Bioparques de Occidente, S.A. de C.V. v. United States , 2024 CIT 130 ( 2024 )


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  •                                  Slip Op. 24-130
    UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
    BIOPARQUES DE OCCIDENTE,
    S.A. DE C.V., AGRICOLA LA
    PRIMAVERA, S.A. DE C.V., AND
    KALIROY FRESH LLC,
    Plaintiffs,
    CONFEDERACION DE
    ASOCIACIONES AGRICOLAS
    DEL ESTADO DE SINALOA,
    A.C., CONSEJO AGRICOLA DE
    BAJA CALIFORNIA, A.C.,
    ASOCIACION MEXICANA DE
    HORTICULTURA PROTEGIDA,
    A.C., ASOCIACION DE
    PRODUCTORES DE
    Before: Jennifer Choe-Groves, Judge
    HORTALIZAS DEL YAQUI Y
    MAYO, AND SISTEMA
    Consol. Court No. 19-00204
    PRODUCTO TOMATE,
    Consolidated Plaintiffs,
    v.
    UNITED STATES,
    Defendant,
    and
    THE FLORIDA TOMATO
    EXCHANGE,
    Defendant-Intervenor.
    Consol. Court No. 19-00204                                                Page 2
    OPINION AND ORDER
    [Granting the Partial Consent Motion to Intervene Out of Time filed by NS Brands,
    Ltd. and Naturesweet Invernaderos S. de R.L. de C.V./NatureSweet
    Comercializadora, S. de R.L. de C.V.]
    Dated: November 25, 2024
    Jeffrey M. Winton, Michael Chapman, Amrietha Nellan, Ruby Rodriguez, and Vi
    N. Mai, Winton & Chapman PLLC, of Washington, D.C., for Plaintiffs Bioparques
    de Occidente, S.A. de C.V., Agricola La Primavera, S.A. de C.V., and Kaliroy
    Fresh LLC.
    Yujin K. McNamara, Bernd G. Janzen, Devin S. Sikes, and Paul S. Bettencourt,
    Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, LLP, of Washington, D.C., for Consolidated
    Plaintiffs Confederacion de Asociaciones Agricolas del Estado de Sinaloa, A.C.,
    Consejo Agricola de Baja California, A.C., Asociacion Mexicana de Horticultura
    Protegida, A.C., Asociacion de Productores de Hortalizas del Yaqui y Mayo, and
    Sistema Producto Tomate.
    Douglas G. Edelschick, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, U.S.
    Department of Justice, of Washington, D.C., for Defendant United States. Of
    counsel are Ayat Mujais and Emma T. Hunter, Office of Chief Counsel for Trade
    Enforcement and Compliance, U.S. Department of Commerce.
    Robert C. Cassidy, Jr., Charles S. Levy, Chase J. Dunn, James R. Cannon, Jr.,
    Jonathan M. Zielinski, Mary Jane Alves, and Nicole Brunda, Cassidy Levy Kent
    (USA) LLP, of Washington, D.C., for The Florida Tomato Exchange.
    Jessica R. DiPietro, ArentFox Schiff, LLP, of Washington, D.C., for Proposed
    Plaintiff-Intervenors NS Brands, Ltd. and Naturesweet Invernaderos S. de R.L. de
    C.V./NatureSweet Comercializadora, S. de R.L. de C.V. Also on the brief were
    Matthew M. Nolan and Leah N. Scarpelli.
    Choe-Groves, Judge: Before the Court is the Partial Consent Motion to
    Intervene Out of Time filed by NS Brands, Ltd. and Naturesweet Invernaderos S.
    de R.L. de C.V./NatureSweet Comercializadora, S. de R.L. de C.V. (collectively,
    Consol. Court No. 19-00204                                                     Page 3
    “NatureSweet”). NatureSweet’s Part. Consent Mot. Interv. Out of Time
    (“NatureSweet’s Motion” or “NatureSweet’s Mot.”), ECF No. 122. Plaintiffs
    Bioparques de Occidente, S.A. de C.V., Agricola La Primavera, S.A. de C.V., and
    Kaliroy Fresh LLC and Consolidated Plaintiffs Confederacion de Asociaciones
    Agricolas del Estado de Sinaloa, A.C., Consejo Agricola de Baja California, A.C.,
    Asociacion Mexicana de Horticultura Protegida, A.C., Asociacion de Productores
    de Hortalizas del Yaqui y Mayo, and Sistema Producto Tomate consent to
    NatureSweet’s Motion. Id. at 9. Defendant United States and Defendant-
    Intervenor The Florida Tomato Exchange oppose NatureSweet’s Motion. Id. at 8–
    9; Def.’s Resp. Opp’n NatureSweet’s Out-of-Time Mot. Interv. (“Def.’s Resp.”)
    ECF No. 128; Def.-Interv.’s Cmts. Opp’n NatureSweet’s Mot. Interv. Out of Time
    (“Def.-Interv.’s Resp.”), ECF No. 127.
    NatureSweet moves to intervene as a matter of right pursuant to USCIT Rule
    24. NatureSweet’s Mot. at 3. In actions filed pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1516a, a
    party may intervene as a matter of right if that party is an “interested party,” 19
    U.S.C. § 1516a(f)(3), “would be adversely affected or aggrieved by a decision in a
    civil action pending in the Court of International Trade,” 
    28 U.S.C. § 2631
    (j)(1),
    and “was a party to the proceeding in connection with which the matter arose,” 
    id.
    § 2631(j)(1)(B). Pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(f)(3), “interested party” includes
    “a foreign manufacturer, producer, or exporter, or the United States importer, of
