Gold East Paper (Jiangsu) Co., Ltd. v. United States , 61 F. Supp. 3d 1289 ( 2015 )


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  •                                         Slip Op. 15 - 37
    UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
    :
    GOLD EAST PAPER (JIANGSU) CO., LTD.,         :
    NINGBO ZHONGHUA PAPER CO., LTD.,             :
    and GLOBAL PAPER SOLUTIONS,                  :
    :
    Plaintiffs,   : Before: R. Kenton Musgrave, Senior Judge
    :
    and                       : Consol. Court No. 10-00371
    :
    BUREAU OF FAIR TRADE FOR IMPORTS             :
    & EXPORTS, MINISTRY OF COMMERCE,             :
    PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA,                  :
    :
    Plaintiff-Intervenor, :
    :
    v.                       :
    :
    UNITED STATES,                               :
    :
    Defendant, :
    :
    and                       :
    :
    APPLETON COATED LLC, NEWPAGE CORP., :
    S.D. WARREN COMPANY d/b/a SAPPI FINE :
    PAPER NORTH AMERICA, and UNITED              :
    STEEL, PAPER AND FORESTRY, RUBBER,           :
    MANUFACTURING, ENERGY, ALLIED                :
    INDUSTRIAL AND SERVICE WORKERS               :
    INTERNATIONAL UNION, AFL-CIO-CLC,            :
    :
    Defendant-Intervenors. :
    :
    OPINION AND ORDER
    [Remanding second results of administrative redetermination on investigation of sales at less than
    fair value of certain coated paper from the People’s Republic of China.]
    Dated: April 22, 2015
    Consol. Court No. 10-00371                                                                  Page 2
    Daniel L. Porter and Ross E. Bidlingmaier, Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle LLP, of
    Washington DC, for the plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenor.
    Alexander V. Sverdlov, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, U.S.
    Department of Justice, of Washington DC, for defendant. With him on the brief were Stuart F.
    Delery, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Jeanne E. Davidson, Director, and Claudia Burke,
    Assistant Director. Of Counsel on the brief was Mykhaylo A. Gryzlov, Senior Attorney, Office of
    the Chief Counsel for Import Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce.
    Terence P. Stewart and William A. Fennell, Stewart and Stewart, of Washington, DC, and
    Gilbert B. Kaplan, Christopher T. Cloutier, and Daniel L. Schneiderman,, King & Spalding, LLP,
    of Washington DC, for the defendant-intervenors.
    Musgrave, Senior Judge: This matter, most lately embodied in the second Final
    Results of Redetermination Pursuant to Court Remand (“RR2”) concerning the antidumping duty
    investigation into Certain Coated Paper from the PRC,1 must be remanded a third time due to
    arguments over (1) the use of market economy purchase prices for certain inputs procured by/for the
    plaintiffs (herein “APP-China”) from the Kingdom of Thailand (“Thailand”) and (2) the targeted
    dumping methodology utilized on second remand that persuade further remand is appropriate.
    Familiarity with the prior opinions on the case is presumed, but a brief background is provided
    below. See 37 CIT ___, 
    918 F. Supp. 2d 1317
    (2013) (“Gold East I”) and 38 CIT ___, 
    991 F. Supp. 2d
    1357 (2014) (“Gold East II”).
    1
    Certain Coated Paper Suitable for High-Quality Print Graphics Using Sheet-Fed Presses
    from the People’s Republic of China, 75 Fed. Reg. 59217 (Sept. 27, 2010), PDoc 360, as amended
    by Certain Coated Paper Suitable for High-Quality Print Graphics Using Sheet-Fed Presses from
    the People’s Republic of China: Amended Final Determination of Sales at Less than Fair Value and
    Antidumping Order, 75 Fed. Reg. 70203 (Nov. 17, 2010) (“Final Determination”), and
    accompanying issues and decision memorandum (“IDM”), PDoc 353. The period of investigation
    (“POI”) covers January 1, 2009 through June 30, 2009.
    Consol. Court No. 10-00371                                                                     Page 3
    Background
    In the Final Determination, the U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade
    Administration (“Commerce”) averred that pursuant to its practice it disregarded the market
    economy purchase prices (“MEPs”) for inputs that originated from Thailand and the Republic of
    Korea (“Korea”) that APP-China submitted to account for its production. See IDM at cmt. 7. Cf.
    19 U.S.C. §1677b(c)(1) with 19 C.F.R. 351.408(c)(1). After considering APP-China’s challenge
    thereto on the basis of relevant precedent2 and legislative history3 in comparison with the relevant
    regulation, Gold East I concluded that the record lacked “positive evidence” to support the
    determination, as articulated, of a belief or suspicion that those inputs had been distorted by
    subsidies, and that issue was remanded with instruction either “to reopen the record and make
    particularized findings in support of [the] decision to ignore the Thai and Korean price data . . . or
    to reverse [the] decision not to use such price data”. 37 CIT at ___, 918 F. Supp. 2d at 1324.
    Commerce also requested remand in order to examine its targeted dumping
    calculation program and, if appropriate, correct certain alleged programming errors. The request was
    endorsed, but the court also concluded that a relevant targeted dumping regulation had not been
    properly withdrawn through the notice and comment required under the Administrative Procedure
    Act, 5 U.S.C. §500, et sequentia. That regulation is no longer in effect, but during the investigation
    it had provided, inter alia, that the application of the “remedy” of targeted dumping should
    2
    See, e.g., Fuyao Glass Indus. Group Co. v. United States, 
    29 CIT 109
    (2005) (“Fuyao II”);
    Sichuan Changhong Electric Co. v. United States, 
    30 CIT 1481
    , 
    460 F. Supp. 2d 1338
    (2006).
    3
    See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 100-576, at 590 (1988) (“[i]n valuing such factors [of production],
    Commerce shall avoid using any prices which it has reason to believe or suspect may be dumped or
    subsidized prices”), reprinted in 1988 U.S.S.C.A.N. 1547, 1623.
    Consol. Court No. 10-00371                                                                    Page 4
    “normally” be limited to those sales that “constitute targeted dumping.”             See 19 C.F.R.
    §351.414(f)(2) (2008). Consistent therewith, therefore, Gold East I opined that the targeted dumping
    remedy had to be limited to targeted sales or adequate explanation provided as to why the relevant
    sales are not “normal”. 37 CIT at ___, 918 F. Supp. 2d at 1328.
    In Commerce’s first final results of redetermination (“RR1”), it complied with the
    opinion on those issues under protest. See generally RR1. The first results incorporated the prices
    of APP-China’s inputs from Thailand and Korea and, apparently, limited the targeted dumping
    “remedy” in accordance with Gold East I, but did not “appl[y]” it. Cf. RR1 at 17 with 
    id. at 18
    (referring parties to a further discussion of the “proprietary nature of this analysis” in a certain
    memorandum dated concurrently with RR1). Those results relied on average to average (“A-A”)
    methodology instead of average to transaction (“A-T”) methodology. Considering those results and
    the parties arguments thereon, Gold East II reiterated why the matter had been remanded and, after
    further analysis of Commerce’s articulated position on the matter, remanded again for a fuller
    analysis either on the record as it stood or as may be supplemented on remand if necessary. Gold
    East II, 38 CIT at ___, 
    991 F. Supp. 2d
    at 1269.4
    On second remand, Commerce reopened the record, and the petitioners and
    APP-China filed submissions with new factual information pertaining to subsidization. Considering
    4
    In passing, the court observed that the fact that Commerce had placed additional
    information on the record in the form of additional administrative determinations via citation thereto
    was at odds with Commerce’s position regarding a “reopening” of the record. See Gold East II, 38
    CIT at ___, 991 F. Supp 2d at 1366 & n.14 (parameters of the administrative record); see also 19
    C.F.R. §351.104(a) (“[t]he Secretary will include in the official record all factual information,
    written argument, or other material developed by, presented to, or obtained by the Secretary during
    the course of a proceeding that pertains to the proceeding”) (italics added).
    Consol. Court No. 10-00371                                                                   Page 5
    them, Commerce again determined to use APP-China’s claimed prices for inputs from Thailand and
    to reject the prices for inputs from Korea in the calculation of the dumping margin. Commerce also
    continued to apply the A-A targeted dumping methodology to all sales to calculate APP-China’s
    dumping margin. The second final remand results (“RR2”) did not substantively change from the
    draft thereof, but they provide further explanation of the determinations made in the calculation of
    a weighted-average dumping margin for APP-China of zero percent.
    APP-China argues the second remand results should be sustained. The petitioners
    agree with them in part, but they continue to contest Commerce’s determination to use market
    economy prices (“MEPs”) for inputs purchased by APP-China from Thailand and the determination
    not to counteract targeted dumping. For the following reasons, the matter must be remanded again.
    Discussion
    I. Administrative Finality and Information on the Record
    On second remand, Commerce took the position that it was appropriate to disregard
    any information submitted for the record that “only became available” subsequent to the
    determination of the original investigation.5 RR2 at 22.
    Disregard of information that “only became available” subsequent to the original
    investigation in the sense of “only came into being” through creation subsequent to the original
    investigation accords respect for that point at which an agency’s determination may reasonably be
    5
    Commerce further explains that “while certain factual information submitted by Petitioners
    may have been available during the POI, . . . the Department continues to rely on its published
    determinations, and the contemporaneity of such determinations to the POI, to determine whether
    there is evidence of the existence of generally available, non-industry specific export subsidies
    during the POI.” RR2 at 22.
    Consol. Court No. 10-00371                                                                    Page 6
    concluded “final” in the administrative sense. See RR2 at 7 (“[o]therwise, the Department’s
    decisions would not have administrative ‘finality’ and would be subject to newly-developed
    documents and facts with the passage of time, when litigation is pursued”). Cf. Essar Steel Ltd. v.
    United States, 
    678 F.3d 1268
    (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“Essar”) (generally improper for courts to “require”
    reopening the record). Commerce’s disregard of information that only came into being subsequent
    to the original investigation is appropriate, but the reader should not confuse or conflate a “final”
    decision thereon with the applicability of law or methodology on remand. See infra.
    II. Treatment of the Certain Input Purchases
    A. MEP Inputs from Korea
    Regarding the relevant MEP inputs from Korea, Commerce found that 2009 CORE
    Review6 provides evidence that Korea maintained at least one countervailable generally-available,
    non-industry specific export subsidy program and that it would have been against any market
    economy supplier’s interest in Korea not to take advantage of the subsidy. Gold East I characterized
    the mere reference to 2009 CORE Review in the Final Determination’s issues and decision
    memorandum as “insufficient” evidence of record to justify disregard of APP-China’s MEP inputs.
    Gold East I, 37 CIT at ___, 918 F. Supp. 2d at 1324. See also, e.g., Gold East II, 38 CIT at ___, 
    991 F. Supp. 2d
    at 1362. At this stage, Commerce’s particularized explication of 2009 CORE Review
    satisfies the three prongs of Fuyao II and provides substantial evidentiary support for disregarding
    the relevant MEP inputs from Korea, which no party contests. See RR2 at 11-14.
    6
    Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from the Republic of Korea: Preliminary
    Results of Countervailing Duty Administration Review, 73 Fed. Reg. 52315, 52323-24 (Sep. 9, 2008)
    (“2009 CORE Review”); unchanged in final determination, see its accompanying issues and decision
    memorandum at cmt. 1.
    Consol. Court No. 10-00371                                                                     Page 7
    B. MEP Inputs from Thailand
    1. Thailand’s Investment Promotion Act of 1977 (“IPA”)
    Regarding the issue of MEPs for certain inputs from Thailand, the petitioners called
    Commerce’s attention to several cases of countervailed sections of Thailand’s Investment Promotion
    Act (“IPA”) from 1989 to 2001, including “countervailable” export subsidy benefits under the IPA
    in 1995 Pocket Lighters investigation.7 The petitioners argued that the record evidence demonstrated
    that the IPA was still in effect during the POI, that the suppliers were eligible for and thus likely
    received benefits under the IPA, and that it would have been unnatural for the suppliers not to have
    taken advantage of the subsidies under the IPA because of the competitive nature of market economy
    countries and the supplier’s demonstrative interest in receiving available subsidies by applying for
    promoted status.
    Commerce disagreed, explaining that although it had countervailed programs under
    sections of the IPA as early as the 1989 Malleable Iron Pipe Fittings investigation8, it had made such
    determinations on a case-by-case and industry-specific basis, which led to differing results depending
    upon the type of monitoring system employed with respect to each particular industry. Consistent
    therewith, Commerce found that its prior findings concerning section 36(1) of the IPA (i.e., duty
    7
    Final Negative Countervailing Duty Determination: Disposable Pocket Lighters From
    Thailand, 60 Fed. Reg. 13961 (Mar. 15, 1995) (“1995 Pocket Lighters”). Actually, that proceeding
    determined the “net bounty or grant” as 0.23 percent, ad valorem, which was not countervailable.
    See 
    id. at 13962.
           8
    Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination and Countervailing Duty Order:
    Malleable Iron Pipe Fittings From Thailand, 54 Fed. Reg. 6439 (Feb. 10, 1989) (“1989 Malleable
    Iron Pipe Fittings”).
    Consol. Court No. 10-00371                                                                  Page 8
    exemptions on imports of raw and essential materials) in 2001 Hot-Rolled Investigation9 did not
    establish that Thailand maintained countervailable broadly-available, non-industry specific export
    subsidies at the time of the original Final Determination. RR2 at 9.
    Elaborating on the specific programs determined countervailable in 2001 Hot-Rolled
    Investigation, Commerce explained that in that determination it countervailed a program under
    sections of the 1991 version of the IPA because it determined that the IPA benefits were de facto
    specific to a steel-sheet industry within the meaning of 19 U.S.C. §1677(5A)(D)(iii)(I) and the
    program was not administered in a manner in accordance with 19 C.F.R. §351.519(a)(4)(i), even
    though it determined that the assistance provided by the Thai Board of Investment under the IPA did
    not constitute an export subsidy. 
    Id. at 18.
    By way of contrast, Commerce noted that in the 2005
    PET Resin investigation10 it had found the import duty exemptions on imports of raw and essential
    materials under section 36 of the IPA not to be countervailable within the meaning of 19 C.F.R.
    §351.519(a)(4). 
    Id. Commerce further
    explained that in that proceeding it had not determined that
    the IPA is an export subsidy per se, because the IPA did not generally require an export commitment
    and Commerce had examined the manner in which the Thai government administered the duty
    drawback program, finding that the system used to monitor and track the consumption and/or
    9
    Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination: Certain Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel
    Flat Products From Thailand, 66 Fed. Reg. 50410 (Oct. 3, 2001) (“2001 Hot-Rolled Investigation”)
    and accompanying issues and decision memorandum.
    10
    Final Negative Countervailing Duty Determination: Bottle-Grade Polyethylene Tereph-
    thalate (PET) Resin From Thailand, 70 Fed. Reg. 13462 (Mar. 21, 2005) (“2005 PET Resin
    Investigation”) and accompanying issues and decision memorandum.
    Consol. Court No. 10-00371                                                                     Page 9
    re-export of imported goods, along with normal allowance for waste, was reasonable and effective.
    Therefore, Commerce explains,
    [t]his demonstrates that the Department’s prior subsidy findings on the IPA were
    industry-specific and led to differing results depending upon the type of monitoring
    system employed with respect to each particular industry. Accordingly, we find that
    the Department’s findings concerning section 36(1) of the IPA (i.e., duty exemptions
    on imports of raw and essential materials) in 2001 Hot-Rolled Investigation do not
    establish that Thailand maintained countervailable broadly available, non-industry
    specific export subsidies at the time of the Final Determination.
    
