Navigator Co., S.A. v. United States , 2020 CIT 94 ( 2020 )


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  •                                       Slip Op. 20-
    UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
    THE NAVIGATOR COMPANY, S.A.,
    Plaintiff,
    PACKAGING CORPORATION OF
    AMERICA, ET AL.,
    Consolidated Plaintiffs,
    and
    DOMTAR CORPORATION,
    Before: Mark A. Barnett, Judge
    Plaintiff-Intervenor,
    Consol. Court No. 18-00192
    v.
    UNITED STATES,
    Defendant,
    and
    PACKAGING CORPORATION OF
    AMERICA, ET AL.,
    Defendant-Intervenors.
    OPINION
    [Sustaining the U.S. Department of Commerce’s final results of redetermination in the
    first administrative review of the antidumping duty order on certain uncoated paper from
    Portugal.]
    Dated: July 7, 2020
    Jonathan M. Zielinski, Thomas M. Beline, and James E. Ransdell, Cassidy Levy Kent
    (USA) LLP, of Washington, DC, for Plaintiff/Defendant-Intervenor The Navigator
    Company, S.A.
    Consol. Court No. 18-00192                                                           Page 2
    Geert De Prest and William A. Fennell, Schagrin Associates, of Washington, DC, for
    Plaintiff/Defendant-Intervenor Packaging Corporation of America, et al.
    Stephen J. Orava and Daniel L. Schneiderman, King & Spalding LLP, of Washington,
    DC, for Plaintiff-Intervenor Domtar Corporation.
    Michael D. Snyder, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, U.S.
    Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, for Defendant United States. With him on
    the brief were Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant Attorney General, Jeanne E. Davidson,
    Director, and Tara K. Hogan, Assistant Director. Of counsel on the brief was Mykhaylo
    A. Gryzlov, Senior Counsel, Office of the Chief Counsel for Trade Enforcement and
    Compliance, U.S. Department of Commerce, of Washington, DC.
    Barnett, Judge: This matter is before the court following the U.S. Department of
    Commerce’s (“Commerce” or “the agency”) redetermination upon court-ordered
    remand. See Final Results of Remand Redetermination, ECF No. 97 (“Remand
    Results”). Commerce issued its Remand Results in response to the court’s disposition
    of separate challenges to the final results and amended final results of the first
    administrative review of the antidumping duty order on certain uncoated paper from
    Portugal. 1 See The Navigator Co., S.A. v. United States, 43 CIT ___, 
    415 F. Supp. 3d 1278
     (2019); 2 Certain Uncoated Paper From Portugal, 
    83 Fed. Reg. 39,982
     (Dep’t
    Commerce Aug. 13, 2018) (final results of antidumping duty admin. review; 2015–2017)
    (“Final Results”), ECF No. 33-2, and accompanying Issues and Decision Mem., A-471-
    1 The administrative record associated with the remand results is contained in a Public
    Remand Record (“PRR”), ECF No. 98-1, and a Confidential Remand Record (“CRR”),
    ECF No. 98-2. Parties submitted public and confidential joint appendices containing
    record documents cited in their remand comments. See Public J.A. (Remand) (“RPJA”),
    ECF No. 107; Confidential J.A. (Remand) (“RCJA”), ECF No. 106. The court references
    the confidential version of the relevant record documents, unless otherwise specified.
    2 Navigator presents additional background on this case, familiarity with which is
    presumed.
    Consol. Court No. 18-00192                                                                Page 3
    807 (Aug. 6, 2018) (“I&D Mem.”), ECF No. 33-3; Certain Uncoated Paper From
    Portugal, 
    83 Fed. Reg. 52,810
     (Dep’t Commerce Oct. 18, 2018) ([am.] final results of
    antidumping duty admin. review; 2015–2017) (“Amended Final Results”), ECF No. 33-1,
    and accompanying Confidential Ministerial Error Mem. (Oct. 9, 2018), ECF No. 65-1.
