TMK IPSCO v. United States , 222 F. Supp. 3d 1306 ( 2017 )


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  •                                        Slip Op. 17-54
    UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
    TMK IPSCO ET AL.,
    Plaintiffs and Consolidated Plaintiffs,
    and
    MAVERICK TUBE CORPORATION ET AL.,
    Plaintiff-Intervenors and Consolidated
    Plaintiff-Intervenors,
    Before: Claire R. Kelly, Judge
    v.
    Consol. Court No. 10-00055
    UNITED STATES,
    Defendant,
    and
    TIANJIN PIPE (GROUP) CORP. AND TIANJIN
    PIPE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC &
    TRADING CORP.,
    Defendant-Intervenors and
    Consolidated Defendant-Intervenors.
    OPINION
    [Sustaining the remand results issued by the U.S. Department of Commerce concerning
    its final determination in the countervailing duty investigation of certain oil country tubular
    goods from the People’s Republic of China.]
    Dated: May 3, 2017
    Roger Brian Schagrin, Christopher Todd Cloutier, John Winthrop Bohn, Jordan Charles
    Kahn, and Paul Wright Jameson, Schagrin Associates, of Washington, DC, for plaintiffs
    and consolidated plaintiff-intervenors TMK IPSCO, V&M Star L.P., Wheatland Tube
    Corp., Evraz Rocky Mountain Steel, and United Steelworkers.
    Consol. Court No. 10-00055                                                       Page 2
    Alan Hayden Price and Robert Edward DeFrancesco, III, Wiley Rein, LLP, of Washington,
    DC, for consolidated plaintiff and consolidated plaintiff-intervenor Maverick Tube
    Corporation.
    Debbie Leilani Shon, Jon David Corey, Jonathan Gordon Cooper, and Kelsey Marie Rule,
    Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, of Washington, DC, for consolidated plaintiff
    and consolidated plaintiff-intervenor United States Steel Corporation.
    Loren Misha Preheim, Assistant Director, U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division,
    Commercial Litigation Branch, of Washington, DC. for defendant. With him on the brief
    were Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Jeanne E. Davidson, Director,
    and Claudia Burke, Assistant Director. Of counsel on the brief was Shelby Mitchell
    Anderson, Attorney, U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of the Chief Counsel for Trade
    Enforcement & Compliance, of Washington, DC.
    Daniel Lewis Porter, William Henry Barringer, and Matthew Paul McCullough, Curtis
    Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle LLP, of Washington, DC, for defendant-intervenors and
    consolidated defendant-intervenors.
    Kelly, Judge: Before the court for review is the U.S. Department of Commerce’s
    (“Department” or “Commerce”) Final Results of Redetermination Pursuant to Court
    Remand filed pursuant to the court’s decision in TMK IPSCO v. United States, 40 CIT __,
    __, 
    179 F. Supp. 3d 1328
     (2016). See Final Results of Redetermination Pursuant to
    Court Remand, Dec. 21, 2016, ECF No. 171 (“Remand Results”). The court remanded
    Commerce’s final determination in its countervailing duty (“CVD”) investigation of certain
    oil country tubular goods (“OCTG”) from the People’s Republic of China (“China”) to
    explain or reconsider its determinations: (1) to use China’s World Trade Organization
    (“WTO”) accession date as a cut-off for identifying and measuring countervailable
    subsidies; (2) to include two disparate freight rates in Commerce’s benchmark price for
    the benefit conferred by the provision of steel rounds for less than adequate remuneration
    (“LTAR”) as representative of what an importer would pay; (3) to attribute subsidies
    received by Changbao Precision Steel Tube Co., Ltd. (“Precision”) to its parent company
    Consol. Court No. 10-00055                                                                 Page 3
    Jiangsu Changbao Steel Tube Co., Ltd. (“Changbao”) and to all of Changbao’s other
    subsidiaries; (4) to attribute subsidies received by four subsidiaries of Tianjin Pipe (Group)
    Corp. (“TPCO”) to sales of other subsidiaries of TPCO; (5) that the provision of steel
    rounds and billets at LTAR is tied to sales of seamless steel pipe; and (6) to include the
    Steel Business Briefing (“SBB”) “East Asia” benchmark data for billets in the benchmark
    calculation for the provision of steel rounds and billets. See TMK IPSCO, 40 CIT at __,
    179 F. Supp. 3d at 1335; see generally Certain Oil Country Tubular Goods From the
    People’s Republic of China, 
    74 Fed. Reg. 64,045
     (Dep’t Commerce Dec. 7, 2009) (final
    affirmative countervailing duty determination, final negative critical circumstances
    determination) (“Final Results”) and accompanying Issues and Decision Memorandum
    for the Final Determination in the Countervailing Duty Investigation of Certain Oil Country
    Tubular Goods (“OCTG”) from the People’s Republic of China, PD 318 (Nov. 23, 2009)
    (“Final Decision Memo”). 1        Commerce’s Remand Results adequately address the
    concerns raised in the court’s prior decision, and Commerce’s revised results are
    supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, the Remand Results are sustained.
    1
    On May 12, 2010, Defendant submitted indices to the public and confidential administrative
    records for its final results, which identify the documents that comprise the public and confidential
    administrative records to the Commerce’s final determination. The indices to the public and
    confidential administrative records to Commerce’s final determination can be located at ECF No.
    40. On January 3, 2017, Defendant submitted indices to the public and confidential administrative
    records for its Remand Results, which identify documents that comprise the public and
    confidential administrative records to Commerce’s Remand Results. Those indices can be
    located at ECF Nos. 173-1 and 173-2, respectively. All further references to the documents from
    the administrative records to the final results and the remand results are identified by the numbers
    assigned by Commerce in these administrative records.
    Consol. Court No. 10-00055                                                                Page 4
    BACKGROUND
    The court presumes familiarity with the facts as discussed in TMK IPSCO.
    Nevertheless, the court briefly summarizes facts relevant to the discussion here for ease
    of reference. First, in its final determination, Commerce declined to identify and measure
    non-recurring subsidies alleged in the petition to have predated China’s accession to the
    WTO on December 11, 2001 because Commerce concluded that it could not identify and
    measure subsidies prior to that date. See Final Decision Memo at 53. The court held
    that Commerce did not articulate a relationship between China’s WTO accession date
    and the implementation of reforms that would enable Commerce to identify and measure
    countervailable subsidies.      TMK IPSCO, 40 CIT at __, 179 F. Supp. 3d at 1343.
    Therefore, the court held that Commerce failed to countervail all identifiable and
    measurable subsidies, as the statute requires it to do. See id.; see generally Section
    701(f) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, 
    19 U.S.C. § 1671
    (f)(1)–(2) (2012). 2 The
    court remanded to Commerce to
    investigate each subsidy program and allocate subsidies beginning on the
    first date it could identify and measure the subsidy considering the particular
    program in question and the impact of relevant economic reforms on that
    program.
    TMK IPSCO, 40 CIT at __, 179 F. Supp. 3d at 1344.
    2
    Although this countervailing duty investigation was initiated on April 28, 2009, the 2012 version
    of 
    19 U.S.C. § 1671
    (f) applies here because the March 13, 2012 amendment to the statute applies
    to all countervailing duty proceedings initiated on or after November 20, 2006 and all civil actions
    relating to such proceedings. See Section 701 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, 
    19 U.S.C. § 1671
     note (2012) (Effective and Applicability Provisions 2012 Acts). All further citations to the
    Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, are to the relevant provisions of Title 19 of the U.S. Code, 2006
    edition unless otherwise indicated.
