Ta Chen Stainless Steel Pipe, Inc. v. United States ( 2000 )


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  •                         Slip Op. 00-107
    UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
    ____________________________________
    :
    TA CHEN STAINLESS STEEL PIPE, Inc., :
    :    Court No. 97-08-01344
    Plaintiff,                :
    :
    v.                        :    Public Version
    :
    UNITED STATES,                      :
    :
    Defendant.                :
    ____________________________________:
    [Commerce remand determination affirmed.]
    Dated: August 25, 2000
    Ablondi, Foster, Sobin & Davidow, p.c. (Joel Davidow and
    Peter Koenig) for plaintiff.
    David W. Ogden, Assistant Attorney General, David M. Cohen,
    Director, Velta A. Melnbrencis, Assistant Director, Commercial
    Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of
    Justice (Mark L. Josephs), Cindy G. Buys, Office of the General
    Counsel, United States Department of Commerce, of counsel, for
    defendant.
    OPINION
    RESTANI, Judge:   On October 28, 1999, the court remanded the
    final results of the Department of Commerce, International Trade
    Administration (“Commerce” or “the Department”) in Certain Welded
    Stainless Steel Pipe from Taiwan, 
    62 Fed. Reg. 37,543
     (Dep't
    Commerce 1997) (final results of admin. rev.) [hereinafter "Final
    Results"].   See Ta Chen Stainless Steel Pipe, Ltd. v. United
    States, No. 97-08-01344, 
    1999 WL 1001194
     (Ct. Int’l Trade Oct.
    28, 1999).   Familiarity with the court’s earlier opinion is
    Court No. 97-08-01344                                       Page 2
    presumed.
    Commerce issued its remand determination on February 25,
    2000.       See Final Results of Redetermination Pursuant to Court
    Remand: Ta Chen Stainless Steel Pipe, Ltd. v. United States,
    Court No. 97-08-01344 [hereinafter “Remand Results” or “RR”].        Ta
    Chen contests the Department’s application of adverse facts
    available and selection of the adverse margin in the Remand
    Results.1
    Standard of Review
    In reviewing final determinations in antidumping duty
    investigations, the court shall hold unlawful any agency
    determination found unsupported by substantial evidence on the
    record, or otherwise not in accordance with law.       19 U.S.C. §
    1516a(b)(1)(B)(i) (1994).
    Background
    A. Ta Chen’s Affiliation with Sun Stainless, Inc.
    In the Final Results, Commerce found that Ta Chen was
    affiliated with one of its U.S. distributors, Sun Stainless, Inc.
    1
    Avesta Sheffield Inc., Damascus Tube Division,
    Damascus-Bishop Tube Co., and United Steelworkers of America
    (AFL-CIO/CLC), defendant-intervenors as to Ta Chen's Rule 56.2
    motion, filed a stipulation of dismissal pursuant to USCIT Rule
    41(a)(1)(B) and no longer appear as defendant-intervenors in this
    case. See Ta Chen Stainless Steel Pipe, Ltd. v. United States,
    No. 97-08-01344 (Ct. Int’l Trade Mar. 3, 2000) (stipulation of
    dismissal).
    Court No. 97-08-01344                                     Page 3
    (“Sun”), by virtue of Ta Chen’s control over Sun, pursuant to 
    19 U.S.C. § 1677
    (33)(G) (1994).    Final Results, 62 Fed. Reg. at
    37,549-50.    Because of Ta Chen’s affiliation with this U.S.
    distributor, Commerce determined that Ta Chen had constructed
    export price (“CEP”) sales during the period of review (“POR”).
    Because Ta Chen had not provided data on Sun’s U.S. sales, the
    record did not contain the information necessary to calculate
    CEP.    Commerce determined that Ta Chen failed to comply to the
    best of its ability in providing Sun’s U.S. sales information.
    Id. at 37,552-53.    Therefore, Commerce applied partial adverse
    facts available for Sun’s U.S. sales.    Id.
    The court held that Commerce’s determination that Ta Chen
    controlled Sun was supported by substantial evidence.     Ta Chen,
    
    1999 WL 1001194
     at *11.    The court found, however, that Commerce
    had failed to provide Ta Chen with sufficient notice of its
    determination that Ta Chen controlled Sun, and that the
    Department had never specifically requested the information on
    Sun’s U.S. sales.    
