Meihua Grp. Int'l Trading (Hong Kong) Ltd. v. United States , 2023 CIT 53 ( 2023 )


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  •                                   Slip Op. 23-53
    UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
    MEIHUA GROUP
    INTERNATIONAL TRADING
    (HONG KONG) LIMITED and
    XINJIANG MEIHUA AMINO
    ACID CO., LTD.,
    Plaintiffs,
    and
    DEOSEN BIOCHEMICAL                      Before: Jennifer Choe-Groves, Judge
    (ORDOS) LTD., DEOSEN
    BIOCHEMICAL LTD., and                   Consol. Court No. 22-00069
    JIANLONG BIOTECHNOLOGY
    COMPANY, LTD.,
    Consolidated Plaintiffs,
    v.
    UNITED STATES,
    Defendant.
    OPINION AND ORDER
    [Remanding the final results of the U.S. Department of Commerce, following the
    final determination in the antidumping duty investigation of xanthan gum from the
    People’s Republic of China.]
    Dated: April 19, 2023
    Consol. Court No. 22-00069                                                Page 2
    Mark B. Lehnardt, Law Offices of David L. Simon, PLLC, of Washington, D.C.,
    for Plaintiffs Meihua Group International Trading (Hong Kong) Limited and
    Xinjiang Meihua Amino Acid Co., Ltd.
    Chunlian (Lian) Yang, and Lucas Querioz Pires, Alston & Bird LLP, of
    Washington, D.C., for Consolidated Plaintiffs Deosen Biochemical (Ordos) Ltd.
    and Deosen Biochemical Ltd.
    Robert G. Gosselink, Jonathan M. Freed, and Kenneth N. Hammer, Trade Pacific
    PLLC, of Washington, D.C., for Consolidated Plaintiff Jianlong Biotechnology
    Company, Ltd.
    Tara K. Hogan, Assistant Director, and Kelly A. Krystyniak, Trial Attorney,
    Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, of
    Washington, D.C., for Defendant United States. With them on the brief were
    Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, and Patricia M.
    McCarthy, Director. Of Counsel was Spencer Neff, Attorney, Office of the Chief
    Counsel for Trade Enforcement and Compliance, U.S. Department of Commerce.
    Choe-Groves, Judge: This action concerns the import of xanthan gum from
    the People’s Republic of China (“China”), subject to the administrative
    determination by the U.S. Department of Commerce (“Commerce”) in Xanthan
    Gum From the People’s Republic of China (“Final Results”), 
    87 Fed. Reg. 7104
    (Dep’t of Commerce Feb. 8, 2022) (final results of antidumping duty
    administrative review and final determination of no shipments; 2019–2021); see
    also Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final Results of the 2019-2020
    Antidumping Duty Administrative Review of Xanthan Gum from the People’s
    Republic of China (“Final IDM”), ECF No. 23-3.
    Consol. Court No. 22-00069                                                   Page 3
    Meihua Group International Trading (Hong Kong) Limited and Xinjiang
    Meihua Amino Acid Co., Ltd. (collectively, “Meihua”) challenge Commerce’s
    Final Results in its Motion of Meihua Group International Trading (Hong Kong)
    Limited and Xinjiang Meihua Amino Acid Co., Ltd., for Judgment on the Agency
    Record and the Memorandum of Meihua Group International Trading (Hong
    Kong) Limited and Xinjiang Meihua Amino Acid Co., Ltd., in Support of its
    Motion for Judgement upon the Agency Record. Pls.’ Mot. J. Agency R., ECF No.
    30-2; Mem. Pls.’ Supp. Mot. J. Agency R. (“Pls.’ Br.”), ECF Nos. 30-4, 31.
    Consolidated Plaintiff Jianlong Biotechnology Co., Ltd. (“Jianlong”) contests
    Commerce’s Final Results in Consolidated Plaintiff’s Rule 56.2 Motion for
    Judgement upon the Agency Record and Memorandum in Support of the Rule 56.2
    Motion of Consolidated Plaintiff Jianlong Biotechnology Co. Ltd., for Judgment
    upon the Agency Record. Consol. Pl.’s R. 56.2 Mot. J. Agency R., ECF Nos. 27,
    28; and Mem. Supp. Consol. Pl.’s R. 56.2 Mot. J. Agency R. (“Jianlong’s Br.”),
    ECF Nos. 27-2, 28-2. Deosen Chemical (Ordos) Ltd. and Deosen Biochemical
    Ltd. (collectively, “Deosen”) challenge Commerce’s Final Results in Consolidated
    Plaintiff Deosen’s Motion for Summary Judgment on the Agency Record and
    Consolidated Plaintiff Deosen’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support
    of its Motion for Summary Judgment on the Agency Record. Consol. Pl.’s R. 56.2
    Mot. J. Agency R. (“Deosen’s Br.”), ECF No. 32. Defendant United States
    Consol. Court No. 22-00069                                                   Page 4
    (“Defendant”) filed Defendant’s Response to Plaintiffs’ and Plaintiff-Intervenors’
    Motions for Judgment Upon the Agency Record.1 Def.’s Resp. Br. Opp’n Pls.’ R.
