for a Safe and Independent Woodmen Hills v. Campaign Integrity Watchdog, LLC , 2019 CO 76 ( 2019 )


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    ADVANCE SHEET HEADNOTE
    September 9, 2019
    
    2019 CO 76
    No. 17SC284, Alliance for a Safe and Independent Woodmen Hills v. Campaign
    Integrity Watchdog, LLC—Campaign Finance—Statutes of Limitations—Attorney
    Fees.
    This case requires the supreme court to decide two questions regarding the
    meaning of article XXVIII, section 9(2)(a) of the Colorado Constitution. First, the
    court must construe the term “violation” as that term is used in section 9(2)(a) and
    decide whether the “violation” that triggers section 9(2)(a)’s one-year statute of
    limitations for private campaign finance enforcement actions can extend beyond
    the dates adjudicated and penalized in the decision being enforced. Second, the
    court must decide whether the attorney fees provision in section 9(2)(a) is
    self-executing or whether it must be read together with section 13-17-102(6), C.R.S.
    (2019), to limit attorney fee awards against a pro se party.
    With regard to the first question, the court concludes that the term
    “violation,” as used in section 9(2)(a), refers to the violation as adjudicated and
    penalized in the decision being enforced. Accordingly, the court further concludes
    that the division erred in perceiving a possible continuing violation under
    section 9(2)(a). Therefore, the enforcement action in this case was barred by the
    one-year statute of limitations.
    With regard to the second question, the court concludes that section 9(2)(a)’s
    language stating that “[t]he prevailing party in a private enforcement action shall
    be entitled to reasonable attorneys fees and costs” is self-executing and that section
    13-17-102(6) cannot be construed to limit or nullify section 9(2)(a)’s unconditional
    award of attorney fees to the prevailing party. Accordingly, the court reverses the
    division’s contrary determination and concludes that petitioners, as the prevailing
    parties in this case, are entitled to an award of the reasonable attorney fees that
    they incurred in the district and appellate courts in this case.
    The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado
    2 East 14th Avenue • Denver, Colorado 80203
    
    2019 CO 76
    Supreme Court Case No. 17SC284
    Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals
    Court of Appeals Case No. 16CA267
    Petitioners:
    Alliance for a Safe and Independent Woodmen Hills and Sarah Brittain Jack
    v.
    Respondent:
    Campaign Integrity Watchdog, LLC.
    Judgment Reversed
    en banc
    September 9, 2019
    Attorneys for Petitioners:
    Law Office of Robert S. Gardner
    Robert S. Gardner
    Laura A. Gardner
    Colorado Springs, Colorado
    Authorized Representative of Respondent:
    Matthew Arnold
    Denver, Colorado
    JUSTICE GABRIEL delivered the Opinion of the Court.
    ¶1       In this case, we are asked to decide two questions regarding the meaning of
    article XXVIII, section 9(2)(a) of the Colorado Constitution.         First, we must
    construe the term “violation” as that term is used in section 9(2)(a) and decide
    whether the “violation” that triggers section 9(2)(a)’s one-year statute of
    limitations for private campaign finance enforcement actions can extend beyond
    the dates adjudicated and penalized in the decision being enforced. Second, we
    must decide whether the attorney fees provision in section 9(2)(a) is self-executing
    or whether it must be read together with section 13-17-102(6), C.R.S. (2019), to limit
    attorney fee awards against a pro se party.1
    ¶2       With regard to the first question, we conclude that the term “violation,” as
    used in section 9(2)(a), refers to the violation as adjudicated and penalized in the
    decision being enforced. Accordingly, we further conclude that the division erred
    1   Specifically, we granted certiorari to review the following issues:
    1. Whether the court of appeals erred in holding that the “violation”
    triggering the statute of limitations for campaign-finance
    enforcement actions could extend beyond the dates adjudicated
    and penalized in the decision being enforced.
    2. Whether the court of appeals erred in applying section
    13-17-102(6), C.R.S. (2017), to the attorneys’ fees provision of
    Article XXVIII of the Colorado Constitution.
    2
    in perceiving a possible continuing violation under section 9(2)(a). Therefore, the
    enforcement action in this case was barred by the one-year statute of limitations.
