Kiswok Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. United States , 28 Ct. Int'l Trade 774 ( 2004 )


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  •                           Slip Op. 04 - 54
    UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
    KISWOK INDUSTRIES PVT. LTD. and      :
    CALCUTTA FERROUS LTD.,
    :
    Plaintiffs,
    :   Consolidated
    v.                       Court No. 00-06-00280
    :
    UNITED STATES,
    :
    Defendant.
    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
    Memorandum & Order
    [Plaintiffs' motion for judgment on the agency
    record granted in part and denied in part; re-
    manded to International Trade Administration.]
    Decided:   May 20, 2004
    Cameron & Hornbostel LLP (Dennis James, Jr.) for the
    plaintiffs.
    Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General; David M. Cohen,
    Director, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, U.S.
    Department of Justice (Lucius B. Lau); and Office of Chief Counsel
    for Import Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce (Robert E.
    Nielsen), of counsel, for the defendant.
    AQUILINO, Judge:   This case commenced pursuant to 19
    U.S.C. §§ 1516a(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) and (B)(iii) and 
    28 U.S.C. §§ 1581
    -
    (c) and   2631(c) consolidates complaints filed by Calcutta Ferrous
    Ltd., CIT No. 00-06-00277, and by Kiswok Industries Pvt. Ltd., CIT
    No. 00-06-00280, each praying for relief from Certain Iron-Metal
    Castings from India: Final Results of Countervailing Duty Adminis-
    trative Review, 65 Fed.Reg. 31,515 (May 18, 2000), promulgated by
    Consolidated
    Court No. 00-06-00280                                      Page 2
    the International Trade Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce
    ("ITA").
    Following the grant of plaintiffs' motion for consoli-
    dation, counsel interposed a consent motion to stay this case
    pending resolution of a related issue still sub judice in Crescent
    Foundry Co. v. United States, CIT No. 95-09-01239, and Kajaria Iron
    Castings Pvt. Ltd. v. United States, CIT No. 95-09-01240, namely,
    how income received on merchandise not subject to the
    relevant countervailing duty order should be treated when
    calculating benefits from an Indian income tax exemption
    program.
    Those matter(s) thereafter finally rested.   See Kajaria Iron Cast-
    ings Pvt. Ltd. v. United States, 
    21 CIT 99
    , 
    956 F.Supp. 1023
    , re-
    mand results aff'd, 
    21 CIT 700
    , 
    969 F.Supp. 90
     (1997), aff'd in
    part, rev'd in part and remanded, 
    156 F.3d 1163
     (Fed.Cir. 1998),
    remanded, 
    23 CIT 13
     (1999), second remand results remanded, 
    24 CIT 134
    , third remand results remanded, 
    24 CIT 1274
     (2000), fourth
    remand results aff'd, 25 CIT     , Slip Op. 01-5 (Jan. 24, 2001);
    and Crescent Foundry Co. v. United States, 
    20 CIT 1469
    , 
    951 F.Supp. 252
     (1996), remand results aff'd, 
    21 CIT 696
    , 
    969 F.Supp. 1341
    (1997), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 
    168 F.3d 1322
     (Fed.Cir.
    1998), remanded, 
    23 CIT 12
     (1999), second remand results remanded,
    
    24 CIT 141
    , third remand results remanded, 
    24 CIT 1278
     (2000),
    fourth remand results aff'd, 25 CIT     , Slip Op. 01-6 (Jan. 24,
    2001). By its terms, the parties' stay thus expiring, the plain-
    Consolidated
    Court No. 00-06-00280                                        Page 3
    tiffs have filed a motion for judgment upon the ITA record pursuant
    to USCIT Rule 56.2.
    I
    All of this litigation, of course, has grown out of
    Certain Iron Metal Castings From India: Countervailing Duty Order,
    45 Fed.Reg. 68,650 (Oct. 16, 1980).   And, as indicated, this par-
    ticular consolidated case focuses on the final results of an ITA
    review of imports subject to that order for the calendar year 1997.
    Plaintiffs' motion faults those results as follows:
    A.   ITA Did Not Use the Correct Benefit Received
    by Calcutta Ferrous to Determine the Counter-
    vailable   Subsidy   from  India's   Passbook
    Scheme[.]
    B.   Countervailing Preferential Export Financing
    as Well as Income Tax Deductions under Tax
    Code Section 80 HHC Double-Counts the Subsi-
    dies from the Financing Programs[.]
