Nature's Touch Frozen Foods (West) Inc. v. United States , 2023 CIT 82 ( 2023 )


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  •                                  Slip. Op. No. 23-82
    UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
    NATURE’S TOUCH FROZEN FOODS
    (WEST) INC.,
    Plaintiff,                       Before: Stephen Alexander Vaden,
    Judge
    v.
    Court No. 1:20-cv-00131
    UNITED STATES,
    Defendant.
    OPINION
    Granting in-part and denying in-part Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary
    Judgment and denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
    Dated: May 26, 2023
    John M. Peterson, Neville Peterson LLP, of New York, NY for Plaintiff. With him on
    the brief were Richard F. O’Neill and Patrick B. Klein.
    Jamie L. Shookman, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division,
    U.S. Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, for Defendant United States. With
    her on the brief were Justin R. Miller, Attorney-in-Charge, International Trade Field
    Office; Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General; and Patricia
    M. McCarthy, Director, Commercial Litigation Branch. Of counsel on the brief was
    Fariha B. Kabir, Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel, International Trade
    Litigation, U.S. Customs and Border Protection.
    Vaden, Judge: Plaintiff Nature’s Touch Frozen Foods (West) Inc. (Plaintiff
    or Nature’s Touch) brought this action contesting U.S. Customs and Border
    Protection’s (Customs) tariff classification of the subject merchandise, which are
    mixtures of frozen fruit, some of which contain frozen vegetable ingredients. In cross-
    Court No. 1:20-cv-00131                                                         Page 2
    motions for summary judgment, Nature’s Touch argues that the merchandise should
    be classified under Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS)
    subheading 2106.90.98 as “[f]ood preparations not otherwise specified or included:
    Other: Other; Other; Other; Other; Other,” while the United States (Defendant or the
    Government) argues for classification under various eight-digit provisions within
    HTSUS heading 0811 as “Fruit . . . frozen[.]” For the reasons stated below, Nature’s
    Touch’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED and the Government’s Cross-
    Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED IN-PART.
    BACKGROUND
    I.      Procedural Background
    This case concerns various frozen fruit mixture products that Nature’s Touch
    imported into the United States from Canada between June 6, 2018, and November
    21, 2018. Summons at 3–4, ECF No. 1. At liquidation, Customs classified the subject
    merchandise under heading 0811, HTSUS, which covers “Fruit and nuts, uncooked
    or cooked by steaming or boiling in water, frozen, whether or not containing added
    sugar or other sweetening matter.” 0811, HTSUS; Pl.’s Statement of Undisputed
    Material Facts (Pl.’s Facts) ¶¶ 11–24, ECF No. 28. Depending on the ingredients of
    the mixture, Customs classified the merchandise in liquidation under the following
    HTSUS    subheadings:          0811.90.10   (“Bananas   and   plantains”),   0811.90.20
    Court No. 1:20-cv-00131                                                                Page 3
    (“Blueberries”), 0811.90.52 (“Mangoes”), and 0811.90.80 (“Other”).1 Pl.’s Facts ¶¶ 11–
    24, ECF No. 28; Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (Def.’s
    Resp. Facts) ¶¶ 11–24, ECF No. 36. The relevant provisions and duty rates of HTSUS
    Chapter 8, which covers “Edible Fruit and Nuts; Peel of Citrus Fruit or Melons,” read:
    0811: Fruit and nuts, uncooked or cooked by steaming or boiling in
    water, frozen, whether or not containing added sugar or other
    sweetening matter:
    0811.10: Strawberries: 11.2%
    0811.20: Raspberries, blackberries, mulberries…4.5–9%
    0811.90: Other:
    0811.90.10: Bananas and plantains: 3.4%
    0811.90.20: Blueberries: Free
    0811.90.52: Mangoes: 10.9%
    0811.90.80: Other: 14.5%
    Nature’s Touch timely protested on October 30, 2019, claiming that the frozen
    fruit mixtures should instead be classified under subheading 2106.90.98, HTSUS, as
    “Food preparations not elsewhere specified or included: Other: Other; Other; Other;
    Other; Other.” 2106.90.98, HTSUS; Summons at 1–2, ECF No. 1. The relevant
    1 Although the Government in general argues in support of the HTSUS classifications used
    by Customs at liquidation, the Government seeks classification under a higher-duty provision
    than the one used at liquidation for two of Nature’s Touch’s products. See Def.’s Br. at 23,
    28, ECF No. 36. These are Organic Triple Berry with Kale (liquidated in subheading
    0811.90.52 at 10.9%, classification sought in 0811.90.80 at 14.5%) and a single entry of
    Blueberry Blitz in Entry No. MK8-5346590 (liquidated in subheading 0811.90.20 duty free,
    classification sought in 0811.90.80 at 14.5%). The Government notes that “due to the
    procedural posture of this case,” it will not seek to amend its answer to claim any duties owed;
    but rather it is “advancing the correct classification of [these products] in order to aid the
    Court in fulfilling its statutory mandate to classify the merchandise at issue under the correct
    provision of the tariff statute[.]” Id. at 23–24, n.7.
    Court No. 1:20-cv-00131                                                       Page 4
    provisions and duty rates of HTSUS Chapter 21, which covers “Miscellaneous Edible
    Preparations,” read:
    2106: Food preparations not elsewhere specified or included:
    2106.90: Other:
    Other:
    Other:
    Other:
    Other:
    2106.90.98:                     Other…6.4%
    Nature’s Touch’s protest further claimed that the merchandise was eligible for duty-
    free treatment under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
    Summons at 2, ECF No. 1.
    That protest was deemed denied on July 4, 2020, and Nature’s Touch filed a
    summons and complaint challenging Customs’ classification on July 15, 2020. Id. at
    1–2; Compl., ECF No. 5. Nature’s Touch later moved for summary judgment with an
    accompanying brief. See Pl.’s Memo in Supp. of Its Mot. for Summ. J. (Pl.’s Br.), ECF
    No. 28. The Government filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. Def.’s Memo
    in Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. and in Supp. of Def.’s Cross-Mot. for Summ. J.
    (Def.’s Br.), ECF No. 36. Thereafter, Nature’s Touch and the Government filed reply
    briefs in support of their Motions. See Pl.’s Reply Br. in Supp. of Its Mot. for Summ.
    J. (Pl.’s Reply), ECF No. 30; Def.’s Reply Memo in Furth. Supp. of Def.’s Cross-Mot.
    for Summ. J. (Def.’s Reply), ECF No. 31.
    The classification at issue was not the first time Customs had classified
    Nature’s Touch’s mixture products. In a prior ruling, HQ H307154, dated February
    Court No. 1:20-cv-00131                                                               Page 5
    7, 2020, Customs classified two such products, one consisting of 25% strawberry, 25%
    blueberry, 25% blackberry, and 25% raspberry and the other of 34% mango, 33%
    raspberry, and 33% cherry. See HQ H307154 at 4; see also Def.’s Br. at 24, ECF No.
    36.   There, Customs determined that both mixtures were described by HTSUS
    0811.90.80, as “Fruit . . . frozen: Other: Other” applying HTSUS General Rule of
    Interpretation 1, which requires that “classification shall be determined according to
    the terms of the headings[.]” See HQ H307154 at 4; GRI 1, HTSUS.
    However, for the merchandise at issue here, Customs changed its position.
    Rather than classify all of the merchandise as “Fruit . . . frozen: Other: Other,”
    Customs employed an alternative methodology and classified the mixtures into
    different subheadings depending on the ingredients in each mixture. See Def.’s Br.
    at 1–2, ECF No. 36; see also Def.’s Resp. Facts ¶¶ 11–24, ECF No. 36. In defending
    Customs’ classification, the Government explained that none of heading 0811’s
    subheadings described mixture products, including subheading 0811.90.80, HTSUS
    (“Fruit . . . frozen: Other: Other”). See Def.’s Br. at 18, 26, ECF No. 36.               The
    Government instead argues that each mixture should be classified by considering the
    subheadings that cover the mixture’s specific fruit ingredients and choosing the
    subheading that comes last in numerical order, applying HTSUS General Rule of
    Interpretation 3(c).2 See id. at 20–21, 27. The Government disavowed its prior
    2That methodology still classified certain products into HTSUS 0811.90.80 (“Fruit . . . frozen:
    Other: Other”) because, if a mixture contained an ingredient not enumerated by a
    Court No. 1:20-cv-00131                                                       Page 6
    classification methodology and wrote that HQ H307154 “employed an incorrect
    reasoning” when it determined that frozen fruit mixtures could be classified under
    HTSUS 0811.90.80 as “Fruit . . . frozen: Other: Other.” Def.’s Br. at 24, ECF No. 36.
    Nature’s Touch rejected both of these methodologies and instead argues that all the
    mixtures are described by the terms of 2106.90.98, HTSUS, covering “Food
    preparations not elsewhere specified or included: Other: Other: Other: Other: Other:
    Other.” Pl.’s Br. at 2–3, ECF No. 28.
    On February 16, 2023, the Court held a status conference and issued an Order
    requiring the parties to submit supplemental briefing. See Order, ECF No. 42. The
    Supplemental Briefing Order asked the parties to address whether all of the
    merchandise at issue could be classified under 0811.90.80, HTSUS (“Fruit . . . frozen:
    Other: Other”). The parties filed supplemental briefs in support of their positions,
    and both Nature’s Touch and the Government continue to argue that subheading
    0811.90.80, HTSUS, does not describe the mixtures. See Def.’s Supplemental Brief,
    ECF No. 44; Pl.’s Supplemental Brief, ECF No. 46.
    II.    Description of Subject Merchandise
    The following facts are taken from the parties’ Statements of Undisputed
    Material Facts or are otherwise on the record and undisputed.            The subject
    merchandise consists of fourteen frozen fruit mixture products, five of which also
    subheading, such as “peaches,” then “Other” became the ingredient subheading that came
    last in numerical order. See Def.’s Br. at 21, ECF No. 36.
    Court No. 1:20-cv-00131                                                       Page 7
    contain frozen vegetable ingredients. Pl.’s Facts ¶¶ 10–24, ECF No. 28; Def.’s Resp.
    Facts ¶¶ 10–24, ECF No. 36. Nature’s Touch produces the mixtures by importing
    fruits and vegetables from around the world to its Abbotsford, Canada facility, where
    they are cleaned, combined, and packaged for export to the United States. Pl.’s Facts
    ¶¶ 4–6, ECF No. 28; Def.’s Resp. Facts ¶¶ 4–6, ECF No. 36. With the exception of
    certain blueberries, all of the fruit and vegetables in the subject mixtures arrive at
    Nature’s Touch’s facility already cut and frozen. Defendant’s Statement of Additional
    Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 6, ECF No. 36; Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s 56.3
    Statement (Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s 56.3 Statement) ¶ 6, ECF No. 30. Consumers use the
    mixtures for a variety of purposes, such as to make smoothies, sauces, chutneys,
    punches, dips, baked goods, and fruit salads; or they may thaw and eat the mixtures
    directly. Pl.’s Facts ¶¶ 34, 45, ECF No. 28; Def.’s Resp. Facts ¶¶ 34, 45, ECF No. 36.
    However, “[n]ew applications for the products at issue may be developed based on
    customer usage,” and Nature’s Touch “does not know how a customer will ultimately
    use the products at issue.” Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s 56.3 Statement, ¶¶ 12–13, ECF No.
    30.
    The mixtures contain no ingredients other than frozen fruit and vegetables,
    and the specific combinations of fruit and vegetables within each product are as
    follows:3
    3See Defendant’s Statement of Additional Undisputed Material Facts ¶¶ 3–5, ECF No. 36;
    Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s 56.3 Statement ¶¶ 3–5, ECF No. 30. Plaintiff’s Response accepts
    Court No. 1:20-cv-00131                                                            Page 8
    All-Fruit Mixtures:
    (1)    Frozen Strawberry/Banana: 52% strawberry, 48% banana
    (2)    Frozen Berry Mix: 22% blueberry, 32% strawberry, 28% blackberry,
    18% raspberry
    (3)    Frozen Triple Berry: 34% blueberry, 33% blackberry, 33% raspberry
    (4)    Organic Mixed Berry: 35% strawberry, 25% blackberry, 25% blueberry,
    15% raspberry
    (5)    Organic Very Berry Burst:        30% strawberry, 30% blackberry, 30%
    blueberry, 10% raspberry
    (6)    Organic Strawberry/Blueberry/Mango: 34% strawberry, 33% blueberry,
    33% mango
    (7)    Organic Tropical Blend: 34% strawberry, 33% mango, 33% pineapple
    (8)    Antioxidant Blend Frozen:     30% strawberry, 20% cherry, 20%
    pomegranate, 15% blueberry, 15% raspberry
    (9)    Frozen Medley Mixed Fruit: 35% strawberry, 25% peach, 15%
    pineapple, 15% mango, 10% grapes
    Fruit-and-Vegetable Mixtures:
    (10)   Organic Green Mango Medley:          18% strawberry, 25% banana, 35%
    mango, 22% kale
    (11)   Organic Tropical Fruit and Greens: 46% pineapple, 37% mango, 8.5%
    spinach, 8.5% kale
    (12)   Organic Strawberry/Cherry/Kale: 34% strawberry, 33% cherry, 33%
    kale
    (13)   Organic Triple Berry with Kale: 27% blueberry, 20% blackberry, 23%
    apple, 15% raspberry, 15% kale
    Defendant’s statement of ingredient proportions for each product and notes that “proportions
    of products in mixtures are subject to occasional variations.” Id. ¶¶ 3-4.
    Court No. 1:20-cv-00131                                                         Page 9
    (14)   Blueberry Blitz: 40% blueberry, 20% blackberry, 25% apple, 15%
    butternut squash
    JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
    The parties have not disputed Nature’s Touch’s fulfillment of the prerequisites
    for initiating this action. See 
    28 U.S.C. § 2637
    (a). Because Nature’s Touch contests
    Customs’ denial of its protests against the tariff classification of its merchandise,
    jurisdiction is proper pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1581
    (a) (“The Court of International
    Trade shall have exclusive jurisdiction of any civil action commenced to contest the
    denial of a protest, in whole or in part …”). The Court reviews Customs’ denial of
    Nature’s Touch’s protest de novo. See Rheem Metalurgica S/A v. United States, 
    951 F. Supp. 241
    , 246 (CIT 1996), aff’d, 
    160 F.3d 1357
     (Fed. Cir. 1998).          Although
    Customs’ decision is presumed correct and “[t]he burden of proving otherwise shall
    rest upon the party challenging such decision,” the Court’s “duty is to find the correct
    result.” 
    28 U.S.C. § 2639
    (a)(1); Jarvis Clark Co. v. United States, 
    733 F.2d 873
    , 878
    (Fed. Cir. 1984) (Wisdom, J.).
    Rule 56 of the United States Court of International Trade provides that
    summary judgment may be granted “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
    interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
    there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
    to judgment as a matter of law.” USCIT Rule 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
    
