Composite Technology International, Inc. v. United States , 106 F. Supp. 3d 1337 ( 2015 )


Menu:
  •                           Slip Op. 15 - 110
    UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
    COMPOSITE TECHNOLOGY
    INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
    Plaintiff,                      Before: Nicholas Tsoucalas,
    Senior Judge
    v.
    Court No. 13-00205
    UNITED STATES,
    Defendant.
    OPINION
    [Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied; Defendant’s
    cross-motion for summary judgment is granted.]
    Dated: September 28, 2015
    Joseph P. Cox and Mandy A. Edwards, Stein Shostak Shostak Pollack
    & O'Hara, LLP, of Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiff.
    Stephen C. Tosini, Senior Trial Counsel, Commercial Litigation
    Branch, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, of Washington
    D.C., for Defendant. With him on the brief were Benjamin C. Mizer,
    Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Jeanne E. Davidson,
    Director, Patricia M. McCarthy, Assistant Director. Of counsel on
    the action was Yelena Slepak, Office of the Assistant Chief
    Counsel, International Trade Litigation, United States Customs and
    Border Protection, of New York, NY.
    Tsoucalas, Senior Judge:     This case is before the court
    on cross-motions for summary judgment.     See Pl.’s Mot. For Summ.
    J., ECF No. 27 (“Pl.’s Br.”); Def.’s Cross-Mot. For Summ. J., ECF
    No. 32 (“Def.’s Br.”); Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Cross-Mot. For Summ.
    J., ECF No. 33; Def.’s Reply in Support of its Cross-Mot. For Summ.
    J., ECF No. 34.    Plaintiff Composite Technology International,
    Court No. 13-00205                                                       Page 2
    Inc.   (“Composite”)   challenges      the   decision   of    Defendant     U.S.
    Customs and Border Protection (“Customs”) denying Plaintiff’s
    protest, which claimed that the imported merchandise is properly
    classified duty free under Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United
    States (“HTSUS”) subheading 4412.99.51 (2012), “Plywood, veneered
    panels and similar laminated wood: Other: Other: With at least one
    outer ply of nonconiferous wood: Other: Other.”              For the reasons
    stated below, the product at issue here is properly classified
    under HTSUS subheading 4421.90.97, and accordingly, Defendant’s
    cross-motion   for    summary    judgment    is   granted    and    Plaintiff’s
    motion for summary judgment is denied.
    BACKGROUND
    The following facts are not in dispute.                Plaintiff is
    the importer of record.       Compl. ¶ 3, June 19, 2013, ECF No. 5.          In
    the instant action Plaintiff imported merchandise under Protest
    No. 2006-13-100540.     Pl.’s Br. Att. 2 at ¶ 1.
    Pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a)(4) (2012), on March 18,
    2013, Plaintiff filed its protest to challenge Customs’ decision
    to assess duty at the rate of 3.3% ad valorem.                     
    Id. at ¶
    3.
    Plaintiff   claimed    that     the   imported    merchandise      is   properly
    classified duty free under HTSUS 4412.99.51 as “Plywood, veneered
    panels and similar laminated wood: Other: Other: With at least one
    Court No. 13-00205                                                    Page 3
    outer ply of nonconiferous wood: Other: Other.”              
    Id. at ¶
    4.     On
    April   17,    2013,   Customs    denied   the   protest,    concluding    that
    Composite’s     merchandise      is   classifiable   under    4421.90.97,   as
    “Other articles of wood: Other: Other: Other.”              
    Id. at ¶
    5.
    The merchandise is wooden door stiles and rails that
    consist of a 9.5 millimeter-thick pine cap laminated to a base of
    laminated poplar wood layers, each with a thickness of less than
    six millimeters.        
    Id. at ¶
    7, 8.      The merchandise has a surface
    layer of pine wood that is used as the exposed surface.             
    Id. at ¶
    10.   Two of the imported items, the “79" MSD Latch Stile with 3/8"
    cap and the 79 Prem Stile with 3/8" Cap, have a rebate cut at both
    ends of the wood.”       
    Id. at ¶
    13.      Other than the rebate cuts, the
    seven imported items are constructed the same, except that they
    are imported in various lengths and thicknesses.             
    Id. at ¶
    14.
    JURISDICITON AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
    The court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
    1581(a) (2012).        The court reviews Customs’ protest decisions de
    novo. 28 U.S.C. § 2640(a)(1).              USCIT Rule 56 permits summary
    judgment when “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
    . . . .” USCIT R. 56(c); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
    
