Foshan Shunde Yongjian Housewares & Hardwares Co. v. United States , 172 F. Supp. 3d 1353 ( 2016 )

Slip Op. 16-1
UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
FOSHAN SHUNDE YONGJIAN
HOUSEWARES & HARDWARES CO.,
LTD.,
Before: Leo M. Gordon, Judge
Plaintiff,
Court No. 12-00069
v.
UNITED STATES,
Defendant.
OPINION and ORDER
[Results on redetermination sustained in part and remanded in part.]
Dated: January 8, 2016
Gregory S. Menegaz, J. Kevin Horgan, and John J. Kenkel, deKieffer & Horgan PLLC,
of Washington, DC for Plaintiff Foshan Shunde Yongjian Housewares & Hardwares Co., Ltd.
Michael D. Snyder, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, U.S.
Department of Justice for Defendant United States. With him on the brief were Benjamin C.
Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Jeanne E. Davidson, Director, and Patricia
M. McCarthy, Assistant Director. Of counsel on the brief was Amanda T. Lee, Attorney, Office
of the Chief Counsel for Trade Enforcement & Compliance, U.S. Department of Commerce of
Washington, DC.
Frederick L. Ikenson and Larry Hampel, Blank Rome LLP of Washington, DC for
Defendant-Intervenor Home Products International, Inc.
Gordon, Judge: This action involves the U.S. Department of Commerce’s
(“Commerce”) sixth administrative review of the antidumping duty order covering Floor-
Standing, Metal-Top Ironing Tables from China. See Floor-Standing, Metal-Top Ironing
Tables and Certain Parts Thereof from the People’s Republic of China, 77 Fed. Reg.
14,499 (Dep’t of Commerce Mar. 12, 2012) (final results admin. review) (Final Results);
see also Issues and Decision Memorandum for Final Results of Antidumping Duty
Court No. 12-00069 Page 2
Administrative Review of Floor-Standing, Metal-Top Ironing Tables and Certain Parts
Thereof from the People's Republic of China, A-570-888 (Dep’t of Commerce Mar. 5,
2012), available at http://enforcement.trade.gov/frn/summary/prc/2012-5915-1.pdf (last
visited this date) (“Decision Memorandum”). Before the court are the Final Results of
Redetermination, ECF No. 64 (“Remand Results”) filed by Commerce pursuant to Foshan
Shunde Yongjian Housewares & Hardwares Co. v. United States, 37 CIT ___, 896 F.
Supp. 2d 1313 (2013) (“Foshan I”). The court has jurisdiction pursuant to Section
516A(a)(2)(B)(iii) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(2)(B)(iii)
(2012),1 and 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) (2012). Familiarity with Foshan I is presumed.
Foshan Shunde challenges several aspects of the Remand Results:
(1) Commerce’s use of a provision in the Harmonized Tariff Schedule (“HTS”) that
includes high-carbon steel to value its steel wire input; (2) Commerce’s use of the World
Bank’s Doing Business 2010: Indonesia publication to value Foshan Shunde’s brokerage
and handling (“B&H”), or in the alternative, Commerce’s failure to adjust the World Bank
data to reflect Foshan Shunde’s actual experience; and (3) Commerce’s application of
zeroing. Pl.’s Comments on Remand Redetermination (June 5, 2015), ECF No. 70 (“Pl.’s
Br.”); see also Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Comments to the Remand Redetermination (Aug. 7,
2015), ECF No. 77 (“Def.’s Resp.”); Def.-Intervenor’s Resp. to Pl.’s Comments to the
Remand Redetermination (Aug. 13, 2015), ECF No. 79; Letter from Gregory S. Menegaz,
1
Further citations to the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, are to the relevant provisions of
Title 19 of the U.S. Code, 2012 edition.
Court No. 12-00069 Page 3
attorney for Plaintiff, to the Hon. Leo M. Gordon, Judge (Aug. 13, 2015), ECF No. 80
(letter correcting factual misstatement).
I. Standard of Review
For administrative reviews of antidumping duty orders, the court sustains
Commerce’s “determinations, findings, or conclusions” unless they are “unsupported by
substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 19 U.S.C.