    477 U.S. 317
    , 322 (1986) (interpreting the analogous provision of the Federal Rules
    Court No. 1:20-cv-00131                                                      Page 10
    of Civil Procedure).    In a tariff classification dispute, summary judgment is
    appropriate where “there is no genuine dispute as to the nature of the merchandise
    and the classification turns on the proper meaning and scope of the relevant tariff
    provisions.” Deckers Outdoor Corp. v. United States, 
    714 F.3d 1363
    , 1371 (Fed. Cir.
    2013) (citing Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. United States, 
    148 F.3d 1363
    , 1366 (Fed. Cir.
    1998)). In ascertaining whether a genuine, material issue of fact exists, a Court
    reviews evidence submitted, in this case from the Statements of Undisputed Material
    Facts, drawing all inferences against the moving party. See Matsushita Elecs. Indus.
    Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 
    475 U.S. 574
    , 587 (1986). The movant bears the burden of
    demonstrating that there exists no genuine issue of material fact that would warrant
    a trial. See, e.g., Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 
    398 U.S. 144
    , 157 (1970). At summary
    judgment, “the judge’s function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine
    the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.”
    Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 
    477 U.S. 242
    , 249 (1986); see also Ford Motor Co. v. United
    States, 
    157 F.3d 849
    , 854 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
    DISCUSSION
    I.    Legal Framework for Tariff Classification Under the HTSUS
    The HTSUS is organized into headings, each of which contains one or more
    subheadings. The headings describe general categories of merchandise, and the
    subheadings “provide a more particularized segregation of goods within each
    category.” Orlando Food Corp. v. United States, 
    140 F.3d 1437
    , 1439 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
    Court No. 1:20-cv-00131                                                        Page 11
    The Court follows a strict order of operations when deciding HTSUS classification
    cases, which is set out in the General Rules of Interpretation (GRIs) of the HTSUS.
    The first task is to classify the merchandise into the correct HTSUS heading by
    construing the language of the headings. 
    Id. at 1440
    . This is done by applying GRI
    1, which provides that “classification shall be determined according to the terms of
    the headings and any relative section or chapter notes.” GRI 1, HTSUS. A product
    is classifiable under GRI 1 if it “is described in whole by a single classification
    heading” of the HTSUS. La Crosse Tech., Ltd. v. United States, 
    723 F.3d 1353
    , 1358
    (Fed. Cir. 2013) (quoting CamelBak Prods., LLC v. United States, 
    649 F.3d 1361
    , 1364
    (Fed. Cir. 2011)). If no heading describes the product in whole, the Court may proceed
    to GRIs 2 through 5, in order, only proceeding to the next GRI if the previous GRI
    cannot classify the product. See Mita Copystar Am. v. United States, 
    160 F.3d 710
    ,
    712 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Wilton Indus. v. United States, 
    741 F.3d 1263
    , 1266 (Fed. Cir.
    2013). “[I]f the proper heading can be determined under GRI 1, the court is not to
    look to the subsequent GRIs.” R.T. Foods, Inc. v. United States, 
    757 F.3d 1349
    , 1353
    (Fed. Cir. 2014).
    GRI 2 provides that the classification of “goods consisting of more than one
    material or substance” shall be according to the principles of GRI 3. GRI 2, HTSUS.
    Under GRI 3(a), goods are classified into “[t]he heading which provides the most
    specific description”; but if multiple headings “each refer to part only of the materials
    or substances contained in [a mixed good],” they are regarded as equally specific and
    Court No. 1:20-cv-00131                                                     Page 12
    the Court moves to GRI 3(b) by classifying the good according to the material that
    gives the good its “essential character.” GRI 3, HTSUS. If no essential character can
    be found, then the good is classified pursuant to GRI 3(c), “under the heading which
    occurs last in numerical order among those which equally merit consideration.” 
    Id.
    After using the GRIs to determine the correct heading, the Court determines the
    correct HTSUS subheading using GRI 6, which directs that GRIs 1 through 5 be re-
    applied at the subheading level. GRI 6, HTSUS. “Only after determining that a
    product is classifiable under the heading should the court look to the subheadings to
    find the correct classification for the merchandise.” Orlando Food, 
    140 F.3d at 1440
    .
    “Absent contrary legislative intent, HTSUS terms are to be construed
    according to their common and commercial meanings, which are presumed to be the
    same.” Carl Zeiss, Inc. v. United States, 
    195 F.3d 1375
    , 1379 (Fed. Cir. 1999). The
    common meaning of a tariff term is a question of law to be decided by the Court. E.M.
    Chems. v. United States, 
    920 F.2d 910
    , 912 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (citing Stewart-Warner
    Corp. v. United States, 
    748 F.2d 663
    , 664–65 (Fed. Cir. 1984)). When a tariff term is
    not clearly defined, the Court “may consult lexicographic and scientific authorities,
    dictionaries, and other reliable information” or may rely on its “own understanding
    of the terms used.” Baxter Healthcare Corp. v. United States, 
    182 F.3d 1333
    , 1337–
    38 (Fed. Cir. 1999). The Court may also consult the Explanatory Notes for the
    Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System, which are maintained by
    the World Customs Organization. Although not legally binding, the Explanatory
    Court No. 1:20-cv-00131                                                      Page 13
    Notes “are generally indicative of the proper interpretation of a tariff provision.”
    Degussa Corp. v. United States, 
    508 F.3d 1044
    , 1047 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing Motorola
    Inc. v. United States, 
    436 F.3d 1357
    , 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).
    II.   Classification of the Subject Merchandise
    A.     Summary
    The nine all-fruit mixtures are properly classified into heading 0811, HTSUS
    pursuant to GRI 1 because the term “Fruit . . . frozen” describes these products in
    whole. The common meaning of “fruit” includes mixed fruit — as in the phrase “a
    bowl of fruit” — so that it is unnecessary for the heading to enumerate fruit mixtures
    in order to cover them. Nature’s Touch’s arguments to the contrary are improper
    because they require inferring from the lack of a subheading enumerating mixtures
    within 0811 that the heading does not cover mixtures, in violation of binding
    precedent that subheadings may not be considered until after the proper heading is
    chosen.
    However, the term “Fruit . . . frozen” does not describe the five mixtures that
    contain vegetable ingredients because these products contain features substantially
    in excess of those within the common meaning of the term. This requires the Court
    to consider whether Nature’s Touch’s preferred heading, 2106, HTSUS (“Food
    preparations not otherwise specified or included”) describes the fruit-and-vegetable
    mixtures pursuant to GRI 1. The Court concludes that it does not. It first finds that
    food preparations must undergo processing additional to what is already inherent to
    Court No. 1:20-cv-00131                                                      Page 14
    the term “food” to avoid rendering “preparations” mere surplusage. The Court then
    considers whether cutting, freezing, and combining fruits and vegetables is sufficient
    to turn these ingredients into food preparations.     It holds that these steps are
    insufficient because the Explanatory Note to heading 2106, HTSUS operates to
    exclude mixtures of cut fruits and vegetables from the heading if they are consumed
    as such and because both case law and the structure of the HTSUS distinguish
    between freezing and preparation. Having eliminated the candidate GRI 1 headings,
    the Court instead classifies the fruit-and-vegetable mixtures into heading 0811 under
    GRI 3(b) because it finds that the fruit content predominates and supplies the
    essential character of these mixtures.
    Finally, all of the subject mixtures are properly classified into the basket
    subheading 0811.90.80, “Other,” pursuant to GRI 1. The Court rejects the arguments
    of both parties that the subheading excludes mixtures because it does not explicitly
    enumerate them and instead finds that the plain meaning of “Other” describes
    products, including the subject merchandise, that cannot be described in whole by the
    terms of the other subheadings within the proper heading. In seeking to require that
    basket subheadings specifically enumerate mixtures in order to include them, the
    Government adopts an interpretive method at odds with both the plain meaning of
    “Other” and with its own position that such enumeration is unnecessary for heading
    0811 to cover mixtures. The Court declines the parties’ invitation to read exclusions
    Court No. 1:20-cv-00131                                                         Page 15
    into tariff provisions that are absent from their text or to apply different
    interpretative rules when construing subheadings rather than headings.
    B.     Application of the GRIs to Determine the Correct Heading
    The threshold issue in this case is whether the merchandise is properly
    classified in HTSUS heading 0811 as “Fruit . . . frozen,” because Nature’s Touch’s
    proposed alternative classification, HTSUS heading 2106, is a basket provision that
    applies to “Food preparations not elsewhere specified or included.” 2106, HTSUS
    (emphasis added). Classification of imported merchandise in a basket provision, like
    2106, “is only appropriate if there is no tariff category that covers the merchandise
    more specifically.” R.T. Foods, 
    757 F.3d at 1354
     (quoting Rollerblade, Inc. v. United
    States, 
    116 F. Supp. 2d 1247
    , 1251 (CIT 2000), aff’d, 
    282 F.3d 1349
     (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
    Therefore, the Court first will apply GRI 1 to determine whether the merchandise
    can be classified as “Fruit . . . frozen” under heading 0811. The Court considers the
    nine all-fruit mixtures separately from the five fruit-and-vegetable mixtures.
    1.     The All-Fruit Mixtures
    Under GRI 1, the Court first asks whether the nine all-fruit mixtures are
    “described in whole” by the terms of heading 0811 — that is, whether they are “Fruit
    . . . frozen[.]” CamelBak Prods., 
    649 F.3d at 1364
    ; see 0811, HTSUS. Nature’s Touch
    claims that they are not because the term “fruit,” as used in the heading, should be
