Invenergy Renewables LLC v. United States ( 2020 )


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  •                                              Slip Op.
    UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
    INVENERGY RENEWABLES LLC,
    Plaintiff,
    and
    SOLAR ENERGY INDUSTRIES ASSOCIATION,
    CLEARWAY ENERGY GROUP LLC, EDF
    RENEWABLES, INC. and AES DISTRIBUTED
    ENERGY, INC.,
    Plaintiff-Intervenors,
    v.
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, OFFICE OF
    THE      UNITED    STATES     TRADE                      Before: Judge Gary S. Katzmann
    REPRESENTATIVE, UNITED STATES TRADE                      Court No. 19-00192
    REPRESENTATIVE ROBERT E. LIGHTHIZER,
    U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION,
    and ACTING COMMISSIONER OF U.S.
    CUSTOMS and BORDER PROTECTION MARK
    A. MORGAN,
    Defendants,
    and
    HANWHA Q CELLS USA, INC. and AUXIN
    SOLAR, INC.,
    Defendant-Intervenors.
    OPINION
    [The court denies Defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to join an indispensable party, grants
    Plaintiffs’ motions to supplement their complaints, denies Defendants’ motion to vacate and
    dismiss for mootness, and denies Defendants’ motion for leave from judgment.]
    Dated: 0D\
    Court No. 19-00192                                                                         Page 2
    Amanda Shafer Berman, John Brew, Kathryn L. Clune, Amanda Shafer Berman, and Larry
    Eisenstat, Crowell & Moring LLP, of Washington, DC and New York, NY, argued for plaintiff,
    Invenergy Renewables LLC and plaintiff-intervenors, Clearway Energy Group LLC and AES
    Distributed Energy, Inc. With them on the briefs was Frances Hadfield.
    Matthew R. Nicely and Daniel M. Witkowski, Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP, of Washington, DC,
    argued for plaintiff-intervenor, Solar Energy Industries Association. With them on the briefs were
    Dean A. Pinkert and Julia K. Eppard.
    Kevin M. O’Brien and Christine M. Streatfeild, Baker & McKenzie LLP, of Washington, DC,
    argued for plaintiff-intervenor, EDF Renewables, Inc.
    Stephen C. Tosini, Senior Trial Counsel, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, U.S.
    Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, argued for defendants. With him on the brief were
    Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant Attorney General, Jeanne E. Davidson, Director, and Tara K. Hogan,
    Assistant Director.
    John M. Gurley, Dianna Dimitriuc-Quaia, and )ULHGHULNH 6 *ऺUJHQV, Arent Fox LLP, of
    Washington, DC, argued for defendant-intervenors, Hanwha Q CELLS USA, Inc. and Auxin Solar
    Inc.
    Katzmann, Judge: In this hotly contested litigation arising from the solar industry, the
    court returns to its order preliminarily enjoining the United States and the Office of the United
    States Trade Representative (“USTR”) from withdrawing its previously granted exclusion from
    safeguard duties on imported bifacial solar modules, duties which the President imposed by
    proclamation to protect domestic industry. 1 Prelim. Inj. Ord. and Op., Invenergy Renewables LLC
    v. United States, 43 CIT __, 
    422 F. Supp. 3d 1255
     (2019), ECF No. 113 (“Invenergy I”); Ord. and
    Op. Denying Mot. to Show Cause, Invenergy Renewables LLC v. United States, 44 CIT __, 
    427 F. Supp. 3d 1402
     (2020), ECF No. 149 (“Invenergy II”). Plaintiff Invenergy Renewables LLC
    (“Invenergy”), a renewable energy company, 2 joined by Plaintiff-Intervenors Solar Energy
    1
    For the purposes of this opinion, the terms “solar modules” and “solar panels” are used
    interchangeably.
    2
    Invenergy describes itself as “the world’s leading independent and privately-held renewable
    energy company.” Invenergy’s Compl. ¶ 14, Oct. 21, 2019, ECF No. 13.
    Court No. 19-00192                                                                         Page 3
    Industries Association (“SEIA”), Clearway Energy Group LLP (“Clearway”), EDF Renewables,
    Inc. (“EDF-R”), and AES Distributed Energy, Inc. (“AES DE”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), filed a
    motion for a preliminary injunction (“PI”) to enjoin the United States, USTR, U.S. Trade
    Representative Robert E. Lighthizer, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”), and CBP
    Acting Commissioner Mark A. Morgan (collectively, “the Government”) from implementing the
    Withdrawal of Bifacial Solar Panels Exclusion to the Solar Products Safeguard Measure, 
    84 Fed. Reg. 54,244
    –45 (USTR Oct. 9, 2019) (“October Withdrawal”). Invenergy’s Mot. for Prelim. Inj.,
    Nov. 1, 2019, ECF No. 49. Defendant-Intervenors Hanwha Q Cells USA, Inc. (“Hanwha Q Cells”)
    and Auxin Solar Inc. (“Auxin Solar”) (collectively, “Defendant-Intervenors”) join the Government
    in this case. Hanwha Q Cells’ Mot. to Intervene as Def.-Inter., Nov. 4, 2019, ECF No. 50; Ord.
    Granting Mot., Nov. 4, 2019, ECF No. 54; Auxin Solar’s Mot. to Intervene as Def.-Inter., Feb. 7,
    2020, ECF No. 136; Ord. Granting Mot., Feb. 10, 2020, ECF No. 141. The court granted Plaintiffs’
    motion for a PI on December 5, 2019, observing that “[t]he Government must follow its own laws
    and procedures when it acts.” Invenergy I, 422 F. Supp. 3d at 1265.
    Before the court now are four motions, two of which were filed in response to USTR’s
    issuance of a new April 2020 determination to withdraw an exclusion for bifacial solar modules
    from safeguard duties.    Determination on the Exclusion of Bifacial Solar Panels from the
    Safeguard Measure on Solar Products, 
    85 Fed. Reg. 21,497
    –99 (USTR Apr. 17, 2020) (“April
    Withdrawal”). First, the Government moved for the court to dismiss the case on the grounds that
    Plaintiffs lacked standing and failed to join an indispensable party. Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss and
    Resp. to Invenergy’s Mot. for a Prelim. Inj., Nov. 8, 2019, ECF No. 74 (“Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss”).
    The Government later moved for the court to vacate the October Withdrawal and dismiss the case
    as moot. Def.’s Resp. to Pls.’ Mot. to Show Cause and Def.’s Mot. to Vacate Withdrawal and
    Court No. 19-00192                                                                                Page 4
    Dismiss Case as Moot, Feb. 7, 2020, ECF No. 139 (“Def.’s Resp. to Pls.’ Mot. to Show Cause and
    Mot. to Vacate and Dismiss”). Next, the Government moved for the court to dissolve the PI
    because USTR “cured the sole reason for which the injunctive relief was granted.” Def.’s Mot. to
    Dissolve Prelim. Inj. at 1, Apr. 16, 2020, ECF No. 156 (“Def.’s Mot. to Dissolve”). Shortly
    thereafter, Plaintiffs moved to supplement their complaints to include USTR’s new decision, the
    April Withdrawal. Pls.’ Mots. for Leave to File Suppl. Compls., May 4, 2020, ECF Nos. 160–162
    (“Pls.’ Mots. to Suppl.”). The court now (1) denies the Government’s Motion to Dismiss; (2)
    grants Plaintiffs’ Motions to Supplement; (3) denies the Government’s Motion to Vacate and
    Dismiss; and (4) denies the Motion to Dissolve the PI. The court denies the Government’s motions
    without prejudice.
