Kelly, Judge: Before the court is the U.S. Department of Commerce’s
    (“Commerce”) remand redetermination filed pursuant to the court’s order in Deacero
    S.A.P.I. de C.V. v. United States, 42 CIT __, __, 
    353 F. Supp. 3d 1303
    , 1314–15 (2018)
    (“Deacero I”). See Final Results of Redetermination Pursuant to Ct. Remand [in Deacero
    I], Mar. 15, 2019, ECF No. 58-1 (“Remand Results”).
    In Deacero I, the court explained that Commerce failed to corroborate the 40.52%
    petition rate it assigned to respondent as total facts available with an adverse inference
    in the 2014–2015 administrative review of the antidumping duty (“ADD”) order covering
    carbon and certain alloy steel wire rod from Mexico and remanded the decision to
    Commerce for further explanation or reconsideration. See Deacero I, 42 CIT at __, 353
    F. Supp. 3d at 1312–14; see also Carbon and Certain Alloy Steel Wire Rod From Mexico,
    
    82 Fed. Reg. 23,190
     (Dep’t Commerce May 22, 2017) (final results of [ADD] admin.
    review and final determination of no shipments; 2014–2015) (“Final Results”) and
    accompanying Decision Mem. for [the] Final Results of 2014/15 [ADD] Admin. Review:
    Carbon and Certain Alloy Steel Wire Rod from Mexico, A-201-830, (May 15, 2017), ECF
    No. 21-5 (“Final Decision Memo”); Carbon and Certain Alloy Steel Wire Rod from Brazil,
    Indonesia, Mexico, Moldova, Trinidad and Tobago, and Ukraine, 
    67 Fed. Reg. 65,945
    ,
    65,947 (Dep’t Commerce Oct. 29, 2002) (notice of [ADD] orders) (“ADD Order”).
    Commerce explains that evidence it placed on the record on remand demonstrates
    the probative value of the assigned rate and satisfies the statutory corroboration
    Court No. 17-00183                                                                              Page 3
    requirement. See Remand Results at 4–7; see also 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(c). 1 For the
    following reasons, Commerce’s Remand Results do not comply with the court’s remand
    order in Deacero I and its decision to apply the 40.52% AFA-rate to Deacero continues
    to be unsupported by substantial evidence.
    BACKGROUND
    The court assumes familiarity with the facts of this case as discussed in the prior
    opinion, see Deacero I, 42 CIT at __, 353 F. Supp. 3d at 1306, and here restates the facts
    relevant to the court’s review of the Remand Results. Commerce’s administrative review
    covered subject merchandise entered during the period of October 1, 2014, through
    September 30, 2015, and respondent Deacero S.A.P.I de C.V. (“Deacero” or
    “respondent”). See Initiation of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Admin. Reviews,
    
    80 Fed. Reg. 75,657
    , 75,658 (Dep’t Commerce Dec. 3, 2015). Pertinent here, in the final
    determination, Commerce used total facts available with an adverse inference (“AFA”)2
    to calculate Deacero’s final dumping margin, explaining that the revised section D cost
    1
    Further citations to the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, are to the relevant provisions of Title 19
    of the U.S. Code, 2012 edition. Citations to 19 U.S.C. § 1677e, however, are to the unofficial U.S.
    Code Annotated 2018 edition, which reflects the amendments made to 19 U.S.C. § 1677e by the
    Trade Preferences Extension Act of 2015 (“TPEA”). See Trade Preferences Extension Act of
    2015, Pub. L. No. 114-27, 
    129 Stat. 362
     (2015).
    2
    Parties and Commerce sometimes use the shorthand “adverse facts available” or “AFA” to refer
    to Commerce’s reliance on facts otherwise available with an adverse inference to reach a final
    determination. However, AFA encompasses a two-part inquiry pursuant to which Commerce
    must first identify why it needs to rely on facts otherwise available, and second, explain how a
    party failed to cooperate to the best of its ability as to warrant the use of an adverse inference
    when “selecting among the facts otherwise available.” See 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(a)–(b). The phrase
    “total adverse inferences” or “total AFA” encompasses a series of steps that Commerce takes to
    reach the conclusion that all of a party’s reported information is unreliable or unusable and that
    as a result of a party’s failure to cooperate to the best of its ability, it must use an adverse inference
    in selecting among the facts otherwise available.