    read to refer only to individual types of fruit and to exclude mixed fruits. See Pl.’s Br.
    at 12, ECF No. 28. Nature’s Touch concedes that heading 0811, taken by itself, could
    Court No. 1:20-cv-00131                                                       Page 16
    potentially classify the mixtures. Oral Arg. Tr. 17:18–19, ECF No. 39 (Peterson: “I
    mean, we concede that 0811 is potentially applicable to our product.”). However,
    Nature’s Touch claims that the heading should be construed in light of its
    subheadings, which do not specifically provide for mixtures and list only individual
    types of fruit, such as “Blueberries” or “Mangoes.” See Pl.’s Br. at 11–12, ECF No. 28;
    see also Oral Arg. Tr. 7:4–8, ECF No. 39 (Peterson: “[I]f you look at heading 0811, you
    will see that they provide for fruits.     And they provide in various eight-digit
    subheadings for individually named fruit. At no point does that provision contain a
    mixtures provision.”). Nature’s Touch contrasts this with other HTSUS headings and
    subheadings that expressly cover “mixtures” and infers that the omission of the term
    “mixtures” from heading 0811 and its subheadings must be read as intentional. See
    Pl.’s Br. at 13–14, ECF No. 28.        For example, Nature’s Touch cites several
    subheadings in Chapter 7 HTSUS that specifically provide for vegetable mixtures.
    See Id. at 13 (noting, among others, subheading 0710.90 providing for “[m]ixtures of
    vegetables.”). Nature’s Touch therefore concludes that, “[w]here the HTSUS intends
    to include mixtures of frozen food in tariff classifications, the plain language of the
    headings clearly provides for mixtures” and that “frozen fruit mixtures do not meet
    the plain language requirements for classification in Heading 0811, HTSUS.” Id. at
    12-13.
    Court No. 1:20-cv-00131                                                              Page 17
    The Government, however, argues that heading 0811 is an eo nomine provision
    — that is, one that “describes the merchandise by name, not by use.”4 Carl Zeiss, 
    195 F.3d at 1379
    . Under well-established case law, eo nomine provisions are interpreted
    to “include[] all forms of the named article, even improved forms,” and as long as the
    product does not “possess features substantially in excess of those within the common
    meaning of the term,” it will be covered by the provision that names it. CamelBak
    Prods., 
    649 F.3d at
    1364–65 (citing Casio, Inc. v. United States, 
    73 F.3d 1095
    , 1098
    (Fed. Cir. 1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Government notes that the
    common meaning of the term “fruit” includes mixtures of different fruits, as in the
    phrase “a bowl of fruit.” Def.’s Br. at 13, ECF No. 36. The Government therefore
    concludes that the term “Fruit . . . frozen” describes the all-fruit mixtures in whole.
    The Government is correct. Heading 0811 is an eo nomine provision that
    describes frozen fruit by name and includes mixtures of frozen fruit. Although the
    term “fruit” is not discussed in either the HTSUS chapter notes or the Explanatory
    Notes, the common meaning of the term “fruit” embraces mixed fruits and does not
    imply a limitation to individual types of fruit. That fact should be plain to anyone
    4 Nature’s Touch’s briefs do not dispute that heading 0811 is an eo nomine provision. See,
    e.g., Pl.’s Resp. at 8, ECF No. 30 (arguing that “[a]n eo nomine tariff classification does not
    embrace mixtures.”). At oral argument, Nature’s Touch abandoned this posture and
    attempted to argue that the term “fruit” in heading 0811 was not an eo nomine term but
    rather a “general description term.” Oral Arg. Tr. 14:14–15, ECF No. 39. Because Nature’s
    Touch failed to raise this issue in its briefs, the argument is forfeited. See McIntosh v.
    Department of Defense, 
    53 F.4th 630
    , 641 (Fed. Cir. 2022). Were it not forfeited, the Court,
    as stated above, confirms the provision is an eo nomine term.
    Court No. 1:20-cv-00131                                                        Page 18
    who has kept a “bowl of fruit” in their kitchen, ordered a “fruit plate” in a restaurant,
    or navigated to the “frozen fruit” aisle in a grocery store and selected one of Nature’s
    Touch’s mixtures. Dictionary definitions of “fruit” confirm that the term has a plural
    meaning that denotes, roughly, “fruits in general.” See, e.g., Fruit, Oxford English
    Dictionary (2d ed. 1989) (“Vegetable products in general, that are fit to be used as
    food     by      men       and      animals.”);      Fruit,     CollinsDictionary.com,
    https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/fruit (last visited May 8,
    2023) (noting that “[t]he plural form is usually fruit, but can also be fruits”); Fruit,
    American Heritage Dictionary (3d ed. 1996) (plural “fruit or fruits”); Fruit, Webster’s
    New International Dictionary (2d ed. 1956) (“Collectively, a dish, a selection, a diet,
    of fruits”). The Court concludes that the common meaning of the term “fruit,” as used
    in heading 0811, refers generally to fruit of all kinds and is not limited to individual
    fruit. It therefore includes mixed fruit.
    Nature’s Touch’s method of construing the language of the heading in light of
    its subheadings impermissibly scrambles the order of operations for tariff
    classification. The Court must determine the correct heading “without reference to
    [its] subheadings . . . . ” R.T. Foods, 
    757 F.3d at 1353
    ; see also Orlando Food, 
    140 F.3d at 1440
     (“Only after determining that a product is classifiable under the heading
    should the court look to the subheadings to find the correct classification for the
    merchandise.”). Once the correct heading has been determined, the Court continues
    its analysis by choosing a subheading contained within that heading. It may not hop
    Court No. 1:20-cv-00131                                                       Page 19
    out of the heading and restart the process because it believes the available
    subheadings are inadequate, as Nature’s Touch suggests. See Oral Arg. Tr. 22:22–
    23:2, ECF No. 39 (Peterson: “Now, let’s say we’ve gone through 0811. There is no
    provision in there prescribing a rate of duty for mixtures of frozen fruit . . . you are
    commanded by [GRI 1] to see if there is any other way, any other provision that
    classifies these goods at the GRI 1 level.”). Rather, “[o]nce the Court chooses the
    proper heading, the Court is limited to choosing a subheading only from within the
    proper heading, i.e., the subheadings appearing under other headings become
    irrelevant for the classification of the merchandise at issue.” Witex, U.S.A., Inc. v.
    United States, 
    353 F. Supp. 2d 1310
    , 1315-16 (CIT 2004).
    Nature’s Touch argues that, unless the plain language of the heading
    specifically provides for mixtures, the heading cannot cover them. Pl.’s Br. at 13, ECF
    No. 28. This interpretive method requires ignoring binding precedent that headings
    must be chosen without any reference to subheadings. To take Nature’s Touch’s own
    example, subheading 0710.90, providing for frozen mixed vegetables, is contained
    within heading 0710, which itself makes no mention of mixtures and provides only
    for “Vegetables . . . frozen.” 0710, HTSUS. They are organized in the HTSUS as:
    0710: Vegetables (uncooked or cooked by steaming or boiling in water),
    frozen:
    0710.90: Mixtures of vegetables
    Because the subheading cannot inform the interpretation of the heading, a frozen
    mixed vegetable product could only be properly classified in heading 0710 if it is
    Court No. 1:20-cv-00131                                                       Page 20
    interpreted to include mixtures despite its text not expressly providing for them.
    Nature’s Touch is therefore incorrect when it states that “[w]here the HTSUS intends
    to include mixtures of frozen food in tariff classifications, the plain language of the
    headings clearly provides for mixtures.” Pl.’s Br. at 13, ECF No. 28. Rather, as the
    Government correctly argues, “a broad eo nomine term can cover mixtures, even if
    not explicitly stated in the text.” Def.’s Br. at 16, ECF No. 36.
    Nature’s Touch contends that an eo nomine provision cannot be expanded “to
    include something mixed or joined with the named article, which is not that named
    article,” noting that an eo nomine provision for strawberries will include all forms of
    strawberries but not a mixture of strawberries and blueberries. Pl.’s Reply at 8, 9,
    ECF No. 30. This argument is unavailing where all of the articles are themselves
    frozen fruit.   A mixture of frozen strawberries and frozen blueberries does not
    “possess features substantially in excess of those within the common meaning” of the
    terms of heading 0811 — it is frozen fruit. Casio, 
    73 F.3d at 1098
     (quoting United
    Carr Fastener Corp. v. United States, 54 CCPA 89, 91 (1967)) (internal quotation
    marks omitted). Because the nine all-fruit frozen mixture products are described in
    whole by the term “Fruit . . . frozen,” they are classified in heading 0811 by operation
    of GRI 1.
    Court No. 1:20-cv-00131                                                       Page 21
    2.     The Fruit-and-Vegetable Mixtures
    (a) Application of GRI 1
    The Court next must determine whether the remaining five mixture products,
    which contain both fruit and vegetable ingredients, are described in whole by the
    term “Fruit . . . frozen[.]” Pl.’s Facts ¶¶ 11–24, ECF No. 28; Def.’s Resp. Facts ¶¶ 11–
    24, ECF No. 36. The Court finds that they are not; therefore, GRI 1 cannot classify
    them into heading 0811. The Court is mindful that a product may contain materials
    that are not named by an eo nomine provision and still be classified into that provision
    under GRI 1 as long as those materials do not trigger a “change in identity” of the
    product. CamelBak Prods., 
    649 F.3d at 1365
    . To determine whether a change in
    identity has occurred, the Court asks whether the product contains features
    substantially in excess of those within the common meaning of the term “Fruit . . .
    frozen.” See Casio, 
    73 F.3d at 1098
    . The Court may look to a variety of factors,
    including commercial factors such as the marketing of the product in question. See
    CamelBak Prods., 
    649 F.3d at 1369
     (finding that the products contained features
    substantially in excess of “backpacks,” in part, because they “are commercially
    known, advertised and sold as ‘hydration packs.’”).
    Here, the Court finds that the fruit-and-vegetable mixtures contain features
    substantially in excess of frozen fruit. In addition to comprising between 15% and
    33% of the mixtures’ total content by weight, the vegetable content of these mixtures
    forms a significant part of the products’ commercial identity.         Nature’s Touch
