Universal Tube and Plastic Indus., Ltd. v. United States , 2024 CIT 85 ( 2024 )

Slip Op. 24-85
UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
UNIVERSAL TUBE AND
PLASTIC INDUSTRIES, LTD.,
THL TUBE AND PIPE
INDUSTRIES, LLC, and KHK
SCAFFOLDING & FORMWORK,
LLC,
Plaintiffs,
Before: Jennifer Choe-Groves, Judge
v.
Court No. 23-00113
UNITED STATES,
Defendant,
and
WHEATLAND TUBE COMPANY,
Defendant-Intervenor.
OPINION
[Remanding the U.S. Department of Commerce’s final results in the 2020‒2021
antidumping duty review of circular welded carbon-quality steel pipe from the
United Arab Emirates.]
Dated: July 26, 2024
Robert G. Gosselink, Jonathan M. Freed, and MacKensie R. Sugama, Trade
Pacific, PLLC, of Washington, D.C., for Plaintiffs Universal Tube and Plastic
Industries, Ltd., THL Tube and Pipe Industries, LLC, and KHK Scaffolding &
Formwork, LLC. With them on the brief was Kenneth N. Hammer.
Court No. 23-00113 Page 2
Franklin E. White, Jr., Assistant Director, and Kelly M. Geddes, Trial Attorney,
Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, of
Washington, D.C., for Defendant United States. With them on the brief were
Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, and Patricia M.
McCarthy, Director. Of counsel was Brishaila Brown, Attorney, Office of the
Chief Counsel for Trade Enforcement and Compliance, U.S. Department of
Commerce. Vania Y. Wang also appeared.
Roger B. Schagrin and Luke A. Meisner, Schagrin Associates, of Washington,
D.C., for Defendant-Intervenor Wheatland Tube Company. Christopher T.
Cloutier, Elizabeth Jackson Drake, Jeffrey D. Gerrish, Justin M. Neuman, Michelle
R. Avrutin, Nicholas J. Birch, Nicholas Phillips, Saad Younus Chalchal, William
A. Fennell, and Alessandra A. Palazzolo, also appeared.
Choe-Groves, Judge: This case presents a unique issue that Plaintiffs
describe as an “internal inconsistency.” Plaintiffs argue that the U.S. Department
of Commerce correctly applied one methodology to compare costs in one segment
of the case, yet failed to apply that same methodology in another segment of the
case, and thus there is an internal inconsistency that is not in accordance with law.
The Court agrees with Plaintiffs and remands the U.S. Department of Commerce’s
Final Results.
Plaintiffs Universal Tube and Plastic Industries, Ltd. (“UTP”), THL Tube and
Pipe Industries, LLC (“TTP”), and KHK Scaffolding & Formwork, LLC (“KHK”)
(collectively, “Plaintiffs” or “Universal”) filed this action pursuant to 19 U.S.C.
§ 1675 contesting the final results of the U.S. Department of Commerce
(“Commerce”) in Circular Welded Carbon-Quality Steel Pipe from the United Arab
Emirates (“Final Results”), 88 Fed. Reg. 28,483 (Dep’t of Commerce May 4, 2023)
Court No. 23-00113 Page 3
(final results of antidumping duty administrative review; 2020‒2021) and
accompanying Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final Results of the 2020‒
2021 Administrative Review of the Antidumping Duty Order on Circular Welded
Carbon-Quality Steel Pipe from the United Arab Emirates (Dep’t of Commerce Apr.
27, 2023) (“Final IDM”), ECF No. 22-5.
Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Rule 56.2 Motion for Judgment on the Agency
Record. Pls.’ R. 56.2 Mot. J. Agency R. (“Plaintiffs’ Motion” or “Pls.’ Mot.”), ECF
Nos. 23, 24; see also Mem. Supp. Pls.’ Mot. J. Agency R. (“Pls.’ Br.”), ECF Nos.