    Consol. Court No. 10-00055                                                         Page 5
    Second, Commerce included ocean freight quotes from both Maersk and an
    unaffiliated freight forwarder used by mandatory respondent Zhejiang Jianli Enterprise
    Co., Ltd. (“Jianli”) to generate an average price for ocean freight in calculating its world
    market price benchmark to measure the adequacy of remuneration for steel rounds
    provided to Jianli in its final determination. See Final Decision Memo at 84. The court
    remanded the issue to Commerce to reconsider or further explain its decision to use an
    average of these two freight quotes because Commerce had inadequately explained how
    both quotes could be representative given the significant disparity between them. See
    TMK IPSCO, 40 CIT at __, 179 F. Supp. 3d at 1350–51.
    Third, Commerce included monthly export pricing data for billets from SBB “East
    Asia” among the data included in its benchmark calculation for determining the adequacy
    of remuneration of the provision of steel rounds and billets in its final determination. See
    Final Decision Memo at 77. The court granted Commerce’s request for a remand to allow
    it to reconsider its determination to include the SBB “East Asia” series pricing data in its
    benchmark calculation. See TMK IPSCO, 40 CIT at __, 179 F. Supp. 3d at 1347.
    Fourth, Commerce attributed subsidies received by Precision to Changbao,
    Precision’s parent company, and to all of Changbao’s other subsidiaries. See Final
    Decision Memo at 8. Commerce likewise attributed or cumulated subsidies received by
    four of TPCO’s subsidiaries to the consolidated sales of TPCO and all of its subsidiaries.
    See Final Decision Memo at 9 (citing Certain Oil Country Tubular Goods From the
    People’s Republic of China, 
    74 Fed. Reg. 47,210
    , 47,215 (Dep’t Commerce Sept. 15,
    2009) (preliminary affirmative countervailing duty determination, preliminary negative
    Consol. Court No. 10-00055                                                            Page 6
    critical circumstances determination) (“Prelim. Results”). The court held that 
    19 C.F.R. § 351.525
    (b)(6)(iii) (2009)3 does not give Commerce authority to attribute subsidies
    received by a subsidiary to the consolidated sales of the parent company’s other
    subsidiaries. TMK IPSCO, 40 CIT at __, 179 F. Supp. 3d at 1357. The court remanded
    to Commerce to explain what other authority allows it to attribute subsidies received by
    certain subsidiaries of Changbao and TPCO to the consolidated sales of all subsidiaries
    of each respective company or reconsider its determination. Id., 40 CIT at __, 179 F.
    Supp. 3d at 1358.
    Lastly, in its final determination, Commerce attributed the provision of steel rounds
    to TPCO’s consolidated sales of all merchandise, not just to its sales of seamless steel
    pipe products. See Final Decision Memo 128–29. The court held that Commerce’s
    attribution decision is not supported by substantial evidence because the court could not
    “discern whether Commerce determined that the provision of steel rounds at LTAR is tied
    to sales of seamless pipe.” TMK IPSCO, 40 CIT at __, 179 F. Supp. 3d at 1359. The
    court remanded Commerce’s determination to determine whether its tying regulation
    applies to TPCO and support its determination with record evidence. See id.
    In its remand determination Commerce makes the following determinations.
    Under protest, Commerce no longer adopts China’s WTO accession date as a uniform
    date when subsidy programs were identifiable and measurable in China. 4 See Remand
    3
    Further references to the Code of Federal Regulations are to the 2009 edition.
    4
    The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that Defendant may preserve its standing to
    pursue an appeal even though Defendant may technically be the prevailing party by adopting a
    position “under protest”. See Viraj Grp., Ltd. v. United States, 
    343 F.3d 1371
    , 1376 (Fed. Cir.
    2003).
    Consol. Court No. 10-00055                                                      Page 7
    Results 11. Instead, Commerce identified four categories of programs alleged in the
    petition to assess when “a sufficiently developed legal framework relevant” to each
    existed such that Commerce could appropriately evaluate whether a subsidy had been
    bestowed. See Remand Results 11, 13–19. Commerce applies the benefit conferred on
    the earliest date when the government bestowal was identifiable or measurable. See 
    id.
    at 31–35. Commerce continues to use the ocean freight quotes provided by Maersk and
    by Jianli’s freight forwarder. See id. at 42. Commerce reverses its prior conclusion
    regarding the attribution of subsidies received by TPCO’s and Changbao’s subsidiaries.
    See id. at 38–39. Commerce maintains its determination to attribute steel rounds and
    billets provided at LTAR program to TPCO’s applicable total sales and not solely to sales
    of seamless steel pipe. See id. at 46. Finally, Commerce excludes the SBB East Asia
    pricing data from its benchmark calculation for steel rounds. See id. at 48.
    Commerce’s changes in approach resulted in revised subsidy rates for all
    mandatory respondents and for all respondents not individually investigated.        See
    Remand Results 56. On remand, Commerce assigned mandatory respondents the
    following subsidy rates: (1) Changbao a subsidy rate of 28.70%; (2) Jianli a subsidy rate
    of 30.56%; (3) TPCO a subsidy rate of 21.48%; (4) Wuxi a subsidy rate of 29.48%. Id.
    For all other exporters not individually investigated, Commerce assigned a subsidy rate
    of 27.08%.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    The court continues to have jurisdiction pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(2)(B)(i)
    and 
    28 U.S.C. § 1581
    (c) (2006), which grant the court authority to review actions
    Consol. Court No. 10-00055                                                           Page 8
    contesting the final determination in an investigation of a CVD order. See 19 U.S.C.
    § 1516a(a)(2)(B)(i); 
    28 U.S.C. § 1581
    (c) (2012). “The court shall hold unlawful any
    determination, finding, or conclusion found . . . to be unsupported by substantial evidence
    on the record, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i).
    “The results of a redetermination pursuant to court remand are also reviewed ‘for
    compliance with the court’s remand order.’” Xinjiamei Furniture (Zhangzhou) Co. v.
    United States, 38 CIT __, __, 
    968 F. Supp. 2d 1255
    , 1259 (2014) (quoting Nakornthai
    Strip Mill Public Co. v. United States, 
    32 CIT 1272
    , 1274, 
    587 F. Supp. 2d 1303
    , 1306
    (2008)).
    DISCUSSION
    I. Commerce’s Evaluation of Non-Recurring Subsidy Programs
    In TMK IPSCO, the court held that by cutting off its investigation and measurement
    of subsidies on December 11, 2001, the date China acceded to the WTO, Commerce had
    failed to countervail all identifiable and measurable subsidies, as the statute requires it to
    do. See id.; see generally 
    19 U.S.C. § 1671
    (f)(1)–(2). The court remanded to Commerce
    to investigate each subsidy program and allocate subsidies beginning on the first date it
    could identify and measure the subsidy considering the particular program in question
    and the impact of relevant economic reforms on that program. TMK IPSCO, 40 CIT at
    __, 179 F. Supp. 3d at 1344. Consolidated Plaintiff, United States Steel Corporation
    (“U.S. Steel”), contends that Commerce’s determination on remand to evaluate the
    subsidy programs in the petition by type of program does not comply with the court’s order
    that Commerce investigate “each subsidy program and allocate subsidies beginning on
    Consol. Court No. 10-00055                                                        Page 9
    the first date it could identify and measure the subsidy considering the particular program
    in question.”   United States Steel Corporation’s Comments Def.’s Final Results of
    Redetermination Pursuant to Remand Order 3–6, Jan. 23, 2017, ECF. No. 174 (“U.S.