    Consol. Court No. 19-00204                                                  Page 4
    subject merchandise or a trade or business association a majority of the members
    of which are producers, exporters, or importers of such merchandise.” 19 U.S.C.
    §§ 1516a(f)(3), 1677(9)(A). “Interested party” also includes “a manufacturer,
    producer, or wholesaler in the United States of a domestic like product.” Id.
    § 1677(9)(C). To be timely, the motion to intervene as a matter of right must be
    made no later than 30 days after the date of service of the complaint. USCIT R.
    24(a)(3). A motion to intervene will only be considered after the 30-day period
    upon a showing of “mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect” or that,
    despite the proposed intervenor having exercised due diligence, the motion could
    not have been timely filed. Id.
    NatureSweet is an interested party to this proceeding because Naturesweet
    Invernaderos S. de R.L. de C.V. and NatureSweet Comercializadora, S. de R.L. de
    C.V. are foreign producers of tomatoes and NS Brands, Ltd. is a domestic importer
    and producer of tomatoes. NatureSweet’s Mot. at 4; see 
    28 U.S.C. § 1677
    (9)(A),
    (C). NatureSweet participated in the underlying administrative proceedings during
    the remand by requesting an examination, submitting comments, and meeting with
    the U.S. Department of Commerce (“Commerce”). NatureSweet’s Mot. at 4, Exs.
    4, 5. NatureSweet’s Motion was untimely filed on October 25, 2024, more than 30
    days after Plaintiff filed the initial Complaint on December 20, 2019.
    NatureSweet’s Mot.; Compl., ECF No. 9.
    Consol. Court No. 19-00204                                                       Page 5
    Defendant and Defendant-Intervenor oppose NatureSweet’s untimely
    motion on three grounds. First, they contend that the motion is procedurally
    defective because it does not identify the issues sought to be raised through
    intervention, as required by USCIT Rule 24(c)(2). Def.’s Resp. at 5; Def.-Interv.’s
    Resp. at 3–4. Second, Defendant argues that NatureSweet’s arguments have been
    waived because NatureSweet did not file an administrative brief during the remand
    proceedings. Def.’s Resp. at 5–7. Third, Defendant and Defendant-Intervenor
    assert that NatureSweet has not demonstrated good cause for the nearly five-year
    delay in filing its intervention motion. Def.’s Resp. at 7–8; Def.-Interv.’s Resp. at
    1–3.
    Beginning with the first argument, USCIT Rule 24(c)(2) requires that
    “[w]hen the movant for intervention seeks to intervene on the side of the plaintiff,
    the motion must state the movant’s standing, and must state the administrative
    determination to be reviewed and the issues that the intervenor desires to litigate.”
    USCIT R. 24(c)(2). Defendant contends that “[i]t is unclear whether NatureSweet
    desires to litigate issues that it raised in comments during the remand or the
    underlying investigation, because NatureSweet’s motion fails to identify the issues
    that it actually intends to litigate.” Def.’s Resp. at 5. In its motion, NatureSweet
    explains that during the 2019 investigation, it “repeatedly requested an
    investigation of its operations in order to obtain an individually calculated rate,
    Consol. Court No. 19-00204                                                    Page 6
    which was denied by Commerce.” NatureSweet’s Mot. at 7. On remand,
    NatureSweet submitted comments in response to Commerce’s Draft Results of
    Redetermination Pursuant to Court Remand, arguing that Commerce should
    conduct a changed circumstances review or a new shipper review to determine if
    NatureSweet is entitled to an individually calculated dumping margin.
    NatureSweet’s Mot. at 6, Ex. 5; see Final Results of Redetermination Pursuant to
    Court Remand (“Remand Redetermination”) at 31–32, ECF Nos. 120-1, 121-1. In
    the Remand Redetermination, Commerce expressly addressed NatureSweet’s
    comments and determined that neither a changed circumstances review nor a new
    shipper review is possible under the applicable statutes because an antidumping
    duty order has not been issued. Remand Redetermination at 32–33. In its motion
    for intervention, NatureSweet states that “the circumstances that now exist
    regarding NatureSweet providing information on the record of the remand
    proceeding and its information being used in Commerce’s remand redetermination
    did not exist during the initial thirty-day period for intervention from when the
    Complaint was filed.” NatureSweet’s Mot. at 8. Read in its totality, the Court