    BACKGROUND
    The court presumes familiarity with its previous opinions -- (1) Invenergy I, supra, and (2)
    Invenergy II, supra, -- both of which provide additional information on the factual and legal
    background of this case. Information pertinent to this decision follows.
    As the court has noted:
    This case emerges from a debate within the American solar industry between
    entities that rely on the importation of bifacial solar panels and entities that produce
    predominately monofacial solar panels in the United States. Plaintiffs here, who
    include consumers, purchasers, and importers of utility-grade bifacial solar panels,
    argue that the importation of bifacial solar panels does not harm domestic producers
    because domestic producers do not produce utility-scale bifacial solar panels; they
    thus oppose safeguard duties that they contend increase the cost of these bifacial
    solar panels. Domestic producers, however, contend that solar project developers
    can use either monofacial or bifacial solar panels, and thus safeguard duties are
    necessary to protect domestic production of solar panels. Both sides contend that
    their position better supports expanding solar as a source of renewable energy in
    the United States.
    Invenergy I, 422 F. Supp. 3d at 1264.
    Court No. 19-00192                                                                               Page 5
    The statutory scheme for imposition of safeguard duties has been summarized by the court
    as follows:
    Through Section 201, Congress provided a process by which the executive branch
    could implement temporary safeguard measures to protect a domestic industry from
    the harm associated with an increase in imports from foreign competitors. Trade
    Act of 1974 §§ 201–04, 
    19 U.S.C. §§ 2251
    –54 (2012). Section 201 dictates that,
    upon petitions from domestic entities or industries, the International Trade
    Commission (“ITC”) may make an affirmative determination that serious injury or
    a threat of serious injury to that industry exists. 
    19 U.S.C. § 2252
    . The President
    may then authorize discretionary measures, known as “safeguards,” to provide a
    domestic industry temporary relief from serious injury. 
    19 U.S.C. § 2253
    . The
    statute vests the President with decision making authority based on consideration
    of ten factors. 
    19 U.S.C. § 2253
    (a)(2). Safeguard measures have a maximum
    duration of four years, unless extended for another maximum of four years based
    upon a new determination by the ITC. 
    19 U.S.C. § 2253
    (e)(1). The statute also
    outlines certain limits on the President’s ability to act under this statute, including
    to limit new actions after the termination of safeguard measures regarding certain
    articles. See 
    19 U.S.C. § 2253
    (e). Further, the safeguard statute mandates that the
    President “shall by regulation provide for the efficient and fair administration of all
    actions taken for the purpose of providing import relief.” 
    19 U.S.C. § 2253
    (g)(1).
    Invenergy I, 422 F. Supp. 3d at 1265–66 (footnote omitted).
    Through Presidential Proclamation 9693 issued on January 23, 2018, the President
    imposed safeguard duties, designed to protect the domestic industry, on imported monofacial and
    bifacial solar panels, but delegated authority to USTR to exclude products from the duties. 
    83 Fed. Reg. 3,541
    –51 (“Presidential Proclamation”). After a sixteen-month notice-and-comment process
    through which USTR considered requests for exclusions, USTR decided to exclude bifacial solar
    panels from safeguard duties. Exclusion of Particular Products From the Solar Products Safeguard
    Measure, 
    84 Fed. Reg. 27,684
    –85 (USTR June 13, 2019) (“Exclusion”). Four months later,
    however, USTR published the October Withdrawal. The October Withdrawal explained that,
    “[s]ince publication of [the Exclusion] notice, the U.S. Trade Representative has evaluated this
    exclusion further and, after consultation with the Secretaries of Commerce and Energy, determined
    it will undermine the objectives of the safeguard measure.” October Withdrawal at 54,244. Absent
    Court No. 19-00192                                                                          Page 6
    court action, therefore, the October Withdrawal would have reinstituted safeguard duties on certain
    bifacial solar panels.
    Plaintiff Invenergy initiated this case in response to the October Withdrawal. Summons,
    Oct. 21, 2019, ECF No. 1; Invenergy’s Compl., Oct. 21, 2019, ECF No. 13. The Government
    subsequently moved for, and the court allowed, USTR to delay the effective date of the October
    Withdrawal to November 8, 2019. Def.’s Mot. to Stay Effective Date of Withdrawal, Oct. 25,
    2019, ECF No. 23; Ord. Granting Mot., Oct. 25, 2019, ECF No. 29. The court then issued a
    temporary restraining order, Nov. 7, 2019, ECF No. 68, and later a PI, to enjoin USTR from
    reinstituting safeguard duties on certain bifacial solar panels through implementation of the
    October Withdrawal. Invenergy I, 
    422 F. Supp. 3d 1255
    . The PI found that USTR made the
    decision with only nineteen days’ notice to the public, without an opportunity for affected or
    interested parties to comment, and without a developed public record. 
    Id.
     at 1286–88. The PI
    included enjoining USTR from amending the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States
    (“HTSUS”) to reflect withdrawal of the Exclusion, “until entry of final judgment as to Plaintiffs’
    claims against Defendants in this case.” 
    Id. at 1295
    . In so ruling, the court held that the October
    Withdrawal of the Exclusion by the Government likely violated the Administrative Procedure Act
    (“APA”) on two grounds: (1) the rulemaking occurred without notice and comment, 
    id.
     at 1286–
    87; and (2) it was likely done in an arbitrary and capricious manner, 
    id.
     at 1287–88.
    In responding to Plaintiffs’ motion for a PI, the Government moved to dismiss the case for
    Plaintiffs’ alleged lack of standing and failure to join an indispensable party. Def.’s Mot. to
    Dismiss. In issuing the PI, the court ordered the parties to confer and submit a proposed briefing
    Court No. 19-00192                                                                         Page 7
    schedule on this issue. 3 Invenergy I, 422 F. Supp. 3d at 1295. Throughout late December 2019
    and early January 2020, Plaintiffs filed four consent motions for an extension of time to file the
    proposed briefing schedule and indicated to the court that the parties were close to reaching an
    agreement to resolve this case. See Pls.’ Mot. for an Ext. of Time, Dec. 19, 2019, ECF No. 118;
    Ord. Granting Mot., Dec. 20, 2019, ECF No. 119; Pls.’ Mot. for Ext. of Time, Dec. 27, 2019, ECF
    No. 121; Ord. Granting Mot., Dec. 27, 2019, ECF No. 122; Pls.’ Mot. for Ext. of Time, Jan. 3,
    2020, ECF No. 123; Ord. Granting Mot., Jan. 3, 2020, ECF No. 124; Pls.’ Mot. for Ext. of Time,
    Jan. 17, 2020, ECF No. 125; Ord. Granting Mot., Jan. 17, 2020, ECF No. 126.
    However, on January 24, 2020, the Government filed its Motion for Leave to File a Status
    Report and Status Report (“January Status Report”), notifying the court and the other parties of
    USTR’s publication of “a notice in the Federal Register, requesting interested party comment
    regarding whether to withdraw the [Exclusion] from the safeguard measure pursuant to section
    201 of the Trade Act of 1974, 
    19 U.S.C. § 2251
    , et seq., for bifacial solar panels contained in
    [Exclusion].” ECF No. 129. The court granted the Government’s motion that same day, thus
    deeming the January Status Report filed. Ord. Granting Mot., Jan. 24, 2020, ECF Nos. 130, 131.