    Steel Remand Comments”).         Alternatively, U.S. Steel argues even if Commerce’s
    approach of evaluating subsidy programs by type is legally supported, Commerce’s
    conclusions about when credit-oriented subsidy programs and land-oriented subsidy
    programs were first identifiable and measurable are unsupported by substantial evidence.
    U.S. Steel Remand Comments 6–7. Commerce’s evaluation of subsidy programs in this
    investigation is reasonable and consistent with its statutory obligations. Commerce’s
    conclusions as to when credit-oriented and land-oriented subsidy programs were first
    identifiable and measurable are also supported by substantial evidence.
    Commerce generally must impose countervailing duties on merchandise from a
    non-market economy (“NME”) country if Commerce makes the findings necessary to
    countervail a subsidy more generally under the statute. See 
    19 U.S.C. § 1671
    (f)(1)
    (2012); see also 
    19 U.S.C. §§ 1677
    (5)–(5A) (2006) (setting forth the determinations
    Commerce must make before imposing a CVD generally). However, Commerce need
    not countervail a subsidy imported from a NME country if Commerce determines it cannot
    identify and measure the subsidy in question “because the economy of that country is
    essentially comprised of a single entity.” See 
    19 U.S.C. § 1671
    (f)(2) (2012). Commerce
    has significant discretion in determining whether it can identify and measure subsidies
    provided by the government or a public entity within the NME country because the statute
    is silent as to when Commerce can identify and measure a subsidy. See 19 U.S.C.
    Consol. Court No. 10-00055                                                              Page 10
    § 1671(f)(1)–(2) (2012). Normally, a reviewing court should not disrupt the agency’s
    exercise of discretion in fashioning an approach to a problem delegated to it unless the
    agency has not supplied a reasoned basis for its action. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n
    of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
    463 U.S. 29
    , 43 (1983) (citations omitted).
    Nonetheless, the “agency must cogently explain why it has exercised its discretion in a
    given manner.” 
    Id. at 48
     (citations omitted).
    On remand Commerce articulated a rational relationship between specific legal
    reforms in China and the effect of such reforms on Commerce’s ability to identify and
    measure subsidies. 5      See Remand Results 13–19.            Commerce “assessed when a
    sufficiently developed legal framework relevant to th[e] particular type of subsidy existed
    that would enable [it] to identify the sphere of commercial activity involved, the economic
    actors involved and the government action required to bestow that type of subsidy.” Id.
    at 11. Commerce identified four types of subsidies alleged in the petition: grants, credit-
    oriented subsidies, tax-related subsidies and land-oriented subsidies. See id. at 11–19.
    Commerce explained that it evaluated each type of non-recurring subsidy to determine
    when China first developed a sufficient “legal framework relevant to that particular type of
    subsidy . . . that would enable [it] to identify the sphere of commercial activity involved,
    the economic actors involved and the government action required to bestow that type of
    subsidy.” Remand Results 11.
    5
    Commerce only evaluated the countervailability of programs that provided a non-recurring
    benefit as early as 1994 because it only allocates the benefit conferred of a non-recurring subsidy
    program over the average useful life of the assets involved. See 
    19 C.F.R. § 351.401
    (a)–(b). The
    average useful life of the assets used in the production of subject merchandise was 15 years.
    Remand Results 12.
    Consol. Court No. 10-00055                                                      Page 11
    Commerce determined that grant programs could first be identified and measured
    as of 1994. Id. at 14. Commerce reasoned that the first Company Law took effect in
    1994, which marks a point “where distinct economic actors were legally extended the
    flexibility to engage in commercial activity” for the first time. Id. Commerce concluded
    that credit-oriented subsidies could be identified and measured starting from 1996, which
    Commerce grounded in two economic reforms: the 1995 Commercial Bank Law and the
    1996 General Rules on Loans. Id. at 15–16. Commerce deduced that the former reform
    defined a commercial bank, made commercial banks legally responsible for their own
    profits and losses, and afforded commercial banks legal autonomy from the state in
    certain matters. Id. at 15. Commerce resolved that the General Rules on Loans set out
    legal rights and obligations for lenders and borrowers.       Id. at 15–16.   Commerce
    concluded that both reforms were necessary to “identify distinct legal economic actors in
    the credit market as well as to examine specific loans and potential forgiveness of such
    loans.” Id. at 16. Commerce determined that “it may have been able to evaluate the
    countervailability of tax-related subsidies” starting from 1994. Id. at 18. Commerce
    supported its decision by highlighting that before the entry into force of a series of tax
    laws, including regulations regarding the value-added tax, consumption taxes, business
    taxes, enterprise income taxes, individual income taxes, and resources, China lacked a
    comprehensive legal framework that would be necessary to identify tax payers and
    assess and collect taxes. Id. at 16. Commerce also explained that the adoption of the
    Foreign Trade Law on May 12, 1994 allowed all individuals and legal persons to engage
    in foreign trade, which had been restricted to a monopoly of state-trading enterprises
    Consol. Court No. 10-00055                                                          Page 12
    managed by a Chinese government ministry before the Foreign Trade Law took effect.
    Remand Results 17. Therefore, Commerce implied that, prior to the adoption of the
    Foreign Trade Law, individual actors could not have taken advantage of certain tax-
    related subsidies. See id. Lastly, Commerce discerned that it could identify and measure
    land-oriented subsidies as of 1999. Id. at 19. Commerce resolved that until 1999, the
    year that both the Revised Land Administration Law and its implementing regulations
    came into effect, the Chinese government had not established the legal framework for the
    basic elements of land transactions. See id. Therefore, Commerce has articulated a
    logical relationship between specific types of Chinese reforms and the legal conditions
    necessary to permit Commerce to identify and measure countervailable subsidies for
    individual actors within the Chinese economy.
    For programs that Commerce determined were established prior to December 11,
    2001, Commerce next proceeded to consider each specific subsidy program alleged in
    the petition to determine the extent to which any investigated programs may have
    provided a benefit prior to December 11, 2001. 6 See id. at 19–35. Depending upon the
    6 Commerce did not change its determination with respect to the identification and measurement
    of certain non-recurring subsidy programs that it determined based on record information had
    been established after December 11, 2001 because the full benefit conferred by such programs
    had already been assessed and applied in Commerce’s final determination. See Remand Results
    20–25.
