Nan Ya Plastics Corp. v. United States , 6 F. Supp. 3d 1362 ( 2014 )


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  •                                           Slip Op. 14-94
    UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
    NAN YA PLASTICS CORPORATION, LTD.,
    Plaintiff,
    Before: Leo M. Gordon, Judge
    v.
    Court No. 11-00535
    UNITED STATES,
    Defendant.
    OPINION
    [Remand results sustained.]
    Dated: August 14, 2014
    Peter J. Koenig, Squire Sanders (US) LLP, of Washington, DC, for Plaintiff Nan Ya
    Plastics Corporation, Ltd.
    David F. D’Alessandris, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division,
    U.S. Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, for Defendant United States. With him on the
    briefs were Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney General, Jeanne E. Davidson, Director, Patricia
    M. McCarthy, Assistant Director. Of counsel on the briefs was George Kivork, U.S. Department
    of Commerce, Office of the Chief Counsel for Import Administration, of Washington, DC.
    Jeffrey I. Kessler, David M. Horn, Patrick J. McLain, and Ronald I. Meltzer, Wilmer,
    Cutler, Pickering, Hale and Dorr LLP, of Washington, DC for Defendant-Intervenors
    Mitsubishi Polyester Film, Inc. and SKC, Inc.
    Gordon, Judge: This action involves an administrative review conducted by the
    U.S. Department of Commerce (“Commerce”) of the antidumping duty order covering
    polyethylene terephthalate film, sheet, and strip from Taiwan.             See Polyethylene
    Terephthalate Film, Sheet, and Strip from Taiwan, 76 Fed. Reg. 76,941 (Dep’t of
    Commerce Dec. 9, 2011) (final results admin. review) (“Final Results”); see also Issues
    and Decision Memorandum, A-583-837 (Dep’t of Commerce Dec. 5, 2011), available at
    Court No. 11-00535                                                                    Page 2
    http://enforcement.trade.gov/frn/summary/taiwan/2011-31695-1.pdf         (last   visited   this
    date) (“Decision Memorandum”).           Before the court are the Final Results of
    Redetermination, ECF No. 66 (“Remand Results”), filed by Commerce pursuant to Nan
    Ya Plastics Corp. v. United States, 37 CIT ___, 
    906 F. Supp. 2d 1348
    (2013)
    (“Nan Ya I”). The court has jurisdiction pursuant to Section 516A(a)(2)(B)(iii) of the Tariff
    Act of 1930, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(2)(B)(iii) (2012),1 and 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c)
    (2012).
    Plaintiff Nan Ya Plastics Corporation, Ltd. (“Nan Ya”) challenges Commerce’s
    continued assignment of a total adverse facts available (“AFA”) rate of 74.34%. See Nan
    Ya Comments on Remand Results 1, ECF No. 84 (“Pl.’s Br.”). For the reasons set forth
    below, the court sustains the Remand Results.
    I. Standard of Review
    For administrative reviews of antidumping duty orders, the court sustains
    Commerce’s “determinations, findings, or conclusions” unless they are “unsupported by
    substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 19 U.S.C.
    § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i). More specifically, when reviewing agency determinations, findings,
    or conclusions for substantial evidence, the court assesses whether the agency action is
    reasonable given the record as a whole. Nippon Steel Corp. v. United States, 
    458 F.3d 1345
    , 1350-51 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Substantial evidence has been described as “such
    relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
    1
    Further citations to the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, are to the relevant provisions of
    Title 19 of the U.S. Code, 2012 edition.
    Court No. 11-00535                                                               Page 3
    conclusion.” DuPont Teijin Films USA v. United States, 
    407 F.3d 1211
    , 1215 (Fed. Cir.
    2005) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 
    305 U.S. 197
    , 229 (1938)). Substantial
    evidence has also been described as “something less than the weight of the evidence,
    and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not
    prevent an administrative agency's finding from being supported by substantial evidence.”
    Consolo v. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 
    383 U.S. 607
    , 620 (1966).          Fundamentally, though,
    “substantial evidence” is best understood as a word formula connoting reasonableness
    review. 3 Charles H. Koch, Jr., Administrative Law and Practice § 9.24[1] (3d ed. 2014).