    USTR published the notice in the Federal Register three days later, thereby initiating the comment
    period. Procedures to Consider Retention or Withdrawal of the Exclusion of Bifacial Solar Panels
    From the Safeguard Measure on Solar Products, 
    85 Fed. Reg. 4,756
    –58 (USTR Jan. 27, 2020)
    (“January Notice”). The January Notice acknowledged the court’s PI “enjoining the U.S. Trade
    Representative from withdrawing the exclusion on bifacial solar panels from the safeguard
    3
    Plaintiffs Invenergy, Clearway, AES DE, and SEIA responded to the Government’s Motion to
    Dismiss on December 13, 2019. Invenergy, Clearway, and AES DE’s Resp. in Opp’n to Def.’s
    Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 115; Resp. of Pl.-Inter. SEIA in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF
    No. 116. The Government and Defendant-Intervenors never replied to the responses to the motion
    and have not pursued this motion before the court.
    Court No. 19-00192                                                                           Page 8
    measure,” and noted that “[i]f the U.S. Trade Representative determines after receipt of comments
    pursuant to this notice that it would be appropriate to withdraw the bifacial exclusion or take some
    other action with respect to the exclusion, the U.S. Trade Representative will request that the
    [c]ourt lift the injunction.” Id. at 4,756. The January Notice provided a deadline for comments of
    February 17, 2020 and for responses to those comments of February 27, 2020. Id. at 4,757.
    In response, Plaintiffs Invenergy, Clearway, and AES DE filed their Motion to Show Cause
    as to Why the Court Should Not Enforce the Preliminary Injunction, Jan. 30, 2020, ECF No. 132,
    alleging that the Government’s publication of the January Notice violated the PI. Plaintiffs asked
    the court to “order Defendants to show cause as to why it should not enforce the PI by ordering
    USTR to cease proceedings under the [January Notice], and instead proceed to briefing on
    Plaintiffs’ substantive and procedural claims.” Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Show Cause as to Why
    the Ct. Should Not Enforce the PI at 12, Jan. 30, 2020, ECF No. 132. The court ordered the
    Government and Hanwha Q Cells to respond, Jan. 31, 2020, ECF No. 133, which they did on
    February 7, 2020, Def.’s Resp. to Pls.’ Mot. to Show Cause and Def.’s Mot. to Vacate and Dismiss;
    Hanwha Q Cells’ Resp. to Pls.’ Mot. to Show Cause, ECF No. 140. The Government included
    with its response a motion to vacate the October Withdrawal and to dismiss the case as moot.
    Def.’s Mot. to Vacate and Dismiss. The court held oral argument on Plaintiffs’ Motion to Show
    Cause on February 12, 2020. ECF No. 145. The court then denied Plaintiffs’ motion stating, “the
    Government’s [January Notice] did not violate the text of [the PI] because the [January Notice]
    does not (1) implement the [October Withdrawal]; (2) modify the HTSUS; or (3) enforce or make
    effective the [October Withdrawal] or modifications to the HTSUS related to the [October
    Withdrawal].” Invenergy II, 427 F. Supp. 3d at 1407. The court further held that the January
    Notice alone did “not constitute a final decision to implement the previous or any new withdrawal
    Court No. 19-00192                                                                          Page 9
    of the Exclusion of bifacial solar panels.” Id. The court, moreover, made clear that “[it] retains
    exclusive jurisdiction over the implementation, enforcement, or modification of the [October
    Withdrawal] until such date as a final judgment is entered in this case.” Id.
    Following the court’s decision to deny the Plaintiffs’ Motion to Show Cause, the parties
    continued to brief the Government’s Motion to Vacate and Dismiss. Plaintiffs filed responses to
    the motion on March 16, 2020. Pls.’ Resp. in Opp’n to Mot. to Vacate and Dismiss, ECF No. 152
    (“Pls.’ Resp. to Def.’s Mot. to Vacate and Dismiss”). The Government and Defendant-Intervenor
    Hanwha Q Cells replied on April 6, 2020. Def.’s Reply to Pls.’ Resp. to Def.’s Mot. to Vacate
    and Dismiss, ECF No. 153; Def.-Inter. Hanwha Q Cells’ Reply to Pls.’ Resp. to Def.’s Mot. to
    Vacate and Dismiss, ECF No. 154 (“Hanwha Q Cells’ Reply to Def.’s Mot. to Vacate and
    Dismiss”). Thus, the Government’s Motion to Vacate and Dismiss has been fully briefed by all
    parties.
    On April 14, 2020, the Government filed another status report to inform the court of the
    issuance of USTR’s April Withdrawal. Def.’s Status Report, ECF No. 155 (“April Status Report”).
    The April Withdrawal constitutes a withdrawal of the Exclusion of bifacial solar panels from
    safeguard duties -- the same ultimate conclusion as the October Withdrawal. In its April Status
    Report, the Government explained that “[i]n response to the [c]ourt’s preliminary conclusion that
    repealing the withdrawal of the exclusion ‘requires rulemaking subject to . . . APA notice and
    comment,’ USTR ‘opened a public docket,’ and received 15 comments regarding the bifacial
    exclusion and 49 subsequent comments responding to the initial comments.” April Status Report
    at 2 (internal citations omitted). Further, the Government explained that USTR “based the [April
    Withdrawal] on the comments and evidence received.” Id.
    Court No. 19-00192                                                                         Page 10
    Two days later, the Government filed its Motion to Dissolve the Preliminary Injunction,
    pursuant to USCIT Rule 60(b)(5). Def.’s Mot. to Dissolve. The Government argued that the April
    Withdrawal “cured the sole reason for which the injunctive relief was granted.” Id. at 1. Plaintiffs
    filed responses in opposition to the motion on May 7, 2020. Invenergy, Clearway, and AES DE’s
    Resp. in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Dissolve Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 163 (“Invenergy’s Resp. to Def.’s
    Mot. to Dissolve”); Pl.-Inter. SEIA’s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. to Dissolve PI, ECF No. 164 (“SEIA’s
    Resp. to Def.’s Mot. to Dissolve”); Pl.-Inter. EDF-R’s Resp. in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Dissolve,
    ECF No. 166 (“EDF-R’s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. to Dissolve”). Plaintiffs argued that the April
    Withdrawal was an arbitrary and capricious decision and thus did not cure the likely APA violation
    previously identified by the court. Id. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiffs filed motions to supplement
    their complaints to include the April Withdrawal. Pls.’ Mots. to Suppl. The Government and
    Defendant-Intervenors subsequently responded. Def.’s Resp. to Pls.’ Mots. for Leave to File
    Suppl. Compls., May 11, 2020, ECF No. 171 (“Def.’s Resp. to Pls.’ Mots. to Suppl.”); Def.-Inters.’
    Resp. to Pls.’ Mots. for Leave to File Suppl. Compls., May 12, 2020, ECF No. 173 (“Def.-Inters.’
    Resp. to Pls.’ Mots. to Suppl.”).
    The court issued questions regarding the Government’s Motion to Dissolve to the parties
    on May 8, 2020, ECF No. 169, to which the parties responded on May 12, 2020, Def.’s Resps. to
    the Ct.’s Questions of May 8, 2020, ECF No. 172 (“Def.’s Resps. to Ct.’s Questions”); Def.-
    Inters.’ Resps. to Ct.’s Questions Issued May 8, 2020, ECF No. 174 (“Def.-Inters.’ Resps. to Ct.’s
    Questions”); Pls.’ Resps. to Ct.’s Questions Regarding Mot. to Dissolve PI, ECF No. 175 (“Pls.’