    Id. at 9.
    See 66 Fed. Reg. 50410 and accompanying issues and decision memorandum, section II.A.
    Commerce’s explanation of the nonapplicability of its prior IPA findings to the subject matter at bar
    is reasonable and supported by substantial evidence of record. See, e.g., MTZ Polyfilms, Ltd v.
    United States, 33 CIT1575, 1582, 
    659 F. Supp. 2d 1303
    , 1311 (2009) (proposed methodology not
    “relevant to” and “does not comport with” how Commerce treated export program benefits).
    2. Export-Import Bank of Thailand 2009 Statements
    The petitioners also cited to mission statements from the 2009 annual report of the
    Export-Import Bank of Thailand to argue that the bank was funded by the Thai government to cover
    losses on loans and credit insurance provided to exporters, and that it would be unnatural for
    APP-China’s Thai suppliers not to have taken advantage of the program. Commerce, however,
    responded that it has not countervailed a program under the Export-Import Bank of Thailand, and
    that therefore the above assertion in the mission statements of the bank’s annual report is, by itself,
    insufficient for finding that any Thai company received countervailable export subsidies through
    programs from the Export-Import Bank of Thailand during the POI. Substantial evidence of record
    supports this determination.
    Consol. Court No. 10-00371                                                                    Page 10
    3. Thai Tax Coupon Program
    a. Further Background
    On remand, the petitioners argued that the record now contained the same law
    governing the Thai tax coupon program11 that was countervailed in 1992 Carbon Steel Butt-Weld
    Pipe Review as well as documentation that a change was made to the tax coupon law in 2009 and
    the ad valorem export coupon rates applicable during 2009 for the inputs exported from Thailand.
    See Petitioners’ Submission of New Information (Aug. 20, 2014) at Exhibits 1, 2A & 2B. The
    petitioners argued this evidence demonstrated that the tax coupon program was still in place during
    2009 and that APP-China could have benefitted from the program. Petitioners’ Comments on Draft
    Second Remand Redetermination (Oct. 9, 2014) at 10.
    Commerce interpreted Gold East II as ordering it to address whether subsidies existed
    during the POI of this instant investigation.12 The interpretation led to disregarding the petitioners’
    evidence and determining that Commerce did not have a reason to believe or suspect that prices may
    have been subsidized, on the grounds that it has not countervailed the tax coupon program as an
    11
    The petitioners aver this is Thailand’s Tax and Duty Compensation of Exported Goods
    Produced in the Kingdom Act, B.E. 2524 (1981). Cf. Carbon Steel Butt-Weld Pipe Fittings From
    Thailand; Preliminary Results of Countervailing Duty Administrative Review, 56 Fed. Reg. 55283,
    55283-84 (Oct. 25, 1991) (“Carbon Steel Butt-Weld Pipe Review”).
    12
    In the process, Commerce highlighted the prior decision’s observation that “detailed
    positive evidence of that existence -- during the POI -- of broadly-available, non-industry specific
    subsidies has been held to satisfy this prong”, and from other context that “[i]t thus behooves
    Commerce to relate a relevant and contemporaneous factual predicate to the particular period of
    investigation, not merely to avoid the appearance of ossification of administrative practice, but also
    as a necessary part of the particularized findings that will suffice for the purpose of the substantial
    evidence standard of review.” RR2 at 15-16, quoting Gold East II, 38 CIT at ___, 
    991 F. Supp. 2d
    at 1363 (referencing CS Wind Vietnam Co., Ltd. v. United States, 38 CIT ___, ___, 
    971 F. Supp. 2d 1271
    , 1292 (2014) (“CS Wind”)) & 38 CIT at ___, 
    991 F. Supp. 2d
    at 1365.
    Consol. Court No. 10-00371                                                                    Page 11
    export subsidy since the 1997 Apparel Review13 and that all the orders countervailing the tax coupon
    program had been revoked by 2000.14 Commerce reasoned that the subsidization determinations
    concerning the tax coupon program from the 1980s and 1990s were “not sufficiently
    contemporaneous with the POI of the instant investigation” to accord with the order of remand. RR2
    at 9-10, 15-17.
    Though Petitioners placed on the record evidence of the law in 2009 governing the
    tax coupon after we opened the record, the Department is not required in the context
    of this antidumping duty investigation to conduct a formal investigation of this
    alleged subsidy program and make [a] de novo determination that this law establishes
    a generally available countervailable export subsidy program in Thailand. Because
    we did not make any subsidization determinations on the tax coupon program in
    other CVD reviews or investigations that are sufficiently contemporaneous with the
    POI, we are not relying on the evidence of the law alone to conclude that
    countervailable export subsidies existed during the POI.
    
    Id. at 16-17
    (footnotes omitted).
    b. Analysis
    Commerce’s conclusion that “no information generally available to it at the time of
    the Final Determination supports a finding that the MEP prices for inputs from Thailand during the
    POI may have been distorted because of countervailable export subsidies” is not supported by
    substantial evidence for the following reasons, and therefore the matter of whether there is a reason
    to believe or suspect that MEPs from Thailand were distorted would require further consideration
    if it presents a material impact on the results. However, it is unclear at this time whether that would
    have a material impact on the results or should be regarded as harmless error. Cf. infra, notes 25-26.
    13
    Certain Apparel From Thailand; Final Results of Countervailing Duty Administrative
    Review, 62 Fed. Reg. 63071 (Nov. 26, 1997) (“1997 Apparel Review”).
    14
    See RR2 at 10 & n.49.
    Consol. Court No. 10-00371                                                                  Page 12
    Commerce bases its decision in part on its observation that all the orders
    countervailing the tax coupon program had been revoked by the year 2000. In one sense, that would
    not be unreasonable. Cf. AK Steel Corp. v. United States, 
    192 F.3d 1367
    , 1376 (1999) (clear that the
    Korean government exercised control to benefit a particular industry at one time but court not
    referred to evidence to support reasonable inference that governmental control continued into the
    period of investigation). However, to the extent Commerce interpreted the law of the case as
    expressing that “the standard for determining the existence of generally available
    non-industry-specific export subsidies is a particularized finding of subsidization during the POI”
    requiring a new, de novo, determination of subsidization as a result of those revocations,
    Commerce’s interpretation is overly restrictive. Revocation is a discrete agency action, and the act
    thereof does not invalidate the prior administrative findings and conclusions upon which the issuance
    of the countervailing or antidumping duty order being revoked was validly predicated. Indeed, that
    is basically the premise that Commerce sought to advance in Canadian Wheat Bd. v. United States,
    