    Specifically, the subsidy programs that Commerce determined were unaffected by its
    application of the December 11, 2001 cut-off date include: (1) Tianjin Binhai New Area; (2) the
    Tianjin Economic and Technological Development Area (Science and Technology Fund); (3) the
    Sub-central Government Programs to Promote Famous Export Brands and China World Top
    Brands; (4) the Jiangsu Province Brands; (5) the Stamp Exemption on Share Transfers Under
    Non-Tradeable Share Reform: (6) the Foreign Trade Development Fund (Northeast Revitalization
    (footnote continued)
    Consol. Court No. 10-00055                                                          Page 13
    extent of the information available on the record, Commerce determined that each
    program conferred a benefit either based on facts otherwise available or adverse facts
    available (“AFA”) because neither the Government of China (“GOC”) nor the mandatory
    respondents responded to additional questionnaires issued by Commerce. 7                  See
    Remand Results 25–29.         Although Commerce analyzed the programs by creating
    categories, Commerce grouped programs together by category because it concluded that
    the nature of the government bestowals are similar for the individual programs examined
    under each type. 8 See id. at 50. Commerce states that “[t]he next step in the process
    Program); (7) the Five Points, One Line Program; (8) the Forgiveness of Tax Arrears For
    Enterprises in the Old Industrial of Northeast China; (9) the Debt-to-Equity Swap for Pangang;
    (10) the Bohai Fund’s equity infusion in TPCO; (11) the Exemptions for State Owned Enterprises
    from Distributing Dividents to the State; (12) all lending programs offered through government
    entities; and (13) the VAT and Tariff Exemptions for the Purchase of Fixed Assets Under the
    Foreign Trade Development Fund. See id.
    7
    Although 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(a)–(b) and 
    19 C.F.R. § 351.308
    (a)–(c) each separately provide for
    the use of facts otherwise available and the subsequent application of an adverse inference to
    those facts, Commerce uses the shorthand term “adverse facts available” or “AFA” to refer to
    Commerce’s use of such facts otherwise available with an adverse inference. See, e.g., Remand
    Results 27–35.
    Commerce requested information regarding the alleged subsidy programs for other
    programs alleged in the petition for which it lacked information to determine whether they had
    begun prior to December 11, 2001 by sending questionnaires to the Government of China
    (“GOC”) and to the mandatory respondents. See 
    id.
     at 4 (citing Letter Pertaining to GOC
    Questionnaire, Rem. PD 2, bar code 3490597-01 (July 25, 2016); Letter Pertaining to Jianli
    Questionnaire, Rem PD 3, bar code 3490598-01 (July 25, 2016); Letter Pertaining to TPCO
    Questionnaire, Rem. PD 4, bar code 3490600-01 (July 25, 2016); Letter Pertaining to Wuxi
    Questionnaire, Rem. PD 5, bar code 3490602-01 (July 25, 2016)). Commerce states that it
    received no responses to its request for information. Remand Results 19 (citing Memorandum
    Pertaining to Changbao, Jianli, TPCO, Wuxi Status of Respondent Representation, Rem. PD 7,
    bar code 3591043-01 (July 27, 2016)). As a result, Commerce based its CVD rates for these
    programs on AFA in its Remand Results.
    8
    For example, Commerce first determined identifying and measuring grants does not require a
    “specific legal framework guiding government action,” but does require that Commerce can
    “identify distinct economic actors.” Remand Results 13. Commerce then identified that the entry
    into force of the first Company Law in 1994, which recognized the legal standing of privatized
    (footnote continued)
    Consol. Court No. 10-00055                                                               Page 14
    would have been to evaluate the countervailability of each program from the starting point
    or year established for a particular category.” Id. at 50. It is reasonably discernible that
    Commerce categorized the investigated programs by type in order to efficiently allocate
    its resources. See id.
    Lacking information on the record for certain subsidy programs alleged in the
    petition, Commerce applied an adverse inference that they were in effect prior to
    December 11, 2001 and that the respondents benefited from the program. 9 Remand
    Results 31. Commerce used its standard AFA rate selection methodology to apply an
    AFA rate for these individual programs. 10 Id. at 31–35. For the State Key Technology
    firms and “setting forth principles of business autonomy, responsibility for profits and losses, and
    right to own assets,” represents the threshold where China transitioned “to a phase of economic
    development where distinct economic actors were legally extended the flexibility to engage in
    commercial activity.” See id. at 14–15. Therefore, it is reasonably discernible that Commerce
    concludes that identifying and measuring all grants requires it to identify benefits to distinct
    economic actors and match such benefits to individual economic actors. See id.
    9
    Specifically, Commerce applied an adverse inference that the following individual non-recurring
    subsidy programs were countervailable from the time the category of bestowal was first
    identifiable and measurable: (1) Export Assistance Grants, Program to Rebate Antidumping Fees,
    and Grants to Loss-Making SOEs; and (2) Provision of Land and/or Land Use Rights for SOEs
    for LTAR. See Remand Results 31–32; 34–35.
    10
    For purposes of calculating the AFA rate, Commerce found all alleged programs for which it
    requested a questionnaire response countervailable because respondents withheld requested
    information and significantly impeded the proceeding. See Remand Results 28. Because the
    GOC and the mandatory respondents failed to participate, Commerce applied the following
    hierarchy to select appropriate subsidy rates for the subsidy programs for which it applied AFA:
    (a) [Commerce] first applied, where available, the highest above de minimis
    subsidy rate calculated for an identical program from any segment of this
    proceeding; (b) absent such a rate, [Commerce] applied, where available, the
    highest above de minimis subsidy rate calculated for a similar program for any
    segment of this proceeding; (c) absent an above de minimis subsidy rate
    calculated for the same or similar program in any segment of proceeding,
    [Commerce] applied the highest above de minimis calculated subsidy rate for
    identical, or if not available, a similar program from any CVD proceeding
    involving the country in which the subject merchandise is produced (i.e.,
    (footnote continued)
    Consol. Court No. 10-00055                                                            Page 15
    Project Fund grant program, Commerce found it had adequate record information to
    determine that the program was established on September 10, 1999. Remand Results
    32. Lacking any information on the usage of the program by individual mandatory
    respondents prior to December 11, 2001, Commerce inferred that the program conferred
    a benefit on all mandatory respondents for the years 1999–2001 and applied an AFA rate
    of 0.58 percent, the highest above de minimis rate calculated from any similar program in
    any CVD proceeding involving China, to mandatory respondents Changbao Jianli, and
    Wuxi Seamless Oil Pipe Co., Ltd. (“Wuxi”). Id. at 33. For mandatory respondent TPCO,
    although Commerce had information on the company’s use of this program from
    December 11, 2001 through the end of 2008, Commerce states it lacked information on
    TPCO’s use of the program from 1999 through December 11, 2001. Id. To fill in the
    missing information, Commerce added an AFA rate of 0.03 percent to the calculated rate
    from its final determination of 0.01 (i.e., a combined rate of 0.04 percent) to reflect the
    inferred benefit received during the years TPCO had not provided a response. Id.
    Commerce found that most of the preferences provided by the exemption of customs
    duties for the importation of instruments and equipment in the High-Tech Industrial
    Development Zones program were already properly allocated in its final determination
    [China]), provided the producer of the subject merchandise or the industry to
    which it belongs could have used the program for which the rates were
    calculated. Absent an above de minimis rate for the same or similar program
    from any CVD proceeding involving [China], [Commerce] applied the highest
    calculated rate from any program in any CVD proceeding for [China].
    Id. at 28–29.
    Consol. Court No. 10-00055                                                            Page 16
    because they represented recurring benefits allocated in the year received. 11 Remand
    Results 33. Nonetheless, Commerce applied an AFA rate of 9.71 percent to this program
    to reflect the exemption of customs duties for the importation of instruments and
    equipment aspect of the program, which Commerce found is a non-recurring benefit. Id.
    at 33–34.