    Court No. 17-00183                                                                          Page 4
    dataset Deacero submitted following the preliminary determination was unreliable and
    impeded the review process.            See Final Decision Memo at 4–8, 12; see generally
    Deacero’s Resp. Suppl. Sections A–E at Exs. Supp. D-6–7, PD 52, bar code 3490088-
    04 (July 21, 2016). 3 Pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b) and in accordance with its practice,
    Commerce chose the highest margin alleged in the 2001 petition—40.52%—as
    Deacero’s final weighted-average dumping margin. See Final Decision Memo at 8–9 &
    n.33; Final Results, 82 Fed. Reg. at 23,190.
    In Deacero I, the court sustained Commerce’s decision to apply total-AFA to
    calculate Deacero’s final weighted-average dumping margin. 4 See Deacero I, 42 CIT at
    __, 353 F. Supp. 3d at 1307–12, 1314. The court, however, determined that Commerce
    failed to corroborate the 40.52% AFA-rate it assigned to Deacero because it did not place
    any information demonstrating the rate’s probative value, as required under 19 U.S.C. §
    1677e(c)(1) and 
    19 C.F.R. § 351.308
    (d) (2015). 5 See 
    id.
     at __, 353 F. Supp. 3d at 1314–
    15. As a result, the court remanded the corroboration issue for further explanation or
    reconsideration. Id.
    3
    On September 5, 2017, Defendant filed indices to the public and confidential administrative
    records underlying Commerce’s final determination. These indices are located on the docket at
    ECF Nos. 21-2–3. On April 1, 2019, Defendant filed indices to the public and confidential
    administrative records underlying Commerce’s remand redetermination. These indices are
    located on the docket at ECF Nos. 61-2–3. Citations to administrative record documents in this
    opinion are to numbers Commerce assigned to such documents in the indices.
    4
    Relatedly, the court did not reach challenges to Commerce’s (1) decision to calculate a U.S.
    affiliate’s general and administrative expenses without accounting for further manufacturing costs
    incurred, (2) failure to address certain clerical errors made in the preliminary determination, and
    (3) use of zeroing to calculate Deacero’s dumping margin, because these issues became moot
    as a result of the court sustaining Commerce’s decision to rely on AFA to calculate Deacero’s
    rate. See Deacero I, 42 CIT at __, 353 F. Supp. 3d at 1314.
    5
    Further citations to Title 19 of the Code of Federal Regulations are to the 2015 edition.
    Court No. 17-00183                                                                   Page 5
    Commerce filed the Remand Results on March 15, 2019. On remand, Commerce
    placed copies of the Federal Register notice announcing the initiation of an ADD
    investigation into carbon and certain alloy steel wire rod from Mexico and the public
    version of the Wire Rod from Mexico Initiation Checklist on the record. See Remand
    Results at 6; Placement Wire Rod from Mexico Less Than Fair Value (LTFV) Notice of
    Initiation & Accompanying Public Version Wire Rod from Mexico Initiation Checklist on
    R., PRR 1, bar code 3790294-01 (Feb. 6, 2019) (“Initiation Notice” 6 and “Initiation
    Checklist”). Commerce continues to apply the 40.52% AFA-rate to Deacero and explains
    that the documents it placed on the record demonstrate that the rate was corroborated
    using independent sources during the pre-initiation analysis. See Remand Results at 6–
    7, 12–16. Deacero S.A.P.I. de C.V. and Deacero USA, Inc. (collectively “Plaintiffs”) argue
    that Commerce did not satisfy the statutory corroboration requirement because it did not
    show that the 40.52% AFA-rate has probative value and is reliable and relevant. See
    [Pls.’] Comments Opp’n [Remand Results] at 6–14, May 6, 2019, ECF No. 64 (“Pls.’
    Comments”). Plaintiffs also contend that it would be “futile” for this court to remand the
    corroboration issue to Commerce for reconsideration and request this court to instruct
    Commerce to choose Deacero’s weighted-average dumping margin from among the
    rates calculated for Deacero in the investigation or any of the prior administrative reviews
    of the ADD Order. Id. at 14–17. Defendant-Intervenor, Nucor Corporation (“Nucor”) filed
    6
    The Federal Register notice announcing the initiation is also available at Carbon and Certain
    Alloy Steel Wire Rod From Brazil, Canada, Egypt, Germany, Indonesia, Mexico, Moldova, South
    Africa, Trinidad and Tobago, Ukraine, and Venezuela, 
    66 Fed. Reg. 50,164
     (Dep’t Commerce
    Oct. 2, 2001) (notice of initiation of [ADD] investigations).