    32 CIT 1116
    , 
    580 F. Supp. 2d 1350
    (2008), aff’d 
    641 F.3d 1344
    (Fed. Cir. 2011). Commerce here
    noted that the tax coupon program had been countervailed in the 1997 Apparel Review,15 and the
    petitioners had placed on the record the law in 2009 governing the tax coupon program to show that
    the program existed in 2009, not to induce a formal investigation. On those facts, Commerce could
    have reasonably inferred that the tax coupon program continued to exist during the POI.
    To the extent Commerce interpreted the prior opinions as at odds with its “practice”
    of imposing a rebuttable presumption from a past affirmative subsidy determination that the
    15
    See RR2 at 10, referencing 1997 Apparel Review.
    Consol. Court No. 10-00371                                                                    Page 13
    particular program “exists” for purposes of a period under consideration,16 certain clarification is
    necessary here: In neither the Final Determination nor the first remand results did Commerce ever
    explain that its finding was predicated on the basis of a rebuttable presumption,17 Commerce simply
    (1) stated that it had determined in the past that Korea and Thailand “maintain” broadly available
    non-industry specific export subsidy programs and (2) declared from citations to same that such
    programs were in “existence” during the POI. Yet, “[i]t is well established that an agency’s action
    must be upheld, if at all, on the basis articulated by the agency itself.”18 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n
    v. State Farm, 
    463 U.S. 29
    , 50 (1983). Courts are thus bound not to sustain on grounds not
    articulated by the agency itself. See, e.g., Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 
    371 U.S. 16
                The second remand results explain that in countervailing duty proceedings “if the
    Department has countervailed an export subsidy in a prior determination, unless parties provide us
    with the evidence that the program has been terminated and flow of the residual benefits has ceased,
    we will normally find that the subsidy is still in existence.” RR2 at 16. Cf. 19 C.F.R. §351.526(d)
    (“Terminated programs”) (“The Secretary will not adjust the cash deposit rate under paragraph (a)
    of this section if the program-wide change consists of the termination of a program and: (1) The
    Secretary determines that residual benefits may continue to be bestowed under the terminated
    program . . ..”); ALZ N.V. v. United States, 
    27 CIT 1265
    , 1284, 
    283 F. Supp. 2d 1302
    , 1318 (2003)
    (“Commerce regularly requires direct evidence of a program-wide change in a subsidy program
    before it adjusts the cash deposit rate”) (citations omitted).
    17
    In point of fact, it was the court, not Commerce, that first brought up the subject of
    presumptions in the context of the matter at bar. See, e.g., Gold East II, 38 CIT at ___, 991 F. Supp
    2d at 1360-67. Cf. RR1 generally; Def’s 56.2 Resp. at 6-7, 16, 28-33; Def’s RR2 Resp. to Cmts at
    4-8. The petitioners here also call attention to Peer Bearing Company-Changshan v. United States,
    