§ 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i). More specifically, when reviewing agency determinations, findings,
or conclusions for substantial evidence, the court assesses whether the agency action is
reasonable given the record as a whole. Nippon Steel Corp. v. United States, 458 F.3d
1345, 1350-51 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Substantial evidence has been described as “such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” DuPont Teijin Films USA v. United States, 407 F.3d 1211, 1215 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). Substantial
evidence has also been described as “something less than the weight of the evidence,
and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not
prevent an administrative agency’s finding from being supported by substantial evidence.”
Consolo v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966). Fundamentally, though,
“substantial evidence” is best understood as a word formula connoting reasonableness
review. 3 Charles H. Koch, Jr., Administrative Law and Practice § 9.24[1] (3d ed. 2015).
Therefore, when addressing a substantial evidence issue raised by a party, the court
analyzes whether the challenged agency action “was reasonable given the circumstances
Court No. 12-00069 Page 4
presented by the whole record.” 8A West’s Fed. Forms, National Courts § 3:6 (5th ed.
2015).
Separately, the two-step framework provided in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984), governs judicial review of
Commerce's interpretation of the antidumping statute. See United States v. Eurodif S.A.,
555 U.S. 305, 316 (2009) (Commerce's “interpretation governs in the absence of
unambiguous statutory language to the contrary or unreasonable resolution of language
that is ambiguous.”).
II. Discussion
A. Steel Wire Surrogate Value
In Foshan I the court remanded to Commerce to further consider the surrogate
value for Foshan Shunde’s steel wire input. Foshan I, 37 CIT at ___, 896 F. Supp. 2d at
1326-28. During the administrative review Commerce had three choices. Foshan Shunde
proposed a relatively lower cost surrogate value derived from Indonesian HTS 7217.10.10
(“Containing by weight less than 0.25% of carbon”), a category assigned to low carbon
steel wire. Home Products International, Inc. (“HPI”), the petitioner, proposed a relatively
higher cost surrogate value derived from Indonesian HTS 7217.10.39 (“Containing by
weight 0.6% or more of carbon”), a category assigned to high carbon steel wire. Conf.
J.A. at JA002672-73 (Feb. 15, 2015), ECF Nos. 37-39 (HPI’s brief in rebuttal to Foshan
Shunde’s administrative case brief) (“J.A.”). HPI also suggested, as an alternative, a
surrogate value derived from the six-digit basket category, Indonesian HTS 7217.10
(“Wire of iron or non-alloy steel”), which encompassed both of the other two proposed
Court No. 12-00069 Page 5
categories. Id. at JA002673 (“[Commerce] may consider it appropriate to broaden the
surrogate value classification beyond the sublevels reflecting carbon content and simply
base the value on data reflecting Indonesian imports at the 6-digit level.”) (HPI’s
administrative rebuttal brief).
The Indonesian “carbon” metric posed an issue because the administrative record,
through no fault of Foshan Shunde, did not identify the carbon content of Foshan
Shunde’s steel wire inputs. HPI acknowledged that the absence of record information was
not the result of “a shortcoming of [Foshan Shunde’s] production records system.” See
id. Foshan Shunde did not capture that information in its production records, and as one
can infer from HPI’s concession, it is not something about which an ironing board
manufacturer appears to care. Commerce therefore had to choose the “best available”
surrogate value based on incomplete information, or more simply, a lack of direct
information about the carbon content of Foshan Shunde’s steel wire input.
The surrogate value for the steel wire input was not an issue in the prior
administrative review in which India was the surrogate country. Commerce used Indian
HTS 7217.10.10. India, though, unlike Indonesia, categorizes its additional subheadings
under HTS 7217.10 according to wire thickness, not carbon content. Foshan Shunde,
nevertheless, argues that Indonesian HTS 7217.10.10 is a logical, if not comparable,
surrogate selection given the past selection of Indian HRS 7217.10.10. HPI argued, and
Commerce agreed, however, that no direct concordance exists between the diameter-
based provisions of the Indian tariff schedule and the carbon-based provisions of the
Indonesian schedule. Remand Results at 17-18.