    Id. at *12
    .   Therefore, the court held that
    Commerce had failed to comply with its statutory obligation under
    19 U.S.C. § 1677m(d) (1994) by failing to provide the respondent
    with notice of a deficient submission before applying facts
    available.    Id.   The court remanded the Final Results for
    Commerce to request Sun’s U.S. sales information from Ta Chen.
    Court No. 97-08-01344                                       Page 4
    Id. at *14.
    On November 9, 1999, Commerce issued a supplemental
    questionnaire to Ta Chen requesting information on Sun’s U.S.
    sales in order to calculate CEP. RR at 2.       Ta Chen contacted
    Picol Enterprises, Inc. (“Picol”) for this information. Letters
    (Nov. 30, 1999), at 5, P.R. Doc. 1216, Def.’s Remand App., Tab 4,
    at 5.    Sun’s owner, Frank McLane, had sold Sun to Picol
    International and Masaru Kimura in July 1995.      Ta Chen’s Response
    to Petitioner’s Comments (Dec. 20, 1996), at 12-14 & Ex. 3, C.R.
    Doc. 14, Pl.’s Prop. App. to 56.2 motion, Tab B, at 12-14 & Ex.
    3.    In response to its inquiry, Ta Chen received a letter dated
    November 25, 1999, from Picol Sun’s counsel stating that it would
    not cooperate with the Department’s inquiry because the company
    had closed on September 30, 1996.       Letters, at 6, Def.’s Remand
    App., Tab 4, at 6.       Picol Sun’s counsel stated that it no longer
    maintained any business operations in the United States and that
    it would be burdensome for Picol Sun to respond to the request.
    Id.     Picol Sun’s counsel did state that he would ask his client
    to reconsider.     Id.    On November 30, 1999, Ta Chen requested an
    extension of time in which to provide the Sun information, which
    the Department granted.      RR at 2.   On December 7, 1999, Ta Chen
    requested another extension, but the next day it forwarded the
    Department a letter from Picol Sun’s counsel stating that it
    Court No. 97-08-01344                                      Page 5
    would not respond to the Department’s questionnaire for the
    reasons stated in the November 25, 1999 letter.     Letters (Dec. 8,
    1999), at 2, P.R. Doc. 1218, Def.’s Remand App., Tab 7, at 2.
    Without the information on Sun’s U.S. sales, Commerce did not
    have the information needed to calculate CEP.
    Commerce concluded that because Ta Chen had withheld or
    failed to provide the information requested, it would apply facts
    otherwise available pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(a) (1994).        RR
    at 3.    Commerce further concluded that Ta Chen had failed to
    comply to the best its ability in providing the information, and
    that an adverse inference pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b) was
    warranted for the Sun sales.     Id. at 3-4.   In calculating a
    partial adverse facts available margin, Commerce “assigned the
    highest calculated margin calculated for these final remand
    results to be applied to Ta Chen’s sales to Sun.”     Id. at 5-6.
    The sale with the highest dumping margin was 30.95 percent, which
    Commerce used to recalculate the margin of 2.60 percent for Ta
    Chen’s sales during the POR.     Id. at 14-15.   Ta Chen challenges
    the remand determination, contesting the application of adverse
    facts available and the selection of the margin.
    B. Alleged Commissions to Anderson
    In its motion for judgment on the agency record, Ta Chen
    challenged the Department’s finding that Ta Chen had failed to
    Court No. 97-08-01344                                     Page 6
    report commissions to a U.S. customer, Anderson Alloys.    In the
    Final Results, Commerce had applied partial adverse facts
    available to Ta Chen’s sales to Anderson.    Final Results, 62 Fed.
    Reg. at 37,544.   The court found that Commerce’s finding in this
    regard was not supported by substantial evidence.    Ta Chen, 
    1999 WL 1001194
     at *16.     The court directed Commerce either to provide
    Ta Chen with an opportunity to submit evidence on the purported
    commissions or to disregard this issue on remand.    
    Id. at *17
    .