    C.   ITA Failed to Properly Account for Penal In-
    terest Paid by Calcutta Ferrous on Preferen-
    tial Export Loans[.]
    D.   Since Kiswok Was Able to Break down Revenues
    Between Subject and Non-Subject Castings, ITA
    Should Have Calculated the Section 80 HHC
    Subsidy Based on Tax Savings Relating to
    Subject Castings Only[.]
    Plaintiffs' Memorandum, p. i (capitalization in original).
    A
    The ITA's administrative review herein found that the
    government of India's "Passbook Scheme" remained in effect for the
    first three months of the year at issue.   See Certain Iron-Metal
    Consolidated
    Court No. 00-06-00280                                         Page 4
    Castings From India:    Preliminary Results and Partial Recission of
    Countervailing Duty Administrative Review, 64 Fed.Reg. 61,592,
    61,596 (Nov. 12, 1999).    For that time frame, the scheme
    provided exporters with credits that could be used to pay
    the countervailing and custom duties levied on imported
    products. [It] was available to certain categories of
    exporters, i.e., those manufacturer and merchant export-
    ers which were granted the status of export house,
    trading house, star trading house, or super star trading
    house. Upon the export of finished goods, which were
    produced with indigenous raw materials, and not imported
    materials, the exporter was eligible to claim credits
    which could be used to pay customs duties on subsequent
    imports. The . . . scheme was only applicable for those
    exported products for which standard input/output norms
    had been fixed. The standard input/output norms set out
    quantities of imported raw materials needed to produce
    one unit of finished output. The credit in the passbook
    . . . was calculated on the basis of input/output norms
    for the deemed input content of the exported product.
    The Indian Customs Authority (ICA) determined the basic
    customs duty payable against the input as if it had been
    imported and not sourced from the domestic market. A
    company's passbook account was then credited for the
    amount equivalent to the basic customs duty payable on
    such deemed imports. The company could then utilize the
    credits in its passbook account to pay the countervailing
    and customs duty levied on imported goods.       Any good
    which was not included in the Negative List of Imports
    could be imported under the Passbook Scheme. Payment of
    the duties was made through a debit entry in the com-
    pany's passbook account by the ICA.
    
    Id.
       The agency verified that it was not mandatory for the
    passbook holder to consume the goods, imported with
    passbook credits, in the production of exported products.
    There was no relation between the imported goods and the
    production of the exporter and no relation between the
    standard input/output norms of the export product and the
    goods being imported with passbook credits. The norms
    were simply used to calculate the credits. A company
    could not transfer or sell passbook credits received, but
    the goods imported with passbook credits could be
    transferred or sold in the domestic market.
    
    Id.
    Consolidated
    Court No. 00-06-00280                                                   Page 5
    The record indicates that Calcutta Ferrous Ltd. ("CFL"),
    a plaintiff at bar, availed itself of this program and also that
    the ITA determined the scheme was an export subsidy "[b]ecause
    receipt    of   the    passbook     credits   was   contingent   upon   export
    performance"1 and countervailable because
    a financial contribution was provided by the government
    in the form of customs duty revenue forgone[, and t]he
    amount of customs duty which should have been paid by the
    company to import the goods constitute[d] the benefit
    . . ..
    
    Id. at 61,596-97
    .
    To calculate the benefit conferred by this program,
    we summed the amount of passbook credits each respondent
    company used during the POR to pay the customs duty on
    goods imported.   We then divided the benefit by each
    company's f.o.b. value of total exports for 1997.2
    This approach resulted in a rate of 7.27 percent for CFL3 that is
    contested by this plaintiff in several ways.
    (1)
    CFL contends that the ITA inappropriately relied on 
    19 C.F.R. §351.519
    (a)(3)(ii), adopted November 25, 1998, and which
    provided    with      regard   to    identification    and   measurement    of
    countervailable subsidies:
    1
    64 Fed.Reg. at 61,597.
    2
    
    Id.
     The "we" quoted here and hereinafter refers to the ITA
    and "POR" to the period of review.
    3
    See 
    ibid.
    Consolidated
    Court No. 00-06-00280                                       Page 6
    Exemption of import charges.     If the Secretary
    determines that the exemption of import charges upon
    export confers a benefit, the Secretary normally will
    consider the amount of the benefit to be the import
    charges that otherwise would have been paid on the inputs
    not consumed in the production of the exported product,
    making normal allowance for waste, and the amount of
    charges other than import charges covered by the exemp-
    tion.