Court No. 12-00069 Page 6
In the Final Results Commerce chose the relatively higher cost, higher carbon
surrogate value for Foshan Shunde’s steel input. Decision Memorandum at 13. When
subsequently challenged by Foshan Shunde, the court found persuasive Foshan
Shunde’s argument made before Commerce that ironing boards do not require the higher
cost steel input Commerce selected: “As a matter of common sense, this common
household product has no special requirement for high strength high carbon steel wire . .
. .” J.A. at JA002593 (Foshan Shunde’s administrative case brief). The court remanded
the issue to Commerce and asked why “it is reasonable to infer/assume from the
administrative record that a household item like an ironing board requires higher carbon
content.” Foshan I, 37 CIT at ___, 896 F. Supp. 2d at 1327-28.
On remand, Commerce replaced the higher cost, high carbon surrogate value with
a surrogate value derived from the broader six-digit HTS subheading 7217.10 that
includes both high carbon and low carbon steel wire. Remand Results at 17. Commerce
concluded, “while the record establishes that Foshan Shunde consumed steel wire in the
production process, there is nothing on the record of this proceeding that establishes the
particular carbon content of the steel wire that Foshan Shunde used.” Id. at 8. As further
justification, Commerce noted that Foshan Shunde had failed to demonstrate that the
administrative record supported its claims that it used only low carbon steel wire as its
input. Id. at 7-8.
These conclusions, however, still do not, in the court’s view, provide a reasoned
basis for Commerce’s choice of a surrogate value that includes some high carbon steel
for Foshan Shunde’s steel wire inputs. More specifically, the conclusions do not provide
Court No. 12-00069 Page 7
a reasonable basis to infer that Foshan Shunde, or any ironing board manufacturer for
that matter, would choose to source higher cost, high carbon steel wire inputs to make
ironing boards. The court still does not understand how a reasonable mind would include
those higher cost inputs as surrogate values. Neither Commerce nor HPI has explained
why an ironing board manufacturer requires higher cost, high carbon inputs. This is not
an adverse facts available situation in which Foshan Shunde withheld information or failed
to cooperate. Foshan Shunde offered a common sense explanation in lieu of direct
evidence of the actual carbon content of its steel inputs, which everyone concedes was
not knowable. As HPI itself stated in its administrative rebuttal brief, “the record does not
reflect the necessary specification (carbon content) but not through a shortcoming of the
respondent's production records system.” J.A. at JA002673.
HPI could have buttressed its preferred inferences about Foshan Shunde’s
potential use of higher cost, higher carbon steel wire with HPI’s own declarations
demonstrating that ironing board manufacturers typically use higher cost, higher carbon
steel wire, or that they typically use a mixture of high carbon and low carbon steel wire.
Without that informational proffer, however, it is difficult for the court to conceive a
reasonable mind disregarding the common sense intuition that an ironing board
manufacturer simply does not require higher cost, higher carbon steel wire, and would
therefore logically favor the lower cost input. “Occasionally, even in the law, common
sense must prevail.” Wind Tower Trade Coal. v. United States, 741 F.3d 89, 99 (Fed. Cir.
2014).
Court No. 12-00069 Page 8
Without a reasonable explanation supporting Commerce’s inference that Foshan
Shunde would have sourced the relatively higher cost, high carbon steel wire to
manufacture its ironing boards, the court holds that the relatively lower cost, low carbon
surrogate value derived from Indonesian HTS subheading 7217.10.10 is the only
surrogate value on this administrative record that a reasonable mind would select as the
best available information for Foshan Shunde’s steel wire input. Accordingly, the court
remands this issue to Commerce to use HTS subheading 7217.10.10 to calculate Foshan
Shunde’s steel wire input.
B. Brokerage and Handling
Foshan Shunde challenges Commerce’s calculation of its B&H. This has become
a well-worn issue in the administrative reviews of the ironing board antidumping order.
The issue resulted in four remands from this Court covering the fifth administrative review.
In a series of decisions in that action, most notably Since Hardware (Guangzhou) Co. v.