    Therefore, when addressing a substantial evidence issue raised by a party, the court
    analyzes whether the challenged agency action “was reasonable given the circumstances
    presented by the whole record.” Edward D. Re, Bernard J. Babb, and Susan M. Koplin,
    8 West's Fed. Forms, National Courts § 13342 (2d ed. 2014).
    Separately, the two-step framework provided in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
    Res. Def. Council, Inc., 
    467 U.S. 837
    , 842-45 (1984), governs judicial review of
    Commerce's interpretation of the antidumping statute. See United States v. Eurodif S.A.,
    
    555 U.S. 305
    , 316 (2009) (Commerce's “interpretation governs in the absence of
    unambiguous statutory language to the contrary or unreasonable resolution of language
    that is ambiguous.”).
    II. Background
    As a consequence of Nan Ya’s failure to cooperate during the administrative
    review, Commerce preliminarily assigned Nan Ya a total AFA rate of 99.31%, which it
    derived from two of Nan Ya’s transaction-specific margins from the prior administrative
    Court No. 11-00535                                                                    Page 4
    review. See Polyethylene Terephthalate Film, Sheet, and Strip from Taiwan, 76 Fed.
    Reg. 47,540, 47,545 (Dep’t of Commerce Aug. 5, 2011) (preliminary results); Decision
    Memorandum at 5. Nan Ya argued in its administrative case brief that Commerce should
    have instead used information obtained during the current administrative review,
    specifically, the transaction-specific data of cooperating mandatory respondent Shinkong
    Materials Technology Co., Ltd. (“Shinkong”). Case Br. of Nan Ya Plastics Corporation,
    Ltd., 7 (Dep’t of Commerce Oct. 4, 2011), PD 23.2 Commerce agreed and in the Final
    Results selected Shinkong’s highest transaction-specific margin, 74.34%, as Nan Ya’s
    total AFA rate. Commerce reasoned “this rate is representative of Nan Ya’s current
    business practice” because “the data from the most recent review in which Nan Ya
    participated show . . . numerous [transaction-specific] margins for Nan Ya far above 74.34
    percent.”     Assignment of the Adverse Facts Available Rate for Nan Ya Plastics
    Corporation, Ltd. (Nan Ya), 3 (Dep’t of Commerce Dec. 5, 2011), CD 27 (“AFA
    Assignment Memorandum”).
    Nan Ya then commenced this action challenging the 74.34% total AFA rate as “an
    unlawful aberrant outlier” that did not reflect its “commercial reality albeit with some built
    in increase to induce compliance.” Nan Ya I, 37 CIT at ___, 906 F. Supp. 2d at 1351; see
    Nan Ya Plastics Corporation Rule 56.2 Mot. for J. on the Agency R. 3, ECF No. 3 (“Pl.’s
    56.2 Br.”).    Among its contentions Nan Ya proffered what appeared to be several
    compelling statistical arguments in support of its position. See Nan Ya I, 37 CIT at ___,
    2
    “PD” refers to a document contained in the public administrative record. “CD” refers to
    a document contained in the confidential record.
    Court No. 11-00535                                                                 Page 
    5 906 F. Supp. 2d at 1353-55
    . However, because Commerce changed Nan Ya’s AFA rate
    between the preliminary and final results, Nan Ya’s first opportunity to present these
    arguments was in its opening brief before the court. The court therefore remanded the
    action for Commerce to address Nan Ya’s arguments in the first instance. Id. at ___, 906
    F. Supp. 2d at 1354-55.
    The court also remanded to Commerce for further explanation the issue of the
    applicability of corroboration. 
    Id. Although Commerce
    appeared, consistent with its
    practice, to corroborate the selected rate with Nan Ya’s own transaction-specific data from
    a prior review, see, e.g., PAM, S.p.A. v. United States, 
    582 F.3d 1336
    , 1340 (Fed. Cir.
    2009); Ta Chen Stainless Steel Pipe, Inc. v. United States, 
    298 F.3d 1330
    , 1339–40 (Fed.
    Cir. 2002); Fujian Lianfu Forestry Co. v. United States, 34 CIT ___, ___, 
    700 F. Supp. 2d 1361
    , 1363 (2010), Defendant claimed that Commerce technically was not required to do
    so under 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(c) because Commerce selected the AFA rate from data
    obtained during the current administrative review. Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s R. 56.2 Mot. 11,
    ECF No. 48. This, in turn, raised an issue about the applicability of the de Cecco standard
    the courts use to evaluate the reasonableness of Commerce’s total AFA rates, a standard
    that emanates from the statute’s corroboration requirement. Nan Ya I, 37 CIT at ___, 906
    F. Supp. 2d at 1355 (citing F.LLI de Cecco Di Filippo Fara S. Martino S.p.A. v. United
    States, 
    216 F.3d 1027
    , 1032 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“de Cecco”)).