    Implicit in plaintiff's position are two propositions,
    namely, that the ITA did in fact rely on this provision, and that
    the reliance was unfounded.   But CFL fails to show how and where on
    the record the agency so relied.    Instead, it states in conclusory
    fashion that the "ITA initially based its reason for using the
    unpaid duties as the benefit on 
    19 C.F.R. §351.519
    (a)(3)(ii)".
    Plaintiffs' Memorandum, p. 7.      Later, it tempers this assertion
    with "apparently".   See 
    id. at 11
    .   Whatever the choice of words,
    the record shows that the ITA plainly and repeatedly indicated that
    it did not rely on section 351.519(a)(3)(ii), viz:
    . . . All citations to the Department's regulations
    reference 19 CFR part 351 (1998), unless otherwise
    indicated. Because the request for this administrative
    review was filed before January 1, 1999, the Department's
    substantive countervailing regulations, which were
    published in the Federal Register on November 25, 1998
    (see CVD Regulations, 63 FR 65348), do not govern this
    review.
    65 Fed.Reg. at 31,515-16 (bold face in original);
    . . . [U]nless otherwise indicated, all citations to the
    Department's regulations are to the regulations as
    codified at 19 CFR Part 351 (1998).
    64 Fed.Reg. at 61,593;
    Consolidated
    Court No. 00-06-00280                                               Page 7
    . . . We note that the Department's substantive CVD
    Regulations cited by respondents are not controlling in
    this review because the request for the review was
    received prior to the effective date of the new regula-
    tions.
    ITA Issues and Decision Memorandum ("DecMemo"), PubDoc 94, p. 16,
    n. 27.
    (2)
    CFL contends that the ITA inappropriately applied 
    19 U.S.C. §1677
    (5)(D)(ii), which defined "financial contribution" to
    mean   a   governmental   authority's    "foregoing   or   not   collecting
    revenue that is otherwise due, such as granting tax credits or
    deductions from taxable income".        The gist of plaintiff's argument
    is that the agency failed to find both governmental pecuniary
    assistance and a benefit as required by 
    19 U.S.C. §§ 1677
    (5)(D) and
    (E). Cf. Delverde, SRL v. United States, 
    202 F.3d 1360
    , 1366 (Fed.
    Cir. 2000)("the statute clearly requires that in order to find that
    a person received a subsidy, Commerce [must] determine that that
    person received from a government both [pecuniary assistance] and
    benefit").    In particular, CFL insists that the ITA did not make a
    determination under section 1677(5)(E).         In support thereof, it
    directs the court's attention to the ITA's lack of reference to
    that section in its decision memorandum, page 17:
    . . . [T]he respondents are incorrect on the valuation of
    the benefit. It is irrelevant whether the respondents
    make a profit on the sale of the imported good.       The
    financial contribution and benefit provided to the
    respondents by the government under this program is the
    amount of duties that otherwise would have been paid on
    these imports. See section [1677](5)(D)(ii) of the Act.
    Consolidated
    Court No. 00-06-00280                                       Page 8
    Therefore, we calculated the benefit under this program
    based upon the amount of import duties that would have
    been paid by the respondents absent the use of credits
    provided under the Passbook Scheme.
    The plaintiff claims that, because only that subsection (5)(D)(ii)
    is cited, the agency relied on it alone and could not have properly
    derived any benefit conferred.   See Plaintiff's Memorandum, p. 12.
    In a case such as this, the court must consider the
    entire record within the meaning of 19 U.S.C. §1516a(b)(2).      E.g.,
    Ausimont USA, Inc. v. United States, 
    19 CIT 151
    , 157, 
    882 F.Supp. 1087
    , 1092 (1995), citing Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 
    340 U.S. 474
    , 488 (1951).   Having now done so, the inference the court draws
    is that the ITA properly relied on both subsections (5)(D) and (5)
    (E) in deriving the benefit conferred.     Its Preliminary Results
    state that the amount of customs which should have been paid by the
    company to import the goods constitutes the benefit under (5)(E) of
    the Act. 64 Fed.Reg at 61,596-97.    At the beginning, the decision
    memorandum assures that there were no changes in methodology from
    that used in the Preliminary Results.    The agency's Final Results
    are to the same effect.   See 65 Fed.Reg. at 31,515.   To the extent
    the record induces a conflicting inference, "the court will uphold
    a decision of less-than-ideal clarity if the agency's path may be
    reasonably discerned". Neenah Foundry Co. v. United States, 25 CIT
    ,      , 
    142 F.Supp.2d 1008
    , 1020 (2001), citing Colorado Inter-
    state Gas Co. v. FPC, 
    324 U.S. 581
    , 595 (1945).   In sum, the court
    cannot find that the ITA's approach was not in accordance with law.