United States, 38 CIT ___, 37 F. Supp. 3d 1354 (2014) (“Since Hardware IV”) and Since
Hardware (Guangzhou) Co v. United States, 38 CIT ___, 977 F. Supp. 2d 1347, vacated
in part after remand, 38 CIT ___, 37 F. Supp. 3d 1354 (“Since Hardware III”), the court
and the parties came to a fuller understanding of the World Bank’s Doing Business 2010
series of publications, the source for Commerce’s B&H surrogate value selection in the
fifth administrative review. Commerce turned to Doing Business 2010 again in this
administrative review (and Remand Results), but used Indonesian data. See Foshan I,
37 CIT at ___, 896 F. Supp. 2d at 1323 (sustaining Commerce’s selection of Indonesia
as the primary surrogate country). Foshan Shunde challenges Commerce’s use of the
Court No. 12-00069 Page 9
Doing Business data over other sources in the record and in the alternative seeks
adjustments to the Doing Business data points to conform with other evidence on the
record.
The Doing Business 2010 series compares the costs of doing business in 183
different economies based on surveys of local companies. The survey data are compiled
into the costs a hypothetical business would incur when undertaking various activities in
an economy. B&H costs in particular are aggregated as those a hypothetical medium-
sized business located within an economy’s largest city would incur when exporting
merchandise in a single 20-foot shipping container. The Doing Business 2010: Indonesia
data point is thus the cost a hypothetical business in Indonesia’s largest city, Jakarta,
might incur when exporting a single 20-foot shipping container as derived from survey
responses from companies all over Indonesia. See J.A. at JA1394-412.
The Doing Business 2010: Indonesia B&H figure consists of three relevant
components:
Document Preparation Fees $210
Customs Clearance Fees $169
Ports & Terminal Handling Charges $165
Total $544
Remand Results at 9. Commerce doubled these amounts to reflect Foshan Shunde’s use
of 40-foot containers rather than the 20-foot containers presumed in the World Bank’s
surveys. Id.
Foshan Shunde first argues that Commerce’s selection of the Doing Business
2010: Indonesia data is unreasonable because the data comes from survey responses
describing hypothetical costs. Pl.’s Br. at 7-10. The court does not agree. Commerce in
Court No. 12-00069 Page 10
the Remand Results explained that Doing Business 2010: Indonesia meets its announced
surrogate value selection criteria. Specifically, the Doing Business 2010 data is sourced
from the primary surrogate country and “reflect the experience of a broad number of
exporters, are publicly available, specific to the costs in question, represent a broad
market average, and are contemporaneous to the [period of review].” Remand Results at
12-13. Commerce reasonably found that Foshan Shunde’s proffered alternative sources
were inferior to the Doing Business 2010 data when measured against those same
criteria. Specifically, Foshan Shunde’s alternative data are from individual, mostly non-
Indonesian freight forwarding companies, which represent less of a broad market average
and are not sourced from the primary surrogate country. Foshan Shunde’s Indonesian
data similarly fall short of the Doing Business source because they are from individual
companies and cover only portions of the total B&H cost. See Remand Results at 12-14.
Commerce’s conclusion that the World Bank data represent the “best available” data to
value Foshan Shunde’s B&H costs is therefore reasonable.
Foshan Shunde next argues that Commerce should have altered the World Bank
data to reflect Foshan Shunde’s actual experience. Pl.’s Br. at 10-16. Specifically, Foshan
Shunde argues that Commerce should subtract $255 for letter of credit preparation fees
because Foshan Shunde did not actually incur that cost. Id. at 11-13. Foshan Shunde
points to correspondence from a World Bank staffer indicating that the $210 document
preparation component of the Doing Business data point includes the cost of procuring a
letter of credit. The court, though, agrees with Defendant that Commerce’s refusal to
subtract the $255 letter of credit fee was reasonable. The document preparation
Court No. 12-00069 Page 11
component of the Doing Business data point is an aggregate figure that includes costs
for the preparation of numerous documents. Foshan Shunde identifies no evidence to
indicate what segment of the $210 document preparation cost is attributable to obtaining
a letter of credit. As Commerce reasonably explained, “without knowing the exact
breakdown of the data included in the World Bank report, and how the business practices
of this broad pool of companies relate to the business practices of Foshan Shunde, the
Department can no more deduct a letter of credit expense, or remove elements of
document and preparation charges, than it can add extra expenses which Foshan
Shunde incurred but which are not reflected by the World Bank data.” Remand Results
at 24. The court therefore sustains Commerce’s refusal to subtract Foshan Shunde’s
suggested letter of credit fee from the Doing Business data point.