    Court No. 1:20-cv-00131                                                              Page 22
    references the vegetable ingredients in the names of four of the five products and
    prominently features vegetables on the packaging of at least four of those products.
    Pl.’s Facts ¶¶ 14, 16, 19, 21, ECF No. 28; Def.’s Resp. Facts ¶¶ 14, 16, 19, 21, ECF
    No. 36 (referencing product names “Organic Green Mango Medley,” “Organic Tropical
    Fruit and Greens,” “Organic Strawberry/Cherry/Kale,” and “Organic Triple Berry
    with Kale”);5 Pl.’s Br. at Ex. D, ECF No. 28 (depicting the retail packaging for all
    products except “Organic Tropical Fruit and Greens”).6 The vegetable ingredients
    are therefore substantially in excess of frozen fruit, and the mixtures are not
    classifiable through GRI 1 into an eo nomine provision for “Fruit . . . frozen[.]”
    At this point, the Government argues that the fruit-and-vegetable mixtures
    should be classified as “Fruit . . . frozen” using a GRI 3(b) essential character analysis.
    See Def.’s Br. at 25–26, ECF No. 36. But GRI 3 may only be reached if the terms of
    all available headings do not describe the product, eliminating all GRI 1 possibilities.
    See Mita Copystar, 
    160 F.3d at 712
     (“As GRI 1 expressly provides, the other GRI
    provisions may be consulted only if the headings and notes ‘do not otherwise require’
    5  Plaintiff and Defendant both reference a “Blueberry Blitz” product containing 15%
    butternut squash, a vegetable ingredient. Pl.’s Facts ¶ 15, ECF No. 28; Def.’s Resp. Facts ¶
    15, ECF No. 36. Although the vegetable content is not referenced in the name of the product,
    the Court nonetheless finds that this content is prominently displayed in the product’s
    marketing and is significant enough to render the ingredients substantially in excess of fruit.
    See Pl.’s Br. at Ex. D, ECF No. 28 (demonstrating that butternut squash is featured on the
    product’s packaging).
    6 At oral argument, the parties stipulated that Exhibit D was an accurate reflection of the
    products’ retail packaging. Oral Arg. Tr. 5:16–6:2, ECF No. 39; see also Def.’s Resp. Facts ¶
    7, ECF No. 36 (accepting same).
    Court No. 1:20-cv-00131                                                        Page 23
    a particular classification.”) (quoting GRI 1, HTSUS). The Court must therefore ask
    whether these mixtures are described by the terms of heading 2106, “Food
    preparations not otherwise specified or included.” 2106, HTSUS. The Court holds
    that they are not.
    Because it is undisputed that the mixtures at issue are “food,” the Court’s
    inquiry turns on the meaning of “preparations” as used in heading 2106. “The term
    ‘preparation’ is not defined in the HTSUS or the General Rules of Interpretation.”
    BASF Corp. v. United States, 
    29 C.I.T. 681
    , 691 (2005). The Federal Circuit has found
    that “[i]nherent in the term ‘preparation’ is the notion that the object involved is
    destined for a specific use.” Orlando Food, 
    140 F.3d at
    1441 (citing the Oxford
    English Dictionary (2d ed. 1989) definition of “preparation” as “a substance specially
    prepared, or made up for its appropriate use or application, e.g. as food or medicine,
    or in the arts or sciences.”). However, for the purposes of the HTSUS, use as food is
    not, by itself, sufficient to turn a product into a “food preparation.” “Products are not
    classifiable under heading 2106, HTSUS, merely because they are specifically made
    for use in food.” Mondelez Global LLC v. United States, 
    253 F. Supp. 3d 1329
    , 1332
    (CIT 2017) (finding that an article must be both “food” and a “preparation”). For a
    product to qualify as a “food preparation,” it must undergo processing additional to
    what is already inherent in the term “food,” otherwise the term “preparation” would
    become mere surplusage. “It is our duty ‘to give effect, if possible, to every clause and
    word of a statute[.]’” United States v. Menasche, 
    348 U.S. 528
    , 538–39 (1955) (quoting
    Court No. 1:20-cv-00131                                                              Page 24
    Montclair v. Ramsdell, 
    107 U.S. 147
    , 152 (1883)).             Nature’s Touch is therefore
    incorrect when it argues that the mixtures are food preparations because they are
    “specially prepared for multiple appropriate uses and applications as food.” Pl.’s Br.
    at 18, ECF No. 28.       Nature’s Touch is also incorrect when it attempts to read
    “preparation” out of the heading entirely by arguing that “[t]here is no required,
    minimum or mandated type of ‘preparation’ required for a product to be classified
    under heading 2106, HTSUS.” Pl.’s Reply at 14–15, ECF No. 30. The Court declines
    to read “food preparation” as “food.”
    Nature’s Touch emphasizes the many processing operations it performs on the
    mixtures, describing such activities as recipe design, cleaning, sorting, inspection,
    packaging, and readying for importation and sale as “preparation.” Pl.’s Br. at 5, 19–
    21, ECF No. 28. Yet recipe design is product development, not a step to prepare or
    process food. See Def.’s Br. at 36–37, ECF No. 36. The other operations are common
    to all commercial food products, which must necessarily be cleaned, sorted, inspected,
    packed, and readied for sale. See id. at 34. Because the Court is compelled to read
    “preparation” as requiring more than what is already inherent to “food,” these steps
    are insufficient to turn Nature’s Touch’s mixtures into food preparations. Rather,
    fruit and vegetable ingredients undergo three processing steps that turn them into
    Nature’s Touch’s unique products: cutting,7 freezing, and combining. See Pl.’s Br. at
    7 Nature’s Touch refers to ingredients being “reduced in size” and offers the example of
    “chopped pineapples or melons.” Pl.’s Br. at 4, ECF No. 28; see also Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s 56.3
    Court No. 1:20-cv-00131                                                               Page 25
    4–5, ECF No. 28; Def.’s Resp. Facts ¶ 5–6, ECF No. 36; see also Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s
    56.3 Statement ¶ 5–8, ECF No. 30 (recounting processing steps and agreeing that
    “[o]nce frozen, the individual pieces of fruit in the products undergo no further change
    in character prior to the products’ retail sale.”).         The Court therefore considers
    whether these operations are sufficient to create a “food preparation” within the
    meaning of HTSUS heading 2106.
    The Government argues that they are not, pointing out that the Explanatory
    Note to heading 2106 lists exemplar products that “require significant processing
    beyond simply mixing fresh food ingredients.” Def.’s Br. at 30, ECF No. 36. Although
    the Explanatory Note does not expressly define “preparation,” it does list exemplars
    of “food preparations” that fall within the heading.8 See Explanatory Note 21.06 –
    Food preparations not elsewhere specified or included. The qualities shared by such
    exemplar products may be used by courts to derive the meaning of the HTSUS
    heading. See, e.g., Schlumberger Tech. Corp. v. United States, 
    845 F.3d 1158
    , 1165-
    Statement ¶ 6, ECF No. 30 (agreeing that “all of the fruit and vegetables in the products at
    issue arrive at plaintiff’s packaging facility already cut and frozen.”).
    8 Explanatory Note 21.06 sets forth two categories of food preparations covered by heading
    2106, but neither supplies a definition of the term “preparation.” They are:
    (A) Preparations for use, either directly or after processing (such as cooking, dissolving
    or boiling in water, milk, etc.), for human consumption.
    (B) Preparations consisting wholly or partly of foodstuffs, used in the making of
    beverages or food preparations for human consumption. The heading includes
    preparations consisting of mixtures of chemicals (organic acids, calcium salts, etc.)
    with foodstuffs (flour, sugar, milk powder, etc.), for incorporation in food
    preparations either as ingredients or to improve some of their characteristics
    (appearance, keeping qualities, etc.)
    Court No. 1:20-cv-00131                                                        Page 26
    66 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (finding that the products listed by the Explanatory Note for a
    heading covering “ceramic wares” all had “definite forms” and because the granulated
    bauxite in question “does not have a definite form, it cannot fall within that Heading’s
    terms.”). The Government is correct that most of these exemplar products require
    significant processing, such as “Flavouring powders for making beverages,” “Protein
    hydrolysates consisting mainly of a mixture of amino-acids and sodium chloride,” and
    “Edible tablets with a basis of natural or artificial perfumes.” Explanatory Note 21.06
    (2), (6), (8). However, certain exemplar products do not indicate on their face whether
    or not they require significant processing. See, e.g., Explanatory Note 21.06 (5)
    (listing “Natural honey enriched with bees’ royal jelly”). The Court therefore will not
    attempt a nebulous inquiry into the intensity or significance of the processing a
    product must undergo to become a food preparation but rather will look to the way
    the processing steps specific to Nature’s Touch’s products — cutting, freezing, and
    combining fruits and vegetables — are treated in the HTSUS, the Explanatory Notes,
    and case law.
    The Explanatory Note to heading 2106 excludes mixtures of cut fruits and
    vegetables from heading 2106 if they are fit for consumption “as such.” Explanatory
    Note 21.06 (15) describes an exemplar food preparation consisting of:
    Mixtures of plants, parts of plants, seeds or fruit (whole,
    cut, crushed, ground or powdered) of species falling in
    different Chapters (e.g. Chapters 7, 9, 11, 12) or of different
    species falling in heading 12.11, not consumed as such, but
    Court No. 1:20-cv-00131                                                       Page 27
    of a kind used either directly for flavouring beverages or for
    preparing extracts for the manufacture of beverages.
    Explanatory Note 21.06 (15) (emphasis added). The Explanatory Note’s exclusion of
    plant or fruit mixtures that can be consumed independently reflects a specific intent
    to remove products similar to the mixtures at issue from heading 2106. See Pl.’s Resp.
    to Def.’s 56.3 Statement ¶ 11, ECF No. 30 (agreeing that consumers “eat [the
    mixtures] directly”). The Court therefore concludes that cutting and combining fruits
    and vegetables is insufficient to turn these ingredients into a “food preparation.” If
    it were, the drafters of the Explanatory Notes would not have bothered to insert
    language prohibiting the application of heading 2106 to such mixtures.
    The Court is left to determine whether freezing an otherwise excluded mixture
    of cut fruits and vegetables turns it into a “food preparation.”          The Court is