    Resps. to Ct.’s Questions”). The Government attached two memoranda to its responses to the
    court’s questions. Mem. from DUSTR Jeffrey D. Gerrish and General Counsel Joseph Barloon to
    USTR Robert Lighthizer, Apr. 13, 2020, Attach. 1 to Def.’s Resp. to Ct.’s Questions, ECF No.
    Court No. 19-00192                                                                          Page 11
    172-1 (“Lighthizer Decision Memorandum”); Mem. from DUSTR Jeffrey D. Gerrish and General
    Counsel Joseph Barloon to USTR Robert Lighthizer, Apr. 10, 2020, Attach. 2 to Def.’s Resp. to
    Ct.’s Questions, ECF No. 172-2 (“Gerrish Memorandum”), (collectively, “USTR Memoranda”).
    The USTR Memoranda consist of Deputy U.S. Trade Representative Jeffrey D. Gerrish’s and U.S.
    Trade Representative General Counsel Joseph Barloon’s analysis of USTR’s authority to withdraw
    an exclusion, their analysis of comments received pursuant to the January Notice, and a
    recommended decision, initialed by U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer. Id.
    The court held oral argument via teleconference on May 13, 2020. ECF No. 177 (“Oral
    Arg.”). Following the teleconference, at the court’s direction, the parties filed supplemental briefs
    on May 15, 2020. Invenergy, Clearway, AES DE’s Post-Arg. Submission in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot.
    to Dissolve PI, ECF No. 182 (“Invenergy’s Post-OA Filing”); Pl.-Inter. SEIA’s Post-Arg. Br. in
    Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Dissolve PI, ECF No. 181 (“SEIA’s Post-OA Filing”); Pl.-Inter. EDF-R’s
    Suppl. Resp. After Oral Arg. to Def.’s Mot. to Dissolve PI, ECF No. 180 (“EDF-R’s Post-OA
    Filing”); Def.’s Post-Hearing Br., ECF No. 179 (“Def.’s Post-OA Filing”); Suppl. Br. of Def.-
    Inters. Hanwha Q Cells and Auxin Solar, ECF No. 183 (“Def.-Inters.’ Post-OA Filing”).
    JURISDICTION
    The court has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1581
    (i) (2018), which
    provides that the court “shall have exclusive jurisdiction of any civil action commenced against
    the United States, its agencies, or its officers, that arises out of any law of the United States
    providing for . . . [the] administration and enforcement” of tariffs and duties.
    DISCUSSION
    The court takes this opportunity to address all outstanding motions in this case because of
    the implications of each motion on the others. The court first denies the Government’s Motion to
    Court No. 19-00192                                                                           Page 12
    Dismiss filed in November 2019 in response to Plaintiffs’ Motion for a PI. Next, the court grants
    Plaintiffs’ Motions to Supplement. The court then denies the Government’s Motion to Vacate and
    Dismiss. Finally, the court denies the Government’s Motion to Dissolve the PI. The court
    addresses each of these motions in turn and sets forth its reasoning.
    I.      The Court Denies the Government’s November Motion to Dismiss.
    As a preliminary matter, the court first addresses the Government’s outstanding Motion to
    Dismiss, filed with the court on November 8, 2019, before the court issued the PI.               The
    Government argued that the court should dismiss the case because (1) Invenergy lacks Article III
    standing; (2) Invenergy lacks prudential standing; 4 and (3) Invenergy has not joined an
    indispensable party. Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss at 11–21. Later that same day, the court granted the
    Motion to Intervene of EDF-R, a self-described “importer, purchaser, and user of bifacial solar
    modules.” EDF-R’s Unopposed Mot. to Intervene as Pl.-Inter. at 2, Nov. 7, 2019, ECF No. 69;
    Ord. Granting EDF-R’s Mot. to Intervene, Nov. 8, 2019, ECF No. 78. On December 5, 2019, the
    court issued the PI, in which it squarely addressed the Government’s objections to standing,
    concluding that Invenergy, both independently and as joined by Plaintiff-Intervenors, had Article
    III and statutory standing necessary for the court to exercise jurisdiction. Invenergy I, 422 F. Supp.
    3d at 1275–80. Plaintiffs Invenergy, Clearway, AES DE, and SEIA then responded to the
    Government’s Motion to Dismiss on December 13, 2019, discussing and incorporating the court’s
    standing analysis in Invenergy I. Invenergy, Clearway, and AES DE’s Resp. in Opp’n to Def.’s
    Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 115; Resp. of Pl.-Inter. SEIA in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF
    4
    As the court noted in Invenergy I, “prudential standing” is “a misnomer” and should be referred
    to as “statutory standing.” 422 F. Supp. 3d at 1275 (quoting Lexmark Int’l Inc. v. Static Central
    Components, Inc., 
    572 U.S. 118
    , 126, 128 n.4 (2014)).
    Court No. 19-00192                                                                             Page 13
    No. 116. The Government and Defendant-Intervenors, however, never filed a reply. See USCIT
    R. 7(d) (setting deadline for reply to a response filed to dispositive motion).
    The reply would have provided the Government and Defendant-Intervenors an opportunity
    to respond to both the intervention in the case of an importer of bifacial solar panels, EDF-R, and
    the issuance of the PI, including the court’s standing analysis in its opinion. It appears instead,
    however, that the Government has abandoned this initial Motion to Dismiss.                 Neither the
    Government nor Defendant-Intervenors have made any subsequent motions or mentions of this
    Motion to Dismiss since issuance of the PI. Furthermore, when directly asked about this motion
    by the court in its written questions to the parties and at the most recent oral argument, the
    Government declined to acknowledge that motion or answer the question as to that motion. See
    Oral Arg.; Def.’s Resps. to Ct.’s Questions at 4.
    The court concludes that the Motion to Dismiss must be denied because the Government
    has failed to pursue this motion, despite ample opportunity to do so and direct questioning by the
    court. See Silicon Graphics, Inc. v. ATI Techs., Inc., 
    607 F.3d 784
    , 801 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
    (upholding district court’s entry of judgment based on abandoned and unargued claims and stating
    that “[i]t is a claimant’s burden to keep the district court clearly apprised of what parts of its claim
    it wishes to pursue and which parts, if any, it wishes to reserve for another day”); Coal. for the
    Abolition of Marijuana Prohibition v. City of Atlanta, 
    219 F.3d 1301
    , 1326 (11th Cir. 2000) (“The
    appellants’ failure to brief and argue this issue during the proceedings before the district court is
    grounds for finding that the issue has been abandoned.”).
    II.     The Court Grants Plaintiffs’ Motions to Supplement Their Complaints.
    The court next exercises its discretion to grant Plaintiffs’ Motions to Supplement their
    complaints pursuant to USCIT Rule 15(d). After the Government filed the April Status Report
    Court No. 19-00192                                                                           Page 14
    alerting the parties to USTR’s new final determination to withdraw the Exclusion, the April
    Withdrawal, Plaintiffs moved to supplement their complaints to “add facts and claims regarding”
    the April Withdrawal. See, e.g., Mem. of Points and Authorities in Supp. of the Pl. and Pl.-Inters.’