    ¶3    With regard to the second question, we conclude that section 9(2)(a)’s
    language stating that “[t]he prevailing party in a private enforcement action shall
    be entitled to reasonable attorneys fees and costs” is self-executing and that section
    13-17-102(6) cannot be construed to limit or nullify section 9(2)(a)’s unconditional
    award of attorney fees to the prevailing party. Accordingly, we reverse the
    division’s contrary determination and conclude that petitioners, Alliance for a Safe
    and Independent Woodmen Hills (“Alliance”) and Sarah Brittain Jack, as the
    prevailing parties in this case, are entitled to an award of the reasonable attorney
    fees that they incurred in the district and appellate courts in this case.
    I. Facts and Procedural History
    ¶4    In May 2014, Woodmen Hills Metropolitan District (“Woodmen Hills”) held
    an election to fill vacant positions on its board of directors, and Ron Pace was one
    of the candidates for such a position. Several months before the election, a group
    of Woodmen Hills residents formed Alliance, a non-profit organization headed by
    Jack, to educate Woodmen Hills residents about issues affecting their community.
    ¶5    Alliance subsequently undertook efforts advocating Pace’s defeat in the
    upcoming election. Among other things, in the months leading to the election,
    Alliance mailed four different postcards to over 2,400 Woodmen Hills residents,
    3
    each making negative comments about Pace. Alliance also established a Facebook
    page that featured posts sharply critical of Pace and that expressly called for his
    defeat in the upcoming election.
    ¶6    Pursuant to article XXVIII, section 9(2)(a) of the Colorado Constitution,
    respondent Campaign Integrity Watchdog (“Watchdog”), Pace, and another
    Woodmen Hills resident subsequently filed campaign finance complaints with the
    Colorado Secretary of State (“Secretary”). As pertinent here, Watchdog alleged
    that Alliance violated the Colorado Fair Campaign Practices Act (“FCPA”),
    sections 1-45-101 to -118, C.R.S. (2019), and article XXVIII of the Colorado
    Constitution when it failed (1) to register as a political organization and political
    committee and (2) to report accurately all contributions received and all campaign
    spending or expenditures. The Secretary referred the complaints to the Office of
    Administrative Courts where they were consolidated.
    ¶7    Thereafter, an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) held two days of hearings,2
    and on August 8, 2014, he issued a Final Agency Decision. In this decision, the
    ALJ found that Alliance was a political committee because it (1) expended over
    2The ALJ held the initial hearing on June 26, 2014, but because of a power outage,
    the hearing could not be concluded in one day as scheduled but was completed
    on July 28, 2014.
    4
    $200 to oppose Pace’s election by expressly advocating his defeat on its Facebook
    page and (2) received contributions in excess of $200 that were intended for and
    used to oppose Pace’s election.          The ALJ further found that as a political
    committee, Alliance was required to register with the Secretary and to make
    periodic reports of its contributions and expenditures but that it had not done so.
    Specifically, as to the failure to register, the ALJ ruled that “[b]ecause Alliance’s
    first contribution in excess of $200 was received on March 16, 2014, it was obligated
    to register as of that date. Because March 16 was a Sunday, Alliance’s registration
    was due the following workday, March 17th.” And as to the reporting violations,
    the ALJ concluded that “[t]he reporting periods for special district elections are
    defined by Secretary of State Rule 17.4 as the 21st day before, the Friday before,
    and the 30th day after the date of a regular election,” and “[b]ecause the election
    was held May 6, 2014, Alliance’s reports were due April 15, May 2, and June 5,
    2014.”
    ¶8       The ALJ then proceeded to address the applicable sanctions to which
    Alliance was subject under article XXVIII, sections 9(2) and 10(2) and
    section 1-45-111.5(1.5), of the FCPA. In this regard, the ALJ imposed the following
    sanctions:
    a) Failure to register: Registration was due March 17, 2014, but not
    filed as of the first day of hearing, June 26, 2014; a period of 101 days,
    for a total of $5,050.
    5
    b) Failure to report: Alliance received two contributions ($10,000 on
    March 16, 2014; $7,500 on March 17, 2014) by April 10, 2014, and
    therefore was required to report those contributions by April 15, 2014.
    No report was filed as of June 26th, a period of 71 days, for a total of
    $3,550.
    Alliance received no more contributions and made no expenditures
    prior to the closing date for the report due May 2, 2014.