    477 U.S. 242
    , 247 (1986).         In considering whether material facts
    are in dispute, the evidence must be considered in the light most
    Court No. 13-00205                                                         Page 4
    favorable    to     the    non-moving     party,    drawing     all    reasonable
    inferences in its favor.           See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 
    398 U.S. 144
    , 157 (1970); 
    Anderson, 477 U.S. at 261
    n.2.
    A classification decision involves two steps. The first
    step   addresses     the     proper     meaning    of     the   relevant   tariff
    provisions, which is a question of law.                 See Faus Group, Inc. v.
    United States, 
    581 F.3d 1369
    , 1371-72 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citing
    Orlando Food Corp. v. United States, 
    140 F.3d 1437
    , 1439 (Fed.
    Cir. 1998)).       The second step involves determining whether the
    merchandise at issue falls within a particular tariff provision as
    construed, which, when disputed, is a question of fact. 
    Id. When there
       is   no    factual    dispute      regarding    the
    merchandise, the resolution of the classification issue turns on
    the first step, determining the proper meaning and scope of the
    relevant tariff provisions. See Carl Zeiss, Inc. v. United States,
    
    195 F.3d 1375
    , 1378 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. United
    States, 
    148 F.3d 1363
    , 1365-66 (Fed. Cir. 1998).                 This is such a
    case, and summary judgment is appropriate.               See Bausch & 
    Lomb, 148 F.3d at 1365-66
    .
    While     the     court      accords    deference         to   Customs
    classification rulings relative to their “power to persuade,”
    United States v. Mead Corp., 
    533 U.S. 218
    , 235 (2001) (citing
    Court No. 13-00205                                                       Page 5
    Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 
    323 U.S. 134
    , 140 (1944)), the court has
    “an independent responsibility to decide the legal issue of the
    proper meaning and scope of HTSUS terms.”            Warner-Lambert Co. v.
    United States, 
    407 F.3d 1207
    , 1209 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing Rocknel
    Fastener, Inc. v. United States, 
    267 F.3d 1354
    , 1358 (Fed. Cir.
    2001)).
    DISCUSSION
    Classification disputes under the HTSUS are resolved by
    reference to the General Rules of Interpretation (“GRIs”) and the
    Additional U.S. Rules of Interpretation.           See Carl 
    Zeiss, 195 F.3d at 1379
    .       The   GRIs   are   applied   in   numerical    order.      
    Id. Interpretation of
    the HTSUS begins with the language of the tariff
    headings, subheadings, their section and chapter notes, and may
    also be aided by the Explanatory Notes published by the World
    Customs Organization.         
    Id. “GRI 1
    is paramount . . . The HTSUS is
    designed so that most classification questions can be answered by
    GRI 1 . . . .”         Telebrands Corp. v. United States, 36 CIT ___,
    ___, 
    865 F. Supp. 2d 1277
    , 1280 (2012).
    Pursuant to GRI 1, merchandise that is described “in
    whole   by   a   single   classification      heading   or   subheading”     is
    classifiable under that heading.           CamelBak Prods. LLC v. United
    States, 
    649 F.3d 1361
    , 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2011).                  If that single
    Court No. 13-00205                                                              Page 6
    classification applies, the succeeding GRIs are inoperative.                       Mita
    Copystar Am. v. United States, 
    160 F.3d 710
    , 712 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
    Here,     GRI     1        resolves    the    classification        of    Composite’s
    merchandise.
    The court construes tariff terms according to their
    common and commercial meanings, and may rely on both its own
    understanding of the term as well as upon lexicographic and
    scientific authorities.               See Len-Ron Mfg. Co. v. United States,
    
    334 F.3d 1304
    , 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2003).                  The court may also refer to
    the Explanatory Notes “accompanying a tariff subheading, which—
    although not controlling—provide interpretive guidance.”                           E.T.
    Horn Co. v. United States, 
    367 F.3d 1326
    , 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
    (citing 
    Len-Ron, 334 F.3d at 1309
    ).
    The issue before the court in the instant action concerns
    whether    Composite’s         merchandise        is   properly    classified      under
    heading    4412       as    “[p]lywood,”     “veneered      panels,”     or   “similar
    laminated wood,” or under heading 4421 as “other articles of wood.”
    Plaintiff argues that Composite’s merchandise is classifiable
    under heading 4412.            Pl.’s Br. at 1.          Plaintiff insists that the
    subject merchandise fits squarely within the common meaning of
    “veneered       panels,”       provided      by    lexicographical       sources     and
    supported by the Explanatory Notes.                    
    Id. at 2.
      Plaintiff relies
    Court No. 13-00205                                                        Page 7
    on the litigation in Boen Hardwood Flooring, Inc. v. United States,
    
    26 CIT 253
    (2002), reh’g granted, 
    27 CIT 40
    (2003), rev'd, 
    357 F.3d 1262
    (Fed. Cir. 2004) to support its contention that the 9.5
    millimeter pine caps on its products must be treated as veneers.
    