    concludes that NatureSweet’s Motion sufficiently articulates its reasons for seeking
    intervention.
    Defendant next argues that NatureSweet’s arguments have been waived
    because NatureSweet did not file an administrative brief during the remand
    Consol. Court No. 19-00204                                                      Page 7
    proceedings. Def.’s Resp. at 5–7. Before a claim may be brought to the Court, an
    aggrieved party must exhaust available administrative remedies. 
    28 U.S.C. § 2637
    (d). The Court “generally takes a ‘strict view’ of the requirement that
    parties exhaust their administrative remedies.” Yangzhou Bestpak Gifts & Crafts
    Co. v. United States, 
    716 F.3d 1370
    , 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (citations omitted). 
    19 C.F.R. § 351.309
    (c)(2) requires that, “[t]he case brief must present all arguments
    that continue in the submitter’s view to be relevant to the . . . final determination or
    final results.” 
    19 C.F.R. § 351.309
    (c)(2). Among the limited exceptions to the
    exhaustion requirement is that “exhaustion may be excused if the issue was raised
    by another party, or if it is clear that the agency had an opportunity to consider it.”
    Holmes Prod. Corp. v. United States, 
    16 CIT 1101
    , 1104 (1992) (“[E]xhaustion
    may be excused if the issue was raised by another party, or if it is clear that the
    agency had an opportunity to consider it.”). NatureSweet did not file an
    administrative case brief during the remand, but submitted comments to
    Commerce. See Remand Redetermination at 9. Commerce expressly responded to
    arguments raised by NatureSweet in the Remand Redetermination, demonstrating
    that Commerce had an opportunity to consider the arguments raised by
    NatureSweet during the administrative process. Therefore, the exception to
    administrative exhaustion applies and the Court concludes that NatureSweet’s
    arguments were not waived.
    Consol. Court No. 19-00204                                                       Page 8
    Defendant’s and Defendant-Intervenor’s final objection asserts that
    NatureSweet has not demonstrated good cause for the nearly five-year delay in
    filing its intervention motion. Def.’s Resp. at 7–8; Def.-Interv.’s Resp. at 1–3. In
    Bioparques de Occidente, S.A. v. United States, 
    48 CIT __
    , 
    698 F. Supp. 3d 1265
    (2024), the Court remanded this case to Commerce in 2024 to “resume its
    investigation flowing from the affirmative preliminary determination issued on
    November 1, 1996, including focusing its analysis on the evidence submitted
    regarding the original period of investigation of March 1, 1995 through February
    29, 1996, and reviewing the original six mandatory respondents.” 
    Id.
     at __, 698 F.
    Supp. at 1276–77. In doing so, the Court drastically changed the landscape of this
    litigation by ordering Commerce to investigate the tomato market in 1995–1996,
    approximately 29 years earlier. Despite all appropriate due diligence, it would
    have been nearly impossible in 2019 for NatureSweet to anticipate the results of
    the Court’s 2024 remand in this unique case, and NatureSweet should not be
    penalized now for failing to anticipate in 2019 that it needed to intervene to
    participate in the 2024 court proceeding. See USCIT R. 24(a)(3). The Court finds
    that good cause exists to excuse NatureSweet’s delay in seeking to intervene.
    Upon consideration of NatureSweet’s Partial Consent Motion to Intervene
    Out of Time, ECF No. 122, Defendant-Intervenor’s Comments Opposing
    NatureSweet’s Motion to Intervene Out of Time, ECF No. 127, Defendant’s
    Consol. Court No. 19-00204                                                   Page 9
    Response in Opposition to NatureSweet’s Out-of-Time Motion to Intervene, ECF
    No. 128, and all other papers and proceedings in this action, it is hereby
    ORDERED that NatureSweet’s Partial Consent Motion to Intervene Out of
    Time, ECF No. 122, is granted; and it is further
    ORDERED that NS Brands, Ltd. and Naturesweet Invernaderos S. de R.L.
    de C.V./NatureSweet Comercializadora, S. de R.L. de C.V. are added as Plaintiff-
    Intervenors in Bioparques de Occidente, S.A. de C.V. v. United States, Consol.
    Court No. 19-00204.
    /s/ Jennifer Choe-Groves
    Jennifer Choe-Groves, Judge
    Dated:    November 25, 2024
    New York, New York
    

Document Info

Docket Number: Consol. 19-00204

Citation Numbers: 2024 CIT 130

Judges: Choe-Groves

Filed Date: 11/25/2024

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/25/2024