    56.2 Mots. J. Agency R. (“Def.’s Resp. Br.”), ECF Nos. 35, 36.2 Meihua,
    Jianlong, and Deosen filed reply briefs. See Pl.’s Reply Br. Supp. R. 56.2 Mot. J.
    Agency R. (“Meihua’s Reply”), ECF Nos. 41, 42; Consol. Pl.’s Reply Br.
    (“Jianlong’s Reply”), ECF No. 39; Consol. Pl.’s Reply Supp. Mot. Summary J.
    Agency R. (“Deosen’s Reply”), ECF No. 40.
    For the reasons discussed below, the Court remands Commerce’s Final
    Results.
    ISSUES PRESENTED
    The Court reviews the following issues:
    1. Whether Commerce’s application of facts otherwise available to
    Meihua was in accordance with the law and supported by substantial
    evidence;
    1
    Defendant incorrectly identified Consolidated Plaintiffs Deosen Biochemical
    (Ordos) Ltd., Deosen Biochemical Ltd., and Jianlong Biotechnology Company,
    Ltd. as Plaintiff-Intervenors.
    2
    Plaintiffs Meihua Group International Trading (Hong Kong) Limited and
    Xinjiang Meihua Amino Acid Co., Ltd. submitted Plaintiffs’ Unopposed Motion
    for Oral Argument, ECF No. 43, which was granted by the Court. See Order, ECF
    No. 46. Because some of the Parties were unavailable for a substantial period of
    time, the Court decides this case without oral argument.
    Consol. Court No. 22-00069                                                    Page 5
    2. Whether failure to exhaust administrative remedies prevents
    Jianlong’s arguments before the Court;
    3. Whether Commerce’s application of the separate rate to Jianlong and
    Deosen was supported by substantial evidence and in accordance with
    the law; and
    4. Whether Commerce’s determination not to rescind Deosen’s review
    was supported by substantial evidence.
    PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    On July 19, 2013, Commerce published an antidumping duty order on
    xanthan gum from China. Xanthan Gum From the People’s Republic of China, 
    78 Fed. Reg. 43,143
     (Dep’t of Commerce July 19, 2013) (amended final
    determination of sales at less than fair value and antidumping duty order).
    Commerce published a notice of opportunity to request an administrative review of
    the antidumping duty order on xanthan gum from China for the period of July 1,
    2019 through June 30, 2020. Antidumping or Countervailing Duty Order, Finding,
    or Suspended Investigation, 
    85 Fed. Reg. 39,531
     (Dep’t of Commerce July 1,
    2020) (opportunity to request administrative review). Commerce initiated an
    administrative review of the antidumping duty order Xanthan Gum From the
    People’s Republic of China. Initiation of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty
    Consol. Court No. 22-00069                                                     Page 6
    Administrative Reviews (“Initiation Notice”), 
    85 Fed. Reg. 54,983
    , 54,990 (Dep’t
    of Commerce Sep. 3, 2020).
    Commerce received requests for reviews of several companies and selected
    Neimenggu Fufeng Biotechnologies Co., Ltd., Xinjiang Fufeng Biotechnologies
    Co., Ltd., and Shandong Fufeng Fermentation Co., Ltd. (collectively, “Fufeng”),
    and Meihua Group International Trading (Hong Kong) Limited, Langfang Meihua
    BioTechnology Co., Ltd., and Xinjiang Meihua Amino Acid Co., Ltd. for review.
    Memo From USDOC to Office Director Pertaining to Interested Parties
    Respondent Selection, PR 39.3 Commerce explained that because Commerce
    treated Deosen Chemical (Ordos), Ltd. and Deosen Biochemical Ltd. as a single
    entity during the investigation, it would continue to do so in the 2019–2020
    administrative review. 
    Id.
     at 2 n.5. Commerce published its Seventh Antidumping
    Duty Administrative Review of Xanthan Gum from the People’s Republic of
    China: Preliminary Application of Adverse Facts Available to Meihua on July 30,
    2021. Seventh Antidumping Duty Administrative Review of Xanthan Gum from
    the People’s Republic of China: Preliminary Application of Adverse Facts
    Available to Meihua (“AFA Memo”), PR 285. Commerce published its
    preliminary results and accompanying issues and decision memorandum on August
    3
    Citations to the administrative record reflect the public administrative record
    (“PR”) document numbers. ECF No. 45.