    unpersuaded. Case law and the HTSUS distinguish between “prepared” foods and
    “frozen” foods. In Frosted Fruit Products Co. v. United States, 
    18 Cust. Ct. 119
     (1947),
    the Customs Court held that frozen guavas that had been trimmed, cleaned, and
    packed in boxes “are not ‘prepared,’ in a tariff sense” and declined to classify them as
    “guavas prepared or preserved.” 
    Id. at 121
    . That holding has been repeatedly
    extended. See Interocean Chem. & Minerals Corp. v. United States, 
    13 C.I.T. 449
    , 453
    (1989) (“[I]t has been held that freezing, being a temporary preservation[,] is neither
    a preparation nor a preservation for tariff purposes.”); see also Crawfish Processors
    Alliance v. United States, 
    30 C.I.T. 639
    , 645 (2006) (noting that “Frosted Fruit made
    Court No. 1:20-cv-00131                                                       Page 28
    it clear that more is necessary than freezing to make something prepared or
    preserved.”). This is reflected in the structure of the HTSUS. For example, Chapter
    20, HTSUS covers “Preparations of vegetables, fruit, nuts or other parts of plants.”
    The chapter excludes fruits and vegetables that have been “prepared or preserved by
    the processes specified in chapter 7, 8, or 11.” Ch. 20, Note 1(a), HTSUS. Chapters
    7 and 8 contain frozen fruit and vegetables; therefore, Chapter 20 should exclude
    them if the HTSUS considers freezing a process to prepare or preserve. Yet Chapter
    20 is filled with frozen products — for instance heading 2008, which covers “Other
    vegetables prepared or preserved otherwise than by vinegar or acetic acid, frozen[.]”
    2008, HTSUS. The HTSUS therefore considers whether a product is frozen to be
    separate from whether it is prepared or preserved. See R.T. Foods, 
    757 F.3d at
    1356–
    57 (making the same observation concerning vegetables of Chapter 7).
    Nor do the fruit-and-vegetable mixtures satisfy the test offered by Orlando
    Food, which found that “[i]nherent in the term ‘preparation’ is the notion that the
    object involved is destined for a specific use.” 
    140 F.3d at 1441
     (classifying tomato
    sauce base in heading for “sauces and preparations therefor”).           The parties’
    Statements of Undisputed Material Facts, which bind the Court on summary
    judgment, provide that (1) all of the products at issue “can be used for many purposes”
    and may be “eat[en] directly,” (2) “[n]ew applications for the products at issue may be
    developed based on customer usage,” and (3) Nature’s Touch “seeks to provide
    customers with a wide range of possible end uses for its products” but “does not know
    Court No. 1:20-cv-00131                                                             Page 29
    how a customer will ultimately use the products at issue.” Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s 56.3
    Statement, ¶¶ 9–13, ECF No. 30. Products that “can be used for many purposes” are
    not “destined for a specific use.” See Orlando Food, 
    140 F.3d at 1441
    .
    The fruit-and-vegetable mixtures therefore cannot be described as “food
    preparations” within the meaning of the HTSUS, the Explanatory Notes, or case law.
    Because fruit-and-vegetable mixtures that are consumed as such are excluded from
    heading 2106 by Explanatory Note 21.06 (15) and because freezing is distinguished
    from preparation by both the HTSUS and case law, the Court holds that Nature’s
    Touch’s mixtures of frozen fruits and vegetables are not “food preparations” within
    the meaning of heading 2106.
    (b)    Application of GRI 3
    Having established that neither of the candidate HTSUS headings describe the
    fruit-and-vegetable mixtures in whole under GRI 1, the Court moves sequentially to
    the next applicable General Rule of Interpretation, GRI 3(a), in order to classify the
    mixtures.9 GRI 3(a) provides that the heading “which provides the most specific
    description” shall be preferred over headings providing “a more general description.”
    GRI 3(a), HTSUS. However, when two headings each refer to only part of the
    materials contained in mixed goods, they are regarded as equally specific under GRI
    3(a); and the court must move to a GRI 3(b) essential character analysis to resolve
    9GRI 2(a), which applies to incomplete and unfinished products, is inapplicable. See GRI
    2(a), HTSUS. GRI 2(b) provides that “[t]he classification of goods consisting of more than one
    material or substance shall be according to the principles of rule 3.” GRI 2(b), HTSUS.
    Court No. 1:20-cv-00131                                                        Page 30
    the classification. GRI 3(a), HTSUS. In this case, heading 0811 (providing for “Fruit
    . . . frozen”) and heading 0710 (providing for “Vegetables . . . frozen”) each “refer to
    part only” of the fruit-and-vegetable mixtures. GRI 3(a), HTSUS. The Court will
    therefore pick between these two headings by conducting an essential character
    analysis under GRI 3(b), which provides that mixtures that cannot be classified by
    GRI 3(a) “shall be classified as if they consisted of the material or component which
    gives them their essential character, insofar as this criterion is applicable.” GRI 3(b),
    HTSUS.
    The Court conducts an essential character analysis by “‘isolat[ing] the most
    outstanding and distinctive characteristic of the article’” through a fact-based
    analysis that “consider[s] the totality of the evidence.” Structural Indus., Inc. v.
    United States, 
    29 C.I.T. 180
    , 185 (2005) (quoting Canadian Vinyl Indus., Inc. v.
    United States, 
    408 F. Supp. 1377
    , 1378 (Cust. Ct. 1976)). Put simply, the Court asks
    what component “predominate[s]” over the others. See La Crosse Tech. 
    723 F.3d at 1360
    . Because the fruit-and-vegetable mixtures contain between 67% and 85% frozen
    fruit ingredients by weight, the Court finds that the fruit ingredients predominate
    and impart the essential character of these mixtures. See Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s 56.3
    Statement ¶ 4, ECF No. 30; see also Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. U.S., 
    491 F.3d 1334
    ,
    1336 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (quoting Explanatory Note VIII for GRI 3(b), explaining that
    essential character may be determined by “the nature of the material or component,
    its bulk, quantity, weight or value”). Nature’s Touch apparently agrees because it
    Court No. 1:20-cv-00131                                                      Page 31
    refers to the fruit-and-vegetable mixtures as “fruit mixtures” in its Statement of
    Undisputed Material Facts. See, e.g., Pl.’s Facts ¶¶ 14, 15, 19, 21, ECF No. 28. The
    fruit-and-vegetable mixtures are therefore properly classified into heading 0811
    under GRI 3(b).
    C.    Application of the GRIs to Determine the Correct Subheading
    With all the merchandise classified into heading 0811, the Court next
    determines the correct subheading within heading 0811 by reapplying the GRIs
    sequentially. See GRI 6, HTSUS. The Court first applies GRI 1 and asks whether
    the mixtures are described in whole by the terms of any of the three available six-
    digit subheadings: 0811.10 (“Strawberries”); 0811.20 (“Raspberries, blackberries,
    mulberries, loganberries, black, white or red currants and gooseberries (other than
    kiwi fruit)”); and a basket or residual subheading, 0811.90 (“Other”). Subheading
    0811.90, “Other,” contains additional eight-digit subheadings that include, among
    others, 0811.90.10 (“Bananas and plantains”); 0811.90.20 (“Blueberries”); 0811.90.52
    (“Mangoes”); and, finally, 0811.90.80 (“Other”). See supra at I. The Court applies the
    GRIs once at the six-digit subheading level and again, separately, at the eight-digit
    level. See GRI 6, HTSUS (providing that “only subheadings at the same level are
    comparable”).
    One of the few issues that the parties agree on is that subheadings 0811.90
    and 0811.90.80, “Other,” do not describe the mixtures under GRI 1. Nature’s Touch
    argues that, “[s]ince the various subheadings of Heading 0811, HTSUS include only
    Court No. 1:20-cv-00131                                                       Page 32
    single fruits, ‘other’ frozen fruits of subheading 0811.90.80, HTSUS, similarly fails to
    describe the instant goods . . . this Court should use [noscitur a sociis] and examine
    the word ‘other’ in Subheading 0811.90.80, HTSUS, as only encompassing a signal
    [sic] fruit not previously or specifically mentioned.” Pl.’s Br. at 12–13, ECF No. 28.
    The Government largely agrees. Casting aside Customs’ prior contrary ruling in HQ
    H307154, the Government now writes that:
    [T]he subheadings of Heading 0811, HTSUS provide for
    individual types of fruit . . . . Whereas certain subheadings
    under other headings in Chapter 8 cover mixtures of fruit
    . . . subheading 0811.90.80, HTSUS simply says ‘other’
    without any reference to mixtures, and therefore can be
    read to provide just for individual types of fruit not
    enumerated in the preceding subheadings of 0811.90,
    HTSUS.
    Def.’s Br. at 18, ECF No. 36.       The parties therefore agree that, because the
    subheadings under heading 0811, HTSUS contain only single fruits, a subheading
    providing for “other” fruit must be interpreted to mean other single fruits not
    otherwise enumerated and cannot include mixed fruit.
    On that basis, the Government believes that the mixtures cannot be classified
    into any subheading under GRI 1. Nor, in the Government’s view, can a GRI 3(b)
    essential character analysis be performed because “no one ingredient imparts the
    essential character of these mixes.” Def.’s Br. at 27, ECF No. 36. Instead, the
    Government currently believes that each mixture product should be classified by
    applying GRI 3(c) and choosing the subheading that occurs last in numerical order
    Court No. 1:20-cv-00131                                                         Page 33
    among those that equally merit consideration. Id. at 20, 27; see also GRI 3(c), HTSUS.
    In this case, the Government would classify each mixture into the subheading that
    comes last in numerical order among those subheadings that describe individual
    types of fruit included in the mixture. See Def.’s Br. at 20, 27, ECF No. 36.
    The Court was skeptical of the parties’ theories regarding subheadings 0811.90
    and 0811.90.80, “Other.” In its Supplemental Briefing Order, the Court asked the
    parties to address the fact that many subheadings of heading 0811 contain multiple
    fruits.     See, e.g., 0811.20, HTSUS (providing for “Raspberries, blackberries,
    mulberries, loganberries, black, white or red currants and gooseberries”); 0811.90.10,
    HTSUS (“Bananas and plantains”); 0811.90.25, HTSUS (“Cashew apples, mameyes
    colorados, sapodillas, soursops and sweetsops”). The Court noted that these multiple-