    27 CIT 1763
    , 1772, 
    298 F. Supp. 2d 1328
    , 1337 (2003) (opining that once Commerce has presented
    evidence supporting a reason to believe or suspect that prices are subsidized “a rebuttable
    presumption is established that the prices paid are distorted” and the burden shifts to the challenging
    party “to present evidence demonstrating that its supplier did not benefit from such subsidies”).
    18
    See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 
    332 U.S. 194
    , 196 (1947) (“a reviewing court, in dealing with
    a determination or judgment which an administrative agency alone is authorized to make, must judge
    the propriety of such action solely by the grounds invoked by the agency”).
    Consol. Court No. 10-00371                                                                    Page 14
    156, 168-69 (1962). Taking Commerce at its word in the Final Determination, the court could not
    discern from the record and referenced citations the validity of either assertion for purposes of the
    POI, i.e., that Korean and Thai broadly available non-industry specific export subsidy programs
    “existed” during the POI.19 See, e.g., Gold East I, 37 CIT at ___, 918 F. Supp. 2d at 1324 (“there
    must be some positive evidence on the record to permit the court to evaluate whether Commerce’s
    decision is supported by substantial evidence”); Gold East II, 38 CIT at ___, 
    991 F. Supp. 2d
    at 1365
    & n.13 (examining record support for declared existence of relevant subsidy programs). That
    inference was a necessary precursor for further presuming (i.e., providing reason to believe or
    suspect) that the MEPs of the inputs at issue were likely distorted, and therein lay the problem of
    APP-China’s original res on this matter.
    To the extent Commerce would regard the prior opinions and Fuyao II as at odds with
    its, now apparent, rebuttable presumption practice on this issue, clarified here is why those decisions
    are not at odds with such practice. In the Final Determination, Commerce quoted from China
    National Machinery Import & Export Corp. v. United States, 
    27 CIT 1553
    , 1557, 
    293 F. Supp. 2d 1334
    , 1338 (2003), upon which Fuyao II relies, to the effect that “it is sufficient if the Department
    has ‘substantial, specific, and objective evidence in support of its suspicion that the prices are
    19
    Notwithstanding Commerce’s interpretation expressed in RR2, it was for this reason that
    the court previously stated that there must be “some primary source from which it could reasonably
    be concluded that such programs were in fact in existence and operable during the POI, with a degree
    of specificity in describing the relevant program[s], before the possibility of believing or suspecting
    that the relevant MEPs during the POI were likely distorted by such programs could even arise.” See
    RR2 at 5, quoting Gold East II, 38 CIT at ___, 
    991 F. Supp. 2d
    at 1366 (italics in original).
    Consol. Court No. 10-00371                                                                      Page 15
    distorted.’” IDM at cmt. 17, pp. 44-45 (also referencing H.R. Rep. Conf. 100-576 at 590).20
    Considering the circumstances before it, the Fuyao II court unpacked those concepts in stating that
    “Commerce must demonstrate by specific and objective evidence that (1) subsidies of the industry
    in question existed in the supplier countries during the period of investigation . . . ; (2) the supplier
    in question is a member of the subsidized industry or otherwise could have taken advantage of any
    available subsidies; and (3) it would have been unnatural for a supplier to not have taken advantage
    of such subsidies.” Fuyao 
    II, 29 CIT at 114
    . But whether the concern is over an industry-specific
    subsidy program or a broadly available non-industry specific export subsidy program, Fuyao II’s
    summation amounts to a rather straightforward restatement of how to evaluate the “substantial,
    specific, and objective evidence” that would satisfy the reviewing standard of substantial evidence
    on the record and assist in evaluating the validity of the inference or conclusion drawn therefrom.
    Furthermore, as previously mentioned, Fuyao II is not the only “reasonable method
    for evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence upon which Commerce base[s] its belief or suspicion
    that prices were subsidized”, see CS Wind, 38 CIT at ___, 971 F. Supp. 2d at 1292, and in the
    meanwhile, Fuyao II provides useful guidance, and therefore administrative “reasonable suspicion”
    conclusions, established via rebuttable presumption or otherwise, should either be able to satisfy its
    three prongs or be articulated with sufficient clarity to explain why the chosen method reasonably
    gives rise to a valid belief or suspicion that input prices are distorted. See 
    id. at 1292
    n .14.
    20
    See also China National 
    Machinery, 27 CIT at 266-67
    , 264 F. Supp. 2d at 1239, discussing
    AL Tech Specialty Steel Corp. v. United States, 
    6 CIT 245
    , 247, 
    575 F. Supp. 1277
    , 1280 (1983) and
    restating the analysis of Terry v. Ohio, 
    392 U.S. 1
    (1968) upon United States v. Cortez, 
    449 U.S. 411
    (1981) and Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 
    436 U.S. 307
    , 320-21 (1978).
    Consol. Court No. 10-00371                                                                      Page 16
    And, if Commerce perceives anything in this opinion that could be construed as
    inconsistent with its reading of the prior opinions, then this opinion controls.
    III. Targeted Dumping Redetermination
    A. Background
    It will be recalled that the Limiting Rule described that if the criteria for targeted
    dumping are satisfied,21 then in the comparison of normal value and export price Commerce
    “normally will limit the application of the average-to-transaction method to those sales that
    constitute targeted dumping” for purposes of determining sales at less than fair value. See 19 C.F.R.
    §351.414(f)(2) (2008); see also 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(d)(1)(B). Regarding the attempt to withdraw
    that then-existing targeted dumping regulation, Gold East I held that due to noncompliance with the
    notice provision of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), as amended, 5 U.S.C. §553(b), the
    Limiting Rule was still in effect at the time of the Final Determination and remanded the case for
    reconsideration of the targeted dumping analysis. See 37 CIT at ___, 918 F. Supp. 2d at 1328.
    In light of the first remand results, the court refrained from addressing the parties’
    further arguments thereon, due to the uncertain impact of the MEP subsidization issue upon the
    targeted dumping analysis, but it requested that Commerce further address the defendant-intervenors’
    (herein “petitioners”) points on the issue. 38 CIT at ___, 
    991 F. Supp. 2d
    at 1369. On second
    remand, Commerce found that the exclusion of APP-China’s MEP price for the input from Korea
    did not materially affect the targeted dumping analysis results and, as in the first remand, it continues
    to find that the weighted-average margin resulting from either the average-to-average (“A-A”)
    21
    Inter alia, “determined through the use of, among other things, standard and appropriate
    statistical techniques . . ..” 19 C.F.R. §351.414(f)(1)(i) (2007).
    Consol. Court No. 10-00371                                                                  Page 17
    methodology or the average-to-transaction (“A-T”) methodology, as applied only to the sales found
    to have been targeted, is below the de minimis threshold. Accordingly, Commerce continues to
    apply the standard A-A comparison methodology to all sales to calculate the weighted-average
    dumping margin for APP-China.
    B. Motion to Reconsider -- Effect of Limiting Rule Withdrawal
    On remand, pointing to the recent case of Beijing Tianhai Industry Co. v. United
    States, 38 CIT ___, 
    7 F. Supp. 3d 1318
    , 1333-34 (2014) (“Tianhai”), the petitioners argued that the
    withdrawal of the targeted dumping regulation was harmless error, and that A-T methodology should
    be applied to all of APP-China’s sales based on their results of testing for Cohen’s d, part of the
    differential pricing analysis Commerce adopted subsequent to the Final Determination. See
    Petitioners’ Comments on Draft Second Remand Redetermination at 8-9. Commerce responded
    that the United States has already raised the harmless error argument, and since it was not accepted,
    the law of the case is binding. RR2 at 23-24. Cf. Gold East I, 37 CIT at ___, 918 F. Supp. 2d at
    1325-28. The petitioners move at this juncture for reconsideration of the issue.
    The APA requires that a court take “due account” of the harmless error rule. 5 U.S.C.
    § 706. Tianhai proceeded from the proposition that the “‘relevant harm’ to be analyzed when the
    Department fails to comply with the APA’s notice and comment procedures is whether ‘an interested
    party has lost the opportunity to alter the agency’s decision through full participation in the
    regulatory process.”’ Tianhai, 38 CIT at ___, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1333 (citing Parkdale International,
    Ltd. v. United States, 
    31 CIT 1229
    , 1237, 
    508 F. Supp. 2d 1338
    , 1348 (2007)) (“Parkdale”).22
    22
    The quote appears in a discussion of when a claim accrues against “final agency action”
    (continued...)
    Consol. Court No. 10-00371                                                                    Page 18
    Tianhai went on to determine that Commerce’s failure to follow the procedural requirements of the
    APA constituted “harmless error” because the party claiming the error had not filed comments on
    the withdrawal of the regulations during either of the two times when comments were solicited.23
    
    Id., 38 CIT
    at ___, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1334-37. Here, the petitioners argue that, as in Tianhai, APP-
    China filed no comments on the withdrawal when comments were solicited and that therefore any
    procedural failure by Commerce must be considered as “harmless error.”
    “The major grounds justifying reconsideration are an intervening change of
    controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent
    manifest injustice.” Royal Thai Government v. United States, 
    30 CIT 1072
    , 1074, 
    441 F. Supp. 2d 1350
    , 1354 (2006), quoting Doe v. New York City Department of Social Services, 
    709 F.2d 782
    , 789
    (2d Cir. 1983) (quotation marks omitted). Thus, the court will not exercise discretion to disturb a
    previous decision unless it is manifestly erroneous. 
    Id. (citation omitted).
               Upon further
    consideration, the court perceives no manifest error in Gold East I.
    In Parkdale, the relevant issue concerned whether a certain “reseller policy” was void
    because it had not been passed in accordance with the procedural requirements of the APA governing
    the publication of regulations. Parkdale proceeded from the proposition that “if a rule adopts a new
    22
    (...continued)
    (see 5 U.S.C. §704), to wit: “A claim raising procedural objections accrues at the time that the rule
    goes into effect because the relevant harm has already been inflicted: an interested party has lost the
    opportunity to alter the agency’s decision through full participation in the regulatory process.”
    