    Consol. Court No. 22-00069                                                   Page 7
    5, 2021. Xanthan Gum From the People’s Republic of China, 
    86 Fed. Reg. 42,781
    (Dep’t of Commerce Aug. 5, 2021) (preliminary results of the antidumping duty
    administrative review, partial recission of the antidumping duty administrative
    review, and preliminary determination of no shipments; 2019–2020); see also
    Decision Memorandum for the Preliminary Results of the Seventh Antidumping
    Duty Administrative Review of Xanthan Gum from the People’s Republic of
    China, PR 278. Meihua and Deosen filed administrative case briefs. Brief From
    Craven Trade Law LLC to Sec of Commerce Pertaining to Meihua (“Meihua’s
    Admin. Case Br.”), PR 294; Brief from Alston & Bird, LLP to Sec of Commerce
    Pertaining to Deosen (“Deosen’s Admin. Case Br.”), PR 293. Jianlong did not file
    an administrative case brief. Commerce issued its Final Results and Final IDM on
    February 8, 2022. Final Results, 
    87 Fed. Reg. 7104
    ; Final IDM. Commerce
    determined that Meihua provided inaccurate data and withheld information, and
    Commerce applied an adverse inference when selecting from facts otherwise
    available on the record to determine Meihua’s dumping margin. Final IDM at 11–
    16. Commerce assigned a dumping margin to separate rate companies not
    individually investigated (collectively, “Separate Rate Respondents”) (including
    Deosen and Jianlong) of 77.04%, based on the simple average of the alternative
    facts available rate of 154.07% assigned to Meihua and the 0% rate assigned to
    Fufeng. Final Results, 87 Fed. Reg. at 7105.
    Consol. Court No. 22-00069                                                    Page 8
    JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
    The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(2)(B)(iii) and
    
    28 U.S.C. § 1581
    (c), which grant the Court authority to review actions contesting
    the final results of an administrative review of a countervailing duty order. The
    Court shall hold unlawful any determination found to be unsupported by
    substantial evidence on the record or otherwise not in accordance with the law. 19
    U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i).
    DISCUSSION
    I.     Commerce’s Application of Facts Otherwise Available to Meihua
    Section 776 of the Tariff Act provides that if “necessary information is not
    available on the record” or if a respondent “fails to provide such information by the
    deadlines for submission of the information or in the form and manner requested,”
    then the agency shall “use the facts otherwise available in reaching” its
    determination. 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(a)(1), (a)(2)(B). If Commerce determines that a
    response is deficient, 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(a)(1) permits Commerce to select from
    facts otherwise available if necessary information is missing from the record. 19
    U.S.C. § 1677e(a)(2) permits Commerce to select from facts otherwise available if
    an interested party (A) withholds information, (B) fails to provide such information
    by the deadlines for submission, or in the form and manner requested, (C)
    Consol. Court No. 22-00069                                                      Page 9
    significantly impedes a proceeding, or (D) provides such information but the
    information cannot be verified. 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(a)(2).
    The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“CAFC”) has interpreted
    19 U.S.C. § 1677e(a)(1) and (a)(2)(B) to have different purposes. See Mueller
    Comercial de Mexico, S. de R.L. De C.V. v. United States, 
    753 F.3d 1227
    , 1232
    (Fed. Cir. 2014). Subsection (a) applies “whether or not any party has failed to
    cooperate fully with the agency in its inquiry.” 
    Id.
     (citing Zhejiang DunAn Hetian
    Metal Co. v. United States, 
    652 F.3d 1333
    , 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2011)). Subsection (b)
    applies only when the Department makes a separate determination that the
    respondent failed to cooperate “by not acting to the best of its ability.” 
    Id.
     (quoting
    Nippon Steel Corp. v. United States, 
    337 F.3d 1373
    , 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
    When determining whether a respondent has complied to the “best of its
    ability,” Commerce “assess[es] whether [a] respondent has put forth its maximum
    effort to provide Commerce with full and complete answers to all inquiries in an
    investigation.” Nippon Steel, 
    337 F.3d at 1382
    . This determination requires both
    an objective and subjective showing. 
    Id.
     at 1382–83. First, Commerce must
    determine objectively “that a reasonable and responsible importer would have
    known that the requested information was required to be kept and maintained
    under the applicable statutes, rules, and regulations.” 
    Id.
     (citing Ta Chen Stainless
    Steel Pipe, Inc. v. United States, 
    298 F.3d 1330
    , 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). Next,
    Consol. Court No. 22-00069                                                      Page 10
    Commerce must demonstrate subjectively that the respondent’s “failure to fully
    respond is the result of the respondent’s lack of cooperation in either: (a) failing to
    keep and maintain all required records, or (b) failing to put forth its maximum
    efforts to investigate and obtain the requested information from its records.” 
