Royal Thai Government v. United States , 978 F. Supp. 2d 1330 ( 2014 )


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  •                                           Slip Op. 14- 47
    UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
    ROYAL THAI GOVERNMENT,
    Plaintiff,
    MARINE GOLD PRODUCTS LIMITED,
    PAKFOOD PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED,
    THAI ROYAL FROZEN FOOD CO., LTD.,
    THAI UNION FROZEN PRODUCTS
    PUBLIC CO., LTD., and THAI UNION
    SEAFOOD CO., LTD.,
    Plaintiff-Intervenors,
    .v.                                  Before: Jane A. Restani, Judge
    UNITED STATES,                                     Court No. 13-00333
    Defendant,
    COALITION OF GULF SHRIMP
    INDUSTRIES,
    Defendant-Intervenor.
    OPINION
    [Motions to dismiss complaint challenging Commerce’s negative determination in
    countervailing duty investigation granted.]
    Dated: April23, 2014
    Jay C. Campbell and Walter J. Spak, White & Case, LLP, of Washington, DC, for
    plaintiff.
    Robert G. Gosselink and Jonathan M. Freed, Trade Pacific, PLLC, of
    Washington, DC, for plaintiff-intervenors.
    Joshua E. Kurland, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division,
    U.S. Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, for defendant. With him on the brief were
    Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney General, Jeanne E. Davidson, Director, and Patricia M.
    Court No. 13-00333                                                                            Page 2
    McCarthy, Assistant Director. Of counsel on the brief was Jessica M. Forton, Attorney, Office
    of the Chief Counsel for Trade Enforcement and Compliance, U.S. Department of Commerce, of
    Washington, DC.
    Elizabeth J. Drake, Terrence P. Stewart, Jennifer M. Smith, and Sandra K.
    Jorgensen, Stewart and Stewart, of Washington, DC, and Edward T. Hayes, Leake & Andersson,
    LLP, of New Orleans, LA, for defendant-intervenors.
    Restani, Judge: This matter is before the court on two motions to dismiss filed
    pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the United States Court of International Trade by defendant United
    States and defendant-intervenor Coalition of Gulf Shrimp Industries (“COGSI”). Def.-
    Intervenor’s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 26; Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 28. COGSI and the
    United States move to dismiss the complaint filed by plaintiff Royal Thai Government because
    plaintiff lacks standing under Article III of the Constitution as there is no live “case or
    controversy.” For the reasons set forth below, the motions to dismiss are granted without
    prejudice.
    BACKGROUND
    This case concerns a complaint filed by plaintiff challenging the Department of
    Commerce’s (“Commerce”) final negative determination in the countervailing duty (“CVD”)
    investigation of certain frozen warmwater shrimp from Thailand. See Certain Frozen
    Warmwater Shrimp from Thailand: Final Negative Countervailing Duty Determination, 
    78 Fed. Reg. 50,379
     (Dep’t Commerce Aug. 19, 2013). In its final determination, Commerce found that
    the total net countervailable subsidy rates for all producers were de minimis and thus published a
    negative final determination. 
    Id. at 50,380
    . Accordingly, no CVD order issued.1 Plaintiff and
    1
    Because Commerce arrived at a final negative determination, the International Trade
    Commission (“ITC”) did not issue a final injury determination. The court notes, however, that
    the ITC rendered a final negative injury determination with respect to the imports of the same
    (continued...)
    Court No. 13-00333                                                                              Page 3
    plaintiff-intervenors Marine Gold Products Limited, Pakfood Public Company Limited, Thai
    Royal Frozen Food Co., Ltd., Thai Union Frozen Products Public Co., Ltd., and Thai Union
    Seafood Co., Ltd. (collectively “Thai Union”) challenge certain aspects of Commerce’s decision
    that were “unfavorable” to plaintiff’s and Thai Union’s positions before the agency. Pl.’s Resp.
    in Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 30, 2 (“Pl. Br.”). Plaintiff is also a defendant-intervenor
    in the parallel challenge to Commerce’s determination brought by COGSI, COGSI v. United
    States, Ct. No. 13-00332 (CIT filed Sept. 18, 2013), but in this action, plaintiff bases its
    challenges on aspects of the determination that are not raised by COGSI in the parallel case.
    Specifically, plaintiff’s complaint alleges that the de minimis subsidy rates calculated by
    Commerce should have been even lower. Compl., ECF No. 8, ¶ 10. Through this action,
    plaintiff seeks to offset any increases in the subsidy rates that might result in the event COGSI is
    successful in its appeal of Commerce’s final negative determination.2 Pl. Br. 3.
    JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
    Plaintiff has the burden of establishing that jurisdiction is appropriate. See
    McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 
    298 U.S. 178
    , 189 (1936). In this case, plaintiff
    claims jurisdiction is proper pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), 1516a(a)(2)(B)(ii)
    1
    (...continued)
    products from several other countries. See Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from China, Ecuador,
    India, Malaysia, and Vietnam, 
    78 Fed. Reg. 64,009
     (ITC Oct. 25, 2013). That determination also
    is the subject of a challenge by COGSI in a parallel case. COGSI v. United States, Ct. No. 13-
    00386 (CIT filed Nov. 22, 2013). The court has stayed consideration of COGSI’s appeal of
    Commerce’s final negative determination in Frozen Warmwater Shrimp from Thailand until the
    challenge to the ITC determination in Ct. No. 13-00386 has been resolved.
    2
    The parallel case brought by Thai Union raising the same issues will be dismissed
    simultaneously with the issuance of this opinion for the same reasons that plaintiff’s complaint is
    dismissed.
    Court No. 13-00333                                                                               Page 4
    (2012). The jurisdiction of the federal courts, pursuant to the Constitution, however, is
    constrained to those cases which involve “actual cases or controversies.” Simon v. E. Ky.
    Welfare Rights Org., 
    426 U.S. 26
    , 37 (1976) (“No principle is more fundamental to the
    judiciary’s proper role in our system of government than the constitutional limitation of
    federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies.”); see U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. A
    necessary component of establishing a case or controversy pursuant to Article III is standing.
    See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 
    504 U.S. 555
    , 560 (1992) (“[T]he core component of
    standing is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article
    III.”). To establish standing, a plaintiff must show an “injury in fact” that is “concrete and
    particularized” as well as “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” 
    Id.
     (internal
    quotation marks omitted). Additionally, plaintiff must demonstrate that the injury is “fairly
    traceable to the challenged action” and that it is “likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that
    the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” 
    Id.
     at 560–61 (internal quotation marks
    and brackets omitted).
    DISCUSSION
    Both this court and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit have held that
    when a respondent challenges an administrative proceeding in which it has prevailed there is no
    case or controversy, and thus no jurisdiction lies. See Rose Bearings Ltd. v. United States, 
    14 CIT 801
    , 802–03, 
    751 F. Supp. 1545
    , 1546–47 (1990); see also Freeport Minerals Co. v. United
    States, 
    758 F.2d 629
    , 634 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Plaintiff alleges that a live case or controversy exists
    because it is challenging issues from Commerce’s determination on which it did not prevail. Pl.
    Br. 2–5. Nevertheless, the court has held previously that “a prevailing party may not appeal an
    administrative determination merely because it disagrees with some of the findings or
    Court No. 13-00333                                                                           Page 5
    reasoning.” Rose Bearings, 14 CIT at 803, 
    751 F. Supp. at 1547
     (internal quotation marks and
    brackets omitted). The lack of a CVD order means that plaintiff is currently not suffering any
    actual or imminent injury in fact due to any alleged errors committed by Commerce. See Lujan,
    