Foshan Shunde also argues that Commerce unreasonably doubled the Doing
Business data point (and, by extension, each component of that data point) to reflect
Foshan Shunde’s use of 40-foot containers instead of 20-foot containers as described in
the World Bank’s surveys. The court agrees.
Commerce states that it could “find no record evidence in this redetermination
establishing that a 100 percent proportionate increase in shipments between a 20-foot
and 40-foot container is unreasonable.” Remand Results at 11. Foshan Shunde, though,
identified several record documents demonstrating that ports and terminal handling fees
do not increase proportionally with container size and that document preparation fees do
not increase at all with container size. Specifically, Foshan Shunde cites a document
indicating that the Indonesian Government limits ports and terminal handling fees to $95
Court No. 12-00069 Page 12
for 20-foot containers and $145 for 40-foot containers, as well as price quotes from an
Indonesian freight forwarder appearing to corroborate these figures. The court therefore
wonders how Commerce could reasonably assume that ports and terminal handling fees
increase proportionally with container size if, as the record appears to demonstrate, the
Indonesian Government sets fees at levels that do not. See Remand Results at 14, 22-
25. Commerce relies on ports and terminal handling fees in other countries that show less
than proportionate increases. Commerce’s reliance on this data, however, does not
support an inference or assumption that such fees in Indonesia rise proportionately with
container size. See id. at 14-15 (attempting to justify a 100 percent increase for the
Indonesian data point by reference to data for other countries that “range from 67 percent
to 84 percent” as well as a suggested calculation from the domestic interested party
yielding a “93 percent higher rate”). Quite the opposite. That sort of “reasoning” is, in the
court’s view, unreasonable.
Next, Foshan Shunde identifies a quote for obtaining a letter of credit from an
Indonesian bank that does not depend on container size, as well as correspondence from
a World Bank official indicating that letter of credit costs are included within the document
preparation component of the Doing Business 2010: Indonesia data point. Foshan
Shunde also identifies a report from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
Secretariat describing fees for the preparation of bills of lading assessed on a per-
document basis. The fees for two of the documents in the document preparation
component do not increase proportionally with container size, which should preclude a
reasonable mind from “assuming” that the total document preparation component
Court No. 12-00069 Page 13
increases proportionally with container size. See id. at 22-25.
The court understands that Foshan Shunde utilized 40-foot containers and that the
Doing Business 2010: Indonesia study described the hypothetical costs of shipping goods
in 20-foot containers. Commerce chose to alter the Doing Business data point to reflect
that difference, but did so without explaining what relationship (if any) exists between the
Doing Business data point and container size. With Foshan Shunde’s demonstration that
two of the three components do not increase proportionally with container size, the court
cannot sustain Commerce’s approach. Cf. Remand Results at 24 (rejecting Foshan
Shunde’s proposed alteration because Commerce could not determine “the exact
breakdown of the data included in the World Bank report, and how the business practices
of this broad pool of companies relate to the business practices of Foshan Shunde”). The
court therefore remands the B&H issue for Commerce to reconsider its alteration of the
Doing Business 2010: Indonesia figure.
C. Zeroing
Foshan Shunde challenges Commerce’s application of zeroing in this
administrative review. The court stayed resolution of this issue pending the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s (“Federal Circuit”) decision in Union Steel v. United
States, 713 F.3d 1101 (Fed. Cir. 2013), and then pending this Court’s decision in Since
Hardware IV. See Foshan Shunde Yongjian Housewares & Hardwares Co. v. United
States, Ct. No. 12-00069, at 1-2 (CIT Aug. 22, 2013), ECF No. 55 (order continuing stay).
The Federal Circuit in Union Steel affirmed Commerce’s practice of zeroing in
administrative reviews as a reasonable interpretation of a silent statutory provision under
Court No. 12-00069 Page 14
Chevron. The court in Since Hardware IV concluded that the reasoning in Union Steel, a
market economy case, also applied in the non-market economy setting and as a
consequence also held Commerce’s use of zeroing to be reasonable under Chevron.
Familiarity with the background and holdings on the issue of zeroing in those cases is
presumed.