    On remand, Ta Chen responded to Commerce’s supplemental
    questionnaire, stating that it had not made any sales during the
    POR on which it paid commissions to Anderson.    Remand Results at
    5.   Commerce therefore did not apply facts available to Ta Chen’s
    sales to Anderson upon remand.    
    Id.
       This issue is thus no longer
    before the court.
    Discussion
    I.    Application of adverse facts available
    Ta Chen contests the application of adverse facts available
    to its sales to Sun, arguing that it was unable to provide Sun’s
    information because of the sale to Picol International and Masaru
    Kimura in July 1995.    Ta Chen argues that the Department’s remand
    determination impermissibly concludes that Ta Chen is affiliated
    with the new entity, Picol Sun.    Ta Chen maintains that it did
    not have control over Picol Sun’s records and could not force
    Court No. 97-08-01344                                       Page 7
    Picol Sun to provide the necessary information.    Ta Chen states
    that Department precedent does not support the application of
    adverse facts when a respondent cannot obtain information from an
    affiliate, but only supports the application of neutral facts
    available.
    Commerce concluded that it could expect Ta Chen to provide
    Sun’s information.    Commerce stated in the Remand Results:
    We are not convinced that Sun’s closure is a sufficient
    explanation as to why Ta Chen cannot develop the necessary
    information. The requested data relates to a period when Ta
    Chen and Sun were readily sharing the subject information.
    Thus, this is not a situation where one corporate entity
    would object to disclosure of confidential business
    information to another corporate entity. In this situation,
    it is reasonable to expect Ta Chen to work with Sun’s new
    owners to obtain the new information.
    RR at 11.    As Commerce notes, the burden of creating an accurate
    record rests with the respondent.   See Tianjin Mach. Import &
    Export Corp. v. United States, 
    16 CIT 931
    , 936, 
    806 F. Supp. 1008
    , 1015 (1992) (“burden of creating an adequate record lies
    with respondents and not with Commerce”) (citation omitted).
    Ta Chen does not and cannot contest the fact it had
    operational control of Sun.    The court found Commerce’s
    affiliation finding supported by substantial evidence due to the
    numerous connections between Ta Chen and Sun.     See Ta Chen, 
    1999 WL 1001194
     at *4-10 (discussing Ta Chen and Sun’s historical
    ties, Sun’s distribution of only Ta Chen products, Ta Chen’s
    Court No. 97-08-01344                                    Page 8
    custody of Sun’s signature stamp, Ta Chen’s credit monitoring of
    Sun, and debt financing arrangement between Ta Chen and Sun).     It
    is reasonable for the Department to conclude that this
    operational control gave Ta Chen access to Sun’s records.   This
    conclusion is further supported by the fact that Ta Chen was able
    to provide other confidential records from Sun, such as Sun’s
    federal income tax records.   See Final Results, 62 Fed. Reg. at
    37,552.   It is also reasonable for Commerce to expect Ta Chen to
    maintain any relevant records pending the final outcome of the
    administrative review.   See Krupp Stahl A.G. v. United States, 
    17 CIT 450
    , 454, 
    822 F. Supp. 789
    , 793 (1993) (stating that
    respondents are responsible for maintaining their records during
    a pending litigation); Koyo Seiko Co. v. United States, 
    16 CIT 366
    , 376, 
    796 F. Supp. 517
    , 525 (1992) (holding that respondent
    had responsibility of keeping records for the ongoing
    investigation despite Commerce’s “extraordinary delay”).    In
    order to comply to the best of its ability, Ta Chen should have
    preserved Sun’s information in the event that its sales were
    classified as CEP.
    Ta Chen argues that it did not have reason to provide Sun’s
    information until January 1997, because the Department did not
    state its intention to classify Ta Chen’s sales as CEP sales
    until the issuance of the Preliminary Results in January 1997.