    Consolidated
    Court No. 00-06-00280                                               Page 9
    (3)
    CFL claims its benefit was the profit earned on the goods
    it imported and not the amount of duty foregone by the Indian
    government.      Plaintiffs' Memorandum, p. 11.     The court can concur
    that the company benefitted from that profit, but this is not to
    say that it therefore disagrees with the ITA's conclusion. Indeed,
    CFL may have benefitted twice under the scheme, first via the
    exemption from duties and then the profit earned on the goods
    subject to the exemption.
    The question the court must decide is whether the ITA's
    approach   was    permissible.    The    court   concludes   that   it   was
    consistent with the statute, subparagraph 1677(5)(B) of which
    states:
    A subsidy is described in this paragraph in the case
    in which an authority - -
    (i) provides a financial contribution,
    (ii) provides any form of income or price
    support within the meaning of Article XVI of
    the GATT 1994, or
    (iii) makes a payment to a funding mecha-
    nism to provide a financial contribution, or
    entrusts or directs a private entity to make a
    financial contribution, if providing the con-
    tribution would normally be vested in the
    government and the practice does not differ in
    substance from practices normally followed by
    governments,
    to a person and a benefit is thereby conferred. For pur-
    poses of this paragraph . . . , the term "authority"
    means a government of a country or any public entity
    within the territory of the country.
    Consolidated
    Court No. 00-06-00280                                        Page 10
    Furthermore, a benefit "shall normally be treated as conferred
    where there is a benefit to the recipient".4      Whatever twists of
    reasoning this language may permit, they do not negate the agency's
    determination.
    CFL's preferred approach on the other hand, the benefit
    conferred should be the profit earned, would nullify the intent of
    the statute in all those instances where recipients of home-govern-
    ment, countervailable benefits still do not turn a profit.         Of
    course, that intent, unchanged from the law's enactment, has been
    to compensate for the unfair opportunity to compete that receipt of
    such benefits entails, not what actually is made of such opportun-
    ity:
    . . . This purpose is relatively clear from the face of
    the statute and is confirmed by the congressional
    debates: The countervailing duty was intended to offset
    the unfair competitive advantage that foreign producers
    would otherwise enjoy from export subsidies paid by their
    governments.
    Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 
    437 U.S. 443
    , 455-56 (1978),
    citing to remarks in the Congressional Record by three Senators
    with regard to the Tariff Act of 1897; Wolff Shoe Co. v. United
    States, 
    141 F.3d 1116
    , 1117 (Fed.Cir. 1998)(countervailing duties
    "are levied on subsidized imports to offset the unfair competitive
    advantages created by foreign subsidies").
    4
    
    19 U.S.C. §1677
    (5)(E). Apparently, the word "normally" was
    added "only to indicate that in the case of certain types of
    subsidy programs . . . [none of which are involved here] the use of
    the benefit-to-the-recipient standard may not be appropriate."
    H.R. Rep. 103-826(I), p. 109 (1994).
    Consolidated
    Court No. 00-06-00280                                      Page 11
    B
    According to the ITA's Preliminary Results herein, the
    Reserve Bank of India ("RBI"),
    through commercial banks, provides short-term pre-ship-
    ment financing, or "packing credits," to exporters. Upon
    presentation of a confirmed export order or letter of
    credit, companies may receive pre-shipment loans for
    working capital purposes, i.e., for the purchase of raw
    materials and for packing, warehousing, and transporting
    of export merchandise. Exporters may also establish pre-
    shipment credit lines upon which they may draw as needed.
    Credit line limits are established by commercial banks,
    based upon a company's creditworthiness and past export
    performance.   Companies that have pre-shipment credit
    lines typically pay interest on a quarterly basis on the
    outstanding balance of the account at the end of each
    period. In general, packing credits are granted for a
    period of up to 180 days.