Foshan Shunde’s arguments here are similar to those it made in Since Hardware
IV, focusing on the difference between Commerce’s application of the average-to-
transaction (“A-to-T”) methodology in market economy reviews as compared to non-
market economy reviews. As Foshan Shunde explains, Commerce in market economy
reviews uses monthly average normal values, so that the “A” in the “A-to-T” comparison
changes with each month covered in the period of review. In non-market economy
reviews, however, Commerce uses one average normal value, so that the “A” in the “A-
to-T” comparison does not change at all. According to Foshan Shunde, the single average
value produces a “less accurate” and “less reasonable” comparison, and therefore
renders Commerce’s application of zeroing in non-market economy reviews
unreasonable. Pl.’s Br. at 22. Foshan Shunde adds that Commerce “offered no
explanation” for its conclusion in the Remand Results, “merely relying on prior case
decisions and not addressing Foshan Shunde’s arguments.” Id. at 24.
The court is not convinced. Foshan Shunde develops its argument by comparing
the market economy and non-market economy versions of A-to-T. The question of
whether Commerce’s application of A-to-T yields more accurate results in the market
economy setting as compared to the non-market economy setting, however, is not as
Court No. 12-00069 Page 15
critical as Foshan Shunde insists. The issue before the Union Steel court was the
reasonableness of Commerce’s justification for zeroing in administrative reviews but not
investigations. Union Steel, 713 F.3d at 1107-09. That explanation turned on the
differences in Commerce’s application of A-to-T rather than average-to-average (“A-to-
A”) in administrative reviews. Union Steel, 713 F.3d at 1107-09. Through that lens, the
Federal Circuit concluded that Commerce’s practice of zeroing when applying A-to-T
“better reflect[s] the results of each average-to-transaction comparison” because “zeroing
reveals masked dumping,” and that zeroing therefore “reasonably reflects unique goals
in differing comparison methodologies.” Id. at 1109.
When using A-to-T in the non-market economy setting, Commerce gains the same
kind of comparative advantage over A-to-A because it uses individual transaction prices
instead of average transaction prices. Remand Results at 16. This is why, in the court’s
view, Union Steel applies in the non-market economy setting. See Since Hardware IV, 38
CIT at ___, 37 F. Supp. 3d at 1361-63. And although Foshan Shunde may be able to
show that A-to-T in the market economy context yields more accurate results than A-to-
T in the non-market economy context, Foshan Shunde has not demonstrated that that
Commerce’s non-market economy practices eliminate the comparative advantage A-to-
T has over A-to-A more generally. See Pl.’s Br. at 20-24. The court therefore concludes
that Commerce’s application of zeroing here is reasonable under Chevron. See Union
Steel, 713 F.3d at 1107-09.
The court also does not agree with Foshan Shunde that Commerce did not provide
an explanation. Commerce in the Remand Results noted that “zeroing can increase
Court No. 12-00069 Page 16
accuracy and reveal potential masked dumping,” and that both Union Steel and Since
Hardware IV support its position. Remand Results at 16, 26. This explanation, though
short, is reasonable. See NMB Singapore Ltd. v. United States, 557 F.3d 1316, 1321-22
(Fed. Cir. 2009) (The court must sustain a determination “‘of less than ideal clarity’” where
Commerce’s decisional path is reasonably discernable. (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs.
Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983))).
III Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the court sustains the Remand Results with the
exception of Commerce’s surrogate value selection for steel wire and Commerce’s
adjustment of the documents preparation and ports and terminal handling components of
the Doing Business 2010: Indonesia data point.
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED that Commerce on remand use Indonesian HTS 7217.10.10 to
calculate Foshan Shunde’s steel wire input; it is further
ORDERED that Commerce on remand clarify or reconsider its adjustment of the
Doing Business 2010: Indonesia data point for use as the surrogate value for brokerage
and handling; it is further
ORDERED that Commerce shall file its remand results on or before March 8, 2016;
and it is further
Court No. 12-00069 Page 17
ORDERED that, if applicable, the parties shall file a proposed scheduling order
with page/word limits for comments on the remand results no later than seven days after
Commerce files its remand results with the court.
/s/ Leo M. Gordon
Judge Leo M. Gordon
Dated: January 8, 2016
New York, New York