    Parkdale, 31 CIT at 1237
    , 508 F. Supp. 2d at 1348-49 (citations omitted).
    23
    See Targeted Dumping in Antidumping Investigations, 72 Fed. Reg. 60651 (Oct. 25,
    2007); Proposed Methodology for Identifying and Analyzing Targeted Dumping in Antidumping
    Investigations, 73 Fed. Reg. 26371 (May 9, 2008).
    Consol. Court No. 10-00371                                                                    Page 19
    position inconsistent with an existing regulation, or effects a substantive change in the regulation,
    notice and comment are required.” 
    Parkdale, 31 CIT at 1246
    , 508 F. Supp. 2d at 1356 (internal
    quotation marks omitted), quoting United States Telecom Association v. FCC, 
    400 F.3d 29
    , 35 (D.C.
    Cir. 2005) (quoting Shalala v. Guernsey Memorial Hospital, 
    514 U.S. 87
    , 100 (1995)) (emphasis
    omitted in Parkdale). After considering the relevant policy, Parkdale found that it “is not a new
    position inconsistent with the existing regulation” and thus notice and comment were not required.
    The decision in Gold East I is in accord with the line of cases that extend from Braniff
    Airways v. CAB, 
    379 F.2d 453
    (D.C. Cir. 1967) (“Braniff”), which evaluated the administrative law
    question posed therein on the basis of whether the “mistake of the administrative body is one that
    clearly had no bearing on the procedure used or the substance of the decision 
    reached.” 379 F.2d at 466
    , quoting Massachusetts Trustees of Eastern Gas and Fuel Associates v. United States, 
    377 U.S. 235
    , 248 (1964) (“EGFA Trustees”). In United States Steel Corp. v. EPA, 
    595 F.2d 207
    (5th
    Cir. 1979) (“U.S. Steel”), for example, the Fifth Circuit held that the EPA’s failure to provide notice
    and comment in advance of designating certain areas in Alabama as nonattainment areas “plainly
    affected the procedure used, and we cannot assume that there was no prejudice to the petitioners[;]
    [a]bsence of such prejudice must be clear for harmless error to be applicable.” 
    See 595 F.2d at 215
    .
    and cases cited. The petitioners in that case faced “collateral effects” as a consequence of the EPA’s
    action, and the agency’s acceptance of comments after the effective date of the designations did not
    cure the lack of prior notice and comment. 
    Id. The case
    of Riverbend Farms, Inc. v. Madigan, 
    958 F.2d 1479
    (9th Cir.1992) is
    further instructive on this point. After observing that “the notice and comment requirements . . . are
    Consol. Court No. 10-00371                                                                    Page 20
    designed to ensure public participation in 
    rulemaking”, 958 F.2d at 1485
    , the court went on to state
    as truism that a court
    must exercise great caution in applying the harmless error rule in the administrative
    rulemaking context. The reason is apparent: Harmless error is more readily abused
    there than in the civil or criminal trial context. An agency is not required to adopt a
    rule that conforms in any way to the comments presented to it. So long as it explains
    its reasons, it may adopt a rule that all commentators think is stupid or unnecessary.
    Thus, if the harmless error rule were to look solely to result, an agency could always
    claim that it would have adopted the same rule even if it had complied with the APA
    procedures. To avoid gutting the APA’s procedural requirements, harmless error
    analysis in administrative rulemaking must therefore focus on the process as well as
    the result. We have held that the failure to provide notice and comment is harmless
    only where the agency’s mistake “clearly had no bearing on the procedure used or the
    substance of decision 
    reached.” 958 F.2d at 1487
    , quoting Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Hodel, 
    790 F.2d 760
    , 764-65 (9th Cir.1986)
    (quoting 
    Braniff, supra
    , 379 F.2d at 461) (further citations omitted). See also, e.g., Natural
    Resources Defense Council v. Abraham, 
    355 F.3d 179
    (2d Cir. 2004) (suspension or delayed
    implementation of a rule normally constitutes substantive rulemaking requiring notice and
    opportunity for comment; DOE’s withdrawal of published final rules and replacement with less
    stringent standards without notice and comment held not to be a valid exercise of agency authority);
    Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 
    683 F.2d 752
    (3d Cir. 1982).
    As discussed in Gold East I, Commerce’s Withdrawal of Regulatory Provisions
    Governing Targeted Dumping in Antidumping Duty Investigations, 73 Fed. Reg. 74930 (Dec. 10,
    2008) (“Withdrawal Notice”) plainly resulted in a substantive rule change24 and a new position
    24
    Parkdale provides an excellent summation of the distinction between legislative
    (substantive) and interpretive rules. See 31 CIT at 
    1246, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 1356
    (‘“[A]n interpretive
    statement simply indicates an agency’s reading of a statute or a rule. It does not intend to create new
    rights or duties, but only reminds affected parties of existing duties’”), quoting Paralyzed Veterans
    (continued...)
    Consol. Court No. 10-00371                                                                      Page 21
    inconsistent with existing regulation or effected a substantive change in the regulation. 37 CIT at
    ___, 918 F. Supp. 2d at 1325. Cf. 
    Parkdale, 31 CIT at 1246
    , 508 F. Supp. 2d at 1356. As further
    implied in Gold East I, because the Withdrawal Notice was found not to meet the APA’s good cause
    exception, 5 U.S.C. §553(b)(3)(B), and because of the uncertainty surrounding the two requests for
    comments on targeted dumping methodology generally, it could not (and cannot) be concluded that
    the Withdrawal Notice’s noncompliance with APA notice and comment had been without “bearing
    on the procedure used” nor can the procedure Commerce did pursue be assumed non-prejudicial to
    APP-China. See, e.g., U.S. 
    Steel, 595 F.2d at 215
    . Cf. EGFA 
    Trustees, 377 U.S. at 248
    ; 
    Braniff, 379 F.2d at 412
    . At the time Gold East I was issued, it was not incorrect, notwithstanding how
    Commerce has developed its targeted dumping methodology in the period since its issuance. For
    these reasons, the court perceives no reason to disturb its prior decision.
    B. Administrative Finality and Application on Remand
    of Law, Policy, Methodology, Et Cetera
    1. Background
    As mentioned, in remanding this matter, the court requested Commerce to consider
    and address in greater detail the petitioners’ points on the issue of targeted dumping as raised in their
    confidential brief. In commenting on the draft of the second remand results, the petitioners argued
    that their points with respect to applying the exception to the Limiting Rule had not been properly
    addressed in the draft in accordance with Gold East II. In particular, they contended that their
    24
    (...continued)
    of Am. v. West, 
    138 F.3d 1434
    , 1436 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (quoting Orengo Caraballo v. Reich, 
    11 F.3d 186
    , 195 (D.C. Cir. 1993)).
    Consol. Court No. 10-00371                                                                   Page 22
    allegation that APP-China’s targeted dumping was not “normal” but was so pervasive that it is
    appropriate to apply the A-T methodology to all of APP-China’s sales was not properly analyzed.
    In the second remand results, Commerce responded that it is incumbent on a party
    before it to make specific arguments in each particular administrative proceeding including during
    remand in order for the agency to be able to consider them, that the petitioners’ targeted dumping
    points had been addressed in the First Remand Redetermination as well as the United States’
    response brief before the court, and that the court had not ruled in favor of them. Commerce
    continued to disagree that the targeted dumping among APP-China’s sales is abnormal, and it
    repeated the First Remand Redetermination’s articulation that the only circumstances that may
    support applying the A-T methodology to all sales
    include when “targeted dumping by a firm is so pervasive that the A-T methodology
    becomes the best benchmark for gauging the fairness of that firm’s pricing
    practices,”[ ] or alternatively, when “targeted dumping practice is so widespread it
    may be administratively impractical to segregate targeted dumping pricing from the
    normal pricing behavior of a company.”[ ] We find neither of these circumstances
    is present here. . . . Moreover, we discern no other distinguishing facts or features
    of the U.S. sales (targeted or otherwise), and Petitioners did not articulate[ ]any
    either, that would justify the conclusion that the “normal” targeted dumping analysis
    is inappropriate. Accordingly, consistent with our past practice, which was
    previously affirmed by this Court, we declined to find that the specific circumstances