    Commercial banks extending export credit to Indian
    companies must, by law, charge interest on this credit at
    rates determined by the RBI.      The rate of interest
    charged on pre-shipment export loans up to 180 days was
    13.0 percent for the period January 1, 1997 through
    October 21, 1997, and 12.0 percent for the period October
    22, 1997 through December 31, 1997. For pre-shipment
    loans not repaid within 180 days, the banks charged
    interest at the following rates for the number of days
    the loans were overdue: 15.0 percent for the period
    January 1, 1997 through October 21, 1997, and 14.0
    percent for the period October 22, 1997 through December
    31, 1997. An exporter would lose the concessional in-
    terest rate if the export loan was not repaid within 270
    days. If that occurred, the banks were able to assess
    interest at a non-concessional interest rate above the
    ceiling rate of interest set by the RBI.
    64 Fed.Reg. at 61,593.   The agency also found that post-shipment
    export financing
    consists of loans in the form of trade bill discounting
    or advances by commercial banks. The credit covers the
    period from the date of shipment of the goods, to the
    date of realization of export proceeds from the overseas
    customer. Post-shipment finance, therefore, is a working
    Consolidated
    Court No. 00-06-00280                                       Page 12
    capital finance or sales finance against receivables.
    The interest amount owed is deducted from the total
    amount of the bill at the time of discounting by the
    bank. The exporter's account is then credited for the
    rupee equivalent of the net amount.
    In general, post-shipment loans are granted for a
    period of up to 90 days. The following interest rates
    were charged on post-shipment loans up to 90 days: 13.0
    percent for the period January 1, 1997 through June 23,
    1997, 12.0 percent for the period June 24, 1997 through
    October 21, 1997, and 11.0 percent for the period October
    22, 1997 through December 31, 1997.
    For loans not repaid within the negotiated number of
    days (90 days maximum), banks assessed the following
    rates of interest for the number of days the loans were
    overdue, up to six months from the date of shipment: 15.0
    percent for the period January 1, 1997 through June 23,
    1997, 14.0 percent for the period June 24, 1997 through
    October 21, 1997, and 13.0 percent for the period October
    22, 1997 through December 31, 1997. If a post-shipment
    loan was not repaid within six months of the date of
    shipment, an exporter would lose the concessional in-
    terest rate on the financing, and interest would be
    charged at a commercial rate determined by the banks.
    
    Id. at 61,594
    .
    CFL availed itself of such financing, which the ITA
    determined to be an export subsidy because it was contingent upon
    export performance and also countervailable because the interest
    rates charged were less than what the company otherwise would have
    had to pay on comparable short-term loans.   See id.; 65 Fed.Reg. at
    31,517.   To calculate the benefit, the agency
    compared the actual interest paid on the loans with the
    amount of interest that would have been paid at the
    benchmark interest rate.     Where the benchmark rate
    exceeded the program rates, the difference between those
    amounts is the benefit.
    Consolidated
    Court No. 00-06-00280                                       Page 13
    If the . . . loans were received solely to finance
    exports of subject merchandise to the United States, we
    divided the benefit derived from those loans by exports
    of subject merchandise to the United States. For all
    other . . . loans, we divided the benefit by total ex-
    ports to all destinations.
    64 Fed.Reg. at 61,594.
    CFL's complaint now is that the agency "double-counted"
    the export finance subsidies.   Its reliance on Kajaria, supra, in
    this regard, however, is misplaced.    Countervailing a subsidy and
    countervailing the non-taxation of that subsidy is not countenanced
    by Kajaria; countervailing a subsidy and countervailing the non-
    taxation of a different subsidy that incidentally includes a
    partial benefit via the other is not impermissible. The facts at
    bar constitute an instance of the latter, not the former, and
    therefore do not run afoul of that case.
    The issue in Kajaria was whether the ITA had double-
    counted a subsidy by countervailing both a section 80HHC deduction
    on export profits and some over-rebates resulting from India's Cash
    Compensatory Support ("CCS") Program.     The court held in the af-
    firmative, 
    156 F.3d at 1173-74
    .   The over-rebates were the result
    of the agency's finding that certain rebates claimed and received
    under the CCS program were improper.      That program rebated both
    indirect taxes and import duties imposed on products physically
    incorporated into an export product.    The ITA determined that port
    and harbor taxes were not the type of taxes and duties falling
    within the rebate exemption under the CCS; instead, they were
    Consolidated
    Court No. 00-06-00280                                             Page 14
    service charges.   The rebate of these non-exempt service charges
    was   countervailable   as   a   subsidy.   See   
    156 F.3d. at 1168
    .