23, 24. Defendant United States (“Defendant” or “the Government”) filed
Defendant’s Response to Plaintiffs’ Rule 56.2 Motion for Judgment Upon the
Agency Record. Def.’s Resp. Pls.’ R. 56.2 Mot. J. Agency R. (“Def.’s Resp.”),
ECF No. 27. Defendant-Intervenor Wheatland Tube Company (“Defendant-
Intervenor” or “Wheatland”) filed Defendant-Intervenor’s Response in Opposition
to Plaintiffs’ Rule 56.2 Motion for Judgment on the Agency Record. Def.-Interv.’s
Resp. Opp’n Pls.’ R. 56.2 Mot. J. Agency R. (“Def.-Interv.’s Resp.”), ECF No. 26.
Plaintiffs filed Reply Brief of Plaintiffs Universal Tube and Plastic Industries, Ltd.,
THL Tube and Pipe Industries, LLC, and KHK Scaffolding and Formwork, LLC.
Pls.’ Reply Br. (“Pls.’ Reply”), ECF No. 33.
ISSUES PRESENTED
The Court reviews the following issues:
Court No. 23-00113 Page 4
1. Whether Universal failed to exhaust its administrative remedies with
respect to its arguments regarding Commerce’s use of quarters as time
periods for the comparison of sales prices in the Cohen’s d test.
2. Whether Commerce’s determination to compare sales prices made in
different quarters of the period of review under one provision of the
antidumping statute while declining to utilize the same comparisons
of sales prices under another provision of the antidumping statute is in
accordance with law.
BACKGROUND
Commerce conducted an administrative review for the period from
December 1, 2020 to November 30, 2021. Initiation of Antidumping and
Countervailing Duty Administrative Reviews, 87 Fed. Reg. 6487, 6492 (Dep’t of
Commerce Feb. 4, 2022), PR 7.1 Commerce selected Universal as one of the
mandatory respondents in the investigation.2 See Commerce’s 2020‒2021
1
Citations to the administrative record reflect the public administrative record
(“PR”) document numbers. ECF No. 35.
2
Commerce collapsed UTP, TTP, and KHK into a single entity, Universal, in a
prior investigation and treated Universal as one respondent. See Circular Welded
Carbon-Quality Steel Pipe from the United Arab Emirates, 81 Fed. Reg. 36,881,
36,881 (Dep’t Commerce June 8, 2016) (affirmative preliminary determination of
sales at less than fair value and postponement of final determination). For the
current period of review, Commerce continued to collapse Universal. Commerce’s
2020‒2021 Antidumping Duty Administrative Review of Circular Welded Carbon-
Court No. 23-00113 Page 5
Antidumping Duty Administrative Review of Circular Welded Carbon-Quality
Steel Pipe from the United Arab Emirates: Selection of Respondents for Individual
Examination, PR 22.
On December 28, 2022, Commerce published its preliminary results.
Circular Welded Carbon-Quality Steel Pipe from the United Arab Emirates
(“Preliminary Results”), 87 Fed. Reg. 79,862 (Dep’t of Commerce Dec. 28, 2022)
(preliminary results of antidumping duty administrative review; 2020‒2021), and
accompanying Decision Memorandum for the Preliminary Results of the 2020‒
2021 Administrative Review of the Antidumping Duty Order on Circular Welded
Carbon-Quality Steel Pipe from the United Arab Emirates (Dec. 20, 2022)
(“Preliminary Determination Memorandum” or “PDM”), PR 105.
Universal submitted an administrative case brief arguing that Commerce
should ensure that its differential pricing analysis for Universal was not impacted
inaccurately by comparing perceived patterns of price differences among quarters.
Universal’s Admin. Case Br. at 2‒5, PR 117.
In the Final Results, Commerce continued to compare sales prices across
different quarters of the period of review as part of the differential pricing analysis
and determined that there was a pattern of export prices that differed significantly
Quality Steel Pipe from the United Arab Emirates: Selection of Respondents for
Individual Examination at 1 n.2, PR 22.
Court No. 23-00113 Page 6
across purchasers, regions, or time periods. Final IDM at 10‒11, 14‒15.
Commerce did not make any changes to its determination to calculate the cost of
production using a method based on the weighted-average of costs within
individual quarters of the period of review. See id. at 5‒6. Commerce calculated
Universal’s antidumping duty margin at 2.63%. Final Results, 88 Fed. Reg. at
28,484.