    Court No. 17-00183                                                                 Page 6
    comments supporting the agency’s position. See Def.-Intervenor [Nucor]’s Comments
    [Remand Results] at 4–10, May 7, 2019, ECF No. 66 (“Nucor’s Comments”).
    JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
    The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to section 516A(a)(2)(B)(iii) of the Tariff Act of
    1930, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(2)(B)(iii) and 
    28 U.S.C. § 1581
    (c) (2012).
    Commerce’s antidumping determinations must be in accordance with law and supported
    by substantial evidence. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i). “The results of a redetermination
    pursuant to court remand are also reviewed ‘for compliance with the court’s remand
    order.’” Xinjiamei Furniture (Zhangzhou) Co. v. United States, 38 CIT __, __, 
    968 F. Supp. 2d 1255
    , 1259 (2014) (quoting Nakornthai Strip Mill Public Co. v. United States, 
    32 CIT 1272
    , 1274, 
    587 F. Supp. 2d 1303
    , 1306 (2008)).
    DISCUSSION
    Plaintiffs argue that Commerce’s corroboration analysis does not rely upon
    independent sources and fails to demonstrate that the petition rate is probative, relevant,
    and reliable. Pls.’ Comments at 6–14. Plaintiffs also argue that the determination on
    remand evidences “that [Commerce] is incapable of corroborating its chosen AFA rate”
    and ask the court to issue a remand order with specific instructions that Commerce
    assign, as Deacero’s rate, a rate calculated in any prior segment of this proceeding. 
    Id.
    at 14–17. Defendant responds that Commerce verified the rate’s reliability, relevancy,
    and probative value during the pre-initiation analysis, that the independent sources
    Commerce relied upon are reflected in the Initiation Notice and Initiation Checklist, and
    that respondent should not be allowed to choose its own rate via this court’s remand
    Court No. 17-00183                                                                       Page 7
    instructions. Def.’s Resp. to Comments [Remand Results] at 8–15, June 20, 2019, ECF
    No. 67 (“Def.’s Comments”). For the following reasons, Commerce’s Remand Results do
    not comply with the court’s remand order, are unsupported by substantial evidence, and
    are remanded for further explanation or reconsideration consistent with this opinion.
    Whenever Commerce relies on information not “obtained in the course of an
    investigation or review,” such as allegations in a petition, it is relying on secondary
    information and is required, “to the extent practicable, [to] corroborate that information
    from independent sources that are reasonably at [its] disposal.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(c)(1); 7
    see also Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Statement of Administrative Action, H.R. Doc.
    No. 103-465, vol. 1, at 870 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4040, 4199 (“SAA”)
    (providing the same); 
    19 C.F.R. § 351.308
    (c)(1)(i) (listing, as a source of “[s]econdary
    information,” information derived from “[t]he petition”).             Commerce corroborates
    secondary information by “examin[ing] whether the secondary information to be used has
    probative value.” 
    19 C.F.R. § 351.308
    (d); see also SAA at 870, 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
    4199 (tying corroboration to whether the secondary information has probative value).
    Examples of independent sources include “published price lists, official import
    statistics and customs data, and information obtained from interested parties during the
    instant investigation or review.” 
    19 C.F.R. § 351.308
    (d); SAA at 870, 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N.
    at 4199 (listing the same sources). The independent nature of a source depends on who
    7
    Since the passage of the TPEA, Commerce is no longer required to link the selected adverse
    rate to the respondent’s commercial reality. 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(d)(3)(B). Commerce, however,
    is still required to demonstrate, “to the extent practicable,” the probative value of the secondary
    information it is using. 
    19 C.F.R. § 351.308
    (d).
    Court No. 17-00183                                                                  Page 8
    originates the information provided and not by who files the information. KYD, Inc. v.
    United States, 
    607 F.3d 760
    , 765 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (concluding that import statistics, price
    quotations, and affidavits from officials in a third-party company, attached to an
    antidumping petition, were independent sources).
    The court must base its review of Commerce’s corroboration upon the record of
    the proceeding, which consists of
    (i) a copy of all information presented to or obtained by the Secretary, the
    administering authority, or the Commission during the course of the
    administrative proceeding, including all governmental memoranda
    pertaining to the case and the record of ex parte meetings required to be
    kept by section 1677f(a)(3) of this title; and
    (ii) a copy of the determination, all transcripts or records of conferences or
    hearings, and all notices published in the Federal Register.
    19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(2)(A)(i)–(ii). Commerce’s regulations require it to maintain “the
    official record of each segment of the proceeding[ ]” that will form the record reviewed by
    this Court. 