    of this case are abnormal.
    RR2 at 24-25, quoting RR1 at 18 (footnotes omitted).
    Commerce thus maintains that APP-China’s U.S. sales did not present an abnormal
    situation that warranted the application of the A-T methodology to all sales because neither of the
    listed circumstances occurred here.25 Commerce interpreted the petitioners to argue that the current
    25
    In passing, Commerce also calls attention to the fact that the level of targeted dumping
    (continued...)
    Consol. Court No. 10-00371                                                                   Page 23
    administrative differential pricing analysis based on Cohen’s d should be applied “with respect to
    APP-China” and Commerce declined to do so because the differential pricing methodology was not
    in effect at the time of the Final Determination. RR2 at 25. To analyze the extent of the alleged
    targeted dumping, Commerce therefore applied the targeted dumping test that was in effect at the
    time of the Final Determination based on the Steel Nails test.26 From the result thereof, Commerce
    determined it was appropriate to continue to apply the A-A methodology to all of APP-China’s sales
    to calculate its dumping margin because even after accepting APP-China’s purchase prices from
    Thailand, the dumping margin continues to be de minimis under either A-A methodology applied
    to all sales or A-T methodology applied only to targeted sales in accordance with the Limiting Rule.
    The petitioners argue Commerce’s reasoning is flawed. They contend that on second
    remand they highlighted to Commerce the extent to which APP-China engaged in targeted dumping
    25
    (...continued)
    remained the same from that of the first remand results because the change in the margin calculation
    affected only normal values and not U.S. prices, which is the case “regardless of whether the
    Department accepted any of the MEP input prices”. RR2 at 25 (italics added). The court remains
    unclear as to what this implies, for Commerce does not here state “all”, cf. RR1 at 5, , and the issue
    of MEP inputs from Thailand is being 
    remanded, supra
    .
    26
    See Certain Steel Nails from the People's Republic of China: Final Determination of Sales
    at Less Than Fair Value and Partial Affirmative Determination of Critical Circumstances, 73 Fed.
    Reg. 33977 (June 16, 2008) and accompanying issues and decision memorandum at comments 1
    through 8; Certain Steel Nails from the United Arab Emirates: Notice of Final Determination of
    Sales at Not Less than Fair Value, 73 Fed. Reg. 33985 (June 16, 2008) and accompanying issues and
    decision memorandum at comments 1 through 8. “Under the Department’s Steel Nails test, the
    extent of an alleged targeted dumping is measured by dividing the total quantity of the targeted sales
    which passed the gap test by the total quantity of a respondent’s U.S. sales. In this case, record
    evidence shows that the percentage of alleged targeted sales with respect to APP-China’s total U.S.
    sales when the Department accepted the MEP prices from both . . . Korea and Thailand in the First
    Remand Redetermination does not change when the Department accepted the MEP prices only from
    Thailand in this instant remand.” RR2 at 25 n.116 (italics added). 
    Cf. supra
    , section II.B.3.b.
    Consol. Court No. 10-00371                                                                    Page 24
    and noted Commerce’s statement when it promulgated its targeted dumping regulation that “where
    a firm engages extensively in the practice of targeted dumping[ ] the only adequate yardstick
    available to measure such pricing behavior may be the average-to-transaction methodology.”
    Petitioners’ Comments on Second Remand Redetermination at 3-8, quoting Antidumping Duties;
    Countervailing Duties, 62 Fed. Reg. 27296, 27375 (May 19, 1997) (final rule). They contended they
    had undertaken the Cohen’s d test as an “additional means” of examining the extent to which
    APP-China engaged in targeted dumping, 
    id. at 5-7,
    and that based on this information they
    requested Commerce to consider the data and employ the alternate methodology to determine
    dumping for APP-China. 
    Id. at 8.
    At this stage, they argue that Commerce’s refusal to apply the
    Cohen’s d test to measure even the pervasiveness of targeted dumping, on the ground that “the
    differential pricing methodology was not in effect at the time of the Final Determination,” RR2 at
    25, misses the point, because at the time of the Final Determination there was no test for
    determining when the exception to the Limiting Rule applied. They argue here that they did not ask
    Commerce to replace the Nails test for targeted dumping used in the investigation with the
    alternative “differential pricing” methodology, which came into being shortly before (and
    unbeknownst to the court at) issuance of Gold East I in 2013, but rather, because Commerce must
    now, for the first time in this case, adopt a test for determining “pervasiveness” under the old
    targeted dumping methodology. They contend they explained to Commerce that for that purpose,
    it is reasonable to use the standard that is currently in use in differential pricing methodology. Cf.,
    note 
    21, supra
    . The petitioners here argue that Commerce provided no reasonable explanation for
    why it should not utilize the Cohen’s d test for the limited purpose of determining “pervasiveness,”
    Consol. Court No. 10-00371                                                                      Page 25
    nor did Commerce explain why the test it actually used in the first redetermination -- which was
    essentially “we know it when we see it” -- is superior to the Cohen’s d test. For these reasons as well
    as ignoring the request of Gold East II, 39 CIT at ___, 
    991 F. Supp. 2d
    at 1369, they argue the
    second remand redetermination is unsupported by substantial evidence and is not in accordance with
    law. Remedially, they contend the targeted dumping by APP-China should have been found
    “pervasive” and the exception to the Limiting Rule should have applied. Petitioners’ Comments
    on Second Remand Redetermination at 25.
    2. Analysis
    The fact that the court did not rule in Gold East II in favor of the petitioners on their
    targeted dumping arguments does not result in construing that they were ruled against. The opinion
    simply did not reach their arguments. Here, however, the court disagrees with the petitioners’
    premise that “pervasiveness” is a new issue that Steel Nails did not test for, as Commerce explained
    that the Steel Nails test addresses that question.27
    On the other hand, the agency’s position is that it was necessary to apply the Steel
    Nails methodology because that was the test in effect at the time of the original investigation. It is
    unclear from the papers whether that was by choice, or because Commerce believed it was
    compelled to do so in consequence of Gold East I. Cf., e.g., Def’s Resp. at 9-10. Either way, insofar
    27
    See id; see also Antidumping Duties; Countervailing Duties, 61 Fed. Reg. 7308, 7350
    (Feb. 27, 1996), and Antidumping Duties; Countervailing Duties, 62 Fed. Reg. 27296, 27375 (May
    19, 1997) (Preamble) (it is appropriate to depart from the default rule when: (1) “targeted dumping
    by a firm is so pervasive that the average-to-transaction method becomes the best benchmark for
    gauging the fairness of that firm’s pricing practices,” or (2) “the targeted dumping practice is so
    widespread it may be administratively impractical to segregate targeted dumping pricing from the
    normal pricing behavior of the company”) (italics added).
    Consol. Court No. 10-00371                                                                    Page 26
    as APP-China is concerned, Gold East I only decided that the Limiting Rule was still effective for
    purposes of the investigation. Whether the record compels that the Limiting Rule be excepted is a
    different matter, as the defendant also seems to recognize. Cf., e.g., 
    id. As the
    matter stands,
    Commerce’s indication of the “proper” methodology to apply in order to answer that question
    reveals a concept of administrative finality that is at odds with this court’s general understanding of
    that concept, pursuant to which the application of changes or developments in methodology with
    respect to matters outstanding before the agency have generally been held appropriate -- indeed,
    encouraged -- on the assumption that current methodology is the result of refinement, and interest
    in the application of particular methodology generally does not “vest” without demonstrative reliance
    upon it. See, e.g., Ugine and Alz Belgium, N.V. v. United States, 
    31 CIT 1536
    , 1553, 
    517 F. Supp. 2d
    1333, 1347 (2007) (“[i]n the trade context, administrative finality attaches when entries are
    liquidated, not when the administrative review closes”); Brother Industries, Ltd. v. United States,
    