    Mot. for Leave to File Suppl. Compls. at 1, May 4, 2020, ECF No. 161 (“Invenergy’s Mem. re:
    Suppl. Compl.”). Plaintiffs argue that supplementing their complaints “will avoid piecemeal
    litigation, allow a prompt and efficient resolution of the entire controversy among the parties, and
    impose no prejudice on the United States.” 
    Id.
     at 3–4. The Government and Defendant-
    Intervenors, for their part, do not object to supplementation of the complaints, but rather defer to
    the court’s judgment as to whether supplementation here meets the requirements of USCIT Rule
    15(d). See Def.’s Resp. to Pls.’ Mots. to Suppl. at 1; Def.-Inters.’ Resp. to Pls.’ Mots. to Suppl. at
    1.
    USCIT Rule 15(d) states that “[o]n motion and reasonable notice, the court may, on just
    terms, permit a party to serve a supplemental pleading setting out any transaction, occurrence, or
    event that happened after the date of the pleading to be supplemented.” Thus, it is within the
    court’s discretion to grant such a motion. The court has described the USCIT Rule 15 standard as
    “equitable and lenient.” Arlanxeo USA LLC v. United States, 42 CIT __, __, 
    337 F. Supp. 3d 1350
    , 1356 (2018). Further, the Federal Circuit has adopted the Supreme Court’s view of Rule 15
    under the corresponding Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as a mandate “which declares that leave
    to amend ‘shall be freely given when justice so requires’ [that] ‘is to be heeded.’” Intrepid v.
    Pollock, 
    907 F.2d 1125
    , 1128 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (quoting Foman v. Davis, 
    371 U.S. 178
    , 182
    (1962)). The Federal Circuit in Intrepid also noted that “Rule 15(d) unequivocally allows
    supplementing a complaint with a count based on later events.” Id. at 1129 (“Where the
    supplemental pleading with respect to such later events relates to the same cause of action
    Court No. 19-00192                                                                             Page 15
    originally pleaded, the Supreme Court held, in Griffin v. School Board, 
    377 U.S. 218
    , 227 (1964),
    that it would be an abuse of discretion to deny the amendment.”). Factors that may weigh against
    permitting amendment or supplementation of a complaint include: “[u]ndue delay, bad faith or
    dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments
    previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the
    amendment, [and] futility of the amendment.” Foman, 
    371 U.S. at 182
    . Further, this court’s rules
    “should be construed, administered, and employed by the court and the parties to secure the just,
    speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.” USCIT R. 1.
    The court concludes that equity and judicial efficiency dictate that it grant Plaintiffs’
    Motions to Supplement.       The April Withdrawal is a later-in-time event that is sufficiently
    connected to the original pleading because of its impact on the Exclusion, and Plaintiffs’ claims
    regarding the legality of the April Withdrawal are substantially similar to those in their original
    complaints. Furthermore, the court has already established its jurisdiction to hear these claims,
    including by ruling on Plaintiffs’ standing to challenge the USTR’s decision regarding safeguard
    tariffs on bifacial solar panels. Invenergy I, 422 F. Supp. 3d at 1271–80. The court agrees that to
    require Plaintiffs “to file a brand new suit to challenge the [April Withdrawal]” would “waste the
    parties’ and the [c]ourt’s resources given that this [c]ourt is already familiar with both the
    jurisdictional and merits issues in this case that were raised by Plaintiffs’ challenge to the [October
    Withdrawal].” See Invenergy’s Mem. re: Suppl. Compl. at 3.
    Further, because the Government and Defendant-Intervenors do not oppose the motion, see
    Def.’s Resp. to Pls.’ Mots. to Suppl. at 1; Def.-Inters.’ Resp. to Pls.’ Mots. to Suppl. at 1, the court
    finds that allowing Plaintiffs to supplement their complaints will not prejudice the Government or
    Defendant-Intervenors. There being no indication of undue delay, lack of notice, or bad faith on
    Court No. 19-00192                                                                       Page 16
    the part of Plaintiffs, the court concludes that none of the factors that weigh against
    supplementation is present here. Therefore, the court grants Plaintiffs’ Motions to Supplement,
    and deems their supplemental complaints filed.
    III.    The Court Denies the Government’s Motion to Vacate the October Withdrawal
    and Dismiss the Case as Moot.
    After the publication of the January Notice and the initiation of a new notice-and-comment
    period to consider withdrawal of the Exclusion by USTR, the Government moved to vacate the
    October Withdrawal and to dismiss the case as moot in order to clear the way for implementation
    of a new determination by USTR. Def.’s Mot. to Vacate and Dismiss at 10. The Government
    explained that, while it was not confessing error in USTR’s issuance of the October Withdrawal,
    USTR wished to “address interested party comments in the first instance,” which would “provide
    certainty to interested parties during the remaining term of the safeguard measure.” Id. The
    Government further argued that both USTR’s initiation of a notice-and-comment period and the
    requested vacatur would moot Plaintiffs’ claims. Id. at 11. Defendant-Intervenor Hanwha Q Cells
    supported this motion by arguing that the court should vacate the October Withdrawal and noting
    that, at least at the time, USTR’s January Notice had not produced a final agency action that was
    ripe for review. Hanwha Q Cells’ Reply to Def.’s Mot. to Vacate and Dismiss at 10.
    Plaintiffs opposed vacatur of the October Withdrawal and dismissal of the case as moot
    because they argued that the court could not vacate an agency decision without a final judgment
    and that the case should not be dismissed due to the ongoing process initiated by the January
    Notice. Pls.’ Resp. to Def.’s Mot. to Vacate and Dismiss at 6–19. Specifically, Plaintiffs opposed
    vacatur of the October Withdrawal because the Government neither confessed error nor requested
    a voluntary remand, and the court had made no final decision on the merits. Id. at 7–8 (citing SKF
    USA v. United States, 
    254 F.3d 1022
    , 1028–29 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Nat’l Parks Conservation Ass’n
    Court No. 19-00192                                                                          Page 17
    v. Salazar, 
    660 F. Supp. 2d 3
    , 4–5 (D.D.C. 2009)). In light of the court’s decision, discussed supra,
    Discussion, Section II, to allow Plaintiffs to supplement their complaints, thus establishing the
    court’s jurisdiction over claims related to the April Withdrawal, the court addresses the
    Government’s mootness argument before separately addressing its request for vacatur of the
    October Withdrawal.
    The court first denies the Government’s Motion to Vacate and Dismiss for mootness
    because, particularly in light of the supplemental complaints, a live dispute no doubt exists. In
    order to maintain jurisdiction to adjudicate a dispute, a case must present a live dispute between
    the parties for which the court can provide relief. Chafin v. Chafin, 
    568 U.S. 165
    , 171–72 (2013).
    “There is thus no case or controversy, and a suit becomes moot, ‘when the issues presented are no
    longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.’” 
    Id. at 172
     (quoting
    Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 
    568 U.S. 85
    , 91 (2013)) (other quotations omitted). Unlike the
    Government’s Motion to Dismiss filed in November, the Government has fully briefed and
    pursued its Motion to Vacate and Dismiss for mootness. However, the Government filed, and the
    parties briefed, the motion before USTR issued the April Withdrawal and before Plaintiffs moved
    to supplement their complaints to reflect the April Withdrawal. Indeed, one of the Government’s
    arguments in support of its motion was that “any complaint regarding the outcome of USTR’s
    proceeding is necessarily speculative.” Def.’s Mot. to Vacate and Dismiss at 11. Because the
    court today grants Plaintiffs’ Motions to Supplement their complaints, the court must deny the
    Government’s Motion to Vacate and Dismiss the case as moot because, as the parties do not
    dispute, a live controversy regarding the legality of the April Withdrawal is now before the court.