    Id.
     at
    1382–83. Adverse inferences are not warranted “merely from a failure to
    respond,” but rather in instances in which the Department reasonably expected that
    “more forthcoming responses should have been made.” 
    Id. at 1383
    . “The
    statutory trigger for Commerce’s consideration of an adverse inference is simply a
    failure to cooperate to the best of respondent’s ability, regardless of motivation or
    intent.” 
    Id.
    Meihua argues that Commerce’s use of facts otherwise available should be
    remanded because Commerce’s determination is not supported by substantial
    evidence and is not in accordance with the law. Pls.’ Br. at 19–20. Meihua
    contends that it did not withhold information requested by Commerce, that it
    timely submitted all information requested by Commerce, and that its submission
    of incorrect information did not call into question the reliability of the information
    reported by Meihua. 
    Id.
     In the alternative, Meihua asserts that even if
    Commerce’s determination that the application of an adverse inference to Meihua
    was justified, “its decision to apply total [alternative facts available] was not.” Id.
    at 19. Meihua contends that it cooperated to the best of its ability and that
    Consol. Court No. 22-00069                                                   Page 11
    Commerce failed to conduct the statutorily required evaluation of circumstances
    leading to its use of alternative facts available. Id.
    Defendant argues that Commerce’s determination that there is a “gap in the
    record based on Meihua’s failure to report accurate information” regarding United
    States sales is supported by substantial evidence and in accordance with the law
    because Meihua knowingly reported inaccurate information that was vital to
    Commerce’s calculation of a U.S. price, and thus Commerce’s ultimate duty rate
    calculation. Def.’s Resp. Br. at 12–13. Defendant asserts that “by failing to
    provide Commerce with [necessary information], Meihua withheld information
    requested by Commerce, failed to provide that information for the deadline
    established by Commerce, and—by significantly impeding Commerce’s
    proceeding—Meihua’s [sic] created a gap in the record that Commerce needed to
    fill by reliance on facts otherwise available pursuant to 19 U.S.C.
    § 1677e(a)(2)(A)–(C).” Id. at 13 (citing Final IDM at 14).
    Commerce’s Section C Questionnaire requested information about amounts
    of duties paid: “Field Number 29.0: U.S. Customs Duty . . . Description: If terms
    of sale included this charge, report the unit amount of any customs duty paid on the
    merchandise under consideration. . . . Narrative: Describe how you calculated the
    unit cost of U.S. customs duties and customs fees, and include your worksheets as
    attachments to the narrative response.” Letter from USDOC to Grunfeld,
    Consol. Court No. 22-00069                                                    Page 12
    Desiderio Pertaining to Meihua Questionnaire; Appendix VIII, Appendix VII,
    Appendix X (“Section C Questionnaire”) at C-19–C-20, PR 44–47. Meihua
    contends that it provided the information requested by Commerce when Meihua
    submitted calculations of the unit amounts of customs duty paid, including the
    amounts of Harbor Maintenance Tax, Merchandise Processing Fee, and ordinary
    duty due at the time of entry. Pls.’ Br. at 8. Meihua asserts that it also provided
    Section 301 duties paid by Meihua and explained its methodology for reporting the
    Section 301 duties as follows:
    [B]ecause in the accounting system of Meihua Hong Kong, there is
    [not] any sub-account to catch these duties (the Section 301 duty, the
    normal duty, ocean freight and ocean insurance expense as well as
    [Merchandise Processing Fee/Harbor Maintenance Tax] expenses are
    deducted from the gross sales revenue to arrive at a net sales revenue).
    In other words, because of the terms of sale, Meihua began with the sale
    price and backed out customs duties, 301 duties, ocean freight and
    insurance, and [Merchandise Processing Fee/Harbor Maintenance Tax]
    to arrive at the net sales price. . . .
    Meihua reported the actual amounts paid to [Customs] upon entry of
    the merchandise for regular customs duties, [Harbor Maintenance Tax],
    and [Merchandise Processing Fee]—not any more or less. . . . Meihua
    had not paid, or been refunded, any amounts; and the amounts it would
    eventually need to pay or that it would be reimbursed were not final.
    There was no other number that Meihua could report.
    Id. at 8–9 (citing Response from Craven Trade Law LLC to Sec of Commerce
    Pertaining to Meihua Sec C QR (“Meihua’s Section C Questionnaire Response”) at
    C-48, C-31, Exhibit C-5, PR 71–74; Letter from Craven Trade Law LLC to Sec of
    Consol. Court No. 22-00069                                                    Page 13
    Commerce Pertaining to Meihua Rebuttal to Pre-Prelim Cmts, PR 274; Meihua’s
    Admin. Case Br. at 9–13).