    Court No. 97-08-01344                                        Page 9
    See Certain Welded Stainless Steel Pipe from Taiwan, 
    62 Fed. Reg. 1,435
    , 1,435-36 (Dep’t Commerce 1997) (preliminary results of
    admin. rev.).   By that time, Ta Chen argues, it could not have
    provided the information because Sun had already been sold.          Ta
    Chen was nevertheless aware prior to January 1997 that its sales
    to Sun were at issue.     As early as July 1994, Ta Chen knew its
    relationship with Sun was at issue because the petitioners had
    called it to the Department’s attention in the first
    administrative review.    See Certain Welded Stainless Steel Pipe
    from Taiwan, 
    64 Fed. Reg. 33,243
    , 33,244 (Dep’t Commerce 1999)
    (final results of administrative review) (results from the first
    and second administrative reviews of Ta Chen).    Petitioners also
    renewed their concerns regarding Sun in July 1995.     
    Id.
         Ta Chen
    had reason to argue that it was not affiliated with Sun, pursuant
    to the new definition of the term “affiliated party.”     Ta Chen,
    
    1999 WL 1001194
     at *14.    But Ta Chen cannot claim that it was
    unaware of the possibility that its sales would be classified as
    CEP sales, in light of its numerous connections with Sun.       Ta
    Chen therefore could have, and should have, preserved its
    information on Sun’s sales in order to provide full information
    for the Department.
    Ta Chen also claims that the application of adverse facts
    available is inconsistent with prior determinations.    Ta Chen
    Court No. 97-08-01344                                     Page 10
    cites in particular Certain Cut-to-Length Carbon Steel Plate from
    Belgium, 
    63 Fed. Reg. 2,959
     (Dep’t Commerce 1998) (final results
    of antidumping duty admin. rev.)[hereinafter “Cut-to-Length from
    Belgium”].   In that determination, Commerce stated it “may resort
    to adverse facts available in response to [respondent’s] failure
    to report [information from an affiliate] unless [respondent]
    establishes that it could not compel its affiliate to report [the
    information].”   
    Id.
        Commerce chose not to make an adverse
    inference in that determination because the Department had not
    informed the respondent of certain deficiencies in the
    respondent’s attempt to show that it could not obtain the
    information from the affiliate.    
    Id.
       Similarly, in the other
    determinations cited by Ta Chen, Commerce applied a general rule
    of not using adverse facts when the respondent could demonstrate
    that it did try to obtain information from an affiliate.    See
    Roller Chain, Other than Bicycle, from Japan, 
    62 Fed. Reg. 60,472
    , 60,476 (Dep’t Commerce 1997) (notice of final results and
    partial recission of antidumping duty administrative review)
    (despite respondent’s efforts, “it was not in a position to
    compel the affiliated customer to produce the information
    requested by the Department” and Department did not apply adverse
    facts available); see also Certain Fresh Cut Flowers from
    Colombia, 
    63 Fed. Reg. 5,354
    , 5,356 (Dep’t Commerce 1998)
    Court No. 97-08-01344                                      Page 11
    (preliminary results and partial termination of antidumping duty
    admin. rev.) (Department chose not to apply adverse facts for
    missing information where respondent’s “exhaustive efforts at
    locating [the information from a former affiliate] . . . were
    futile”); Certain Cut-to-Length Carbon Steel Plate from Brazil,
    
    63 Fed. Reg. 12,744
    , 12,751 (Dep’t Commerce 1998) (final results
    of antidumping duty admin. rev.) (Department did not apply
    adverse inference where respondent “did attempt to obtain [COP]
    information from its affiliate” and where nature of affiliation
    was such that respondent could not compel affiliate to provide
    information).
    On remand, Commerce applied this general rule as stated in
    Cut-to-Length from Belgium.   As in that determination, the burden
    was on Ta Chen to show that it could not compel Sun to provide
    the information.   Ta Chen failed to meet that burden.     Upon
    remand, Ta Chen simply forwarded the Department’s questionnaire
    to Picol Sun, and once Picol Sun’s counsel stated that Sun did
    not wish to comply, Ta Chen informed the Department that it would
    be unable to provide Sun’s information.   This was not a
    sufficient effort on the part of Ta Chen.   See Kawasaki Steel
    Corp. v. United States, No. 99-08-00482, Slip Op. 00-91 at 22-23
    (Ct. Int’l Trade, Aug. 1, 2000) (holding that respondent’s
    letters requesting information from affiliate were insufficient
    Court No. 97-08-01344                                      Page 12
    to show respondent cooperated to best of its ability because
    respondent simply acquiesced in affiliate’s refusal to provide
    information).