    U.S. Steel argues that the cut-off dates adopted by Commerce for each type of
    program are as arbitrary as Commerce’s use of China’s accession to the WTO in its final
    determination. See U.S. Steel Remand Comments 4–5. The court labeled Commerce’s
    selection of China’s WTO accession date as arbitrary because Commerce failed to
    identify specific economic reforms that occurred on China’s accession date and match
    those reforms to conditions it deemed necessary to identify and measure subsidies. TMK
    IPSCO, 40 CIT at __, 179 F. Supp. 3d at 1343. Here, the dates adopted for each type of
    subsidy program tie specific reforms to Commerce’s ability to identify the sphere of
    commercial activity involved, the economic actors involved, and the government action
    required to bestow the type of subsidy. See Remand Results 13–19.                    Therefore,
    Commerce identifies the dates that specific reforms are implemented and connects those
    reforms to the presence of legal conditions it reasonably deemed necessary to identifying
    and measuring a particular type of bestowal. U.S. Steel points to no reason or instance
    where one program of a particular type would be identifiable and measurable before
    11
    For recurring benefits, Commerce allocates those benefits or expenses to the year in which
    the benefit is received. 
    19 C.F.R. § 351.524
    (a). In other words, only recurring benefits bestowed
    during the POI could possibly be countervailable. See 
    id.
     Therefore, recurring programs were
    unaffected by Commerce’s determination to apply a cut-off date for identifying and measuring
    non-recurring subsidies.
    Consol. Court No. 10-00055                                                        Page 17
    another program of the same type. Therefore, Commerce’s determination to establish
    categories of programs and determine when each type of program would first be
    countervailable and measurable is reasonable and consistent with the statutory
    obligations to countervail all identifiable and measurable subsidies in a NME country.
    U.S. Steel also argues that Commerce’s adoption of a uniform cut-off date for each
    type of subsidy is arbitrary because it is inconsistent with Commerce’s conclusion that the
    process of economic reform is uneven and may take hold in some sectors before others.
    U.S. Steel Comments 4. But the court faulted Commerce’s adoption of the December 11,
    2001 cut-off date as arbitrary because Commerce failed to identify reforms that occurred
    on December 11, 2001 or explain how any such reforms permitted it to identify and
    measure subsidies. See TMK IPSCO, 40 CIT __, 179 F. Supp. 3d at 1343. Even if
    reforms identified are uneven and take hold in different sectors of the economy or areas
    of the country before others, as U.S. Steel contends, Commerce’s investigation of types
    of programs focused on the most basic legal conditions that would be necessary to
    identify a specific type of subsidy program. See Remand Results 13–19. Commerce
    cannot, for example, identify and measure the benefit provided by a specific loan to a
    specific party before it is possible to identify a loan as a legal, binding contract between
    distinct parties generally. Based on Commerce’s logic, it is possible that a specific
    program could be identifiable and measurable later than the category of program to which
    it belongs, but not earlier. Commerce has articulated a logical relationship between
    specific types of reforms and the legal conditions necessary to permit Commerce to
    identify and measure countervailable subsidies for individual actors within the Chinese
    Consol. Court No. 10-00055                                                              Page 18
    economy. See Remand Results 13–19. Therefore, in this investigation Commerce’s
    adoption of a uniform cut-off date for each category of subsidy program is reasonable.
    In the alternative, U.S. Steel argues that, even if Commerce’s practice of
    examining subsidy programs by type is reasonable, the specific cut-off dates adopted for
    land-oriented subsidies and credit-oriented subsidies are not supported by substantial
    evidence. 12 U.S. Steel Remand Comments 6–7. For credit-oriented subsidies, U.S. Steel
    “disagrees with Commerce’s conclusion that the earliest it could evaluate the
    countervailability of credit-oriented subsidies is 1996.” Id. at 6 (citing Remand Results
    16). U.S. Steel focuses on Commerce’s acknowledgment that specific economic actors
    involved in providing credit in China could be identified as of 1993, and U.S. Steel
    contends this evidence renders Commerce’s conclusion that credit-oriented subsidies
    could not be identified and measured until 1996 unsupported by substantial evidence. Id.
    at 7.    Commerce notes that before a credit-oriented subsidy can be considered
    countervailable in an NME, Commerce “needs to be able to identify the loan as a legal,
    binding contract between distinct parties.” Remand Results 15. Although Commerce
    says that it could identify specific actors involved in the provision of credit as early as
    1993, it is reasonably discernible that Commerce determined the banking sector reforms
    leading up to 1993 did not permit the identification of a binding contract between distinct
    parties. See id. Commerce notes that, until the passage of the 1995 Commercial Bank
    Law, commercial banks were not responsible for their own profits and losses, and banks
    12
    The court considers any substantial evidence challenges to Commerce’s determinations of
    when it could identify and measure other alleged subsidy programs waived because U.S. Steel
    challenges the specific cut-off dates selected for only land-oriented subsidies and credit-oriented
    subsidies. See U.S. Steel Remand Comments 6–7.
    Consol. Court No. 10-00055                                                         Page 19
    lacked legal autonomy from the state. See id. In addition, Commerce states that the
    General Rules on Loans, enacted in 1996, regulated activities related to loans and
    protected the lawful rights and interests of all parties.     Id. at 15–16.    In particular,
    Commerce credited the 1996 General Rules on Loans as setting the legal rights and
    obligations for both lenders and borrowers as providing the legal basis for defining the
    legal terms of a given loan. Id. at 16. Commerce reasonably determined that both the
    identification of distinct legal actors and the legal underpinnings required to render a loan
    legally binding are necessary to identifying and measuring credit-oriented subsidies. See
    id. at 15–16. U.S. Steel offers no evidence that the legal requirements to render a loan
    legally binding between independent economic actors occurred earlier than 1996. The
    court declines to reweigh the evidence.
    Likewise, for land-oriented subsidies, U.S. Steel argues that Commerce’s own
    analysis indicates that it can identify and measure these subsidies from 1986 when the
    Land Administration Law first “allowed for the ownership of land-use rights and, in certain
    circumstances, their transfer.” U.S. Steel Remand Comments 7 (citing Remand Results
    18).   U.S. Steel contends, that, although subsequent reforms may have provided
    additional incentive, it is unreasonable for Commerce to conclude that those reforms were
    necessary to first identify and measure such subsidies. Id. Commerce justified its
    assessment that the conditions were insufficient to allow for the identification and
    measurement of land-oriented subsidies in 1986 by highlighting: (1) the fact that the Land
    Administration law of 1986 conflicted with China’s constitution, which banned selling,
    leasing, and transferring land; and (2) that land-use rights were vague and ill-defined until
    Consol. Court No. 10-00055                                                      Page 20
    the legal framework for basic elements of land transactions took effect in 1999. Remand
    Results 18–19. The court defers to Commerce’s reasonable determination that the legal
    framework for the basic elements of property transactions is necessary for identifying and
    measuring subsidies.    U.S. Steel highlights no record evidence indicating that the
    necessary legal conditions were in place prior to 1999.
    II. Continued Inclusion of the Ocean Freight Quote from Jianli’s Freight
    Forwarder
    The court remanded to Commerce to reconsider or further explain its decision to
    use an average of two freight quotes from Maersk and Jianli’s freight-forwarder because
    Commerce had not adequately explained how two such disparate quotes could be
    representative of freight prices available to respondents. See TMK IPSCO, 40 CIT at __,
    179 F. Supp. 3d at 1350–51. U.S. Steel continues to challenge Commerce’s explanation.
    See U.S. Steel Remand Comments 10–12. Commerce has now adequately explained
    how both quotes could be reflective of market rates and, as a result, its determination is
    supported by substantial evidence.