    Approximately three months prior to filing Meihua’s Section C
    Questionnaire Response, Meihua filed a document with the U.S. Department of
    Customs and Border Protection (“Customs”) containing certain information that
    arguably differed from the information in Meihua’s Section C Questionnaire
    Response (specific differences included the identity of the consignee provided to
    Customs as well as information related to Meihua’s methodology for reporting to
    Customs entered values for certain sales). Id. at 5–6, 10. Meihua explained that it
    “reported to [Customs] all the errors it had found, but stated that it would perfect
    (or complete) the disclosure in near the future.” Id. at 6. Meihua did not initially
    report the corrected information regarding entered values to Commerce, but in
    supplemental filings to Commerce, Meihua provided the documents that Meihua
    had submitted previously to Customs regarding these corrections to information
    about consignees and reported value for certain sales.
    Meihua contends that the information initially provided to Commerce was
    accurate and answered Commerce’s specific question about “duties paid” to
    Customs. Meihua argues that it accurately “reported the actual amounts paid” to
    Customs upon entry, and that “the amounts it would eventually need to pay or that
    it would be reimbursed were not final” due to ongoing Section 301 exclusion
    Consol. Court No. 22-00069                                                    Page 14
    requests. Id. at 9. Notably, Meihua asserts that “Commerce provided no indication
    that it believed Meihua’s submissions were deficient in any way.” Id. at 11.
    Meihua contends that it first learned of any purported deficiency when it received
    the AFA Memo on July 30, 2021:
    Meihua was flabbergasted. . . . Commerce hadn’t seemed to disagree
    that the information was not relevant to the calculation of duties, and
    Commerce certainly hadn’t pointed out a deficiency and provided
    Meihua an opportunity to remedy a deficiency.
    Id. at 14.
    Defendant does not dispute that Commerce failed to provide notice of a
    deficiency, instead blaming Meihua for Commerce’s lack of knowledge:
    Meihua could have alerted Commerce to the fact that its reported sales
    were under revision, giving Commerce an opportunity to recognize the
    deficiency in Meihua’s reporting, potentially issue further supplemental
    questionnaire(s), and adjust its calculations accordingly.”
    Def.’s Resp. Br. at 14. Commerce determined that:
    Meihua withheld relevant information about these adjustments and
    failed to disclose certain information concerning the documentation for
    these reported sales. Meihua was aware that the duties and entered
    values that it reported to Commerce were incorrect at the time it filed
    its Section C Questionnaire Response and should have informed
    Commerce about the inaccuracy of the sales adjustments and other
    relevant information about the sales at issue early in the proceeding.
    Meihua’s actions call into question the reliability of its reported sales
    information and prevented Commerce (and interested parties) from
    fully analyzing and commenting on Meihua’s sales data and calculating
    an accurate dumping margin.
    Consol. Court No. 22-00069                                                     Page 15
    Final IDM at 11. Commerce determined that Meihua’s dumping margin should be
    based on facts otherwise available because:
    (1) Information necessary to calculate an accurate dumping margin for
    Meihua is not available on the record; (2) Meihua did not fully disclose
    information regarding the U.S. sales data that it reported and thus, in
    that sense, it withheld information that had been requested; (3) Meihua
    failed to provide information within the deadlines established, or in the
    form and manner requested by Commerce; and (4) Meihua significantly
    impeded this proceeding. We also used adverse inferences in selecting
    from the facts otherwise available because Meihua did not act to the
    best of its ability because it withheld information and knowingly failed
    to disclose that certain reported information was inaccurate.
    Id. at 11–12.
    With respect to Meihua’s allegation that Commerce’s determination to use
    facts otherwise available was not in accordance with the law, Meihua argues that it
    provided all of the information that Commerce requested, and that Meihua was not
    provided with sufficient notice or an opportunity to remedy any deficiencies in its
    filing pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1677m(d). This statutory provision states in relevant
    part:
    If the administering authority or the Commission determines that a
    response to a request for information under this subtitle does not
    comply with the request, the administering authority or the Commission
    (as the case may be) shall promptly inform the person submitting the
    response of the nature of the deficiency and shall, to the extent
    practicable, provide that person with an opportunity to remedy or
    explain the deficiency in light of the time limits established for the
    completion of investigations or reviews under this subtitle. If that
    person submits further information in response to such deficiency and
    either—
    Consol. Court No. 22-00069                                                       Page 16
    (1) the administering authority or the Commission (as the case may be)
    finds that such response is not satisfactory, or
    (2) such response is not submitted within the applicable time limits,
    then the administering authority or the Commission (as the case may
    be) may, subject to subsection (e), disregard all or part of the original
    and subsequent responses.
