Acme Furniture Industry, Inc. v. United States , 853 F. Supp. 2d 1331 ( 2012 )

Slip Op. 12- 93
UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
Before: Nicholas Tsoucalas, Senior Judge
___________________________________
ACME FURNITURE INDUSTRY, INC., :
:
:
Plaintiff, :
:
v. : Court No.: 11-00318
:
UNITED STATES, :
:
Defendant. :
:
:
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Held: Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is granted.
Dated: July 18, 2012
Hume & Associates, LLC, (Robert T. Hume) for Acme Furniture
Industry, Inc., Plaintiff.
Stuart F. Delery, Acting Assistant Attorney General; Barbara S.
Williams, Attorney in Charge, International Trade Field Office,
Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States
Department of Justice, (Aimee Lee); Edward N. Maurer, Of Counsel,
Deputy Assistant Chief Counsel, International Trade Litigation, U.S.
Customs and Border Protection, for the United States, Defendant.
TSOUCALAS, Senior Judge: This matter comes before the Court upon
the Motion to Dismiss filed herein by Defendant, United States.
Plaintiff, Acme Furniture Industry, Inc. (“Acme”) initiated this
action invoking the Court’s jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a).
The Government moves to dismiss arguing that the Court is without
jurisdiction to hear the claims set forth in Acme’s two-count
Complaint. Alternatively, the Government asserts that Acme has
Court No. 11-00318 Page 2
failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Acme
responds by asserting that it is challenging an erroneous
reliquidation by the United States Customs and Border Protection
(“CBP”), and that its challenge therefore falls squarely within
section 1581(a). Because Acme has failed to carry its burden of
establishing the Court’s jurisdiction over this matter, or has failed
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted where jurisdiction
exists, the Court grants the Government’s Motion to Dismiss.
BACKGROUND
In 2005, the United States Department of Commerce (“Commerce”)
issued an antidumping duty order on wooden bedroom furniture from the
People’s Republic of China (“PRC”). See Notice of Amended Final
Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value and Antidumping Duty
Order: Wooden Bedroom Furniture from the People’s Republic of China,
70 Fed. Reg. 329 (Jan. 4, 2005) (“Antidumping Duty Order” or
“Order”). Commerce subsequently conducted an administrative review
of the Order for the period of review from January 1, 2008 through
December 31, 2008. See Wooden Bedroom Furniture From the People’s
Republic of China: Final Results and Final Rescission in Part, 75
Fed. Reg 50,992 (Aug. 19, 2010). Per the 2008 review, Commerce set
a China-wide rate of 216.01% and issued liquidation instructions to
CBP. See Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. B. Acme is an importer of
wooden bedroom furniture from the PRC. At issue in this case are
entries of daybeds Acme made in 2008, which were liquidated by CBP at
the China-wide rate on November 5, 2010, and November 12, 2010.
Court No. 11-00318 Page 3
On January 20, 2011, Acme filed a scope ruling request with
Commerce asking for a determination that the daybeds it imported were
outside the scope of the Antidumping Duty Order. Commerce issued a
scope ruling on April 15, 2011 (“Scope Ruling”), concluding that
daybeds with a trundle were subject to the Antidumping Duty Order
while daybeds without a trundle were outside the Order’s scope. On
April 29, 2011, Commerce issued liquidation instructions based on the
Scope Ruling which, in relevant part, directed CBP to “liquidate all
unliquidated entries . . . of Acme’s daybed without a trundle” as
non-subject goods effective June 24, 2004. See Def.’s Mot. to
Dismiss, Ex. B at 2.
In addition to the scope proceedings before Commerce, Acme also
took steps before CBP to dispute whether its daybeds were subject to
the Antidumping Duty Order. On February 10, 2011, Acme filed Protest
No. 2704-11-100435 (“Protest 435") contesting liquidation of the
daybeds at the China-wide rate based on its position that the daybeds
were not subject to the Antidumping Duty Order. After Commerce
issued its Scope Ruling, Acme filed Protest No. 2704-11-100784
(“Protest 784") again contesting the imposition of antidumping duties
on daybeds from the PRC. Protest 435 was denied in its entirety, and
Protest 784 was denied in part and granted in part in an attempt by
CBP to comply with Commerce’s Scope Ruling and subsequent
instructions. See Amended Summons, Protest, Attachment 1. CBP then
reliquidated some of Acme’s entries of daybeds without trundles, and
issued to Acme a bill for certain of those entries in the amount of
Court No. 11-00318 Page 4
$27,641.01.