    19 C.F.R. § 351.104
    (a)(1). The official record will contain,
    all factual information, written argument, or other material developed by,
    presented to, or obtained by the Secretary during the course of a
    proceeding that pertains to the proceeding. . . . [and] government
    memoranda pertaining to the proceeding, memoranda of ex parte meetings,
    determinations, notices published in the Federal Register, and transcripts
    of hearings. The official record will contain material that is public, business
    proprietary, privileged, and classified.
    
    Id.
    Here, and in line with its practice, Commerce selected the highest margin alleged
    in the petition as Deacero’s AFA-rate. See Final Decision Memo at 8 (citations omitted).
    In Deacero I, the court determined Commerce did not corroborate Deacero’s rate
    because it failed to place any information demonstrating the rate’s probative value, as
    Court No. 17-00183                                                                Page 9
    required under 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(c)(1) and 
    19 C.F.R. § 351.308
    (d), on the record. See
    Deacero I, 42 CIT at __, 353 F. Supp. 3d at 1313–14. Specifically, the court stated that
    the statutory requirement for Commerce to corroborate the assigned rate “to the extent
    practicable,” 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(c)(1), “at a bare minimum, requires Commerce to
    produce the documents it relied upon to analyze why the chosen rate is probative.” Id. at
    __, 353 F. Supp. 3d at 1314.
    In response, on remand, Commerce supplemented the administrative record with
    a copy of the Initiation Notice and Initiation Checklist.    See Remand Results at 6.
    Commerce, however, did not rely upon the Initiation Notice and Initiation Checklist to
    corroborate Deacero’s rate. The Initiation Notice and Initiation Checklist present the
    conclusions Commerce reached and describe the evidence available to Commerce at the
    time of the pre-initiation analysis. The Initiation Checklist, in addition to redacting all
    confidential information, merely marks off documents supportive of initiating an
    investigation into the subject merchandise and is evidence of the allegations that the
    petitioners successfully made. See Initiation Checklist at 13–16.
    Indeed, Commerce’s explanation reveals that it merely drew on the conclusions
    stated in the Initiation Notice and Initiation Checklist to conclude that the 40.52% AFA-
    rate is probative and is reliable and relevant. Commerce explains that during the pre-
    initiation stage it looked at various independent sources, provided either in the petition
    itself or solicited through supplemental requests, and that these documents show the
    40.52% AFA-rate’s probative value. See Remand Results at 6–7. Specifically, it explains
    that the rate is probative because
    Court No. 17-00183                                                                         Page 10
    [d]uring our pre-initiation analysis, we examined the information used as the
    basis of export price (EP) (i.e., affidavits of U.S. prices offerings for a
    Mexican wire rod manufacturer), and normal value (NV), (i.e., constructed
    value calculated based on U.S. producers’ cost of producing carbon and
    steel wire rod, adjusted for known differences between the Mexican and
    U.S. markets), in the Petition, and the calculations used to derive the
    alleged margins.
    Id. at 6 (citing Initiation Checklist at 13, 26). Yet, none of the documents Commerce
    references to support its calculations as to export price and normal value have been
    placed on the record. 8 Further, Commerce contends that because it examined the
    adequacy and accuracy of the evidence resulting in the 40.52% rate in its pre-initiation
    analysis, absent evidence to the contrary, the rate continues to be reliable as an AFA
    rate. Id. at 7. The court cannot assess the reasonableness of the preceding statement
    because the documents which Commerce relied upon in making it are not on the record.
    Relatedly, Commerce’s explanation that because it corroborated the 40.52% AFA-
    rate during the pre-initiation stage, the rate continues to be corroborated now, Remand
    Results at 6–7, 13–14, is conclusory. 9 If the obligation to demonstrate the probative value
    8
    The statutory framework governing initiation requires petitioner(s) to allege all elements
    necessary for the imposition of ADDs and to support such allegations with information reasonably
    at its disposal. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673a(b)(1), 1673. Commerce, however, is not required to confirm
    the probative nature of the information underlying the petition at the initiation stage. See 19 U.S.C.
    § 1673a(b)(1); 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(c)(1) (explaining that the agency will examine the adequacy
    and accuracy of the evidence in the petition to determine whether elements necessary to impose
    a duty were met); see also SAA at 870, 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4199 (recognizing that secondary
    information derived from the petition is not de facto reliable because “it is based on unverified
    allegations[.]”). Commerce, therefore, cannot now claim that it corroborated the 40.52% rate,
    applied as AFA to respondent here, by pointing to the conclusions of the pre-initiation analysis,
    but not the independent sources upon which the rate’s probative value is based.