    15 CIT 332
    , 
    771 F. Supp. 374
    (1991) (reliance must be evident from the record). Compare Final
    Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determinations: Certain Steel Products From Mexico, 58 Fed. Reg.
    37352, 37355 (July 9, 1993) (explaining immediate application of change in how hyperinflation is
    analyzed) with British Steel PLC v. United States, 
    127 F.3d 1471
    (Fed. Cir. 1997) (upholding the
    immediate application of that change as reasonably explained). Cf. also, e.g., Tung Mung Dev. Co.
    v. United States, 
    354 F.3d 1371
    , 1378-79 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (any errors in remand orders do not
    survive ITA decisions to adopt a new policy; the Supreme Court “has repeatedly emphasized[ ] the
    Chevron doctrine contemplates that agencies can and will abandon existing policies and substitute
    new approaches” as necessary, including on remand); SKF USA Inc. v. United States, 
    254 F.3d 1022
    ,
    Consol. Court No. 10-00371                                                                    Page 27
    1030 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“an agency must be allowed to assess ‘the wisdom of its policy on a
    continuing basis’”, quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 
    467 U.S. 837
    , 864 (1984)); Allegheny Ludlum Corp. v. United States, 
    367 F.3d 1339
    (Fed. Cir. 2004)
    (discussing new methodologies applied on remand to Commerce); Union Steel Manufacturing Co.,
    Ltd. v. United States, 36 CIT ___, ___, 
    837 F. Supp. 2d 1307
    , 1323-24 (2012) (granting voluntary
    remand to reconsider cost-recovery methodology in light of intervening case law); United States
    Steel Corp. v. United States, 36 CIT ___, Slip Op. 12-48 (Apr. 11, 2012) at 8 (“[t]o the extent [the
    defendant] is arguing ITA’s hands were tied by a ‘record rule’ vis-à-vis application of its new policy
    to a matter remanded for reconsideration, the argument misstates the law”) (citations omitted), aff’d,
    500 Fed. Appx. 948 (Fed. Cir. 2013); AG der Dillinger Huttenwerke v. United States, 
    26 CIT 298
    ,
    319, 
    193 F. Supp. 2d 1339
    , 1361 (2002) (“under its own practices, Commerce may choose or not
    choose to apply current law in a review as circumstances warrant” and remanding for findings to
    support refusal to apply then-current methodologies ) (italics added); 
    id., 26 CIT
    at 320, 
    193 F. Supp. 2d
    at 1362 (further remanding refusal to consider altering change-of-ownership methodology on
    grounds articulated).28 It may be the case that Cohen’s d is not better suited to answering the
    28
    It is also noted that Commerce also had the authority on remand to depart from
    “established” methodology so long as it reasonably explains the circumstances that compel that
    departure, as the petitioners imply -- e.g., NMB Singapore Ltd. v. United States, 
    557 F.3d 1316
    , 1328
    (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“[o]nce Commerce establishes a course of action . . . Commerce is obliged to
    follow it until Commerce provides a sufficient, reasoned analysis explaining why a change is
    necessary”) -- and Commerce implicitly argued that its then-existing targeted-dumping methodology
    should not even be considered “established” despite its public announcement in 1997. Cf.
    Withdrawal of the Regulatory Provisions Governing Targeted Dumping in Antidumping Duty
    Investigations, 73 Fed. Reg. 74930, 74930-31 (Dec. 10, 2008) (“Until recently, there have been very
    few allegations or findings of targeted dumping. This situation has caused the Department to
    question whether, in the absence of any practical experience, it established an appropriate balance
    (continued...)
    Consol. Court No. 10-00371                                                                   Page 28
    “pervasiveness” question in accordance with Commerce’s prior regulation than its Steel Nails test,
    but analysis of pervasiveness appears distinct from the “normal” targeted dumping “remedy”
    articulated in the Limiting Rule. Further clarification from Commerce is therefore requested.
    Conclusion
    In view of the foregoing, the case needs to be remanded a third time. Results shall
    be due July 10, 2015. As soon as practicable after such results are docketed, the parties shall confer
    on filing a joint status report or proposed scheduling order for comments, if any, on the results of
    remand, and the plaintiffs shall apprise the Clerk of the Court of such efforts in writing by close of
    the fifth business day thereafter.
    So ordered.
    /s/ R. Kenton Musgrave
    R. Kenton Musgrave, Senior Judge
    Dated: April 22, 2015
    New York, New York
    28
    (...continued)
    of interests in the provisions. The Department believes that withdrawal of the provisions will
    provide the agency with an opportunity to analyze extensively the concept of targeted dumping and
    develop a meaningful practice in this area as it gains experience in evaluating such allegations.” 73
    Fed. Reg. at 74930-31. But to the extent that implies Commerce has had the ability to “moot” the
    application of the Limiting Rule during this proceeding all along, that still does not translate to
    procedural “harmless error” in that rule’s withdrawal without proper notice and comment. Cf., e.g.,
    Consumer Energy Council of America v. FERC, 
    673 F.2d 425
    , 445-48 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (litigation
    not mooted by revocation not in compliance with APA notice and comment). Cf. Gold East I.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: Consol. 10-00371