    On remand, Commerce assigned the same total AFA rate of 74.34% to Nan Ya.
    Remand Results at 2. Commerce also elaborated that the need to corroborate under
    19 U.S.C. § 1677e(c) only applies to “secondary information” and not “information
    Court No. 11-00535                                                                 Page 6
    obtained in the course of the . . . review,” like Shinkong’s data. 
    Id. at 5.
    Commerce noted
    that although the de Cecco standard does not apply, Commerce’s selection of an AFA
    rate must nevertheless still be supported by substantial evidence.          
    Id. at 10-13.
    Commerce also addressed and rejected each of Nan Ya’s arguments contesting the
    reasonableness of the AFA rate.
    In its comments on the Remand Results, Nan Ya again challenges Commerce’s
    AFA selection as unreasonable (unsupported by substantial evidence). Pl.’s Br. at 2-3.
    III. Discussion
    In a total AFA scenario Commerce typically cannot calculate an antidumping rate
    for an uncooperative respondent because the information required for such a calculation
    (in this case the respondent’s sales and cost information for the subject merchandise
    during the period of review) has not been provided. As a substitute, Commerce relies on
    other sources of information (the petition, the final determination from the investigation,
    prior administrative reviews, or any other information placed on the record), 19 U.S.C.
    § 1677e(b), to select a proxy that should be a “reasonably accurate estimate of the
    respondent's actual rate, albeit with some built-in increase intended as a deterrent to
    noncompliance.” de 
    Cecco, 216 F.3d at 1032
    .
    When selecting an appropriate total AFA proxy, “Commerce must balance the
    statutory objectives of finding an accurate dumping margin and inducing compliance.”
    Timken Co. v. United States, 
    354 F.3d 1334
    , 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The proxy’s purpose
    “is to provide respondents with an incentive to cooperate, not to impose punitive,
    aberrational, or uncorroborated margins.” de 
    Cecco, 216 F.3d at 1032
    . Although a higher
    Court No. 11-00535                                                                 Page 7
    AFA rate creates a stronger incentive to cooperate, “Commerce may not select
    unreasonably high rates having no relationship to the respondent's actual dumping
    margin.” Gallant Ocean (Thailand) Co. v. United States, 
    602 F.3d 1319
    , 1323 (Fed. Cir.
    2010) (citing de 
    Cecco, 216 F.3d at 1032
    ). Commerce must select a rate that has “some
    grounding in commercial reality.” 
    Id. at 1323-24.
    As de Cecco explained, these requirements are logical outgrowths of the statute’s
    corroboration requirement, see de 
    Cecco, 216 F.3d at 1032
    , which mandates that
    Commerce, to the extent practicable, corroborate “secondary” information with
    independent sources reasonably at its disposal. 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(c). In practice
    “corroboration” involves confirming that secondary information has “probative value,”
    19 C.F.R. § 351.308(d) (2013), by examining its “reliability and relevance.” Mittal Steel
    Galati S.A. v. United States, 
    31 CIT 730
    , 734, 
    491 F. Supp. 2d 1273
    , 1278 (2007) (citing
    Ball Bearings and Parts Thereof from France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Singapore, and the
    United Kingdom, 70 Fed. Reg. 54,711, 54,712-13 (Dep’t of Commerce Sept. 16, 2005)
    (final results admin. reviews)). More simply, to corroborate the selection of a total AFA
    rate, Commerce must, to the extent practicable, “demonstrate that the rate is reliable and
    relevant to the particular respondent” in light of the whole record before it. Yantai Xinke
    Steel Structure Co. v. United States, 36 CIT ___, ___, Slip Op. 12-95 at 27 (July 18, 2012)
    (emphasis added); PSC VSMPO-AVISMA Corp. v. United States, 35 CIT ___, ___, 
    755 F. Supp. 2d 1330
    , 1336-37 (2011) (citing Gallant 
    Ocean, 602 F.3d at 1323-24
    ); de 
    Cecco, 216 F.3d at 1032
    .