    9
    Further, to the extent that Commerce and Defendant-Intervenor interpret the court’s remand
    order as simply requiring Commerce to produce the documents cited in the final determination’s
    (footnote continued)
    Court No. 17-00183                                                                      Page 11
    of a rate is to have any meaning, Commerce must do more than refer to conclusions of
    calculations it carried out previously.      Commerce has not complied with the court’s
    instructions that it “produce the documents it relied upon to analyze why the chosen rate
    is probative[,]” 10 Deacero I, 42 CIT at __, 353 F. Supp. 3d at 1314, and its corroboration
    analysis continues to be unsupported by substantial evidence.
    Defendant argues that it is not necessary for Commerce to place evidence
    underlying the Initiation Notice and Initiation Checklist on the administrative record
    because Commerce’s remand redetermination does not directly cite to the supporting
    evidence. Def.’s Comments at 9 n.3. The question is not what Commerce cited in the
    Remand Results, but what it relied upon to analyze whether the rate was probative,
    reliable, and relevant. Defendant also claims that Commerce corroborated the 40.52%
    AFA-rate using independent sources at its disposal. Id. at 12–13. The independent
    sources may be embedded in the pre-initiation analysis; however, the pre-initiation
    corroboration analysis, see Remand Results at 5–6; Nucor’s Comments at 4–5; see also Final
    Decision Memo at 8–9, both read the Deacero I decision too narrowly. See generally Deacero I,
    42 CIT at __, 353 F. Supp. 3d at 1312–14. Deacero I did not rule that Commerce met the statutory
    corroboration requirement and that, on remand, Commerce simply needed to produce documents
    cited to in the final determination. Id. at __, 353 F. Supp. 3d at 1314. In fact, the court clearly
    stated that “Commerce did not corroborate the AFA rate and therefore, its decision to rely on the
    petition rate is remanded for further explanation or reconsideration consistent with this opinion.”
    Id.
    10
    Although petitioner Nucor placed excerpts of the public version of the petition on the record,
    along with several underlying exhibits, [Nucor’s] Draft Comments on Remand, PRR 4, bar code
    3793273-01 (Feb. 13, 2019), nowhere in the Remand Results does Commerce identify which
    exhibits pertain to its corroboration analysis.
    Court No. 17-00183                                                                   Page 12
    analysis itself is not an independent source. 11 Defendant cannot claim that Commerce
    used independent sources to corroborate the 40.52% AFA-rate, as applied to Deacero,
    Def.’s Comments at 10–13, without identifying which independent sources Commerce
    relied upon, placing all such sources on the record, and explaining how such sources
    corroborate the AFA rate.
    Finally, in its second remand order, the court will not, as Plaintiffs request, provide
    explicit instructions to Commerce to abandon its chosen 40.52% AFA-rate and instead,
    select an AFA-rate from among the rates previously calculated for Deacero in a prior
    segment of this proceeding. Pls.’ Comments at 14–17. The facts and circumstances of
    this case do not warrant such a response. Commerce has not shown that it is unwilling
    or unable to corroborate the 40.52% AFA-rate or comply with the court’s orders.
    CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, it is
    ORDERED that Commerce’s decision to rely on the 40.52% AFA-rate is remanded
    for further explanation or reconsideration consistent with this opinion; and it is further
    ORDERED that Commerce shall file its remand redetermination with the court
    within 90 days of this date; and it is further
    11
    To the extent that Plaintiffs challenge the independence of sources Commerce relied upon in
    its pre-initiation analysis because of who submitted information and when, see Pls.’ Comments at
    10–11, the challenge fails. As explained above, independence is a measure of who generates
    the information contained in the document, not who files it and during which proceeding.
    Therefore, a document filed by a domestic party and attached to a petition may constitute an
    independent source. However, because Commerce did not produce the sources underlying the
    pre-initiation analysis, the court cannot opine on whether such sources are independent.
    Court No. 17-00183                                                         Page 13
    ORDERED that the parties shall have 30 days thereafter to file comments on the
    remand redetermination; and it is further
    ORDERED that the parties shall have 30 days thereafter to file their replies to
    comments on the remand redetermination.
    /s/ Claire R. Kelly
    Claire R. Kelly, Judge
    Dated: August 1, 2019
    New York, New York
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 17-00183

Citation Numbers: 2019 CIT 99

Judges: Kelly

Filed Date: 8/1/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 8/1/2019