    fruit subheadings would appear to include mixtures of the named fruits.             For
    example, if Nature’s Touch imported a mixture of frozen bananas and plantains, that
    product would be “described in whole” by the term “Bananas and plantains.” Cf.
    CamelBak Prods., 
    649 F.3d at 1364
    .             The Court therefore questioned why
    subheadings 0811.90 and 0811.90.80, “Other,” should be interpreted to mean “other
    single fruits” and exclude mixtures when the term is surrounded by multiple-fruit
    subheadings that include mixtures of those fruits. See Supplemental Briefing Order,
    ECF No. 42.
    In its supplemental brief, the Government repeated its new litigation position
    that the mixtures could not be classified as “Other” because the term “only
    Court No. 1:20-cv-00131                                                        Page 34
    encompasses individual types of fruit not enumerated in the subheadings that
    precede it.” Def.’s Supplemental Brief at 2, ECF No. 44. The Government asked that
    the term “Other” be read “in its context and with a view to its place with the other
    subheadings of 0811.90,” and warned of “unintended consequences” if the term was
    interpreted to include mixtures. Id. at 3, 5. For example, the Government noted that
    blueberries and cranberries, both of which are duty-free, would become dutiable at
    14.5% if imported in a mixture, a result it described, without citation to any authority,
    as “counterintuitive.” Id. at 5. The Government instead argued that “Other” should
    be read to exclude mixtures that contain products enumerated in the other
    subheadings. Otherwise, mixtures containing ingredients provided for eo nomine by
    other HTSUS provisions would fall into “Other,” which, in the Government’s view, “is
    not what we believe the HTSUS drafters intended.” Id. at 6. Nature’s Touch agreed
    with the Government and denied that the multiple-fruit subheadings suggested that
    the “Other” subheading could include mixtures. Citing Standard Chlorine Chem. Co.
    v. United States, 
    13 C.I.T. 198
     (1989), Nature’s Touch argued that the multiple-fruit
    subheadings “are not ‘mixtures’ provisions. They are merely provisions which eo
    nomine describe two or more items.” Pl.’s Supplemental Brief at 6, ECF No. 46. On
    that basis, Nature’s Touch concluded that “subheading 0811.90.80, covering ‘Other’
    frozen fruits, covers individual frozen fruits not mention [sic] in the eight-digit
    subheadings which preceded it.” 
    Id.
    Court No. 1:20-cv-00131                                                        Page 35
    These arguments ignore something important: the plain meaning of “other.”
    Cf. Carl Zeiss, 
    195 F.3d at 1379
     (“HTSUS terms are to be construed according to their
    common and commercial meanings, which are presumed to be the same.”). “Other”
    means “none of the above.” Under GRI 1 (and GRI 6, for subheadings), if a product
    is not described in whole by any named subheading, it falls into the residual or basket
    subheading “Other.” See, e.g., DMV USA, Inc. v. United States, 
    25 C.I.T. 970
    , 972
    (2001) (“In the event that merchandise is not found to be classifiable under a specific
    subheading, it is then classified as ‘other.’”); Cargill, Inc. v. United States, 
    318 F. Supp. 2d 1279
    , 1290 (CIT 2004) (“Since the merchandise does not fit under a named
    provision, it must be classified elsewhere, under the basket provision[.]”).
    Both Nature’s Touch and the Government seek to prevent this by reading
    “Other” narrowly, using canons of construction and concerns about duty rates to
    defeat the plain meaning. But canons and duty rates do not control classification —
    the text of the headings and subheadings do. See GRI 6, HTSUS (providing that
    “classification shall be determined according to the terms of [the] subheadings.”).
    Indeed, soon after arguing that it “seems illogical” to tax a mixture at 14.5% when its
    individual ingredients would be subject to lesser rates if imported alone, the
    Government concedes that “duty rates apply based on the correct classification” —
    not the reverse. Def.’s Supplemental Brief at 5, ECF No. 44.
    When interpreting the text of basket subheadings like “Other,” the Federal
    Circuit has ruled that the term should be read broadly. See Rollerblade, Inc. v. United
    Court No. 1:20-cv-00131                                                              Page 36
    States, 
    282 F.3d 1349
    , 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (stating that residual subheadings such
    as “other [sports equipment]” are “‘intended as a broad catch-all to encompass the
    classification of articles for which there is not a more specifically applicable
    subheading’”) (quoting EM Indus. v. United States, 
    22 C.I.T. 156
    , 165 (1998))
    (emphasis added).      This comports with the structure of the HTSUS, which “is
    designed so that most classification questions can be answered by GRI 1, so that there
    would be no need to delve into the less precise inquiries presented by GRI 3.”
    Telebrands Corp. v. United States, 
    36 C.I.T. 1231
    , 1235 (2012), aff’d, 
    522 Fed. Appx. 915
     (Fed. Cir. 2013).10 Attempts to narrow the meaning of “Other” are therefore
    inappropriate. It is the proper classification for a product not described in whole by
    the named subheadings within the correct heading.
    Both parties argue that the lack of express language providing for mixtures in
    the “Other” subheadings should be interpreted to mean that the subheadings cannot
    cover mixtures under GRI 1. See Pl.’s Supplemental Brief at 4, ECF No. 46; Def.’s
    Br. at 18, ECF No. 36 (“Whereas certain subheadings under other headings in
    Chapter 8 cover mixtures of fruit . . . subheading 0811.90.80, HTSUS simply says
    10 The Government worries that using a basket provision to classify mixtures “would render
    GRI 3 meaningless.” Def.’s Supplemental Brief at 6, ECF No. 44. The Court’s recourse to
    GRI 3 in this very case obviates the Government’s fear. See supra at II.B.2.b. Regardless,
    the Court cannot reach the later GRIs if classification under GRI 1 is possible. See R.T.
    Foods, 
    757 F.3d at 1353
     (“If the proper heading can be determined under GRI 1, the court is
    not to look to the subsequent GRIs.”); see also Telebrands Corp., 36 C.I.T. at 1235 n.5 (noting
    that proposal to require consideration of GRIs 2–6 concurrently with GRI 1 in certain
    circumstances was rejected by the Harmonized System Committee).
    Court No. 1:20-cv-00131                                                          Page 37
    ‘other’ without any reference to mixtures, and therefore can be read to provide just
    for individual types of fruit not enumerated in the preceding subheadings of 0811.90,
    HTSUS.”). It is surprising that the Government would here require a tariff provision
    to specifically enumerate mixtures in order to cover them — after all, the Government
    argued precisely the opposite when it urged the Court to classify mixtures in heading
    0811 despite the absence of “mixtures” from its text. Cf. Def.’s Br. at 8–9, ECF No.
    36 (“Plaintiff argues that Heading 0811, HTSUS does not cover the products at issue
    because it does not specifically enumerate ‘mixtures.’         However, this argument
    contradicts the broad, plain language of the heading . . . .”); id. at 16 (“[T]he fact that
    ‘mixtures’ of fruit are not explicitly enumerated in Heading 0811, HTSUS is not
    determinative.    Limiting this heading to single types of fruit, when its express
    language contains no such limitation, would contradict well-settled jurisprudence.”).
    The Government’s eagerness to arrive at its now preferred result has led it to demand
    that subheading 0811.90.80, “Other,” be “limit[ed] . . . to single types of fruit, when
    its express language contains no such limitation” — a startling contradiction. Id.
    Rather than allow the Government to switch between two different interpretive rules
    at its pleasure, the Court simply adopts the consistent principle that it is improper to
    infer a mixtures exclusion where none is present in the plain text of heading 0811 or
    subheading 0811.90.80, “Other.”
    Regardless of the Government’s situational ethics, the structure of heading
    0811 forecloses its latest interpretation. Heading 0811 covers “Fruit and nuts . . .
    Court No. 1:20-cv-00131                                                     Page 38
    frozen.” 0811, HTSUS (emphasis added). Because none of the heading’s subheadings
    mention nuts, all frozen nut products, including mixtures of frozen nuts and mixtures
    of frozen fruit and nuts, must fall under subheading 0811.90.80, “Other.”        The
    subheading necessarily embraces mixtures. The Court therefore declines to apply
    one rule to heading 0811 and another to subheading 0811.90.80 and instead finds
    that it is unnecessary for either provision to enumerate mixtures in order to cover
    them.
    The Government believes that subheading 0811.90.80, “Other,” should be read
    to exclude products that contain fruits enumerated by heading 0811’s other
    subheadings, writing without citation to authority that “classification of a mix of
    blueberries and cranberries under the provision for ‘Other,’ meaning in part, ‘other
    than blueberries and cranberries,’ seems illogical.” Def.’s Supplemental Brief at 5,
    ECF No. 44. Yet that was the logic of the Federal Circuit in R.T. Foods. There, the
    court affirmed the Government’s classification of a tempura vegetable mixture
    consisting, among other ingredients, of “three pieces of carrot, three pieces of wing
    bean [and] three pieces of long or green bean” into heading 2004, HTSUS, covering
    “Other vegetables prepared or preserved otherwise than by vinegar or acetic acid,
    frozen[.]” R.T. Foods, 
    757 F.3d at 1351
    . This heading is itself a broad “Other”
    provision that does not enumerate mixtures. The court then classified the product
    into six-digit subheading 2004.90, covering “Other vegetables and mixtures of
    vegetables.”   The court finally had to choose an eight-digit subheading, picking
    Court No. 1:20-cv-00131                                                             Page 39
    between 2004.90.10 (“Antipasto”), 2004.90.80 (“Beans”), and 2004.90.85 (“Other”).
    The Government argued for “Other,” and the court agreed even though the
    merchandise at issue contained beans. See 
    id. at 1351, 1357
    . The Federal Circuit did
    not read “Other” narrowly to mean “products containing no antipasto or beans.” Nor
    did it resort to GRI 3. Instead, it asked whether the terms “antipasto” or “beans”
    described the product.      “[B]ecause the subject merchandise is not ‘antipasto’ or
    ‘beans,’ it is properly classified under subheading 2004.90.85[.]”11 
    Id. at 1357
    . A
    mixture product may therefore be classified into a residual or basket subheading even