    Ta Chen argues that it was not provided with notice that its
    attempts to compel Picol Sun to provide the information were
    deficient.    First, on remand time is of the essence, and parties
    need to take all steps necessary to comply with Commerce’s
    requests promptly and forcefully.    Second, the court cannot
    conclude that one additional chance for Ta Chen to remedy its
    errors would have made a difference in this case, because the
    Department’s decision to apply adverse facts available is also
    supported by the fact that Ta Chen could have done more to
    preserve the information on Sun’s U.S. sales when it clearly had
    control of the information.   By not doing so, Ta Chen failed to
    comply to the best of its ability.      The court therefore affirms
    the application of adverse facts available pursuant to 19 U.S.C.
    § 1677e(b).
    II.   Selection of the adverse margin
    In the Final Results, Commerce applied a 31.90 percent
    margin as partial adverse facts to Ta Chen’s sales to Sun and
    Anderson.    Final Results, 62 Fed. Reg. at 37,555-56.    This margin
    was the highest rate from the less than fair value investigation.
    Ta Chen, 
    1999 WL 1001194
     at *17.    This resulted in a weighted-
    Court No. 97-08-01344                                      Page 13
    average margin of 6.06 percent.   Final Results, 62 Fed. Reg. at
    37,556.   The court did not address Ta Chen’s arguments concerning
    corroboration of the margin from data outside the review in its
    56.2 motion, in light of its remand instructions.    Ta Chen, 
    1999 WL 1001194
     at *18.
    On remand, Commerce applied an adverse inference only as to
    Ta Chen’s sales to Sun.   In recalculating the margin, Commerce
    “assigned the highest calculated margin for these remand results
    to be applied to Ta Chen’s sales to Sun.”    RR at 5-6.2    The
    margin used was 30.95 percent, which led to a recalculated
    weighted-average margin of 2.60 percent.    
    Id. at 15-18
    .    In
    choosing this margin, the Department explained:
    In conducting its own analysis of Ta Chen’s U.S. sales, the
    Department found that the price and quantity of the sales
    for which a 30.95% dumping margin was calculated all fell
    within the normal range of price and quantity as the other
    sales; these sales were not unusually high or low in price
    or quantity. Furthermore, the product for which a 30.95%
    dumping margin was calculated was a normal product of Ta
    Chen’s . . . . Additionally, the Department chose the 30.95%
    rate because it was calculated from Ta Chen’s own sales.
    RR at 16-17.
    Ta Chen first argues that an adverse margin is unwarranted.
    Based on this assumption, Ta Chen maintains that the Department
    should have followed its practice of using the weighted-average
    2
    Corroboration pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(c) is not
    challenged because Commerce selected a margin based on Ta Chen’s
    own information from this review.
    Court No. 97-08-01344                                    Page 14
    dumping margin calculated for all of a respondent’s other sales
    as the dumping margin for those sales lacking the information
    necessary to calculate a dumping margin.   See Static Random
    Access Memory Semiconductors from Taiwan, 
    63 Fed. Reg. 8,909
    ,
    8,920 (Dep’t Commerce 1998) (notice of final determination of
    sales at LTFV) (“as facts available [Department] used the
    weighted-average dumping margin calculated for all of
    [respondent’s] other sales”).   Ta Chen acknowledges that doing so
    would have resulted in a weighted-average dumping margin of close
    to zero percent.   This argument fails because the use of an
    adverse inference is warranted based on these facts, as already
    discussed.   Commerce, therefore, was not required to use its
    neutral facts available methodology.
    Ta Chen further argues that the Remand Results are contrary
    to court precedent and Commerce’s own practice.    Ta Chen asserts
    that the margin used by Commerce is aberrant, and that such
    margins may not be used.   Under the former best information
    available (“BIA”) rule, the court required Commerce to show that
    the margin it selected as BIA was not aberrant.    See National
    Steel Corp. v. United States, 
    18 CIT 1126
    , 1132-33, 
    870 F. Supp. 1130
    , 1136 (1994) [“NSC I”].    Ta Chen, however, misunderstands
    the court’s concerns regarding aberrant margins.   The court in
    NSC I did not hold that because a significant portion of
    Court No. 97-08-01344                                       Page 15
    respondent’s sales had margins below the selected rate, that the
    selected rate was aberrant.    Rather, the court’s concern was that
    Commerce show that the particular margin chosen bear a “rational
    relationship” to respondent’s sales.    