Citation Numbers: 2015 CIT 37, 61 F. Supp. 3d 1289, 37 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1312, 2015 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 36, 2015 WL 1812939

Judges: Musgrave

Filed Date: 4/22/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/7/2024

Authorities (36)

Peer Bearing Co.-Changshan v. United States , 27 Ct. Int'l Trade 1763 ( 2003 )

Massachusetts Trustees of Eastern Gas & Fuel Associates v. ... , 84 S. Ct. 1236 ( 1964 )

Sichuan Changhong Electric Co. v. United States , 30 Ct. Int'l Trade 1481 ( 2006 )

Parkdale International, Ltd. v. United States , 31 Ct. Int'l Trade 1229 ( 2007 )

ALZ N v. v. United States , 27 Ct. Int'l Trade 1265 ( 2003 )

United States v. Cortez , 101 S. Ct. 690 ( 1981 )

Braniff Airways, Incorporated v. Civil Aeronautics Board, ... , 379 F.2d 453 ( 1967 )

tung-mung-development-co-ltd-and-yieh-united-steel-corporation-v , 354 F.3d 1371 ( 2004 )

Al Tech Speciality Steel Corp. v. United States , 6 Ct. Int'l Trade 245 ( 1983 )

AG Der Dillinger Huttenwerke v. United States , 26 Ct. Int'l Trade 298 ( 2002 )

Brother Industries, Ltd. v. United States , 15 Ct. Int'l Trade 332 ( 1991 )

Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc. v. State ... , 103 S. Ct. 2856 ( 1983 )

China National MacHinery Import & Export Corp. v. United ... , 27 Ct. Int'l Trade 1553 ( 2003 )

Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, ... , 104 S. Ct. 2778 ( 1984 )

MTZ Polyfilms, Ltd. v. United States , 33 Ct. Int'l Trade 1575 ( 2009 )

Canadian Wheat Board v. United States , 641 F.3d 1344 ( 2011 )

jose-a-orengo-caraballo-wilfred-santiago-santiago-comite-de-apoyo-a-los , 11 F.3d 186 ( 1993 )

Dave Fleischer, Etc. v. W. P. I. X., Inc. , 371 U.S. 16 ( 1962 )

natural-resources-defense-council-inc-1725-i-street-nw-suite-600 , 683 F.2d 752 ( 1982 )

sagebrush-rebellion-inc-v-donald-p-hodel-secretary-of-the-interior , 790 F.2d 760 ( 1986 )

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