Acme subsequently initiated this action and filed a two-count
Complaint. In Count 1 of the Complaint, Acme challenges “the
liquidation and assessment of antidumping duties on the parts of
plaintiff’s daybed without trundle.” Complaint at ¶ 31 (emphasis
added). It alleges specifically that “[b]ased on the [Scope Ruling],
plaintiff’s daybed without trundle was outside the scope of the
[Antidumping Duty Order],” id. at ¶ 32, and further alleges that CBP
did not provide notice of any findings it made apart from the Scope
Ruling. Id. at ¶ 34. In essence, Acme alleges that CBP’s leveling
of $27,641.01 in antidumping duties was erroneous in light of
Commerce’s Scope Ruling and subsequent instructions, and that there
was no other basis for imposing antidumping duties on any of its
entries of daybeds without trundles. In Count 2, Acme challenges the
“liquidation and assessment of antidumping duties on the parts of
plaintiff’s daybed with trundle.” Complaint at ¶ 39 (emphasis
added).
As clarified in its response to the Government’s Motion, Acme
seeks a second reliquidation of the daybed entries, and a refund of
the $27,641.01 it paid upon the first reliquidation. In moving for
dismissal, the Government argues that because CBP was simply
following instructions from Commerce, Acme may not challenge the
imposition of antidumping duties under § 1581(a). According to the
Government, to the extent Acme challenges the inclusion of its
daybeds in the scope of the Antidumping Duty Order, Acme’s recourse
Court No. 11-00318 Page 5
was to challenge the results of the scope proceedings under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1581(c). Alternatively, the Government argues that even if Acme’s
claims are construed to be challenging CBP’s reliquidation of the
daybed entries, CBP correctly followed the instructions of Commerce
and Acme has not stated claims upon which relief can be granted.
JURISDICTION and LEGAL STANDARD
In its Complaint, Acme invokes the Court’s jurisdiction under 28
§ U.S.C. 1581(a), which provides jurisdiction over actions commenced
pursuant to section 515 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, 19
U.S.C. § 1514.1 Section 1514 states that the following decisions by
CBP may be protested, and are thereafter subject to review before
this court pursuant to § U.S.C. 1581(a):
(1) the appraised value of merchandise;
(2) the classification and rate and amount of duties
chargeable;
(3) all charges or exactions of whatever character within
the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Treasury;
(4) the exclusion of merchandise from entry or delivery
or a demand for redelivery to customs custody under any
provision of the customs laws, except a determination
appealable under section 1337 of this title;
(5) the liquidation or reliquidation of an entry, or
reconciliation as to the issues contained therein, or any
modification thereof, including the liquidation of an
entry, pursuant to either section 1500 or section 1504 of
this title;
(6) the refusal to pay a claim for drawback; or
(7) the refusal to reliquidate an entry under subsection
(d) of section 1520 of this title . . . .
19 U.S.C. § 1514(a). Jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) does
1
All further citations to the Tariff Act of 1930 are to the
relevant provisions of Title 19 of the United States Code, 2006
edition.
Court No. 11-00318 Page 6
not exist except for cases brought to challenge the denial of one
of these categories of protests. See Mitsubishi Elec. Am., Inc. v.
United States, 44 F.3d 973, 976 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
The Court of International Trade “is a court of limited
jurisdiction, possessing ‘only that power authorized by the
Constitution and federal statutes . . . .’” Almond Bros. Lumber
Co. v. United States, 651 F.3d 1343, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (quoting
Sakar Int’l, Inc. v. United States, 516 F.3d 1340, 1349 (Fed. Cir.