    Concurrently, section 80HHC deductions that included the over-
    rebates were countervailed by the agency.     See 
    id. at 1167
    .        Those
    deductions included the over-rebates because the rebates were
    exempt from taxation under that tax section.            See 
    id. at 1172, 1174-75
    .
    The plaintiffs in Kajaria argued that countervailing both
    the CCS over-rebates and the section 80HHC deductions that were
    based on them double-counted the over-rebates.            The court con-
    curred:
    . . . Countervailing the portion of the section 80HHC
    deduction attributable to the CCS over-rebates counter-
    vails the tax [Kajaria et al.] would have paid on the CCS
    over-rebates as a result of their inclusion in taxable
    income. In effect, Commerce fully countervailed the CCS
    over-rebates and the tax that would have been paid on the
    over-rebates. However, [Kajaria et al.] only received a
    benefit equal to the full amount of the CCS over-rebates,
    which Commerce fully countervailed. Commerce overstated
    the subsidies received by double-counting the CCS over-
    rebates.
    
    Id. at 1174-75
    .
    Here, however, the ITA did not attempt to countervail
    more subsidies than were received. It countervailed interest saved
    under the export financing program, and it countervailed taxes
    saved under the section 80HHC deduction for export profits, two
    distinct subsidies, each of which benefitted CFL. That they can be
    seen to partially overlap via accounting principles is not enough
    Consolidated
    Court No. 00-06-00280                                      Page 15
    to render the agency's approach impermissible. This is because the
    ITA is not required to take into account the secondary tax effect
    of subsidies, despite the net benefit's being the amount of the
    subsidy minus the taxes paid on it:
    . . . Mindful of the burden on Commerce, our decision
    does not mean that in every administrative review or
    investigation Commerce must trace the tax treatment of
    subsidies to determine if two independent subsidies
    partially include the same benefit. However, Commerce
    must avoid double-counting subsidies, i.e., countervail-
    ing both the full amount of a subsidy and the nontaxation
    of that subsidy . . ..
    
    Id. at 1175
    .
    C
    CFL alleges that the ITA failed to account for the
    "penal" interest it paid in determining the benefit actually
    derived from the preferential financing:
    Where Calcutta Ferrous paid interest on the same
    loan at rates both less than and greater than the
    benchmark rate, all the interest -- including the penal
    interest paid at rates greater than the benchmark rate --
    must be taken into account to determine the actual
    benefit to the company from the loans. The methodology
    used by ITA, however, improperly eliminates the overdue
    penal interest from the calculation of the benefit from
    the export loans and uses only the preferential interest
    rates.
    Plaintiff's Memorandum, p. 21.   The sum and substance of defend-
    ant's response to this complaint has been as follows:
    . . . As we explained in the preliminary results, ex-
    porters discount their export bills with Indian commer-
    cial banks to finance their operations. . . . By dis-
    counting an export bill, the company receives payment
    from the bank in the amount of the export bill, net of
    Consolidated
    Court No. 00-06-00280                                       Page 16
    interest charges. The loan is considered "paid" once the
    foreign currency proceeds from an export sale are
    received by the bank. If those proceeds are not paid
    within the negotiated period, then the loan is considered
    "overdue." For the overdue loan, the bank will charge
    the company interest on the original amount of the loan
    at a higher interest rate[;] however, the bank does not
    go back and levy the higher penalty interest on the
    original term of the loan. In essence, the overdue loan
    becomes a new loan with a new applicable interest rate.
    Because penalty interest does not apply to the period
    preceding the date the loan is considered overdue, we
    have not taken the penalty interest into account when
    calculating the subsidy provided on the original dis-
    counted loan.
    DecMemo, p. 24.    See also Defendant's Memorandum, pp. 21-25.
    While that memorandum defends this position as being
    supported by substantial evidence on the record and otherwise in
    accordance with law within the meaning of 19 U.S.C. §1516a(b)(1)-
    (B)(i), the defendant does admit that "Commerce has previously
    taken penalty interest into account."    Id. at 22, citing Certain
    Iron-Metal Castings From India; Amended Final Results of Counter-
    vailing Duty Administrative Review, 62 Fed.Reg. 590 (Jan. 3, 1997).
    . . . Since that time, however, Commerce reconsidered its
    practice and concluded that adjusting for penalty
    interest did not conform to the requirements of the
    statute, particularly to the net countervailable subsidy,
    offset provision, 
    19 U.S.C. § 1677
    (6).