    Consolidated Plaintiffs and Plaintiff-Intervenor (collectively, “Petitioners”) 3
    challenged Commerce’s Amended Final Results as making a substantive change to the
    Final Results rather than correcting a purely ministerial error. Confidential Mem. of Law
    in Supp. of Rule 56.2 Mot. of Consol. Pls. Packaging Corp. of America and USW and
    Pl.-Int. Domtar Corp. for J. on the Agency R., ECF No. 48. Plaintiff, The Navigator
    Company, S.A. (“Navigator”), asserted a contingent challenge to the Final Results,
    arguing that Commerce erred in using the facts otherwise available, with or without an
    adverse inference. The Navigator Co.’s Mot. for J. on the Agency R. (“Navigator’s 56.2
    Mot.”), ECF No. 50. 4
    With respect to Petitioners’ challenge to the Amended Final Results, the court
    held that Commerce made an impermissible substantive modification when it amended
    the Final Results and did not, as the agency asserted, correct an inadvertent clerical
    error. Navigator, 415 F. Supp. 3d at 1286–88. With respect to Navigator’s challenge to
    the Final Results, the court held that Commerce permissibly used the facts otherwise
    3 Petitioners consist of Packaging Corporation of America; United Steel, Paper and
    Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers
    International Union, AFL-CIO, CLC; and Domtar Corporation.
    4 Navigator stated that it “would waive its right to pursue its challenge” if Petitioners did
    not prevail in their challenge to the Amended Final Results. Navigator’s Mot. at 3.
    Consol. Court No. 18-00192                                                           Page 4
    available, but the agency’s decision to use an adverse inference in selecting from
    among the facts otherwise available (referred to as “adverse facts available” or “AFA”)
    was unsupported by substantial evidence. Id. at 1290–92.
    In the administrative proceeding underlying the Final Results, Commerce
    rejected Navigator’s allocated U.S. brokerage and handling expenses (reported in the
    field USBROK2U) as anomalous while accepting Navigator’s actual expenses (reported
    in the field USBROKU). I&D Mem. at 6–8. Commerce further found that an adverse
    inference was merited because Navigator failed to demonstrate “that its allocation
    methodology . . . [did] not cause inaccuracies or distortions.” I&D Mem. at 8.
    Commerce selected the highest reported allocated U.S. brokerage and handling
    expense as partial AFA for Navigator’s allocated expenses, which resulted in a
    weighted-average dumping margin of 37.34 percent. Id.; see also Final Results, 83
    Fed. Reg. at 39,983.
    Upon review, the court held that “Commerce’s stated basis for making an
    adverse inference was the very same basis that justified Commerce’s use of the facts
    available—that Navigator failed to establish that its allocation was non-distortive.”
    Navigator, 415 F. Supp. 3d at 1292. Thus, the court remanded the determination for
    Commerce to “either select a neutral value to use as facts available or provide an
    explanation addressing how Navigator failed to act to the best of its ability that is distinct
    from Commerce's basis for using facts available.” Id.
    On January 24, 2020, Commerce issued the draft results of redetermination to
    interested parties. Draft Results of Remand Redetermination (Jan. 24, 2020) (“Draft
    Consol. Court No. 18-00192                                                           Page 5
    Results”), PRR 107, RPJA Tab 1. Therein, Commerce explained that it “selected a
    neutral facts available value for allocated brokerage expenses by calculating the
    weighted-average of all positive USBROK2U values reported for the [period of review
    (“POR”)].” Id. at 2; see also id. at 4 (explaining that Commerce adjusted the reported
    USBROK2U expenses by removing all zero and negative values). Petitioners submitted
    comments on the Draft Results in which they argued, inter alia, that Commerce should
    continue to apply an adverse inference instead of applying neutral facts available.
    Pet’rs’ Cmts. on the Draft Results of Redetermination Pursuant to Court Remand (Jan.
    30, 2020) (“Pet’rs’ Draft Cmts.”) at 1–7, CRR 5, PRR 3, CRJA Tab 3.
    On February 19, 2020, Commerce issued its Remand Results and submitted
    them to the court. The Remand Results remained substantively the same as the Draft
    Results. See Remand Results at 5. Commerce’s use of neutral facts available resulted
    in an amended weighted-average dumping margin of 1.63 percent for Navigator. Id.
    Petitioners oppose the Remand Results. Confidential Remand Cmts. of [Consol.
    Pls.] and Pl.-Int. Domtar Corp. (“Pet’rs’ Opp’n Cmts.”), ECF No. 100. Petitioners argue
    that Commerce’s uniform substitution of the purportedly neutral allocated brokerage
    expense value, including its use for transactions for which the original value was higher
    than the neutral value, introduced distortions and was effectively non-neutral because it
    reduced Navigator’s allocated brokerage expenses and, thus, Navigator’s dumping
    margin. Id. at 3–4. For this reason, Petitioners argue that Commerce’s Remand
    Results lack a “rational connection between the facts of record and the agency’s
    characterization” of its determination as applying neutral facts available. Id. at 4 (citing
    Consol. Court No. 18-00192                                                           Page 6
    Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co.
    
    463 U.S. 29
    , 51–52 (1983)).