2008)). The party invoking federal jurisdiction - in this case,
Acme - has the burden of establishing such jurisdiction once it has
been challenged, see Canadian Lumber Trade Alliance v. United
States, 517 F.3d 1319, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2008), but if jurisdiction
is established, federal courts are without authority to decline to
exercise it. See Ad Hoc Shrimp Trade Action Comm. v. United
States, 618 F.3d 1316, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
ANALYSIS
The Court begins with the simpler question of whether it may
exercise jurisdiction over Count 2 of Acme’s Complaint, and
concludes that it may not. In Count 2, Acme challenges the
imposition of antidumping duties on daybeds with trundles. Acme
sought a ruling from Commerce that both daybeds with trundles and
daybeds without trundles were outside the scope of the Antidumping
Duty Order. Commerce, however, determined only the daybeds without
trundles were outside the scope of the Order. See Def.’s Mot. to
Dismiss, Ex. B. It is well-established that CBP’s role in the
Court No. 11-00318 Page 7
collection of anti-dumping duties is ministerial; in other words,
it merely carries out the instructions of Commerce. See
Mitsubishi, 44 F.3d at 976. If a party believes that the goods it
imports are not subject to an antidumping order, it must make that
argument to Commerce by initiating scope proceedings pursuant to 19
C.F.R. § 351.225. If the party disagrees with Commerce’s resulting
determination, its recourse is to appeal that decision to this
court under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) and 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(§)(2)(B)(vi).
The Court is without jurisdiction to consider scope disputes,
including that set forth in Count 2 of Acme’s Complaint, under 28
U.S.C. § 1581(a).
Turning to Count 1, the Court notes that the Government reads
this claim similarly to Count 2, namely, as a challenge to whether
the daybeds without trundles are subject to the Antidumping Duty
Order. This is an overly narrow reading of Acme’s claim. It is
true that Acme’s Complaint does contain an allegation that its
“daybed without trundle was outside the scope of the [Antidumping
Duty Order].” Complaint at ¶ 32. However, the true gravamen of
Count 1 comes further on when Acme alleges, in essence, that CBP
either misinterpreted Commerce’s instructions, or relied on an
unspecified source other than Commerce’s instructions, in not
refunding to Acme all of the antidumping duties it had paid for the
daybeds without trundles. Complaint at ¶¶ 34-37.
Contrary to Acme’s allegations, however, the instructions
issued by Commerce after the Scope Ruling are consistent with CBP’s
Court No. 11-00318 Page 8
collection of antidumping duties from Acme for its 2008 entries of
daybeds without trundles. As noted above, Acme’s 2008 entries of
daybeds, including daybeds without trundles, were liquidated on
November 5, 2010, and November 12, 2010. Commerce issued the
instructions based on the Scope Ruling on April 29, 2011 directing
CBP to “liquidate all unliquidated entries . . . of Acme’s daybed
without a trundle” as non-subject goods. See Def.’s Mot. to
Dismiss, Ex. B at 2 (emphasis added). Acme has not alleged that it
had any unliquidated entries of daybeds without trundles as of
April 29, 2011; indeed, the parties appear to agree that all of the
entries in question were liquidated by November 2010. Therefore,
the instructions issued to CBP by Commerce following the Scope
Ruling do not give support Acme’s claim that it was injured by an
erroneous liquidation.
In its Reply filed in support of the instant Motion, the
Government does concede that CBP erred in the reliquidation that
followed the April 29, 2011 instructions, but asserts that the
error was that a reliquidation occurred at all. Because the
instructions only applied to “unliquidated” entries of daybeds
without trundles, the reliquidation which occurred, and which
resulted in a lower duty burden for Acme, was actually a windfall
for Acme, and does not form the basis for a claim for relief here.
The Court agrees. Acme has cited no authority, and the Court is
aware of none, holding that CBP’s erroneous reliquidation mandates
another reliquidation of entries that was not provided for in the
Court No. 11-00318 Page 9
instructions from Commerce. Acme was not entitled to the
reliquidation of any of its 2008 entries of daybeds without
trundles per the instructions from Commerce. The fact that CBP
erroneously reliquidated some of those entries to Acme’s benefit
does not entitle Acme to further relief here.
Based on the foregoing, and upon the Government’s Motion, the
response filed by Acme, and all other pleadings and papers filed
herein, it is hereby
ORDERED that the Government’s Motion to Dismiss is granted.
/s/ NICHOLAS TSOUCALAS
Nicholas Tsoucalas
Senior Judge
Dated: July 18, 2012
New York, New York