Plaintiffs filed this action timely pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1675 contesting
Commerce’s Final Results. See Compl., ECF No. 10.
JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The U.S. Court of International Trade has jurisdiction pursuant to 19 U.S.C.
§ 1516a(a)(2)(B)(iii) and 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c), which grant the Court authority to
review actions contesting the final results of an administrative review of an
antidumping duty order. The Court shall hold unlawful any determination found to
be unsupported by substantial evidence on the record or otherwise not in
accordance with law. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i).
DISCUSSION
I. Administrative Exhaustion
As an initial matter, Defendant argues that Universal failed to exhaust its
administrative remedies with respect to the specific argument that “Commerce
could have considered other periods of time to determine whether the ‘pattern’ and
Court No. 23-00113 Page 7
‘significant difference criteria’ were satisfied” because Universal allegedly did not
raise that issue in the administrative case brief and Defendant contends that none of
the exceptions to the exhaustion requirement apply. Def.’s Resp. at 17‒19.
Universal counters that it did not fail to exhaust its administrative remedies
because Universal put Commerce on notice of Universal’s concerns about time
periods during the administrative proceeding. Pls.’ Reply at 8.
Before commencing suit in the U.S. Court of International Trade, an
aggrieved party must exhaust all administrative remedies available to it. “In any
civil action . . . the Court of International Trade shall, where appropriate, require
the exhaustion of administrative remedies.” 28 U.S.C. § 2637(d). The Court
“generally takes a ‘strict view’ of the requirement that parties exhaust their
administrative remedies[.]” Yangzhou Bestpak Gifts & Crafts Co. v. United States,
716 F.3d 1370, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
There are limited exceptions to the exhaustion requirement. See Pakfood
Pub. Co. v. United States, 34 CIT 1122, 1145, 1147, 724 F. Supp. 2d 1327, 1351‒
1352 (2010) (“[T]he court has waived the exhaustion requirement where it would
have been futile for the party to raise its argument at the administrative level, as
well as where the record indicates that . . . the agency in fact thoroughly considered
the issue in question.”); see also Holmes Prod. Corp. v. United States, 16 CIT
Court No. 23-00113 Page 8
1101, 1104 (1992) (“[E]xhaustion may be excused if the issue was raised by
another party, or if it is clear that the agency had an opportunity to consider it.”).
In its administrative case brief, Universal argued that although 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677f-1(d)(1)(B) indicates that Commerce may make comparisons when there is
a pattern of comparable merchandise that differs significantly among purchasers,
regions, or time periods, the use of “may” implies that “there are circumstance[s]
where Commerce need not consider certain criteria, such as periods of time, when
evaluating whether a pattern of prices that differs significantly existed.”
Universal’s Admin. Case Br. at 5; see 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(d)(1)(B). Universal
argued that in the Final Results, Commerce “must limit the first part of its Cohen’s
d differential pricing analysis to a comparison of groups of sales data only for
particular purchasers and regions, and not for time periods.” Universal’s Admin.
Case Br. at 4‒5 (emphasis in original).
On appeal before this Court, Universal asserts that Commerce should not
have considered time periods at all or should have considered other periods of time
in the Cohen’s d test. Pls.’ Br. at 23. Universal challenged Commerce’s use of
quarters within the period of review in the Cohen’s d test. Id. Universal also noted
that 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(d)(1)(B), in permitting Commerce to consider time
periods, does not mandate how Commerce should determine the existence of
Court No. 23-00113 Page 9
patterns of prices that differ or whether Commerce should be required to consider
time periods at all. Id.
Defendant contends that, in the administrative case brief, “Universal argued
that Commerce should not include time periods in its Cohen’s d differential pricing
analysis, but did not raise the alternative argument that Commerce should use a
unit of time other than quarters to assess differences in prices over time periods” or
“suggest a specific alternative time period.” Def.’s Resp. at 18. The Government
asserts that the Court should not “entertain Universal’s arguments concerning the
use of a different time period in its Cohen’s d analysis” and that the exceptions to
the exhaustion doctrine do not apply. Id. at 18‒19.