    504 U.S. at 560
    . Commerce ended the investigation and no cash deposits are currently due and
    no final duties will be assessed for the period of investigation (“POI”). See Pl. Br. 2 n.1. All
    deposits have been or will be returned to the subject producers. See 
    id.
    Nonetheless, plaintiff alleges that it has standing due to the fact that COGSI has
    appealed Commerce’s determination. Pl. Br. 3. Thus, according to plaintiff, the possibility of an
    “affirmative CVD determination” by Commerce after finding a higher subsidy rate as a result of
    COGSI’s appeal, implicates a justiciable “case or controversy.” Id. at 10. This, however, falls
    short of establishing actual injury in fact, as several hypothetical events would need to occur
    before any importers of the Thai goods would be required to post cash deposits or pay
    countervailing duties: COGSI would have to succeed in obtaining remand before the court,
    Commerce would have to reverse its negative final determination, and the ITC would have to
    render an affirmative final determination. The court has held that when a plaintiff merely alleges
    “hypothetical harm,” the court must dismiss the case. See Asahi Seiko Co. v. United States, 
    755 F. Supp. 2d 1316
    , 1322 (CIT 2011). Dismissal here is required as any discussion by the court
    regarding such potential harm would be an impermissible advisory opinion. See Georgetown
    Steel Corp. v. United States, 
    16 CIT 1084
    , 1087–88, 
    810 F. Supp. 318
    , 322 (1992). If plaintiff
    were to prevail on its claims challenging Commerce’s determination, and COGSI were to lose on
    its claims, no remedy would be available as Commerce’s existing negative determination is all
    that plaintiff could hope to obtain on appeal.
    Plaintiff also alleges that dismissing its claim while simultaneously allowing
    Court No. 13-00333                                                                             Page 6
    COGSI’s appeal to continue “would defy notions of fairness.” Pl. Br. 3. Plaintiff’s concerns are
    misplaced. In the event that COGSI succeeds in its appeal of Commerce’s determination,
    Commerce will be required to publish a redetermination on remand. If this occurs, plaintiff will
    still have a right to challenge that redetermination, either during the course of any remand or in a
    new suit, even if this case is dismissed at this juncture. See Rose Bearings, 14 CIT at 803, 
    751 F. Supp. at 1547
    . In the event there is an affirmative determination on remand by Commerce
    and the ITC also issues an affirmative determination, plaintiff may then file a case within thirty
    days of the publication of the resulting CVD order, raising the challenges it now seeks to assert.
    See 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(2)(A)(i)(II).
    CONCLUSION
    As discussed above, plaintiff has failed to establish any live “case or
    controversy,” and thus defendant United States’ and defendant-intervenor COGSI’s motions to
    dismiss are granted without prejudice. Because the court lacks jurisdiction over plaintiff’s
    complaint at this juncture, plaintiff’s motion to stay is moot. Judgment will issue accordingly.
    /s/ Jane A. Restani
    Jane A. Restani
    Judge
    Dated: April 23 , 2014
    New York, New York
    

Document Info

Docket Number: Slip Op. 14-47; Court 13-00333

Citation Numbers: 2014 CIT 47, 978 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 36 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 311, 2014 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 46, 2014 WL 1613905

Judges: Restani

Filed Date: 4/23/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/7/2024