    Id. at 15-18.
        In the alternative, Plaintiff contends that the
    subject merchandise constitutes “similar laminated wood” because
    it is “laminated wood,” and it possesses numerous characteristics
    in common with wood merchandise classified under Heading 4412.
    
    Id. at 18–20.
       It does not appear that the Plaintiff asserts that
    Composite’s   merchandise       can   be   classified   as   “plywood”      under
    heading 4412.
    As required by GRI 1, the court begins its inquiry with
    the relative sections and chapter notes to headings 4412.                 Heading
    4412, HTSUS, provides for “Plywood, veneered panels and similar
    laminated wood.”        The explanatory notes to heading 4412 defines
    veneered panels as “panels consisting of a thin veneer of wood
    affixed to a base.”          4412 Explanatory Note.      Apart from stating
    that a veneered panel must be “thin,” heading 4412 does not specify
    the   specific   size    a   wooden   product   must    be   in   order    to   be
    classified as a veneered panel.              The HTSUS, though, provides
    further guidance with regards to the specific size requirements
    for a wooden product to be considered a veneered panel in heading
    Court No. 13-00205                                                    Page 8
    4408.     Heading 4408 defines sheets for veneering as having “a
    thickness not exceeding 6 mm.”        HTSUS 4408 (emphasis added).
    The pine cap rails and stiles at issue here have a face
    plies that exceed six millimeters in thickness, and therefore
    conflicts with the language found in headings 4412, 4408, and their
    respective explanatory notes discussed above.              See Def.’s Br. at
    Attachment B, ECF 32.2.      The court therefore agrees with Defendant
    that Composite’s merchandise cannot be classified as veneered
    panels under heading 4412.
    Plaintiff argues that the Federal Circuit’s holding in
    Boen    supports   its   contention   that   Composite’s     merchandise   is
    classifiable under heading 4412.          The court disagrees.       In Boen,
    the Federal Circuit held that the subject merchandise in dispute
    was of a plywood construction.         See 
    Boen, 357 F.3d at 1265
    –66.
    Although heading 4412 covers plywood, veneered panels, and similar
    laminated wood, the three types of wooden plies are not synonymous.
    4412    Explanatory   Note   (Outlining    each   wooden    plies’   specific
    characteristics).        The Federal Circuit in Boen defined plywood,
    but made no ruling as to what constitutes a veneer panel.                Boen
    therefore does not support Plaintiff’s position that Composite’s
    merchandise is classifiable as a veneered panel.
    Court No. 13-00205                                                Page 9
    Additionally, the court disagrees with Composite that
    its merchandise is classifiable under heading 4412 as “similar
    laminated wood.”     Pl. Br. at 18-20.     “Similar laminated wood” is
    defined in the Explanatory Notes for HTSUS heading 4412 as follows:
    [1] Blockboard, laminboard and battenboard, in which the
    core is thick and composed of blocks, laths or battens
    of wood glued together and surfaced with the outer plies.
    Panels of this kind are very rigid and strong and can be
    used       without       framing        or       backing.
    [2] Panels in which the wooden core is replaced by other
    materials such as a layer or layers of particle board,
    fibreboard, wood waste glued together, asbestos or cork.
    Def.’s Br. at Attachment B at 1.         The merchandise’s base layers
    consist of wood of a thickness of less than two millimeters.
    Plaintiff does not allege that the merchandise contains a core of
    “blocks, laths, or battens.”         Moreover, the merchandise here is
    composed of wood and thus cannot fit within the second category of
    the   “similar   laminated   wood”    definition.   Because   Composite’s
    merchandise does not meet the requirements outlined by the HTSUS
    and   its   respective   explanatory    notes   with   regards   to   what
    constitutes “similar laminated wood,” the court concludes that
    Composite’s merchandise cannot be classified as being a “similar
    laminated wood” under heading 4412.
    As such, Composite’s merchandise is not classifiable
    under Heading 4412.      Plaintiff has not provided the court with a
    narrative to support its classification under any other heading in
    Court No. 13-00205                                                Page 10
    Chapter 44 of the HTSUS, thus the only remaining heading under
    which the subject merchandise may be classified is heading 4421.
    Heading 4421 covers “other articles of wood” but excludes any that
    are   “specified   or   included   in   the   preceding   headings.”   4421
    Explanatory Note.       Accordingly, since the subject merchandise in
    the instant case cannot be classified under any other heading in
    chapter 44, the court concludes that the merchandise is properly
    classified under heading 4421.
    CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, the court denies Plaintiff’s
    motion for summary judgment, grants Defendant’s cross-motion for
    summary judgment, and holds that Composite’s merchandise at issue
    is properly classified under subheading 4421.90.97.
    /s/ Nicholas Tsoucalas
    Nicholas Tsoucalas
    Senior Judge
    September 28, 2015
    Dated: __________________
    New York, New York