The Court holds that an exception to the exhaustion doctrine applies here
because Commerce was on notice that Universal was challenging the issue of time
periods when Universal argued that 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(d)(1)(B) neither mandates
how Commerce evaluates whether a pattern of prices that significantly differ exists
nor requires Commerce to consider time periods at all. Commerce was aware of
Universal’s challenge to the issue of time periods and had the opportunity to fully
consider the issue of time periods, including whether to use time periods at all or
consider using a different unit of time (either annually, quarterly, or some other unit
of time), or whether to compare sales and cost data within the same quarters, or
data compared from quarter to quarter, in both the preliminary and final results of
Court No. 23-00113 Page 10
the administrative review. Universal’s failure to articulate an alternative argument
that Commerce should use a specific unit of time or failure to “suggest a specific
alternative time period,” as Defendant asserts, did not result in a waiver of the
issue on appeal, when it was clear that Universal was challenging Commerce’s use
of time periods for analyzing costs and prices. See Def.’s Resp. at 18. The Court
concludes that Universal did not waive the issue regarding Commerce’s
consideration of alternative time periods in the Cohen’s d test simply because
Universal did not argue that Commerce should use a unit of time other than
quarters or suggest a specific alternative time period.
II. Internal Inconsistency in Commerce’s Determinations
Universal does not challenge Commerce’s cost of production determination
to consider Universal’s quarterly direct material costs. Pls.’ Br. at 14. Plaintiffs
explain that:
Commerce usually compares prices to a weighted-average of costs
incurred throughout the entire [period of review] (i.e., annual costs). . . .
But Commerce deviates from its standard methodology when it
determines that there are significant changes in costs during the [period
of review]. . . . Commerce concluded that record evidence showed that
Universal had experienced significant cost changes (i.e., changes that
exceeded 25 percent) between the high and low quarterly [costs of
manufacturing] during the [period of review]; that there was linkage
between Universal’s changing selling prices and [costs of
manufacturing] during the [period of review] such that changes in
selling prices correlated reasonably to changes in unit [costs of
manufacturing]; and that it therefore was necessary for Commerce to
Court No. 23-00113 Page 11
employ an alternative costing methodology that relied on Universal’s
quarterly direct material costs.
Id. (citing PDM at 23‒24). Notably, Plaintiffs emphasize that Commerce
“limited its price comparisons for purposes of calculating dumping to sales
made only within the same quarter. . . . to prevent any inter-quarter sales price
comparisons.” Id. at 15. The Court refers to Commerce’s determination to
consider Universal’s quarterly direct material costs as the “same-quarter
comparison,” meaning that Commerce compared only sales made within the
same quarters.
When calculating the cost of production, Commerce explained that its
normal practice is to calculate an annual weighted-average cost based on the
average of the annual cost of production for the period of review. See PDM at 23‒
24. Commerce stated that it deviates from the normal practice of using the annual
weighted-average cost method if using the annual weighted-average cost method
during a time of significant cost changes results in possible distortions. See id. at
23. Based on the cost data provided by Universal, Commerce determined that
deviating from the normal practice of calculating an annual weighted-average cost
was warranted. Id. To determine whether to deviate from the annual weighted-
average cost method, Commerce evaluated whether (1) the changes in the cost of
manufacturing during the period of review were significant and (2) whether the
Court No. 23-00113 Page 12
record evidence showed that there was a correlation between the changes in cost of
manufacturing and the sales prices during the period of review. Id. Changes in
cost of manufacturing were deemed significant if the changes exceeded 25%
between the high cost of manufacturing and the low cost of manufacturing in each
quarter of a period of review. Id. To determine whether there was a correlation
between the changes in cost of manufacturing and the sales prices during the
period of review, Commerce compared the weighted-average of the sales prices
within a quarter of the period of review to the corresponding cost of manufacturing
within the same quarter. Id.
Commerce determined that the record evidence established that Universal
experienced significant changes in cost between the high cost of manufacturing
and the low cost of manufacturing in each quarter of the period of review, and that
there was a reasonable correlation between Universal’s sales prices and the
changes in cost of manufacturing for the period of review. Id. at 23‒24.