    Id.
     (citation omitted).
    The NSC I court thus remanded the case for Commerce to explain
    why its selection of the BIA rate was not aberrant.   
    Id. at 1133
    ,
    870 F. Supp. at 1137.    After remand, the court accepted
    Commerce’s criteria for selecting the highest non-aberrant margin
    as BIA.    National Steel Corp. v. United States, 
    20 CIT 100
    , 103,
    
    913 F. Supp. 593
    , 596 (1996) [“NSC II”].    Commerce’s guidelines
    for selecting the highest non-aberrant margin were to choose a
    margin “sufficiently adverse and . . . indicative of current
    conditions.”    
    Id.
    After a second remand, the court upheld the specific margin
    used by Commerce because the margin came from sales which
    involved a common product and fell within the mainstream of
    respondent’s transactions.    National Steel Corp. v. United
    States, 
    20 CIT 743
    , 745-46, 
    929 F. Supp. 1577
    , 1580 (1996) [“NSC
    III”].    In upholding the BIA margin, the court also noted that
    “[there was] nothing in the record to indicate that [the]
    particular sale was not transacted in a normal manner.”      Id.; see
    also Calcium Aluminate Cement, Cement Clinker and Flux from
    France, 
    59 Fed. Reg. 14,136
    , 14,141 (Dep’t Commerce 1994) (final
    Court No. 97-08-01344                                     Page 16
    determinations of sales at LTFV) (“When we resort to partial BIA,
    it is our practice to use the highest non-aberrational margin
    based on respondent’s reported sales.   This is an adverse figure,
    yet is based on the respondent’s calculated margins.”)3
    Commerce’s selection of the 30.95 percent margin as the adverse
    rate in this case conforms to the court’s requirement that the
    rate not be aberrant, because although the rate is adverse, it is
    indicative of Ta Chen’s sales.
    The Department continues to use the highest non-aberrational
    margin as adverse facts available.   See Stainless Steel Sheet and
    Strip in Coils from Germany, 
    64 Fed. Reg. 30,710
    , 30,714 (Dep’t
    Commerce 1999) (final determination of sales at LTFV) (“As
    adverse facts available we have assigned the highest non-
    aberrational margin calculated for this final determination . . .
    3
    Commerce certainly may not use a margin known to be
    inaccurate. See D&L Supply Co. v. United States, 
    113 F.3d 1220
    ,
    1224 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding that Commerce may not use highest
    margin from prior administrative review as BIA where that margin
    has been “demonstrated to be inaccurate”). The margin used here,
    however, is not inaccurate. It was calculated based on Ta Chen’s
    own reported data. The court in D&L Supply noted that the
    purpose of using the highest prior antidumping duty rate as BIA
    is to “[offer] some assurance that the exporter will not benefit
    from refusing to provide information, and [to produce] a . . .
    rate that bears some relationship to past practices in the
    industry in question.” 
    Id. at 1223
    . While the margin used here
    was not drawn from a prior review, the same goals are served by
    using the 30.95 percent margin: Ta Chen will not benefit from
    refusing to provide the information, and the margin bears a
    rational relationship to Ta Chen’s selling practices.
    Court No. 97-08-01344                                   Page 17
    .”)   In that determination, Commerce determined the highest non-
    aberrational margin by examining the frequency distribution of
    the margins calculated for the respondent’s reported data.
    Commerce then selected the highest margin for the 10 percent of
    respondent’s transactions which fell within a specific range.
    
    Id.
       Ta Chen argues that the Department did not use this same
    methodology in the remand results.   The Government acknowledges
    that Commerce did not use the precise methodology as stated in
    Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip in Coils from Germany, because to
    have done so would have resulted in a final margin of zero
    percent, thereby eviscerating the adverse inference.