    See Pls.’ Resps. to Ct.’s Questions at 8 (“[I]f this [c]ourt grants Plaintiffs’ Motions to Supplement
    the Complaints, then plainly the Court has jurisdiction over the [April Withdrawal] under 28
    Court No. 19-00192                                                                         Page 18
    U.S.C. § 158l(i)(2)–(4) and the APA.”); Def.’s Resps. to Ct.’s Questions at 8 (“If the [c]ourt were
    to allow the filing of supplemental complaints after dissolving the injunction, then, subject to any
    other jurisdictional defects that may be identified, [P]laintiffs could challenge the merits of the
    April Withdrawal, including filing motions for preliminary injunction and dispositive briefing.”).
    Separate and apart from the April Withdrawal, the court also denies the Government’s
    request for vacatur of the October Withdrawal because the Government has not met its burden of
    establishing a legal basis on which the court can grant such a motion. The court may vacate an
    agency decision through a final disposition of a case or via remand of the case to the agency. See
    Limnia, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Energy, 
    857 F.3d 379
    , 381 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (reversing a
    district court grant of a voluntary remand where the agency did not intend to revisit the challenged
    agency decision on review); Concilio de Salud Integral de Loiza, Inc. v. Perez-Perdomo, 
    551 F.3d 10
    , 16–17 (1st Cir. 2008) (reversing a district court’s dissolution of a PI based on sufficient
    compliance with the court’s order because the district court did not resolve outstanding legal
    issues, which would impact compliance before dissolving the PI); Nat’l Parks Conservation Ass’n,
    
    660 F. Supp. 2d at 5
     (denying a motion to vacate an agency rule and remand where it would
    “wrongfully permit the Federal defendants to bypass established statutory procedures for repealing
    an agency rule”). 5 The Government, however, has provided no legal authority in support of the
    5
    Defendant-Intervenor Hanwha Q Cells points the court to a decision by the United States District
    Court of Colorado, in which the court vacated an agency decision without first adjudicating the
    merits of the case. Hanwha Q Cells’ Reply to Def.’s Mot. to Vacate and Dismiss at 4 (citing Center
    for Native Ecosystems v. Salazar, 
    795 F. Supp. 2d 1236
    , 1240–42). However, vacatur in that case
    was in the context of Plaintiffs’ request for remand after the basis for the agency’s decision, a
    separate legal opinion by an executive branch official, had been withdrawn. Center for Native
    Ecosystems, 795 F. Supp. 2d at 1239, 1242 (D. Colo. 2013). That case is not persuasive here
    because USTR has not requested a remand from the court, which would have guaranteed ongoing
    jurisdiction over any decision by USTR to withdraw the Exclusion. Instead, the Government has
    argued that the court did not have jurisdiction over the April Withdrawal until challenged in this
    or another case. Def.’s Resps. to Ct.’s Questions at 6 (“Unless and until the [c]ourt grants
    Court No. 19-00192                                                                         Page 19
    proposition that a court can vacate an agency decision before final disposition of the case or
    without a voluntary remand request from the agency .
    In response to the court’s question on this point, the Government argued that the April
    Withdrawal was designed to supersede the October Withdrawal. Def.’s Resps. to Ct.’s Questions
    at 2–3 (answering “Yes” to the court’s question about whether it was the Government’s position
    that the April Withdrawal legally superseded the October Withdrawal and noting the April
    Withdrawal’s prospective application). At this stage in the litigation, however, the Government
    has not yet demonstrated a legal basis on which the court can vacate the October Withdrawal. The
    Government has not confessed error, requested remand, or indicated that its position regarding the
    October Withdrawal has changed in any way. See Def.’s Mot. to Vacate and Dismiss at 10–11
    (noting that the USTR issued the January Notice “without confessing error,” but that it nonetheless
    mooted Plaintiffs’ alleged procedural violation); Def.’s Resps. to Ct.’s Questions at 9 (“USTR’s
    proceeding leading to the April Withdrawal was not a remand proceeding.”). Moreover, the
    Government’s introduction of the USTR Memoranda two days before oral argument on the
    Government’s Motion to Dissolve the PI raises considerable questions -- ones which have not yet
    been briefed -- as to whether the publication of the April Withdrawal in the Federal Register
    marked the completion of a new determination. See Def.’s Resps. to Ct.’s Questions. Thus, to the
    extent the Government argues the April Withdrawal legally supersedes the October Withdrawal,
    it must also demonstrate that the new determination is complete. The Government has neither
    provided a legal basis on which the court can grant vacatur, as both final disposition on the merits
    [P]laintiffs’ motions to supplement their complaints, the [c]ourt will not have assumed jurisdiction
    to entertain any challenge to the April Withdrawal”). In any event, with today’s opinion and order
    granting Plaintiffs’ Motions to Supplement their complaints to include the April Withdrawal, the
    court establishes jurisdiction over this new decision by USTR.
    Court No. 19-00192                                                                        Page 20
    or voluntary remand do not apply here, nor proven that the April Withdrawal legally supersedes
    or rescinds the October Withdrawal; thus, the court must deny the motion for vacatur at this stage.
    The court denies the Government’s Motion to Vacate and Dismiss without prejudice and takes no
    position as to the outcome of any subsequent requests to vacate the October Withdrawal in the
    context of new developments.
    IV.     The Court Denies the Government’s Motion to Dissolve the PI.
    Finally, the court denies the Government’s Motion to Dissolve the PI pursuant to USCIT
    Rule 60(b)(5). The Government filed this motion shortly after notifying the court of publication
    of USTR’s April Withdrawal. Def.’s Mot. to Dissolve; April Status Report. Plaintiffs responded
    that they opposed the motion before filing their own Motions to Supplement. See Invenergy’s
    Resp. to Def.’s Mot. to Dissolve; SEIA’s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. to Dissolve; EDF-R’s Resp. to
    Def.’s Mot. to Dissolve. The most recent oral argument also focused on the parties’ arguments
    regarding dissolution of the PI. Oral Arg.
    USCIT Rule 60(b)(5) states that “the court may relieve a party or its legal representative
    from a final judgment, order, or proceeding . . . [when] the judgment has been satisfied, released,
    or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it
    prospectively is no longer equitable.” As the court noted in its opinion denying Plaintiffs’ Motion
    to Show Cause, the court has continuing jurisdiction over the injunction on the October
    Withdrawal. Invenergy II, 427 F. Supp. 3d at 1407 (citing In re Shenango Group, 
    501 F.3d 338
    (3d Cir. 2007); In re Tomlin, 
    105 F.3d 933
     (4th Cir. 1997)). The court has significant discretion
    in determining whether it is appropriate to continue to enforce a preliminary injunction. See Sys.
    Fed’n No. 91 v. Wright, 
    364 U.S. 642
    , 647 (1961) (noting that “an injunction often requires
    continuing supervision by the issuing court and always a continuing willingness to apply its powers
    Court No. 19-00192                                                                        Page 21
    and processes on behalf of the party who obtained that equitable relief”); Morita v. Application
    Art Labs. Co., Nos. 89–1270, 89–1293, 
    1989 WL 83256
    , at *1 (Fed. Cir. July 28, 1989) (noting
    that appellate review of denial of motion to dissolve preliminary injunction is “limited to
    determining . . . whether the district court abused its discretion”); Kreepy Krauly U.S.A. Inc., v.