Commerce determined that it was appropriate to base cost of production on a
calculation of a weighted-average within individual quarters of the period of
review. Id. at 24. Commerce did not make any changes to the determination to
calculate a weighted-average cost based on an average of the cost of production
within individual quarters of the period of review for the cost of production
analysis in the Final Results. See Final IDM at 5‒6.
Court No. 23-00113 Page 13
In contrast to the “same-quarter comparison” with which Universal agrees,
Plaintiffs challenge Commerce’s determination in the Final Results as follows:
But after having determined that it was not appropriate to calculate
Universal’s dumping margin by comparing the selling prices of U.S.
and home market sales made in different [period of review] quarters,
Commerce nonetheless did exactly that, i.e., Commerce compared the
selling prices of U.S. sales made in different [period of review] quarters
for purposes of its differential pricing analysis.
Pls.’ Br. at 16. Commerce’s Cohen’s d test analysis compared sales prices
made in different quarters of the period of review. See Final IDM at 14; PDM
at 11‒12 (unchanged in Final Results). The Court refers to this determination
as the “inter-quarter comparison.”
Universal argues that:
In the first stage of the differential pricing analysis, Commerce applied
the “Cohen’s d test,” and found that the extent to which prices in
particular time periods differed from the prices of all other sales was
large. . . . But, as discussed above, Commerce already had determined
in this review (1) that Universal had significant cost changes between
its high and low quarterly costs of manufacturing during the [period of
review], (2) that there was a close linkage between Universal’s
changing selling prices and quarterly costs of manufacturing for the
same periods, and (3) that the change in Universal’s costs of
manufacturing and selling prices between and among quarters was so
significant that Commerce, in fact, modified its margin calculation
program specifically to prevent comparisons of sales in different
quarters. Having already concluded that it could not compare the
selling prices of sales made in different [periods of review] quarters, it
was inconsistent and contradictory for Commerce to compare the
selling prices of Universal’s U.S. sales across the four quarters of the
[period of review] as part of its differential pricing analysis.
Court No. 23-00113 Page 14
Pls.’ Br. at 19.
Plaintiffs allege that Commerce’s application of the “same-quarter
comparison” and the “inter-quarter comparison” within the same administrative
review was internally inconsistent, arbitrary, and contrary to law. Pls.’ Br. at 16‒
20. Universal asserts that Commerce determined in the “same-quarter
comparison” that comparing Universal’s sales prices made in different quarters of
the period of review would be distortive and cause an inaccurate dumping margin
because the costs and prices changed so significantly from quarter to quarter such
that Universal’s sales in different quarters were “incomparable,” and that it was
arbitrary and inconsistent for Commerce to later rely in the “inter-quarter
comparison” on a comparison of Universal’s sales prices made in different quarters
when conducting the differential pricing analysis in the same administrative
review. Id. at 15; 19‒20.
Defendant contends that Universal’s argument is essentially that the
differential pricing analysis cannot consider differences in sales prices that are
caused by changes in cost of production. Def.’s Resp. at 14. Defendant and
Defendant-Intervenor assert that Commerce’s decision to consider changes in sales
prices from quarter to quarter of the period of review for the differential pricing
analysis is consistent with Commerce’s practice and 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(b) because
Court No. 23-00113 Page 15
cost determinations and the differential pricing analysis are governed by different
statutes. Def.’s Resp. at 16, 19‒20; Def.-Interv.’s Resp. at 12‒14.
Universal counters that Defendant’s characterization of Universal’s
argument is “an incorrect and oversimplified description of Universal’s claim that
adopted an internally inconsistent and arbitrary approach for calculating
Universal’s dumping margin in this review.” Pls.’ Reply at 3. Universal explains
that it, “challenges only the arbitrary and inconsistent decision by Commerce” to
compare sales prices made in different quarters of the period of review under one
provision of the statute while refusing to compare sales prices made in different
quarters of the period of review under another provision. Pls.’ Br. at 22; Pls.’
Reply at 3. Universal contends that:
At its core, Universal’s argument is that it is irrational, unreasonable,
and inconsistent for Commerce to reject sales comparisons across
[period of review] quarters to determine dumping while at the same
time rely[ing] on sales comparisons across [period of review] quarters
to determine the methodology to be used to calculate dumping. This
internal inconsistency argument is not one that the [c]ourts have
previously addressed. It is also not an issue that Commerce addressed
in its Final Results.