    Defendant, United States (“the Government”), and Navigator support
    Commerce’s Remand Results. Def.’s Resp. to Cmts. Regarding the Remand
    Redetermination (“Def.’s Reply Cmts.”), ECF No. 102; The Navigator Co.’s Responsive
    Cmts. in Supp. of the Agency’s Remand Determination (“Navigator’s Reply Cmts.”),
    ECF No. 103. The Government argues that Petitioners have failed to administratively
    exhaust their argument, which otherwise fails on its merits. Def.’s Reply Cmts. at 4–10.
    Navigator argues that Commerce’s selection and application of neutral facts available is
    reasonable and supported by substantial evidence, whereas Petitioners’ proposed
    methodology is inherently adverse. Navigator’s Reply Cmts. at 2–6.
    For the reasons discussed below, the court sustains Commerce’s Remand
    Results.
    JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
    The court has jurisdiction pursuant to section 516A(a)(2)(B)(iii) of the Tariff Act of
    1930, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(2)(B)(iii) (2018), 5 and 28 U.S.C § 1581(c).
    The court will uphold an agency determination that is supported by substantial evidence
    and otherwise in accordance with law 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i). “The results of a
    redetermination pursuant to court remand are also reviewed for compliance with the
    5All citations to the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, are to Title 19 of the U.S. Code,
    2012 edition.
    Consol. Court No. 18-00192                                                         Page 7
    court's remand order.” SolarWorld Ams., Inc. v. United States, 41 CIT ___, ___, 
    273 F. Supp. 3d 1314
    , 1317 (2017) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
    DISCUSSION
    Petitioners oppose Commerce’s uniform application of its neutral facts available
    value for the allocated U.S. brokerage and handling expenses. Pet’rs’ Opp’n Cmts. at
    3–4. The court first addresses whether Petitioners adequately exhausted this argument
    before the agency and then turns briefly to the merits.
    I. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
    A. Legal Framework
    “[T]he Court of International Trade shall, where appropriate, require the
    exhaustion of administrative remedies.” 
    28 U.S.C. § 2637
    (d). While exhaustion is not
    jurisdictional, Weishan Hongda Aquatic Food Co. v. United States, 
    917 F.3d 1353
    ,
    1363–64 (Fed. Cir. 2019), the statute “indicates a congressional intent that, absent a
    strong contrary reason, the [CIT] should insist that parties exhaust their remedies before
    the pertinent administrative agencies,” 
    id. at 1362
     (quoting Boomerang Tube LLC v.
    United States, 
    856 F.3d 908
    , 912 (Fed. Cir. 2017)) (alteration original) (emphasis
    added). Failure to present an argument on remand generally precludes parties from
    raising that argument before the court. Mittal Steel Point Lisas Ltd. v. United States,
    
    548 F.3d 1375
    , 1383–84 (Fed. Cir. 2008). There are exceptions to the exhaustion
    requirement, such as when “the party had no opportunity to raise the issue before the
    Consol. Court No. 18-00192                                                        Page 8
    agency.” Essar Steel, Ltd. v. United States, 
    753 F.3d 1368
    , 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
    (citation omitted). 6
    B. Petitioners Failed to Exhaust their Administrative Remedies
    During the remand proceeding, Petitioners argued that Commerce should
    continue to apply an adverse inference as it had done for the Final Results or select a
    different adverse value from the non-aberrational values reported in USBROK2U.
    Pet’rs’ Draft Cmts. at 6–7. Before the court, however, Petitioners have abandoned that
    argument and instead challenge Commerce’s methodology for applying neutral facts
    available. Pet’rs’ Opp’n Cmts. at 2. Specifically, Petitioners argue that Commerce
    should only apply the neutral facts available value to those transactions for which the
    reported expense is less than the selected neutral facts available value. 
    Id.
     at 4–5.
    Petitioners’ methodology would raise Navigator’s dumping margin from that calculated
    in the Remand Results. See id. at 5. Petitioners had the opportunity to present this
    argument to Commerce and failed to do so. Accordingly, Petitioners failed to exhaust
    their administrative remedies. See, e.g., Boomerang, 856 F.3d at 913 (foreclosing
    consideration of an argument when the proponent had the information, opportunity, and
    incentive to present it to the agency).
    6 There are other exceptions to the exhaustion requirement, including futility, an
    intervening court decision, pure questions of law, or when plaintiff had no reason to
    believe the agency would not follow established precedent. See Luoyang Bearing
    Factory v. United States, 
    26 CIT 1156
    , 1186 n.26, 
    240 F. Supp. 2d 1268
    , 1297 n.26
    (2002) (collecting cases). Those exceptions are not relevant here.