    19 U.S.C. § 1677m(d).
    The Court concludes that Commerce failed to fulfill its statutory obligation
    under 19 U.S.C. § 1677m(d) because Commerce did not “promptly inform the
    person submitting the response of the nature of the deficiency and . . . to the extent
    practicable, provide that person with an opportunity to remedy or explain the
    deficiency.” See id. Here, Commerce neither notified Meihua of any deficiencies
    in its provision of information, nor provided Meihua with an opportunity to correct
    such deficiencies before Commerce determined that Meihua failed to cooperate to
    the best of its ability and drew adverse inferences against Meihua. To the extent
    that Defendant argues that Commerce could not have known about any
    deficiencies because the information was solely in Meihua’s possession, the Court
    observes that Commerce was aware of potential discrepancies when Meihua
    provided copies of its prior filings to Customs in Meihua’s supplemental responses
    to Commerce. See Def.’s Resp. Br. at 4–5 (acknowledging the timeline upon
    which Meihua submitted copies of its prior filings).
    Consol. Court No. 22-00069                                                       Page 17
    Because Commerce failed to satisfy its statutory obligation to provide notice
    and an opportunity to remedy any deficiency under 19 U.S.C. § 1677m(d), the
    Court concludes that Commerce has no authority to apply adverse facts and
    inferences under 19 U.S.C. § 1677e. See Maverick Tube Corp. v. United States,
    
    857 F.3d 1353
    , 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (quoting NSK Ltd. v. United States, 
    481 F.3d 1355
    , 1360 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“Commerce . . . satisfied its obligations
    under section 1677m(d) when it issued a supplemental questionnaire specifically
    pointing out and requesting clarification of [the] deficient responses.”) (internal
    quotation omitted); Hitachi Energy USA Inc. v. United States, 
    34 F.4th 1375
    ,
    1384–85 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (“Commerce’s denial of [movant’s] request to provide
    any necessary information was contrary to the statute, which states . . . that
    Commerce ‘shall promptly inform the person submitting the response of the nature
    of the deficiency and shall . . . provide that person with an opportunity to remedy
    or explain the deficiency.’”). The Court does not reach the substantive analysis of
    whether Commerce’s determination to use an adverse inference was supported by
    substantial evidence. The Court remands Commerce’s application of adverse facts
    available and the application of the highest rate in a prior proceeding to Meihua for
    further consideration in accordance with this Opinion.
    Consol. Court No. 22-00069                                                       Page 18
    II.    Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies by Jianlong
    Jianlong argues that Commerce’s determination to assign Separate Rate
    Respondents the simple average of the alternative facts available rate of 154.07%
    assigned to Meihua and the 0% rate assigned to Fufeng is not supported by
    substantial evidence because the rate of 77.04% assigned to the cooperating
    Separate Rate Respondents is not reasonably reflective of the non-investigated
    respondents’ potential dumping. Jianlong’s Br. at 9–17.
    Defendant argues that Jianlong failed to exhaust its administrative remedies
    because Jianlong did not file an administrative case brief addressing the issues it
    now seeks to argue before the Court. Def.’s Resp. Br. at 21–22.
    Before commencing suit in the U.S. Court of International Trade, an
    aggrieved party must exhaust all administrative remedies available to it. “In any
    civil action . . . the Court of International Trade shall, where appropriate, require
    the exhaustion of administrative remedies.” 
    28 U.S.C. § 2637
    (d). The court
    “generally takes a ‘strict view’ of the requirement that parties exhaust their
    administrative remedies[.]” Yangzhou Bestpak Gifts & Crafts Co. v. United
    States, 
    716 F.3d 1370
    , 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
    
    19 C.F.R. § 351.309
    (c)(2) requires that, “[t]he case brief must present all
    arguments that continue in the submitter’s view to be relevant to the . . . final
    determination or final results.” 
    19 C.F.R. § 351.309
    (c)(2). There are limited
    Consol. Court No. 22-00069                                                       Page 19
    exceptions to the exhaustion requirement. See Pakfood Pub. Co. v. Unites States,
    
    34 CIT 1122
    , 1145, 1147, 
    724 F. Supp. 2d 1327
    , 1351, 1352 (2010) (listing
    “futil[ity] for the party to raise its argument at the administrative level” and issues
    “fully considered by Commerce” as two generally recognized exceptions to the
    exhaustion doctrine); see also Holmes Prod. Corp. v. United States, 
    16 CIT 1101
    ,
    1104 (1992) (“[E]xhaustion may be excused if the issue was raised by another
    party, or if it is clear that the agency had an opportunity to consider it.”).