    Court No. 11-00535                                                                   Page 8
    A. Secondary Information and Corroboration
    Section 1677e of the antidumping statute mandates that Commerce use the “facts
    otherwise available” to fill information gaps on the administrative record. 19 U.S.C.
    § 1677e(a). When the gap results from a party’s non-cooperation, Commerce “may use
    an inference that is adverse to the interests of that party in selecting from among the facts
    otherwise available.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b). As noted above, to identify a suitable total
    AFA proxy, Commerce may consult the petition, the final determination in the
    investigation, any previous review or determination, or any other information placed on
    the record, which would include cooperating party information, like Shinkong’s margin
    transaction data. See 
    id. The corroboration
    requirement is housed in subsection (c), and
    provides that when Commerce “relies on secondary information rather than on
    information obtained in the course of an investigation or review, [Commerce] . . . shall, to
    the extent practicable, corroborate that information from independent sources that are
    reasonably at [its] disposal.” 
    Id. § 1677e(c)
    (emphasis added).
    Commerce makes a fairly airtight argument that Nan Ya’s total AFA margin
    selected from Shinkong’s data is not “secondary information” within the meaning of the
    statute because that data was obtained in the course of the instant review, and ergo, no
    corroboration is required. Remand Results at 4-6 & nn.2, 3. It is a straightforward
    Chevron step one interpretation that focuses on the plain meaning of subsection (c), one
    the court has approved on two prior occasions. See iScholar Inc. v. United States, 35 CIT
    ___, ___, Slip Op. 11-4 at 5-7 (Jan. 13, 2011); Ass’n of Am. Sch. Paper Suppliers v.
    United States, 
    32 CIT 1196
    , 1200-04 (2008). With corroboration inoperative, Commerce
    Court No. 11-00535                                                                 Page 9
    maintains that the de Cecco standard is also inapplicable, leaving only the more general
    requirement that its AFA selection must be supported by substantial evidence
    (reasonable).
    And yet, in both the Final Results and Remand Results, Commerce did not simply
    select Shinkong’s highest transaction specific margin in setting Nan Ya’s rate, and leave
    it at that. Commerce went further and measured the rate’s appropriateness by analyzing
    Nan Ya’s own prior transaction-specific data. Remand Results at 15; Nan Ya I, 37 CIT at
    ___, 906 F. Supp. 2d at 1352. Despite asserting the inapplicability of de Cecco and
    corroboration, Commerce nevertheless followed its standard corroboration playbook to
    tie the selected AFA rate (chosen from another party’s data) to the uncooperative
    respondent, Nan Ya. Compare Remand Results at 15, with PAM, 
    S.p.A., 582 F.3d at 1338-40
    (tying “the highest margin applied to any party that had been previously upheld
    in the proceeding” to the uncooperative respondent using uncooperative respondent’s
    own data from a prior administrative review), Ta 
    Chen, 298 F.3d at 1339-40
    (tying the
    highest rate from the investigation to the uncooperative respondent using uncooperative
    respondent’s own data from the current administrative review), and Fujian Lianfu
    Forestry, 34 CIT at ___, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 1363 (tying rate originally assigned to another
    respondent in a contemporaneous new shipper review to uncooperative respondent using
    uncooperative respondent’s own model-specific margins from the prior proceeding). And
    when Commerce suggests that de Cecco is inapplicable, leaving the more general
    substantial evidence standard to review its AFA selection, the question arises:
    “substantial evidence of what exactly?” Commerce provides the answer by effectively
    Court No. 11-00535                                                                 Page 10
    corroborating the rate with Nan Ya’s own data from the prior review. It can be viewed as
    an effort to justify Shinkong’s highest transaction-specific margin as a reasonably
    accurate estimate of Nan Ya’s actual rate plus some built-in increase intended as a
    deterrent against non-compliance. So de Cecco applies after all. And it is that familiar
    standard the court will apply in reviewing the reasonableness of Commerce’s AFA
    selection, to which the court now turns.
    B. Nan Ya’s AFA Rate
    Commerce frequently selects AFA rates from among the highest rates assigned
    during any segment of the proceeding, the highest transaction- or model-specific margins
    available on the administrative record, or somewhat more rarely, the highest rates alleged
    in the petition. E.g., Certain Lined Paper Products from the People’s Republic of China,
    74 Fed. Reg. 63,387, 63,389-90 (Dep’t of Commerce Dec. 3, 2009) (final determ. second
    admin. review) (highest rate from prior segment of the proceeding); Polyethylene Retail
    Carrier Bags From Taiwan, 75 Fed. Reg. 14,569, 14,570 (Dep’t of Commerce Mar. 26,
    2010) (LTFV final determ.) (highest margin alleged in the petition); Certain Tow Behind
    Lawn Groomers and Certain Parts Thereof from the People’s Republic of China, 74 Fed.