    Consol. Court No. 18-00192                                                             Page 9
    Petitioners argue that their failure to suggest any alternative neutral facts
    available methodology or value to Commerce should be excused because, in the Draft
    Results, Commerce abandoned its reliance on adverse facts available and, thus,
    Petitioners’ comments on the Draft Results pressed “Commerce to return to its previous
    position.” Pet’rs’ Opp’n Cmts. at 5. Petitioners’ “excuse” does not relieve their failure to
    raise the instant challenge before Commerce in the alternative.
    Petitioners also argue that they “did propose actual selections, with the specific
    goal of avoiding reducing reported costs, i.e., the same concern that remains now.” 
    Id.
    However, the only alternative selection that Petitioners proposed was “the highest value
    reported in USBROK2U” (and an alternative in case the highest value was considered
    aberrational), which they encouraged Commerce to use “as appropriate adverse facts
    available, as was done in the original Final Results.” Pet’rs’ Draft Cmts. at 7. That the
    “same concern” motivated Petitioners’ proposed AFA value in its comments on the Draft
    Results and now motivates Petitioners’ current challenge to Commerce’s methodology,
    Pet’rs’ Opp’n Cmts. at 5, is irrelevant. “Arguments must be presented in toto for this
    entire judicial review process to work sensibly.” Icdas Celik Enerji Tersane ve Ulasim
    Sanayi, A.S. v. United States, 41 CIT ___, ___, 
    277 F. Supp. 3d 1346
    , 1353 (2017)
    (exhaustion is required when the plaintiff failed to fully apprise Commerce of its
    arguments).
    Accordingly, Petitioners failed to exhaust their argument before Commerce and
    no exception applies to excuse that failure.
    Consol. Court No. 18-00192                                                            Page 10
    II. Petitioners’ Argument Also Fails on its Merits
    Even if an exception applied to excuse Petitioners’ failure to exhaust their
    administrative remedies, Petitioners’ argument that the weighted-average value should
    be applied only to transactions for which Navigator reported expenses that were less
    than the weighted-average value would, nevertheless, fail on its merits. See Pet’rs’
    Opp’n Cmts. at 4. As discussed below, Commerce has provided a rational explanation
    for its uniform substitution of its neutral facts available value to all transactions for
    allocated U.S. brokerage and handling expenses; thus, Petitioners’ argument lacks
    merit.
    First, unless all the values are identical, the calculation of a weighted-average
    value based on thousands of transactions typically will result in a value that is higher or
    lower than each of the transaction-specific values. Def.’s Reply Cmts. at 5. Thus,
    substitution of the weighted-average value uniformly means that certain transactions are
    adjusted upwards while others are adjusted downwards. See id. at 6. As Commerce
    explained, that certain reported values were higher than the weighted-average value
    “does not negate the neutral nature of Commerce’s facts available value.” Remand
    Results at 13.
    Second, correcting Petitioners’ perceived deficiency by applying the neutral value
    only to transactions with lower reported expenses would increase those expenses and
    increase the dumping margin. See Pet’rs’ Opp’n Cmts. at 5; Def.’s Reply Cmts. at 6.
    The court need not determine whether such an alternative methodology would best be
    considered “neutral” facts available or “adverse” facts available because such an
    Consol. Court No. 18-00192                                                          Page 11
    alternative was neither presented to nor selected by Commerce. Commerce has broad
    discretion when selecting from among the facts otherwise available. See, e.g., Acciai
    Speciali Terni S.P.A. v. United States, 
    25 CIT 245
    , 264, 
    142 F. Supp. 2d 969
    , 989
    (2001) (“[T]he ultimate choice of facts available is a matter largely reserved to
    Commerce’s discretion.”) (citation omitted). Commerce addressed any distortion that
    arose from the reporting of zero or negative expenses by substituting a positive value
    for all such transactions. See Pet’rs’ Opp’n Cmts. at 3. Petitioners fail to persuade the
    court that Commerce’s only reasonable invocation of facts available was to limit its
    application to transactions for which the reported U.S. allocated brokerage and handling
    expense was lower than the selected facts available value.
    In sum, Commerce supplied a reasoned explanation to support its use of neutral
    facts available, and its uniform application of a neutral weighted-average value is
    supported by substantial evidence and in accordance with the law.
    CONCLUSION
    In accordance with the foregoing, Commerce’s Remand Results will be
    sustained. Judgment will enter accordingly.
    /s/   Mark A. Barnett
    Mark A. Barnett, Judge
    Dated: July 7, 2020
    New York, New York