    The Court concludes that the limited exception to the exhaustion
    requirement applies here because even though Jianlong did not file an
    administrative case brief, Jianlong now seeks to raise an identical issue addressed
    in an administrative case brief filed by Consolidated Plaintiff Deosen, arguing that
    Commerce’s determination did not reasonably reflect the dumping margin assigned
    to the Separate Rate Respondents. See Jianlong’s Br. at 5–6. Incorporation by
    reference to another party’s administrative argument is among the exceptions this
    court has recognized to the exhaustion requirement. See Holmes Prod. Corp., 16
    CIT at 1104. The Court will allow Jianlong to proceed with its arguments before
    this Court.
    III.    Commerce’s Application of the Separate Rate
    Jianlong and Deosen argue that the separate rate of 77.04% assigned to the
    cooperating Separate Rate Respondents, based on the simple average of the
    Consol. Court No. 22-00069                                                  Page 20
    alternative facts available rate of 154.07% assigned to Meihua and the 0% rate
    assigned to Fufeng, is not reasonably reflective of the Separate Rate Respondents’
    potential dumping. Deosen’s Br. at 5–15; Jianlong’s Br. at 9–17. Defendant
    argues that the separate rate calculated by Commerce is reasonably reflective of
    potential dumping in light of the history of the administrative reviews and because
    Commerce assigned non-selected companies a rate equal to the simple average of
    the final rates assigned to Meihua and Fufeng pursuant to the relevant statutory
    framework. Def.’s Resp. Br. at 22–23 (citing Final IDM at 5; the Uruguay Round
    Agreement Act, H.R. Doc. No. 103-316 at 873 (1994), as reprinted in 1994
    U.S.C.C.A.N. 4040, 4201). Commerce applied the expected method and
    determined that the rate of 77.04%, based on the simple average of the alternative
    facts available rate of 154.07% assigned to Meihua and the 0% rate assigned to
    Fufeng, reasonably reflected the potential dumping margins. Final IDM at 4–7;
    Final Results, 87 Fed. Reg. at 7105.
    The Court is remanding Commerce’s application of adverse facts against
    Meihua due to Commerce’s failure to provide notice and an opportunity to cure
    any deficiencies under 19 U.S.C. § 1677m(d), and therefore does not reach the
    issue of Commerce’s calculation of the separate rate. The Court remands
    Commerce’s Final Results for further consideration or explanation regarding the
    Consol. Court No. 22-00069                                                   Page 21
    applicable rate for the Separate Rate Respondents based on any changes that
    Commerce may make to Meihua’s rate on remand.
    IV.    Commerce’s Determination Not to Rescind its Review of Deosen
    Deosen alleges that, “[o]ne of the Deosen plaintiffs, Deosen Biochemical
    Ltd., made no shipments during the [period of review] and timely submitted a No
    Shipment Certification. Only Deosen Biochemical (Ordos) Ltd. exported subject
    merchandise during the [period of review].” Deosen’s Br. at 15. Deosen argues
    that because Deosen Biochemical Ltd. made no shipments of xanthan gum during
    the period of review, Commerce’s refusal to rescind its review of Deosen
    Biochemical Ltd. was an abuse of discretion and was inconsistent with
    Commerce’s regulations. Deosen’s Br. at 15–16.
    Defendant argues that Commerce properly collapsed Deosen Biochemical
    (Ordos) Ltd. and Deosen Biochemical Ltd. into a single entity. Def.’s Resp. Br. at
    26–27 (citing 
    19 C.F.R. § 351.401
    (f)). Pursuant to 
    19 C.F.R. § 351.401
    (f),
    Commerce collapsed Deosen Biochemical (Ordos) Ltd. and Deosen Biochemical
    Ltd. in its original investigation of xanthan gum from China. Memo From USDOC
    to Office Director Pertaining to Interested Parties Respondent Selection at 2 n.5,
    PR 39. Commerce continued to treat the individual companies as a collapsed
    entity in this review. Final IDM at 8.
    Consol. Court No. 22-00069                                                      Page 22
    
    19 C.F.R. § 351.401
    (f) governs the treatment of affiliated producers in
    antidumping proceedings and provides:
    (1) In general. In an antidumping proceeding under this part,
    [Commerce] will treat two or more affiliated producers as a single
    entity where those producers have production facilities for similar
    or identical products that would not require substantial retooling of
    either facility in order to restructure manufacturing priorities and
    [Commerce] concludes that there is a significant potential for the
    manipulation of price or production.
    (2) Significant potential for manipulation. In identifying a significant
    potential for the manipulation of price or production, the factors
    [Commerce] may consider include:
    (i) The level of common ownership;
    (ii)The extent to which managerial employees or board members
    of one firm sit on the board of directors of an affiliated firm;
    and
    (iii) Whether operations are intertwined, such as through the
    sharing of sales information, involvement in production and
    pricing decisions, the sharing of facilities or employees, or
    significant transactions between the affiliated producers.