    Ta Chen argues that Commerce cannot choose a facts available
    margin based solely on the fact that it is the highest margin
    available.   Ta Chen relies on Rhone Poulenc, Inc. v. United
    States, 
    899 F.2d 1185
     (Fed. Cir. 1990).   Rhone Poulenc, however,
    supports Commerce’s position.   Analyzing Commerce’s practice
    under BIA, the Federal Circuit stated that it was appropriate for
    Commerce to presume that the highest prior margin was the best
    information of current margins.   This presumption “reflect[ed] a
    common sense inference that the highest prior margin is the most
    probative evidence of current margins because, if it were not so,
    the importer, knowing of the rule, would have produced current
    information showing the margin to be less.”   
    Id. at 1190
    .     This
    Court No. 97-08-01344                                    Page 18
    reasoning also applies in this case because using the highest
    calculated dumping margin provided an incentive for Ta Chen and
    other respondents to produce information.
    Ta Chen also contests the Department’s characterization of
    the sales with the 30.95 percent dumping margin as falling within
    the normal range of price compared to other sales.   Ta Chen
    states that the 0.04 percent of sales with a 30.95 percent
    dumping margin were at a significantly lower price than other Ta
    Chen sales.   Ta Chen Remand Br. at 28.   Commerce’s determination
    that the price of the sales for which a 30.95 percent dumping
    margin was calculated fell within the normal range of price as
    other sales, is supported.   In comparing price, Commerce printed
    lists of the twenty-one highest negative and positive margins for
    Ta Chen.   The price of the sales with the 30.95 percent dumping
    margin fell within the range of these prices.4   As in NSC III, 20
    CIT at 746, 929 F. Supp. at 1580, there is nothing to indicate
    that the sales with this particular margin were not “transacted
    in a normal manner.”5
    4
    The prices for the positive dumping margins ranged from
    [ ] to [ ]. Final Margin Calculations (Jan. 18, 2000), at 54,
    C.R. Doc. 1269, Def.’s Remand Ex. 2, at 1. The price of the
    30.95 percent sale was [ ]. Id. The prices for the negative
    dumping margins ranged from [ ] to [ ]. Id. at 56, Def.’s Remand
    Ex. 2, at 2.
    5
    Ta Chen also contests Commerce’s characterization of
    (continued...)
    Court No. 97-08-01344                                     Page 19
    Ta Chen maintains that Commerce may not use a margin where
    fewer than 0.5 percent of the respondent’s sales had that margin,
    because such sales are de minimis.   The Government argues that
    “the number of sales with the chosen dumping margin [is not] a
    factor in determining whether the margin is useable as facts
    available.   Instead, Commerce seeks to determine whether the sale
    on which the margin is derived is otherwise representative of a
    respondent’s other sales.”   Gov’t Remand Br. at 31-32.   Ta Chen
    relies on two revocation decisions for its position.   See Pure
    Magnesium from Canada, 
    64 Fed. Reg. 50,489
     (Dep’t Commerce 1999)
    (final results of antidumping duty admin. rev. and determination
    not to revoke order in part); Certain Corrosion-Resistant Carbon
    Steel Flat Products and Certain Cut-to-Length Carbon Steel Plate
    5
    (...continued)
    the 30.95 percent sales as falling within the range of Ta Chen’s
    other sales for quantity. The Government explains Commerce’s
    position by noting that the quantity of the sales with the 30.95
    percent margin was [ ], and the range for the other sales was
    from [ ] to [ ]. Govt’ Remand Br. at 29 (referring to Ta Chen’s
    data sets attached to Ta Chen’s Supplemental Questionnaire
    Response (Nov. 12, 1996), C.R. Doc. 8). Given the range, this is
    not a particularly telling factor; but Commerce’s other bases for
    testing the margin are supportive of its choice. Further, the
    highest margin selected was close to margins for other sales,
    although the percentage of sales with positive margins was small.
    Ta Chen also argues that the number of sales of the product
    was not typical because it only represented 2.4 percent of Ta
    Chen’s POR sales. The Government states that Ta Chen made [ ]
    sales of this product during the POR. 
    Id.
     The Government notes
    that the number of sales is substantial, “regardless of the
    percentage these sales represent of Ta Chen’s total sales.”
    Gov’t Remand Br. at 29.