    If Commerce determines that the government of a country or any public entity is
    providing, directly or indirectly, a countervailable subsidy, then Commerce shall impose a
    duty equal to the amount of the benefit conferred by the subsidy subject to certain
    adjustments. See 
    19 U.S.C. §§ 1671
    (a),1677(6). Where a good or service is provided
    to a recipient by a government or state-owned entity, if such goods are provided for less
    than adequate remuneration, a benefit shall normally be treated as conferred. See 
    19 U.S.C. § 1677
    (5)(E)(iv).    Commerce generally seeks to measure the adequacy of
    remuneration by comparing the government price to a market-determined price for the
    Consol. Court No. 10-00055                                                        Page 21
    good from actual transactions in the country in question (i.e., a tier i benchmark). 
    19 C.F.R. § 351.511
    (a)(2)(i). However, if there is no useable market-determined price with
    which to make the comparison, Commerce will measure the adequacy of remuneration
    by comparing the government price to a world market price “where it is reasonable to
    conclude that such price would be available to purchasers in the country in question” (i.e.,
    a tier ii benchmark).    
    19 C.F.R. § 351.511
    (a)(2)(ii).    Further, when measuring the
    adequacy of remuneration, Commerce must adjust the benchmark price to reflect the
    price that a firm actually paid or would pay if it imported the product, including delivery
    charges. 
    19 C.F.R. § 351.511
    (a)(2)(iv). Commerce has broad discretion to determine
    how to adjust the world market benchmark price to reflect delivery charges, such as freight
    charges that may be incurred by purchasers so long as such adjustments are reasonable.
    On remand, Commerce continued to find that the ocean freight quotes provided by
    Maersk and by Jianli’s freight forwarder are both reflective of market rates that the
    importer would have paid to import steel rounds and billets notwithstanding the pricing
    disparity. Remand Results 42. Commerce explained that the pricing disparity results
    from the avenue the importer chooses to import the products, but both paths reflect
    market rates for ocean freight and are representative of the rates an importer would have
    paid. See id. at 43. Commerce reasoned that working directly with a shipping company
    may result in a different freight cost than contracting with a freight forwarder that works
    with a shipping company. Id. Commerce supports its conclusion that both the Maersk
    rate and that of Jianli’s freight forwarder are representative of market rates by relying
    upon a statement from Jianli’s freight forwarder explaining that “most shipping companies
    Consol. Court No. 10-00055                                                            Page 22
    and freight forwarders that work with them arrange for the shipment of goods from China
    to the destinations identified . . . and then offer lower rates on the China-bound leg of their
    voyage.” Id. at 42 (citing Jianli Group Submission of Factual Information at Attach. 1, CD
    87 (Oct. 5, 2009) (“Jianli Freight Quote”)). Moreover, Commerce concluded that this
    “deadfreight rate” is negotiated between the freight forwarder and the shipping company
    because the service contracts submitted by Jianli reflect the practice of offering lower
    rates on the China-bound leg. 13 Id. at 43. Commerce found that record evidence
    demonstrates that the prices provided to Jianli by its freight forwarder are actual shipping
    charges paid by the freight forwarder’s customers, and not solely by Jianli, during the
    calendar year 2008, see id. at 54, which coincides with the period of investigation (“POI”).
    See id. at 3. Therefore, Commerce’s determination that Jianli’s freight forwarder’s freight
    pricing reflects market rates that an importer would have paid is supported by substantial
    evidence.
    U.S. Steel implies that it is unreasonable to conclude that two freight options
    available in the marketplace could be so disparate because no importer would choose
    the higher-priced route in such an environment. See U.S. Steel Remand Comments 11.
    It is reasonably discernible that Commerce concluded both the Maersk price quote data
    and that of Jianli’s freight forwarder are market prices available to importers of steel billets
    because no evidence indicates these rates were not available to importers other than
    Jianli and market-driven reasons other than price could motivate some importers to
    13
    Commerce specifically notes that the contracts between Jianli and its freight forwarder include
    the line item “3.) DEADFREIGHT APPLIES IF FINAL CGO QTTY IS LESS THAN OR CGO
    DIMENSION IS DIFFERENT FROM DESCRIBED IN PARA2.)” Remand Results 42 (citing Jianli
    Freight Quote at Attach. 1).
    Consol. Court No. 10-00055                                                       Page 23
    contract with a freight provider directly rather than through a freight forwarder for a
    “deadfreight” rate. See Remand Results 43. U.S. Steel offers no evidence importers
    always prefer a “deadfreight” rate that represents the lowest aggregate price at the
    expense of any other considerations driven by the needs of their business or of their
    customers. The court declines to speculate why an importer may have selected a
    shipping path that may result in a higher aggregate rate or to reweigh the evidence. The
    existence of market-driven reasons to prefer either option renders Commerce’s
    determination that both freight rates are market rates supported by substantial evidence.
    U.S. Steel also questions the reliability of the rate of Jianli’s freight forwarder,
    implying that it “is not normal market price, but rather a sweetheart deal.” U.S. Steel
    Remand Comments 11. However, Commerce references the affidavit provided by Jianli’s
    freight forwarder, which indicates that the prices provided are actual shipping charges
    paid by the freight forwarder’s customers from multiple countries to Shanghai throughout
    the PO. Remand Results 54 (citing Jianli Freight Quote at 2–3, Attach. 1). U.S. Steel
    provides no record evidence supporting its speculation that the prices reflect a special
    deal not available to other importers. In fact, Defendant points out that Jianli’s pricing
    data, which is relied upon by Commerce, reflects a series of transactions from more than
    one customer throughout the POI. See Def.’s Resp. United States Steel Corporation’s
    Comments Remand Redetermination 14, Mar. 7, 2017, ECF No. 182.
    III. Exclusion of SBB East Asia Pricing Data From Tier ii Benchmark
    The court remanded Commerce’s determination to include the SBB East Asia
    pricing from its tier ii benchmark price for steel rounds and billets because Commerce’s
    inclusion of this pricing data in its benchmark calculation is not supported by substantial
    Consol. Court No. 10-00055                                                        Page 24
    evidence. See TMK IPSCO, 40 CIT at __, 179 F. Supp. 3d at 1347. On remand,
    Commerce determined that the SBB East Asia pricing data should be excluded from its
    tier ii benchmark pricing for steel rounds. Remand Results 48.
    As already discussed, if there is no useable market-determined price with which to
    make the comparison, Commerce will measure the adequacy of remuneration by
    comparing the government price to a world market price “where it is reasonable to
    conclude that such price would be available to purchasers in the country in question” (i.e.,
    a tier ii benchmark). 14 
    19 C.F.R. § 351.511
    (a)(2)(ii). Here, Commerce concludes that the
    fact that the SBB East Asia pricing data could include Chinese import prices presents “a
    more compelling rationale for removing the data source from [its] benchmark.” Remand
    Results 48. To support its determination to move from a tier i benchmark, based on actual
    transactions in China, to a tier ii benchmark, based on world market prices, Commerce
    relies on the potential that Chinese prices for steel rounds and billets could distort the
    SBB East Asia data. See 
    id.
     Commerce reasonably concluded that it could not reconcile
    including distorted prices in a world market price benchmark. See 
    id.