    
    19 C.F.R. § 351.401
    (f).
    
    19 C.F.R. § 351.213
    (d) provides in relevant part:
    (3) No shipments. [Commerce] may rescind an administrative review,
    in whole or only with respect to a particular exporter or producer, if
    [Commerce] concludes that, during the period covered by the
    review, there were no entries, exports, or sales of the subject
    merchandise, as the case may be.
    
    19 C.F.R. § 351.213
    (d)(3).
    Commerce’s regulations permit Commerce to treat two or more affiliated
    producers as a single entity under a “collapsing analysis” when those producers
    Consol. Court No. 22-00069                                                     Page 23
    have production facilities for similar or identical products that would not require
    substantial retooling of either facility in order to shift manufacturing priorities and
    Commerce concludes that there is a significant potential for manipulation of price
    or production. 
    19 C.F.R. § 351.401
    (f). In determining whether there is significant
    potential for manipulation, Commerce analyzes: (1) the level of common
    ownership, (2) the extent of managerial crossover between the affiliated firms, and
    (3) whether the affiliated firms’ operations are intertwined through information
    sharing, facilities, employee crossover, and production and pricing decisions. 
    Id.
    § 351.401(f)(2).
    Deosen argues that Commerce failed to conduct a collapsing analysis
    pursuant to 
    19 C.F.R. § 351.401
    (f), improperly rejected Deosen’s timely submitted
    No Shipment Certification, and should have rescinded its review of Deosen
    Biochemical Ltd. Deosen’s Br. at 15–16. Deosen alleges that it offered to submit
    additional documentation to show Commerce that Deosen Biochemical Ltd. should
    not have been identified as an exporter. 
    Id.
     The Court agrees with Deosen that
    there is no evidence on the record that Commerce conducted a collapsing analysis
    pursuant to 
    19 C.F.R. § 351.401
    (f) for the relevant period of review. The Court
    observes that apparently Commerce relied on the past collapsing of the two Deosen
    entities from the previous investigation, without considering whether any factors
    had changed during the relevant period of review.
    Consol. Court No. 22-00069                                                  Page 24
    The Court concludes that Commerce’s failure to conduct a collapsing
    analysis for the period of review was an abuse of discretion, particularly because
    Commerce rejected Deosen Biochemical Ltd.’s No Shipment Certification and its
    offer to submit additional documents demonstrating no shipments of xanthan gum
    during the period of review. The Court observes that Commerce’s error was
    further compounded by Commerce’s apparent determination that Customs data
    may have attributed shipments of subject merchandise to Deosen Biochemical Ltd.
    rather than Deosen Biochemical (Ordos) Ltd. because the two companies were
    “registered under the same company-specific case number because Commerce has
    treated the two companies as a single, collapsed entity in prior reviews.” Final
    IDM at 8. At the very least, the Court holds that Commerce should perform a
    collapsing analysis pursuant to 
    19 C.F.R. § 351.401
    (f) to reexamine the record
    evidence and determine whether Deosen Biochemical Ltd. was an exporter with
    any shipments during the period of review, whether Deosen Biochemical Ltd.
    should have been collapsed into a single entity with Deosen Biochemical (Ordos)
    Ltd., and whether Deosen Biochemical Ltd.’s review should have been rescinded.
    The Court remands this issue for Commerce to reconsider its determinations
    with respect to Deosen Biochemical Ltd. and Deosen Biochemical (Ordos) Ltd.
    Consol. Court No. 22-00069                                                     Page 25
    CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, the Court remands the Final Results.
    Accordingly, it is hereby
    ORDERED that the Final Results are remanded to Commerce to reconsider
    the application of adverse facts available to Meihua, the calculation of the separate
    rate, and whether Deosen Biochemical Ltd. and Deosen Biochemical (Ordos) Ltd.
    should be collapsed into a single entity consistent with this opinion; and it is
    further
    ORDERED that this case shall proceed according to the following schedule:
    (1)    Commerce shall file the remand determination on or before
    June 20, 2023;
    (2)    Commerce shall file the administrative record on or before July
    5, 2023;
    (3)    Comments in opposition to the remand determination shall be
    filed on or before August 4, 2023;
    Consol. Court No. 22-00069                                                Page 26
    (4)   Comments in support of the remand determination shall be filed
    on or before September 5, 2023; and
    (5)   The joint appendix shall be filed on or before October 6, 2023.
    /s/ Jennifer Choe-Groves
    Jennifer Choe-Groves, Judge
    Dated:     April 19, 2023
    New York, New York