    
    Id.,
     citing Certain Iron-Metal Castings From India; Final Results
    of Countervailing Duty Administrative Review, 62 Fed.Reg. 32,297
    (June 13, 1997).    In that determination, the ITA recited section
    1677(6) and proceeded to conclude that penalty interest under
    Consolidated
    Court No. 00-06-00280                                             Page 17
    India's Post-Shipment Export Credit in Foreign Currency Program did
    not   fall    within   that   statutory   section's   exclusive   list   of
    allowable offsets.     See 62 Fed.Reg. at 32,305. This court concurs,
    but it cannot agree that that offset section, on its face5, is
    actually apposite.
    Indeed, the ITA's reasoning in this matter, quoted above,
    makes no mention of that section.         Rather, its "essence" is that
    "the overdue loan becomes a new loan with a new applicable interest
    rate."     Nothing on the record, however, supports this thesis, nor
    should any support be found, given that the loan(s) at issue con-
    sisted of a sum certain of money receivable within a specified
    period of time at a particular rate of interest or thereafter at a
    greater rate.       Those were the elements of the borrowing, the
    5
    The full text of this provision is as follows:
    For the purpose of determining the net counter-
    vailable subsidy, the [ITA] may subtract from the gross
    countervailable subsidy the amount of --
    (A) any application fee, deposit, or similar
    payment paid in order to qualify for, or to
    receive, the benefit of the countervailable
    subsidy,
    (B) any loss in the value of the counter-
    vailable subsidy resulting from its deferred
    receipt, if the deferral is mandated by
    Government order, and
    (C) export taxes, duties, or other charges
    levied on the export of merchandise to the
    United States specifically intended to offset
    the countervailable subsidy received.
    Consolidated
    Court No. 00-06-00280                                       Page 18
    benefit of which is not necessarily conclusive upon the close of
    that specified, initial period.       The duration of the loan, any
    loan, cannot be disregarded.   It is a critical element of the ulti-
    mate cost thereof.
    D
    The section 80HHC of India's Income Tax Act that has been
    referred to hereinabove enabled exporters to deduct from taxable
    income profits derived from the export of merchandise.   The record
    shows that the plaintiffs availed themselves of this deduction,
    which the ITA countervailed
    because it result[ed] in a financial contribution by the
    government in the form of tax revenue not collected which
    also constitute[d] the benefit.
    64   Fed.Reg at 61,595.   Its Preliminary Results report in part
    pertinent to this case:
    In its questionnaire responses, Kiswok Industries
    . . . stated that its profit rate on export sales of
    subject castings is lower than the profit rate the
    company realizes on the export sales of other castings.
    The company submitted audited derivations of its profit
    rate for exports of subject castings in 1997, and its
    profit rate for exports of other castings for the same
    year. The company then calculated that portion of the 80
    HHC tax deduction which was applicable to export profit
    earned on subject castings.
    In prior reviews of this order, the Department has
    found the section 80HHC tax deduction program to be an
    "untied" export subsidy program. The benefits provided
    under this program are not tied to the production or sale
    of a particular product or products. It is the Depart-
    ment's consistent and long-standing practice to attribute
    a benefit from an export subsidy that is not tied to a
    particular product or market to all products exported by
    Consolidated
    Court No. 00-06-00280                                      Page 19
    the company. . . . Therefore, to calculate the benefit
    Kiswok Industries received under the section 80HHC
    program, we have not made any adjustments to our standard
    allocation methodology.
    To calculate the benefit each company received under
    section 80HHC, we subtracted the total amount of income
    tax the company actually paid during the review period
    from the amount of tax the company otherwise would have
    paid had it not claimed a deduction under section 80HHC.
    We then divided this difference by the f.o.b. value of
    the company's total exports.
    
    Id.,
     citing Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination:
    Certain Pasta from Turkey, 61 Fed.Reg. 30,366 (June 14, 1996).
    In contesting this approach, the plaintiff Kiswok refers
    to the opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in
    Kajaria, supra, to wit:
    . . . [W]hen the party under investigation provides
    documentation that allows Commerce to separate the
    portion of the tax deduction based on rebates related to
    non-subject merchandise from the remainder of a counter-
    vailable tax deduction, Commerce should not countervail
    the portion of the tax deduction subsidy tied to non-
    subject merchandise. Since the Producers provided such
    data, Commerce should eliminate the . . . rebates from
    the calculation of the subsidy provided by the section 80
    HHC deduction.