    Court No. 97-08-01344                                     Page 20
    from Canada, 
    64 Fed. Reg. 2,173
     (Dep’t Commerce 1999) (final
    results of antidumping duty admin. revs. and determination to
    revoke in part).   Commerce distinguished these determinations in
    the Remand Results on the basis that they involved the issue of
    whether dumping margins were reflective of a company’s normal
    practice in the context of determining whether the sales had been
    made in commercial quantities for purposes of a revocation
    decision.   RR at 17.   Those determinations did not involve the
    use of adverse facts available.   Commerce stated that it had
    “never determined that an adverse facts available margin should
    be reflective of a respondent’s actual dumping margins.    The
    purpose of applying adverse facts available is to induce
    respondents to cooperate with the Department’s proceedings.”     
    Id.
    While the court does not accept Commerce’s proposition that
    accuracy is not a goal when using adverse facts available,6 it
    agrees with Commerce that in these particular circumstances, if
    Commerce rejected Ta Chen’s sales which had positive dumping
    6
    The court has previously noted its concern that facts
    available margins bear a rational relationship to the matter to
    which they are applied. See Ferro Union, Inc. v. United States,
    
    44 F. Supp.2d 1310
    , 1334-35 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1999) (Commerce must
    select a total substitute margin which is relevant and reliable,
    and bears rational relationship to matter to which it is
    applied); World Finer Foods, Inc. v. United States, No. 99-03-
    00138, 
    2000 WL 897752
     at *6 (Ct. Int’l Trade June 26, 2000)
    (court will not uphold use of individual transaction margins
    which bear no apparent relationship to current level of dumping
    in industry to corroborate a total substitute margin).
    Court No. 97-08-01344                                     Page 21
    margins on the ground that they were de minimis, Commerce would
    not be applying an adverse inference, while still using Ta Chen’s
    information, because Ta Chen would receive a zero percent dumping
    margin.
    Ta Chen lastly argues that Commerce’s choice of the partial
    adverse facts margin is inconsistent with the record as a whole.
    Ta Chen maintains that it is unreasonable to conclude that the
    partial 30.95 percent margin is indicative of Ta Chen’s actual
    selling practices.   Ta Chen ignores that the methodology chosen
    by Commerce was the only way to apply an adverse inference in
    this case, while still using respondent’s own information.     Ta
    Chen’s argument that a lower margin, of zero or 3.27 percent,7
    would also serve the purpose of inducing Ta Chen to cooperate is
    not persuasive.   One of the purposes of using adverse facts
    available is to “ensure that the party does not obtain a more
    favorable result by failing to cooperate than if it had
    cooperated fully.”   Statement of Administrative Action (“SAA”),
    accompanying H.R. Rep. No. 103-826(I), at 870, reprinted in 1994
    U.S.C.C.A.N. 3773, 4199; see also NSC I, 18 CIT at 1132, 870 F.
    Supp. at 1136 (recognizing under BIA that “although the ultimate
    7
    Ta Chen received a 3.27 percent dumping margin in the
    original less than fair value investigation. Certain Welded
    Stainless Steel Pipe from Taiwan, 
    57 Fed. Reg. 62,300
    , 62,301
    (Dep’t Commerce 1992) (amended final determination and
    antidumping duty order).
    Court No. 97-08-01344                                   Page 22
    purpose of BIA is not to punish, BIA is intended to be adverse”).
    If Commerce had used one of the lower margins, as suggested by Ta
    Chen, Ta Chen might have achieved a better result by failing to
    cooperate than by cooperating and providing Sun’s information.
    The SAA also states that Commerce does not have to prove that the
    facts available are the best alternative information.   “Rather,
    the facts available are information or inferences which are
    reasonable to use under the circumstances.”   SAA at 869, 1994
    U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4198.   The court therefore affirms the use of the
    30.95 percent margin as partial adverse facts available,
    resulting in an overall 2.60 percent margin for Ta Chen after
    remand.
    Court No. 97-08-01344                                   Page 23
    Conclusion
    Commerce’s application of partial adverse facts available
    and its selection of the adverse margin were in accordance with
    law and supported by substantial evidence.   The remand results
    are therefore affirmed in their entirety.
    ________________________
    Jane A. Restani
    Judge
    Dated:    New York, New York
    This 25th day of August, 2000.