    Reg. 29,167, 29,170 (Dep’t of Commerce June 19, 2009) (LTFV final determ.) (“highest
    margin on an individual model which fell within the mainstream of [a cooperative
    respondent]’s transactions”); see Remand Results at 16-17.3 Commerce also often uses
    3
    This approach is a vestige from the old pre-URAA “Best Information Available” or total
    BIA cases in which Commerce presumed the highest margin “is the most probative
    evidence of current margins because, if it were not so, the importer, knowing the rule [that
    Court No. 11-00535                                                                  Page 11
    similarly high-value data to corroborate AFA rates derived from secondary information.
    E.g., Wire Decking from the People’s Republic of China, 75 Fed. Reg. 32,905, 32,908
    (Dep’t of Commerce June 10, 2010) (LTFV final determ.) (corroborating petition rate using
    “the highest CONNUM-specific margin from the two mandatory respondents”); Narrow
    Woven Ribbons with Woven Selvedge from the People’s Republic of China, 78 Fed. Reg.
    10,130, 10,133 (Dep’t of Commerce Feb. 13, 2013) (final results admin. review)
    (corroborating petition rate using highest “model-specific rates calculated for the
    mandatory respondent” during the prior proceeding).
    It is not surprising, then, that plaintiffs in total AFA cases often argue that
    Commerce’s selected AFA rate or corroborating information is aberrational or outlying
    (unreasonable) when measured against other margin data from the whole administrative
    record (which includes whatever corroborating information Commerce or the parties add
    to the record). See, e.g., Gallant 
    Ocean, 602 F.3d at 1323-25
    (agreeing that adjusted
    petition rate was “aberrational” in light of record data used to calculate significantly lower
    rates for “over a dozen” cooperative respondents); Fujian Lianfu Forestry, 34 CIT at ___,
    700 F. Supp. 2d at 1362-63 (arguing that model-specific margins used to corroborate
    were “aberrant” because they were too high and based on too small a percentage of total
    sales); PSC VSMPO-AVISMA, 35 CIT at ___, 755 F. Supp. 2d at 1337-38 (arguing that
    the “rate is impermissibly aberrational because it is based on an outlier sale” that had “an
    Commerce would assign it to uncooperative parties], would have produced current
    information showing the margin to be less.” Rhone Poulenc, Inc. v. United States, 
    899 F.2d 1185
    , 1190 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
    Court No. 11-00535                                                               Page 12
    unusually low quantity, unusually high freight expenses”); Universal Polybag Co. v. United
    States, 
    32 CIT 904
    , 918-19 & n.12, 
    577 F. Supp. 2d 1284
    , 1298 & n.12 (2008) (arguing
    that transaction-specific margins used to corroborate AFA rate were aberrational with
    respect to percentage rate and product type).
    Nan Ya is no different than the typical AFA plaintiff, arguing that Shinkong’s
    transaction underlying the 74.34% rate is aberrational because it is based on too small a
    percentage of Shinkong’s total sales, and involves a model with atypical features that
    Shinkong sold infrequently during the POR. Pl.’s 56.2 Br. at 6-8; Pl.’s Br. at 12-14.
    Although these arguments have some merit, they do not render Commerce’s use of that
    transaction unreasonable because other competing record information suggests that the
    transaction was not aberrational. The transaction involved a larger quantity than many of
    Shinkong’s other sales, and differed from other models in “the least important physical
    characteristics.” Remand Results at 14. More important, as Commerce noted, “[i]n the
    underlying review, Shinkong, the party that knows best which of its products are unusual,”
    and the party with the greatest incentive to minimize the impact of its own high-margin
    data, “did not argue that the transaction resulting in the margin should be excluded for
    any reason.” 
    Id. at 16.
    A reasonable mind would therefore not have to conclude that
    Shinkong’s highest margin transaction was aberrational.        Stated another way, the
    administrative record does not mandate a finding that Shinkong’s highest margin
    transaction was aberrational.