    
    156 F.3d at 1176
    .       Whereupon, it argues that this reasoning
    "applies with equal force to Kiswok's calculations in the case at
    bar." Plaintiffs' Memorandum, p. 25. This court cannot concur, as
    countervailing a subsidy tied to non-subject merchandise is dif-
    ferent than countervailing profit on non-subject merchandise.
    Consolidated
    Court No. 00-06-00280                                                Page 20
    Kajaria et alia had challenged the ITA's decision to
    countervail that portion of a section 80HHC deduction attributable
    to IPRS rebates (reimbursements to exporters for the difference in
    price   between    domestic   and   foreign    pig   iron)   on   non-subject
    merchandise.      The agency reasoned that the deduction was an untied
    export subsidy and, in accordance with its policy, allocated the
    benefit of the subsidy over Kajaria’s total exports, which included
    the non-subject merchandise entitled to IPRS rebates. See 
    156 F.3d at 1175-76
    .    The question the court had to answer was "whether the
    portion of the section 80HHC deduction based on the IPRS rebates
    was a countervailable subsidy." 
    Id. at 1176
    .             It answered in the
    negative, holding that the ITA
    erred in countervailing the portion of the section 80HHC
    deduction based on the IPRS rebates because the rebates
    involved were tied to merchandise not within the scope of
    the review.
    
    Id.
       In other words, a subsidy tied to non-subject merchandise--a
    non-countervailable      subsidy--does   not    become    countervailable
    merely by virtue of its being deductible under a separate, untied
    countervailable subsidy that is a tax deduction.
    This precept does not apply herein.            The Kajaria court
    was faced with two subsidies: one tied and countervailable, and one
    tied and not countervailable; and two groups of exports: one
    subject to investigation and one not.          The record at bar, on the
    other hand, involves one subsidy, untied and countervailable, and
    merchandise, some subject to administrative review and some not.
    Consolidated
    Court No. 00-06-00280                                       Page 21
    The question thus is whether that non-subject merchandise is of any
    moment, not, as in Kajaria, whether the countervailing-duty order
    governed a subsidy tied to non-subject merchandise.    On its face,
    that case is not controlling here, nor does it counsel this court
    to apply its reasoning by analogy.
    Untied subsidies are not linked to any particular mer-
    chandise; they are presumed to benefit an exporter in general and
    are therefore allocated to its total business. See, e.g., British
    Steel PLC v. United States, 
    19 CIT 176
    , 
    879 F.Supp. 1254
     (1995),
    aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded sub nom. LTV Steel Co. v.
    United States, 
    174 F.3d 1359
     (Fed.Cir. 1999).    The presumption is
    sensible.    Money is fungible.   A cash subsidy, regardless of its
    intended or actual use, frees up revenue, which in turn may be
    applied for other purposes, and thus entails general benefit. See,
    e.g., Usinor Sacilor v. United States, 
    19 CIT 711
    , 
    893 F.Supp. 1112
    (1995), aff'd in part, rev’d in part, 
    215 F.3d 1350
     (Fed.Cir.
    1999).
    In short, Kiswok is asking this court to reject this
    longstanding approach of the ITA because profit rates on subject
    and non-subject merchandise differed. Yet it fails to point to any
    authority supporting its position.   The simple truth of the matter
    is that the statute does not favor Kiswok’s request.       Counter-
    vailing-duty orders are based on the existence of a countervailable
    Consolidated
    Court No. 00-06-00280                                       Page 22
    subsidy, 
    19 U.S.C. §1671
    (a).    Just as a foreign firm’s revenue or
    expenses do not affect a countervailing-duty order on its subsi-
    dized merchandise, the extent to which the exporter profits on that
    merchandise is irrelevant when it comes to imposition of duties
    thereunder.
    II
    In view of the foregoing, plaintiffs' motion for judgment
    upon the agency record must be, and it hereby is, denied, except
    that the defendant is directed to recalculate the benefit the
    plaintiff Calcutta Ferrous Ltd. realized from its preferential
    loan(s), taking into account all of the interest paid thereon. The
    defendant may have until July 9, 2004 to report the results thereof
    to the court and the plaintiffs, which may then have until July 23,
    2004 to comment thereon.
    So ordered.
    Decided:   New York, New York
    May 20, 2004
    Thomas J. Aquilino, Jr.
    Judge