     No party challenges
    the exclusion of the SBB East Asia pricing data from Commerce’s tier ii benchmark for
    steel billets and rounds. Commerce has complied with the court’s remand order.
    IV. Subsidy Attribution
    The court held that Commerce did not explain what authority allowed it to attribute
    steel rounds and billets received by one subsidiary of TPCO or Changbao for LTAR to
    14
    Commerce generally seeks to measure the adequacy of remuneration by comparing the
    government price to a market-determined price for the good from actual transactions in the
    country in question (i.e., a tier i benchmark). 
    19 C.F.R. § 351.511
    (a)(2)(i).
    Consol. Court No. 10-00055                                                          Page 25
    the consolidated sales of all of each respective parent company’s subsidiaries in its final
    determination. TMK IPSCO, 40 CIT at __, 179 F. Supp. 3d at 1357–58. The court
    remanded to Commerce to explain its attribution methodology or reconsider its
    determination. Id., 40 CIT at __, 179 F. Supp. 3d at 1358. On remand, Commerce
    reconsidered its determination and agreed it should not have attributed subsidies
    received by certain TPCO and Changbao subsidiaries to all of each company’s respective
    subsidiaries. See id. at 38. In its Remand Results, Commerce attributed subsidies
    received by Precision to the combined unconsolidated sales of Changbao and to
    Precision’s sales under 
    19 C.F.R. § 351.525
    (b)(6)(ii). 
    Id.
     Commerce likewise revisited
    its attribution of subsidies for the TPCO entities, and declined to attribute subsidies
    received by TPCO’s subsidiaries Tianguan Yuantong Pipe Product Co., Ltd. (“TPCO
    Yuantong”), Tianjin Pipe Iron Manufacturing Co., Ltd. (“TPCO Iron”), Tianjin Pipe
    International Economic and Trading Co., Ltd. (“TPCO IETC”), and TPCO Charging
    Development Co., Ltd. (“TPCO Charging”) to all of TPCO’s subsidiaries. See Remand
    Results 38–39. Commerce’s determinations on remand comply with the court’s remand
    order.
    In general, Commerce “calculate[s] an ad valorem subsidy rate by dividing the
    amount of the benefit allocated to the period of investigation . . . by the sales value during
    the same period of the product or products to which [Commerce] attributes the subsidy.”
    
    19 C.F.R. § 351.525
    (a). Ordinarily, Commerce divides the subsidies received by a
    company only by the sales of that company. See 
    19 C.F.R. § 351.525
    (b)(6)(i). However,
    if two or more corporations are cross-owned, Commerce’s regulations provide a number
    Consol. Court No. 10-00055                                                              Page 26
    of exceptions to its default attribution rule. 15 See 
    19 C.F.R. § 351.525
    (b)(6)(ii)–(v). If two
    cross-owned corporations produce the same subject merchandise, Commerce will
    attribute subsidies received by either or both corporations to the products produced by
    both corporations. 
    19 C.F.R. § 351.525
    (b)(6)(ii). If the firm that received a subsidy is a
    holding company, including a parent company with its own operations, Commerce will
    attribute the subsidy to the consolidated sales of the holding company and its
    subsidiaries. 
    19 C.F.R. § 351.525
    (b)(6)(iii). If an input supplier and a downstream
    producer are cross-owned, and production of the input product is primarily dedicated to
    production of the downstream product, Commerce will attribute subsidies received by the
    input producer to the combined sales of the input and downstream products produced by
    both corporations (excluding sales between the two corporations).                     
    19 C.F.R. § 351.525
    (b)(6)(iv). Where the other attribution exceptions do not apply, “if a corporation
    producing non-subject merchandise received a subsidy and transferred the subsidy to a
    corporation with cross-ownership, [Commerce] will attributed the subsidy to products sold
    by the recipient of the transferred subsidy.” 
    19 C.F.R. § 351.525
    (b)(6)(v). Commerce
    also cumulates subsidies provided to a trading company exporting subject merchandise
    with benefits from subsidies provided to a firm producing subject merchandise that is sold
    through a trading company regardless of whether those firms are affiliated. 
    19 C.F.R. § 351.525
    (c).
    15
    Commerce’s regulations define cross ownership as “exist[ing] between two or more
    corporations where one corporation can use or direct the individual assets of the other
    corporation(s) in essentially the same ways it can use its own assets.” 
    19 C.F.R. § 351.525
    (6)(vi).
    Consol. Court No. 10-00055                                                       Page 27
    Here, Commerce attributed subsidies received by Precision to the combined
    unconsolidated sales of Changbao and to sales of Precision under 
    19 C.F.R. § 351.525
    (b)(6)(ii) because it found that both corporations are cross-owned and produce
    subject merchandise. See Remand Results 38; see also Final Decision Memo at 7–8
    (citing Prelim Results, 74 Fed. Reg. at 47,214 (stating that Changbao and Precision are
    cross-owned and that Precision is a producer of subject merchandise just like Changbao,
    a mandatory respondent in this investigation). Commerce applied the same attribution
    rule to attribute subsidies received by TPCO Yuantong to TPCO because it found that
    TPCO and its cross-owned subsidiary, TPCO Yuantong, both produced subject
    merchandise. Remand Results 38. In addition, Commerce included service sales in
    TPCO Yuantong’s sales value of subject merchandise because Commerce credited
    TPCO Yuantong’s description of the sales as related to “heat treatment processing.” Id.
    at 38–39 (citing TPCO Verification Report at 13, PD 271 (Oct. 29, 2009)). Commerce
    supported its determination to attribute the steel rounds and billets provided to TPCO Iron
    under 19 C.F.R § 351.525(b)(6)(iv) to the combined sales of TPCO Iron, TPCO Yuantong,
    and TPCO, less intercompany sales, by noting that all three companies are cross-owned
    and TPCO Iron was identified in the investigation as a producer of inputs primarily
    dedicated to producing downstream products produced by TPCO and TPCO Yuantong.
    Id. at 39. Commerce supported its determination to attribute the steel rounds provided at
    LTAR to TPCO Charging to the unconsolidated sales of TPCO by noting that TPCO
    Charging does not meet any attribution method under 
    19 C.F.R. §§ 351.525
    (b)(6)(ii)–(iv)
    and that TPCO Charging, which does not produce subject merchandise, provided steel
    Consol. Court No. 10-00055                                                       Page 28
    rounds to TPCO. Id.; see also Prelim. Results, 74 Fed. Reg. at 47, 215 (stating that
    TPCO stated that Charging acts as a trading company and does not produce any
    merchandise). Lastly, Commerce cumulated steel rounds and billets provided for LTAR
    to TPCO IETC, which was identified as a trading company, with those received by TPCO
    as well benefits received by TPCO’s other subsidiaries TPCO Yuantong, and TPCO
    Charging. Id. at 39–40. Therefore, Commerce used TPCO IETC’s total unconsolidated
    sales value without removing inter-company sales. Id. at 39–40.
    No party challenges Commerce’s attribution methodology.          Commerce has
    explained its attribution methodology and supports its attribution methodology by referring
    to uncontroverted record evidence. Therefore, Commerce has complied with the court’s
    order.