    if it contains ingredients enumerated by other subheadings within the proper
    heading.
    The Government’s sole substantive case citation, Pillowtex Corp. v. United
    States, 
    171 F.3d 1370
     (Fed. Cir. 1999) supports, rather than contradicts, the principle
    that a mixture product may be classified into a basket subheading even if it contains
    materials enumerated by other subheadings within the proper heading. In Pillowtex,
    the court classified comforters consisting of down filling in a cotton shell. 
    Id. at 1372
    .
    The dispute centered around whether the cotton and down comforters were
    11 It is true that, in R.T. Foods, the residual subheading at issue, 2004.90.85, “Other,”
    contained a ten-digit statistical subheading at 2004.90.85.95 providing for “Other, including
    mixtures.” Of course, so does the residual subheading at issue in this case. See
    0811.90.80.85, HTSUS (providing for “Frozen mixes only of combinations of strawberries,
    blueberries, red raspberries or blackberries.”). Because the ten-digit statistical subheadings
    are not part of the statutory language of the HTSUS, the Court will consider neither the
    statistical subheading involved in R.T. Foods nor the statistical subheading present in this
    case. Cf. Chemtall, Inc. v. United States, 
    878 F.3d 1012
    , 1026 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (establishing
    that “[t]he tenth-digit statistical suffixes . . . are not statutory.”).
    Court No. 1:20-cv-00131                                                       Page 40
    classifiable in a subheading for bedding articles “Of cotton” or, alternatively, a
    subheading for “Other” bedding articles. Id. at 1375. In its GRI 1 analysis, the court
    struggled to determine how much cotton an article needed to contain before it could
    be described as “of cotton,” and concluded that the language of the heading,
    subheading, and Explanatory Notes did not “provide any insight into the meaning of
    the term ‘of cotton’ as it relates to comforters.” Id. at 1374. The court concluded that
    both “Of cotton” and “Other” described the goods prima facie: “The cotton outer shell
    part of the subject comforters allow the comforters to fall under [‘Of cotton’], whereas
    the down filling part of the subject comforters allow them to fall under [‘Other’].” Id.
    at 1375–76. The court broke the tie by conducting an essential character analysis
    under GRI 3(b) and classified the product into “Other” on the basis of its down filling.
    Id. at 1376.
    Here, there is no interpretive difficulty under GRI 1 where multiple
    subheadings describe the goods. The named subheadings under heading 0811 do not
    say, for example, “of strawberries,” “containing strawberries,” or “made from
    strawberries.” They simply say “Strawberries,” classifying products that can be
    described, in whole, as strawberries. See CamelBak Prods., 
    649 F.3d at 1364
     (“We
    apply GRI 1 as a substantive rule of interpretation, such that when an imported
    article is described in whole by a single classification heading or subheading, then
    that single classification applies, and the succeeding GRIs are inoperative.”). Mixture
    products containing strawberries cannot be classified under an eo nomine subheading
    Court No. 1:20-cv-00131                                                       Page 41
    for “Strawberries” because “‘when an article “is in character or function something
    other than as described by a specific statutory provision — either more limited or
    more diversified — and the difference is significant,” it is not properly classified
    within an eo nomine provision.’” R.T. Foods, 
    757 F.3d at 1354
     (quoting CamelBak
    Prods., 
    649 F.3d at 1365
    ) (citation omitted). In the absence of a need for any inquiry
    into the proportion of strawberries a product must contain before it can be classified
    as “Strawberries,” the Court is left with “Other” as the only subheading that describes
    the products — which Pillowtex affirms it does when it determined that down and
    cotton comforters could be described by “Other” even though the comforters contained
    cotton. See Pillowtex, 
    171 F.3d at 1375
    .
    The Court will follow the same procedure the Federal Circuit employed in R.T.
    Foods and that Customs followed in its prior ruling, HQ H307154. At the six-digit
    level, the Court asks if any of the mixtures are described in whole by the term
    “Strawberries” and concludes that they are not, ruling out 0811.10. It similarly
    concludes that none of the mixtures are described in whole by the term “Raspberries,
    blackberries, mulberries, loganberries, black, white or red currants and gooseberries
    (other than kiwi fruit),” ruling out 0811.20. Subheading 0811.90, “Other,” describes
    all of the mixtures because they are not described in whole by the terms of any other
    six-digit subheading within the correct heading, 0811. The Court then re-applies GRI
    1 at the eight-digit subheading level. It similarly finds that, because the mixtures
    are not described in whole by the terms of any of the eight-digit subheadings that
    Court No. 1:20-cv-00131                                                            Page 42
    enumerate fruits, they fall into the residual subheading 0811.90.80, “Other,” dutiable
    at 14.5% ad valorem.
    Although this produces the same result that the Government sought for five of
    the mixture products (Antioxidant Blend Frozen, Frozen Medley Mixed Fruit,
    Blueberry Blitz, Organic Strawberry/Cherry/Kale, and Organic Triple Berry with
    Kale), for the other nine products this classification results in a higher duty rate than
    the Government seeks. The Court is required to classify the merchandise into the
    correct HTSUS provision independent of the parties’ arguments and the
    Government’s prior classification. See Jarvis Clark, 
    733 F.2d at 878
     (holding that
    “the court’s duty is to find the correct result, by whatever procedure is best suited to
    the case at hand”) (emphasis in original). However, because the Government makes
    no claim for additional duties as to these nine products, this Court will not order
    reliquidation and grant the Government relief it did not seek. See Answer, ECF No.
    15. Nature’s Touch is therefore not required to pay the difference in duties that
    results from the Court’s reclassification of the nine products for which the
    Government did not seek classification into 0811.90.80, HTSUS. See Mitsubishi
    Intern. Corp. v. United States, 
    22 C.I.T. 324
    , 357 (1998) (finding that, because the
    Government did not request as a remedy that Customs reliquidate entries into the
    correct subheading, “plaintiff is not required to pay the difference in duties as a result
    of the reclassification[.]”), aff’d, 
    182 F.3d 884
     (Fed. Cir. 1999); see also Def.’s Br. at 23
    Court No. 1:20-cv-00131                                                       Page 43
    n.7, ECF No. 36 (conceding the necessity of counterclaims for collection of excess
    duties from Nature’s Touch).
    Accordingly, though the Court differs with the Government’s legal rationale,
    the Court GRANTS IN-PART the Government’s Motion as to the classification of
    Antioxidant Blend Frozen, Frozen Medley Mixed Fruit, Blueberry Blitz, Organic
    Strawberry/Cherry/Kale, and Organic Triple Berry with Kale and DENIES IN-
    PART the Government’s Motion as to the classification of the remaining nine
    products and orders Customs to reclassify all of the products into 0811.90.80, HTSUS.
    Nature’s Touch’s Motion is DENIED.
    D.    Eligibility for Duty-Free Treatment under NAFTA
    The parties do not dispute that the North American Free Trade Agreement
    (NAFTA) was in force at the time the subject merchandise was imported. See Pl.’s
    Br. at 23 n.13, ECF No. 28; Def.’s Br. at 38, ECF No. 36. Under the United States’
    tariff laws, products that “‘originate in the territory of a NAFTA party’ are entitled
    to preferential duty treatment.” Cummins Inc. v. United States, 
    454 F.3d 1361
    , 1361–
    62 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (quoting General Note 12(a)(ii), HTSUS). One way that a product
    may so originate is if it is transformed in the territory of a NAFTA party, and one
    manner of transformation is undergoing a shift in tariff classification as specifically
    provided for in General Note 12 of the HTSUS. Nature’s Touch argues that its
    merchandise qualifies for duty-free treatment under NAFTA because the products
    originate in Canada. Specifically, Nature’s Touch invokes the so-called tariff-shift
    Court No. 1:20-cv-00131                                                      Page 44
    rule by claiming that the imported ingredients “undergo a change from Chapter 8,
    HTSUS, classifications to Heading 2106, HTSUS” when they are mixed at Nature’s
    Touch’s Canadian facility. Pl.’s Br. at 24, ECF No. 28. Because the Court finds that
    no shift into heading 2106 from another HTSUS chapter occurs, Nature’s Touch’s
    arguments concerning duty-free treatment under NAFTA are meritless.
    CONCLUSION
    Although the purpose of the tariff schedules is to implement the nation’s
    customs regime, the tax rates specified therein do not govern the tariff schedules’
    interpretation — their text and the ordered rules established in the General Rules of
    Interpretation do. To find fully in favor of either the Government or Nature’s Touch
    would require the Court to discard these principles of interpretation and to disregard
    Federal Circuit precedent so as to engage in a results-oriented inquiry. This the
    Court cannot do. In consideration of the foregoing, the Court GRANTS IN-PART
    and DENIES IN-PART the Government’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment;
    DENIES Nature’s Touch’s Motion for Summary Judgment; and holds that the
    subject merchandise is properly classified in 0811.90.80, HTSUS, dutiable at 14.5%
    ad valorem. Judgment is entered ordering Customs to reclassify all the merchandise
    but to reliquidate only the following products: Antioxidant Blend Frozen, Frozen
    Medley Mixed Fruit, Blueberry Blitz, Organic Strawberry/Cherry/Kale, and Organic
    Triple Berry with Kale. Such reliquidation shall also not include entries of Organic
    Triple Berry with Kale originally liquidated in subheading 0811.90.52 at 10.9% and
    Court No. 1:20-cv-00131                                                    Page 45
    the single entry of Blueberry Blitz at Entry No. MK8-5346590 that was liquidated in
    subheading 0811.90.20 duty free, for which the Government does not claim duties
    owed. See Def.’s Br. at 23, 29, ECF No. 36. No other products shall be reliquidated,
    as the Government has made no claim for excess duties that would result from their
    proper reclassification into 0811.90.80, HTSUS.
    /s/ Stephen Alexander Vaden
    Judge
    Dated: May 26, 2023
    New York, New York
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 20-00131