Pls.’ Reply at 3.
In support of its argument that Commerce improperly compared sales prices
made in different quarters of the period of review (the “inter-quarter comparison”)
under one provision of the statute while refusing to make such comparisons (the
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“same-quarter comparison”) under another provision of the statute, Universal relies
on NSK Ltd. v. United States, 390 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Id. at 7. In NSK
Ltd., the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“CAFC”) stated
that, “Commerce’s classification of repacking expenses as selling expenses is
internally inconsistent with its classification of U.S. warehousing expenses and
U.S. warehouse-to-customer-shipping expenses as movement expenses.” NSK
Ltd., 390 F. 3d at 1357. The NSK Ltd. court explained that:
To be consistent, it would appear that Commerce should classify them
as the same type of expenses, whether that be as movement expenses
or as sales expenses. If Commerce wants to treat these expenses
inconsistently, then . . . Commerce [must] reasonably explain[] the
inconsistency and . . . not act arbitrarily.
Id. at 1358 (citing SKF USA, Inc. v. United States, 263 F.3d 1369, 1381‒82 (Fed.
Cir. 2001), aff’d, 332 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (vacating Commerce’s decision to
inconsistently define a term in two provisions of the antidumping statute because
Commerce acted arbitrarily by not providing a reasonable explanation for the
inconsistency)). The CAFC in NSK Ltd. held that Commerce’s determination was
arbitrary and impermissible because Commerce did not sufficiently explain the
internal inconsistencies. Id.19 U.S.C. § 1677f requires Commerce to explain the basis for its
determinations. 19 U.S.C. § 1677f(i)(3); see NMB Sing. Ltd v. United States, 557
F.3d 1316, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“Commerce must explain the basis for its
Court No. 23-00113 Page 17
decisions . . . [and] the path of Commerce’s decision must be reasonably
discernable to a reviewing court.” (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983))). As further required by
NSK Ltd., Commerce must either make consistent determinations in different
provisions of the antidumping statute or provide a reasonable explanation for any
inconsistencies, which Commerce failed to do in the Final IDM. See NSK Ltd.,
390 F. 3d at 1357‒58.
Similar to NSK Ltd., Commerce here must either make consistent
determinations, or reasonably explain any inconsistency in why Commerce should
be permitted to calculate Universal’s cost of production using the “same-quarter
comparison,” while then comparing the sales prices of U.S. sales made in different
quarters using the “inter-quarter comparison” for purposes of Commerce’s
differential pricing analysis. Commerce’s explanation that Universal’s costs and
prices changed so significantly from quarter to quarter that Commerce had to
deviate from calculating the cost of production using an annual weighted-average
cost because of possible distortions suggests that applying the “same-quarter
comparison” is inconsistent with Commerce’s later “inter-quarter comparison”
analyzing sales prices made in different quarters for the differential pricing
analysis. The Court observes that if Commerce’s comparison of costs and prices
would lead to distortive results because of significant fluctuations from quarter to
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quarter, thus justifying the “same-quarter comparison” examining sales prices only
within specific quarters, it does not follow that costs and prices from sales in
different quarters should be compared across quarters (the “inter-quarter
comparison”) in a different segment of the administrative review.
Because Commerce did not explain why it was reasonable to apply the
“inter-quarter comparison” and the “same-quarter comparison” in the same
administrative review, the Court holds that Commerce’s internally inconsistent
determinations are not in accordance with law. The Court remands for Commerce
to reconsider or provide further explanation in accordance with this Opinion.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED that this case shall proceed according to the following schedule:
(1) Commerce shall file the remand determination on or before September
23, 2024;
(2) Commerce shall file the administrative record on or before September
30, 2024;
(3) Comments in opposition to the remand determination shall be filed on or
before October 18, 2024;
(4) Comments in support of the remand determination shall be filed on or
before November 18, 2024; and
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(5) The joint appendix shall be filed on or before November 22, 2024.
/s/ Jennifer Choe-Groves
Jennifer Choe-Groves, Judge
Dated: July 26, 2024
New York, New York