    V. Provision of Steel Rounds Tied to Production of Subject Merchandise
    The court remanded Commerce’s decision to attribute the benefit received by
    TPCO from the provision of steel rounds at LTAR because the court could not “discern
    whether Commerce determined that the provision of steel rounds at LTAR is tied to sales
    of seamless pipe.” TMK IPSCO, 40 CIT at __, 179 F. Supp. 3d at 1359. On remand,
    Commerce finds no record evidence as to the purpose or intended use of the steel rounds
    and billets under the subsidy program. See Remand Results 46. Therefore, Commerce
    again attributes the subsidies at issue to TPCO’s applicable total sales, not just sales of
    seamless pipe. See id. U.S. Steel continues to challenge that substantial evidence
    supports Commerce’s determination. U.S. Steel Remand Comments 8–10. The court
    disagrees with U.S. Steel.
    Consol. Court No. 10-00055                                                       Page 29
    Commerce attributes the benefits of subsidies to all products exported by a firm.
    
    19 C.F.R. § 351.525
    (b)(3).      However, if a firm produces more than one product,
    Commerce will attribute the subsidy only to sales of a particular product if the subsidy is
    tied to the production or sale of only that product. See 
    19 C.F.R. § 351.525
    (b)(5). If
    Commerce cannot determine that the subsidy is tied to the production or sale of a
    particular product, then Commerce follows its default rule of attributing subsidies to all
    products exported by the firm. See 
    19 C.F.R. §§ 351.525
    (b)(3), (b)(5). Commerce has
    discretion in determining how to evaluate whether a subsidy is tied to the production or
    sale of a particular product because neither the statute nor Commerce’s regulation
    defines when a subsidy is tied to the production or sale of a particular product. See 
    19 U.S.C. § 1677
    (5)(E)(iv); 
    19 C.F.R. §§ 351.525
    (b)(2), (b)(5). As a matter of practice
    Commerce evaluates the purpose of the subsidy based on information available at the
    time of bestowal and does not trace how the subsidy is actually used by companies. See
    
    id.
     at 45 (citing Large Residential Washers From the Republic of Korea, 
    77 Fed. Reg. 75,975
     (Dep’t Commerce Dec. 26, 2012) (final affirmative CVD determination); and
    accompanying Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final Determination in the
    Countervailing Duty Investigation of Large Residential Washers from the Republic of
    Korea       at     41,     C-580-869,      (Dec.      18,     2012),      available      at
    http://ia.ita.doc.gov/frn/summary/korea-south/2012-31078-1.pdf (last visited Apr. 28,
    2017) (“Large Residential Washers from Korea I&D”)).
    Here, Commerce attributed the provision of steel rounds and billets at LTAR to all
    sales of TPCO rather than to only sales of seamless pipe tubes because record evidence
    Consol. Court No. 10-00055                                                       Page 30
    does not establish that the GOC intended the subsidy to benefit or knew that the subsidy
    would benefit the production of seamless pipe and tube at the time of bestowal. Remand
    Results 46. Commerce evaluated the subsidy based upon information at the time of
    bestowal and there were no documents or statements from the GOC or from state-owned
    producers and suppliers on the purpose or intended use of steel rounds and billets under
    the program. Id. at 46. U.S. Steel points to no evidence demonstrating that the GOC
    intended the subsidy to benefit or knew that the subsidy would benefit the production of
    seamless pipe and tube at the time of bestowal.
    U.S. Steel contends that the GOC’s statement in its response to Commerce’s
    request for a list of industries in China that directly purchase steel rounds that “[s]teel
    rounds (billets in round shape that can be used to produce OCTG) are [purchased] by the
    OCTG industry,” renders Commerce’s conclusion unreasonable. U.S. Steel Remand
    Comments 9 (citing Response of the Government of the People’s Republic of China to
    the Department’s Initial Questionnaire at 49, PD 107 (July 20, 2009)).           However,
    Commerce reasoned that “the mere fact that a good ‘can be used’ does not demonstrate
    that the provision of that good is tied to a particular product within the meaning of 
    19 C.F.R. § 351.525
    (b)(5).” Remand Results 53. In its final determination, Commerce noted
    that the GOC states that steel billet was used “in a number of industries, including rebar,
    plain bar, merchant bar, light sections, narrow strip, wire rod, and seamless tubes.” Final
    Decision Memo at 75. Moreover, Commerce states that its practice is to only “find that a
    subsidy is tied to a particular product when the intended use is known to the subsidy giver
    (in this case the GOC) and so acknowledged prior to [or] concurrent with the bestowal of
    Consol. Court No. 10-00055                                                      Page 31
    the subsidy.” Remand Results 46 (citing Countervailing Duties, 
    63 Fed. Reg. 65,348
    ,
    65,403 (Dep’t Commerce Nov. 25, 1998) (final rule) (explaining that Commerce looks at
    information available at the time of bestowal to analyze the purpose of the subsidy)). The
    POI for Commerce’s investigation of OCTG from China is January 1, 2008 through
    December 31, 2008. See id. at 3. It is therefore reasonably discernible that Commerce
    concluded that that the GOC’s questionnaire response is not an acknowledgment that the
    purpose of the subsidy is to benefit producers of OCTG prior to or concurrent with the
    bestowal of the subsidy because the statement was made in response to Commerce’s
    questionnaire issued in 2009. See id. (citing Countervailing Duties, 63 Fed. Reg. at
    65,403).
    U.S. Steel also argues that Commerce’s statement that the GOC has a policy of
    “supporting and promoting the production of innovative and high-value added products,
    including OCTG” contradicts Commerce’s tying determination.          U.S. Steel Remand
    Comments 9 (citing Prelim. Results, 74 Fed. Reg. at 47,217). It is also reasonably
    discernible that Commerce did not consider this statement inconsistent with its tying
    determination because the GOC’s acknowledgment of support for one of several products
    does not mean that it knew and acknowledged prior to or concurrent with the bestowal of
    the subsidy that the program was intended to benefit any one of those products. See
    Remand Results 46 (citing Countervailing Duties, 63 Fed. Reg. at 65,403 (stating that
    Commerce analyzes the purpose of the subsidy based on information available at the
    time of bestowal)).
    Consol. Court No. 10-00055                                                    Page 32
    Lastly, U.S. Steel argues that Commerce’s tying determination is unsupported
    because there is no affirmative evidence suggesting that the steel rounds and billets
    provided at LTAR are used to produce any products other than OCTG. See U.S. Steel
    Remand Comments 10. However, Commerce makes clear that its practice does not
    consider the actual use of the products provided under the subsidy program in evaluating
    whether the subsidy program is tied to the production of subject merchandise. See
    Remand Results 45 (citing Large Residential Washers from Korea I&D at 41). Commerce
    has explained this practice in the past by noting that tracing funds only establishes
    whether funds are actually used for their stated purpose or the purpose Commerce
    evinces from record evidence and not whether a benefit is conferred or what specific
    products the grantor intended to benefit. See Countervailing Duties, 63 Fed. Reg. at
    65,403. U.S. Steel highlights no reason this practice is unreasonable generally or as
    applied here. Commerce’s determination is therefore supported by substantial evidence.
    CONCLUSION
    Therefore, for the reasons discussed, the court sustains the Remand Results.
    Judgment will enter accordingly.
    /s/ Claire R. Kelly
    Claire R. Kelly, Judge
    Dated: May 3, 2017
    New York, New York
    

Document Info

Docket Number: Consol. 10-00055

Citation Numbers: 2017 CIT 54, 222 F. Supp. 3d 1306

Judges: Kelly

Filed Date: 5/3/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/13/2023