    Beyond the more typical arguments challenging an AFA proxy, Nan Ya also
    presents a formal statistical analysis to demonstrate that the AFA rate was an outlier and
    Court No. 11-00535                                                                  Page 13
    therefore unreasonable. Nan Ya applies three “commonly accepted statistical test[s]” to
    Shinkong’s data: (1) a “gap test”, (2) an interquartile range methodology used by the
    Internal Revenue Service, and (3) a standard deviation analysis. Pl.’s 56.2 Br. at 8-13;
    Pl.’s Br. at 7-9; Nan Ya I, 37 CIT at ___, 906 F. Supp. 2d at 1352-54.
    Just as a quick aside, applying statistical tests to Commerce’s selection of the
    “highest” rate as an AFA proxy makes good practical sense if a respondent ultimately
    plans to challenge whether that “extreme value”4 is a reasonable choice given the “central
    tendency”5 of other data on the administrative record. At the very least, it would seem to
    identify the probable commercial realities of an uncooperative respondent more
    concretely than the guesswork occasioned by an undeveloped record with comparatively
    superficial assertions about outliers and aberrancy.
    Unfortunately, Nan Ya did not apply its statistical analysis to the full data set upon
    which Commerce relied.        When selecting the 74.34% rate, Commerce relied on
    Shinkong’s transaction-specific margins, as well as Nan Ya’s own transaction-specific
    margins from the prior administrative review (finding multiple Nan Ya transactions above
    the 74.34% rate). Decision Memorandum at 15; AFA Assignment Memorandum at 3.
    The reasonableness of the 74.34% rate therefore depends on both Shinkong’s and Nan
    Ya’s data. It is that combined data set against which Nan Ya needed to apply its statistical
    4
    W. Paul Vogt, Dictionary of Statistics & Methodology 115 (3d ed. 2005) (defining
    “extreme values” as “[t]he largest and smallest values in a distribution of values”).
    5
    
    Id. at 41
    (defining “central tendency” as “[a] point in a distribution of [values] that
    corresponds to a typical, representative or middle [value] in that distribution—such as the
    []mode, []mean, and []median”).
    Court No. 11-00535                                                                  Page 14
    analysis. Nan Ya, though, has treated Shinkong’s data as a closed set (as if it were the
    only data supporting Commerce’s decision), and has ignored its own data. Nan Ya
    therefore   leaves   unchallenged    Commerce’s     corroborative   justification   for   the
    reasonableness of the 74.34% rate: “Nan Ya was capable of dumping at” 74.34% as
    evidenced by Nan Ya’s own data. Decision Memorandum at 15 (emphasis added).
    Nan Ya does not offer much of an explanation as to why it failed to incorporate its
    own prior data into its statistical analysis.6   Nan Ya instead tries to minimize the
    significance of that data through two arguments, neither of which the court finds
    persuasive. First, Nan Ya argues that when Commerce summarized Nan Ya’s argument
    in the Final Results “without objection” (Nan Ya’s words), Commerce ostensibly
    “admitted” that Nan Ya’s two 99.31% transaction-specific margins are aberrational. Pl.’s
    Br. at 15-16. Commerce, though, made no such admission, but simply explained that
    Nan Ya’s arguments about the preliminary rate “no longer need[ed] to be addressed”
    because Commerce chose a different rate. Decision Memorandum at 7. More important,
    in the Final Results and Remand Results, Commerce relied on more than those two
    transactions to tie the 74.34% rate to Nan Ya, and Nan Ya simply never addresses this
    additional data. Second, Nan Ya argues that Commerce was required to corroborate the
    corroborating data; that is, corroborate Nan Ya’s transactional data from the prior review.
    See Pl.’s Br. at 14-15. Not much need be said here other than that corroboration need
    not go on ad infinitum. The statute authorizes Commerce to corroborate Shinkong’s
    6
    For whatever reason, Nan Ya also chose not to access and analyze Nan Ya’s more than
    10 years’ worth of prior margin data that Commerce did not use for corroboration.
    Court No. 11-00535                                                               Page 15
    transaction-specific margin with information “from independent sources that are
    reasonably at [its] disposal,” 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(c), which certainly includes Nan Ya’s own
    prior transactional data. See PAM, 
    S.p.A., 582 F.3d at 1340
    ; Fujian Lianfu Forestry,
    34 CIT at ___, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 1363. The burden was not on Commerce to corroborate
    the corroborating data, but instead on Nan Ya to (1) analyze its own prior transactional
    data, (2) provide a compelling narrative of its “commercial reality”, and (3) propose an
    alternative total AFA proxy, all with the aim of demonstrating the unreasonableness of the
    total AFA rate of 74.36%.