Citation Numbers: 2023 CIT 82

Judges: Vaden

Filed Date: 5/26/2023

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 5/26/2023

Authorities (36)

R.T. Foods, Inc. v. United States , 757 F.3d 1349 ( 2014 )

Schlumberger Technology Corp. v. United States , 845 F.3d 1158 ( 2017 )

Rheem Metalurgica S/A v. United States , 951 F. Supp. 241 ( 1996 )

Cargill, Inc. v. United States , 28 Ct. Int'l Trade 401 ( 2004 )

Montclair v. Ramsdell , 2 S. Ct. 391 ( 1883 )

Chemtall, Inc. v. United States , 878 F.3d 1012 ( 2017 )

Cummins Incorporated (Formerly Known as Cummins Engine ... , 454 F.3d 1361 ( 2006 )

Mita Copystar America v. United States , 160 F.3d 710 ( 1998 )

Rollerblade, Inc. v. United States , 282 F.3d 1349 ( 2002 )

Rollerblade, Inc. v. United States , 24 Ct. Int'l Trade 812 ( 2000 )

Bausch & Lomb, Incorporated v. United States , 148 F.3d 1363 ( 1998 )

Canadian Vinyl Industries, Inc. v. United States , 76 Cust. Ct. 1 ( 1976 )

Mondelez Global LLC v. United States , 253 F. Supp. 3d 1329 ( 2017 )

Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co. , 90 S. Ct. 1598 ( 1970 )

Orlando Food Corp. v. States , 140 F.3d 1437 ( 1998 )

Baxter Healthcare Corporation of Puerto Rico v. United ... , 182 F.3d 1333 ( 1999 )

Mitsubishi International Corporation v. United States , 182 F.3d 884 ( 1999 )

CamelBak Products, LLC v. United States , 649 F.3d 1361 ( 2011 )

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 106 S. Ct. 2505 ( 1986 )

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, Administratrix of the Estate of ... , 106 S. Ct. 2548 ( 1986 )

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