    Sta-Rite Indus., Inc., Nos. 97-1091, 97-1368, 
    1998 WL 196750
    , at *9–10 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 24, 1998)
    (same).
    USCIT Rule 60(b)(5) allows the court to relieve a party from a judgment where factual or
    legal circumstances have sufficiently changed such that continued enforcement of the injunctive
    relief would be inequitable. See AIMCOR Ala. Silicon, Inc. v. United States, 
    23 CIT 932
    , 939,
    
    83 F. Supp. 2d 1293
    , 1299 (1999). “A change in operative fact may serve as a basis for vacating
    a preliminary injunction.” Concilio de Salud Integral de Loiza, 
    551 F.3d at 16
     (1st Cir. 2008)
    (citing Agostini v. Felton, 
    521 U.S. 203
    , 215 (1997)). In dissolving an injunction, the court
    requires the moving party to show both changed circumstances and that continuation of the
    injunction would be inequitable. See Morita, 
    1989 WL 83256
    , at *1–2 (noting that court must
    inquire as to “whether the movant has shown that changed circumstances warrant discontinuation
    of the preliminary relief,” and declining to dissolve injunction because the defense’s new
    allegations did not “compel the district court to disturb its earlier finding as to likelihood of
    success”); AIMCOR Ala. Silicon, 
    83 F. Supp. 2d at 1299
     (noting that the moving party “bears the
    burden of showing that changed circumstances . . . make the continuation of the injunction
    inequitable”); Ad Hoc Shrimp Trade Action Comm. v. United States, 
    32 CIT 666
    , 670, 
    562 F. Supp. 2d 1383
    , 1388 (2008) (same). The burden is on the defendant to demonstrate to the court
    that the PI “is unnecessary and should be reconsidered or dissolved.” SKF USA Inc. v. United
    States, 
    28 CIT 170
    , 182, 
    316 F. Supp. 2d 1322
    , 1334 (2004). The requirement that the moving
    Court No. 19-00192                                                                         Page 22
    party meet this dual burden of showing changed circumstances and inequity “prevents an enjoined
    party from constantly challenging the imposition of a preliminary injunction and relitigating
    arguments on motions to dissolve that have already been considered by the district court in its
    initial decision.” See Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. CAT Commc’ns Int’l Inc., 
    335 F.3d 235
    , 242 (3d
    Cir. 2003).
    The Government argues that the April Withdrawal “cured the sole basis -- failure to comply
    with the notice and comment provisions of the APA --” for Plaintiffs’ likelihood of success on the
    merits, justifying injunctive relief. Def.’s Mot. to Dissolve at 7. Thus, the Government maintains
    that “[t]here has been a significant change in ‘factual conditions’ that warrants dissolution of the
    preliminary injunction.” 
    Id.
     The Government further contends that “there is no basis to assume
    that the [April Withdrawal] is unlawful and to maintain the extraordinary remedy of injunctive
    relief” because, the Government claims, it was a new and separate determination entitled to a
    presumption of regularity.    Id. at 8.   Defendant-Intervenors indicate that they support the
    Government’s Motion to Dissolve on a different basis -- that the Government has abandoned the
    October Withdrawal. See Def.-Inters.’ Resps. to Ct.’s Questions at 1–4.
    Plaintiffs oppose this motion, arguing that the Government has not met its burden of
    proving that circumstances have sufficiently changed or that it would be inequitable to continue
    the injunction. First, Plaintiffs dispute the Government’s claim that the April Withdrawal cured
    the procedural deficiencies of the October Withdrawal. See Invenergy’s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. to
    Dissolve at 1; SEIA’s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. to Dissolve at 2; EDF-R’s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. to
    Dissolve at 1.    Specifically, Invenergy contends that the April Withdrawal provided only
    conclusory statements to justify USTR’s determination. Invenergy’s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. to
    Dissolve at 17. Moreover, Plaintiffs point to USTR’s failure to address certain of their comments
    Court No. 19-00192                                                                            Page 23
    in the April Withdrawal as published in the Federal Register to argue that the April Withdrawal,
    like the October Withdrawal, was arbitrary and capricious. Id. at 19. Therefore, they contend, the
    April Withdrawal suffers from at least one of the same procedural deficiencies that warranted
    injunctive relief as the October Withdrawal. Id.; SEIA’s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. to Dissolve at 4;
    EDF-R’s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. to Dissolve at 7. Plaintiffs further assert that, in the Motion to
    Dissolve, the Government “chose to argue only that the injunction should be dissolved, and the
    Withdrawal permitted to go into effect, because they had ‘cured’ the procedural error that the
    [c]ourt found in its PI Opinion by issuing notice and permitting the submission of comments.”
    Pls.’ Resps. to Ct.’s Questions at 11. They contend that the Government “entirely failed to address
    the other basis for the PI: the [c]ourt’s finding that Withdrawal of the Exclusion was likely arbitrary
    and capricious.” Id. Second, Plaintiffs claim that the Government failed to argue that continued
    enforcement of the PI would be inequitable. Invenergy’s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. to Dissolve at 11;
    SEIA’s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. to Dissolve at 2 (adopting the arguments set forth in Invenergy’s and
    EDF-R’s responses); EDF-R’s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. to Dissolve at 10.
    Later, in response to the court’s questions, the Government provided the court with the
    USTR Memoranda, which it relies on as providing the reasoned explanation for the April
    Withdrawal and even characterizes as a part of USTR’s new determination. See Def.’s Resps. to
    Ct. Questions at 12 (“The [Gerrish Memorandum] provides the detailed findings of fact and
    analysis underlying the determination . . . The ‘contested determination’ here consists of the
    [Lighthizer Decision Memorandum] and the ‘findings or report’ would include the April
    Withdrawal published in the Federal Register and the [Gerrish Memorandum] approved by the
    Trade Representative” (quoting USCIT R. 73.3(a)(1))); USTR Mems. The Government and
    Defendant-Intervenors rely on these memoranda at oral argument and in their post-argument briefs
    Court No. 19-00192                                                                         Page 24
    to support the Governments’ Motion to Dissolve the PI. See Oral Arg.; Def.’s Post-OA Filing at
    8–9; Def.-Inters.’ Post-OA Filing at 8. Plaintiffs do not address these memoranda in their
    responses to the court’s questions. See Pls.’ Resp. to Ct.’s Questions. At oral argument and in
    their post-argument filings, however, Plaintiffs make clear that they, like the court, lacked access
    to these documents until the day before oral argument. 6 They argue that (1) the Government
    cannot use the USTR Memoranda to meet its burden of showing that the April Withdrawal cured
    the arbitrary and capricious harm identified in the PI because the Government did not publish,
    provide to the parties, or reference those memoranda in its Motion to Dissolve; and (2) the court
    should not rely on the USTR Memoranda because Plaintiffs have had no opportunity to review
    and respond to those memoranda in the course of briefing on the Motion to Dissolve. See Oral
    Arg.; Invenergy’s Post-OA Filing at 5; SEIA’s Post-OA Filing at 10; EDF-R’s Post-OA Filing at
    6–7.