    It is Nan Ya that ultimately bears the burden to demonstrate that Commerce’s AFA
    selection is unreasonable. See 28 U.S.C. § 2639(a)(1) (“[T]he decision of . . . the
    administering authority . . . is presumed to be correct. The burden of proving otherwise
    shall rest upon the party challenging such decision.”). By failing to address its own data
    that provided the corroborative support for Commerce’s assignment of the 74.34% total
    AFA proxy, Nan Ya has failed to meet that burden. Viewed alongside Shinkong’s data,
    Nan Ya’s numerous transaction-specific margins appear to show that the 74.37% rate
    may well be a reasonably accurate estimate of Nan Ya’s actual rate plus some built-in
    increase intended as a deterrent against non-compliance. Accordingly, the court must
    sustain Commerce’s AFA selection. See Hubscher Ribbon Corp. v. United States, 38
    CIT ___, ___, 
    979 F. Supp. 2d 1360
    , 1366-71 (2014) (“[Plaintiff] . . . passed up an
    important opportunity to crunch [the cooperative respondent’s] data against its own data
    and create a narrative of its own commercial experience to discredit [the AFA rate]. . . .
    Court No. 11-00535                                                                Page 16
    [Plaintiff] has left too much unexplained and has not met its burden to demonstrate the
    unreasonableness of Commerce's corroboration.”).
    With that said, although Nan Ya’s statistical arguments are not persuasive here,7
    such statistical methodologies could very well support or enhance an analysis of the
    reasonableness of Commerce’s total AFA selection under the de Cecco standard.
    Commonly-accepted interquartile range methodologies might be useful in describing
    outliers in non-normally distributed data sets, as they are in other contexts. See, e.g.,
    Jared A. Wilkerson, Defending the Current State of Section 363 Sales, 86 Am. Bankr. L.J.
    591, 618 n.132 (2012); John F. Pfaff, The Durability of Prison Populations, 2010 U. Chi.
    Legal F. 73, 77 (2010); Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin & Christina L. Boyd, On the
    Effective Communication of the Results of Empirical Studies, Part II, 60 Vand. L. Rev.
    801, 815 n.38 (2007). A “gap test” might also be helpful as Commerce itself employed a
    “gap test” of sorts when evaluating its own potential choices for the preliminary results,
    settling upon Nan Ya’s 99.31% rate after rejecting several higher transaction-specific
    7
    Even overlooking the problematical data omission, Nan Ya failed to demonstrate the
    unreasonableness of the 74.34% rate using Shinkong’s data alone. Under the “gap test”
    analysis, the gaps between Shinkong’s highest transaction-specific margins do appear
    small enough to be “consistent with” Commerce’s conclusion that Shinkong’s “margins
    steadily increase by small amounts over the course of [all its] transactions.” Remand
    Results at 18; see 
    id. at 27
    (explaining that, by comparison, Nan Ya’s highest transaction-
    specific margins were not suitable preliminary choices for an AFA rate because they
    “suddenly jumped” significantly, with similar gaps absent in Shinkong’s data). Also, the
    IRS interquartile methodology does not help identify a suitable alternative AFA proxy (at
    least when applied to Shinkong’s data alone), because it yields AFA proxy choices lower
    than Nan Ya’s prior 18.30% calculated rate. See 
    id. at 19.
    Finally, as Commerce
    reasonably explains, Shinkong’s transaction-specific margin data does not appear to lend
    itself to a proper standard deviation analysis. See 
    id. at 19-20.
    Court No. 11-00535                                                                Page 17
    margins because they “suddenly jumped” higher than the two 99.31% transactions. See
    Remand Results at 27. It may be, however, that incorporating statistical tests to challenge
    an AFA rate is easier said than done; otherwise one might have anticipated a more
    prevalent role in the many AFA cases since the de Cecco standard emerged nearly 15
    years ago.
    In any event, for the reasons set forth above, the court sustains Commerce’s
    assignment of a total AFA rate of 74.34% for Nan Ya. Judgment will be entered
    accordingly.
    /s/ Leo M. Gordon
    Judge Leo M. Gordon
    Dated: August 14, 2014
    New York, New York