    The court concludes that the Government has not met its burden of showing changed
    circumstances and resulting inequity in order to justify dissolution of the PI. See, e.g., SKF USA,
    
    316 F. Supp. 2d at 1334
    . Thus, the court denies the Government’s Motion to Dissolve. The court
    reaches this conclusion for two reasons: (1) the Government did not make a showing that the April
    Withdrawal constitutes sufficient changed circumstances regarding its previous arbitrary and
    capricious finding in issuing the PI; and (2) the October Withdrawal is not yet moot because the
    6
    At oral argument on May 13, 2020, the Government responded to Plaintiffs’ concerns regarding
    the alleged last-minute provision of the USTR Memoranda by explaining that such documents are
    typically provided as part of the Administrative Record, pursuant to USCIT Rule 73.3. Oral
    Arg. As this litigation has not proceeded to the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims and had not, prior to
    today’s opinion, included claims related to the April Withdrawal, the Government has not yet
    compiled the Administrative Record. See 
    id.
    Court No. 19-00192                                                                            Page 25
    USTR has not yet rescinded the October Withdrawal, and the Government has not yet met the
    legal requirements for vacatur, addressed in further detail above.
    First, the court finds that the Government’s Motion to Dissolve does not address the court’s
    previous preliminary finding that the October Withdrawal was arbitrary and capricious. See Def.’s
    Mot. to Dissolve. Instead, the Government argues that it addressed the “sole basis” of the PI -- the
    lack of notice-and-comment proceedings. Def.’s Mot. to Dissolve at 7. See also April Status
    Report at 2 (discussing only the court’s preliminary finding regarding APA notice-and-comment
    requirements, but not the arbitrary and capricious finding); Def.’s Mot. to Vacate and Dismiss at
    11 (arguing that USTR’s publication of the January Notice initiating a notice-and-comment period
    “offers all of the relief that the [c]ourt preliminarily found to be lacking”). Further, only after the
    Plaintiffs noted this absence in the Government’s motion does the Government address this basis
    and then provide the court and the parties with the USTR Memoranda that the Government then
    argues provides the reasoned explanation for the April Withdrawal. See Def.’s Resps. to Ct.’s
    Questions at 5, 12–16. While the Government does address the arbitrary and capricious claim in
    response to the court’s questions, the Government’s late attempts to remedy its oversight in its
    original motion is insufficient to meet its burden and to justify disturbing the court’s previous
    findings. 7 See, e.g., Tarpley v. Greene, 
    684 F.2d 1
    , 7 n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (“Clearly, oral
    7
    The Government also contends at oral argument and in its post-oral argument brief that it had
    implicitly argued that the April Withdrawal cured the court’s arbitrary and capricious basis for
    issuing the PI. See Oral Arg.; Def.’s Post-OA Filing at 2–3. However, if that was the
    Government’s position, then it should have explicitly stated so rather than asking the court to
    divine that reading of its April Status Report and Motion to Dissolve ex-post, especially where the
    Government bears the burden here of proving changed circumstances. See Cement Kiln Recycling
    Coal. v. EPA, 
    255 F.3d 855
    , 869 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“A litigant does not properly raise an issue by
    addressing it in a ‘cursory fashion’ with only ‘bare-bones arguments.’” (citations omitted));
    Rivera-Gomez v. de Castro, 
    843 F.2d 631
    , 635 (1st Cir. 1988) (“Judges are not expected to be
    mindreaders. Consequently, a litigant has an obligation ‘to spell out its arguments squarely and
    Court No. 19-00192                                                                        Page 26
    argument on appeal is not the proper time to advance new arguments or legal theories in opposition
    to a motion for summary judgment. . . . It is not the task of this court to consider all of the
    implications of a theory vaguely raised for the first time at oral argument on appeal and to search
    the record for supporting evidence.”). Without having addressed the arbitrary and capricious
    finding in the PI in its Motion to Dissolve, the Government cannot show that circumstances have
    sufficiently changed in regard to this finding, nor can it show that inequity would result in the
    court’s continual enforcement of the PI. See Morita, 
    1989 WL 83256
    , at *1–2; Ad Hoc Shrimp
    Trade Action Comm., 
    562 F. Supp. 2d at 1388
    ; SKF USA, 316 F. Supp. 3d at 1334; AIMCOR
    Ala. Silicon, 
    83 F. Supp. 2d at 1299
    .
    Second, the court recognizes that the Government need not show changed circumstances
    and inequity from continuation of the PI if the October Withdrawal is vacated, and thus the grounds
    on which the PI rests become moot. As discussed in detail above in the context of vacatur,
    however, the Government has not conclusively shown that USTR has rescinded the October
    Withdrawal, or that the October Withdrawal would not go into effect should the court dissolve the
    PI. Thus, the circumstances surrounding the October Withdrawal, taken apart from the April
    Withdrawal, do not justify dissolving the PI. The court does not and need not definitively decide
    whether the April Withdrawal in and of itself cures the deficiencies of the October Withdrawal or
    that the April Withdrawal is free from legal defect. Because USTR has not rescinded the October
    Withdrawal and Plaintiffs have only recently been able to supplement their complaints to include
    claims that USTR’s April Withdrawal also runs afoul of the APA, the court merely concludes that
    the Government has not met its burden of showing sufficiently changed circumstances to justify
    distinctly,’ or else forever hold its peace.” (quoting Paterson–Leitch Co. v. Mass. Mun. Wholesale
    Elec. Co., 
    840 F.2d 985
    , 990 (1st Cir. 1988)).
    Court No. 19-00192                                                                          Page 27
    dissolving the PI at this stage in the litigation. Furthermore, Plaintiffs, the Government, and
    Defendant-Intervenors have not had an adequate opportunity to address the implications of the
    addition of the April Withdrawal to the court’s jurisdiction or the newly provided USTR
    Memoranda in support of that decision. The court’s decision today in no way prejudices the
    Government from making future motions to dissolve the PI, whether by showing changed
    circumstances and inequity or by mooting the October Withdrawal, on which the PI rests, through
    vacatur.
    CONCLUSION
    For these reasons, the court: (1) denies the Government’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to
    Join an Indispensable Party; (2) grants Plaintiffs’ Motions to Supplement their Complaints; (3)
    denies the Government’s Motion to Vacate the Withdrawal and Dismiss the Case as Moot; and (4)
    denies the Government’s Motion to Dissolve the PI. Pursuant to the accompanying Order, the
    court directs the parties to confer and submit a proposed further schedule in this action by June 17,
    2020. The court acknowledges the Government and Defendant-Intervenors’ concern that domestic
    industries may face a threat of material injury due to USTR’s decision to exclude bifacial solar
    products from safeguard duties. See, e.g., Def.’s Post-OA Filing at 7; Def.-Inters.’ Resps. to Ct.’s
    Questions at 20–21; Def.-Inters.’ Post-OA Filing at 12. The court also acknowledges the concerns
    of Plaintiffs (consumers, purchasers and importers of utility-grade bifacial solar panels), who
    oppose safeguard duties that they claim increase the cost of bifacial solar panels. See, e.g.,
    Invenergy’s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. to Dissolve at 25: SEIA’s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. to Dissolve at 21.
    At this stage of the proceedings, the court takes no position on the efficacy of the Exclusion or a
    decision to withdraw the Exclusion in providing protection to the domestic solar industry. Instead,
    the court merely continues to require the Government to follow its own laws when it acts.
    Court No. 19-00192                                    Page 28
    SO ORDERED.
    /s/ Gary S. Katzmann
    Gary S. Katzmann, Judge
    Dated:0D\
    New York, New York