    Alliance received one final contribution of $500 on May 12, 2014; and
    made the expenditure associated with its Facebook based express
    advocacy on May 29, 2014. These were reportable on the report due
    June 5, 2014. This report was not filed as of June 26, 2014, a period of
    21 days, for a total of $1,050.
    The total penalties therefore include $5,050 for failure to register as a
    political committee, and $4,600 for failure to file contributions and
    expenditures reports, for a total penalty of $9,650.
    (Footnotes omitted.)
    ¶9    Alliance subsequently filed a motion to stay the ALJ’s decision pending
    appeal, but the ALJ denied that motion. Several days later, Alliance filed a notice
    of appeal and a motion to stay with the Colorado Court of Appeals. A division of
    that court denied this motion to stay, and on October 8, 2014, Alliance registered
    with the Secretary as a political committee and reported its contributions and
    expenditures as the ALJ ordered it to do.
    ¶10   Just over one month later, Alliance moved to dismiss its appeal voluntarily,
    and the court of appeals granted that motion. Thereafter, the Secretary invoiced
    Alliance for the $9,650 in penalties that Alliance still owed, but the Secretary does
    not appear to have otherwise pursued enforcement of the ALJ’s order.
    6
    ¶11    On September 15, 2015, Watchdog filed a complaint in the El Paso County
    District Court seeking to enforce the portion of the ALJ’s August 8, 2014 Final
    Agency Decision ordering Alliance to pay the $9,650 in penalties. Alliance moved
    to dismiss this complaint, alleging that section 9(2)(a) requires that private
    enforcement actions be brought within one year of the date of the violation and
    that Watchdog had filed its enforcement action more than one year after the latest
    date of any violation stated in the ALJ’s decision.
    ¶12    Because both parties submitted documentary evidence supporting their
    positions on Alliance’s motion, the district court appears to have treated Alliance’s
    motion as a motion for summary judgment and granted that motion. In doing so,
    the court explained:
    The relevant Constitutional provision is clear and unambiguous, and
    it requires in pertinent part that “Any private action brought under
    this section shall be brought within one year of the date of the
    violation in state district court.” Plaintiffs have not complied with
    this provision, and this Court accordingly has no jurisdiction to
    enforce the decision of the ALJ as a private action. [Watchdog’s]
    position that the word “violation” refers to something besides its
    common meaning, such as the date of an alleged failure to pay the
    fine, is unavailing.
    ¶13   The court further explained, “The same constitutional provision which is at
    the heart of this lawsuit provides that ‘[t]he prevailing party in a private
    enforcement action shall be entitled to reasonable attorneys fees and costs.’”
    Accordingly, it concluded that Alliance was entitled to an award of fees and costs.
    7
    ¶14    Watchdog then appealed, contending, among other things, that it had
    alleged a continuing violation and that therefore the district court had erred in
    determining that Watchdog’s complaint was time-barred by the one-year statute
    of limitations. Watchdog further argued that under Colorado statutory law, its
    status as a pro se party precluded the district court from awarding attorney fees
    against it.
    ¶15    In a divided, published opinion, a division of the court of appeals reversed
    the summary judgment for Alliance. Campaign Integrity Watchdog, LLC v. All. for a
    Safe & Indep. Woodmen Hills, 
    2017 COA 22
    , ¶ 1, __ P.3d __. The division majority
    first reviewed the plain language of article XXVIII, section 9(2)(a) of the Colorado
    Constitution and “conclude[d] that the date of ‘violation’ means the date or dates
    the FCPA or [Constitutional] Amendment is violated, and that a private cause of
    action to enforce an ALJ’s decision must be filed within one year of that date.” Id.
    at ¶ 24. The majority then proceeded to analyze whether the district court had
    properly identified the date of the violation. Id. at ¶ 25. The majority observed,
    “Because an ALJ has broad discretion to impose sanctions for violations, the dates
    he or she selects for determining the appropriate sanction are merely instructive
    and not binding for the purposes of the statute of limitations.” Id. at ¶ 34. The
    majority then determined that “to the extent the district court concluded that the
    last date of the penalty range, June 26, 2014, corresponded with the date of
    8
    violation in § 9 of the Amendment, this conclusion was erroneous and was
    contradicted by other language in the decision.” Id. In support of this conclusion,
    the division explained:
    Here, the ALJ’s footnote shows that Alliance had not registered or
    filed reports as of July 2014, and its order to Alliance to do so within
    fourteen days of the decision shows that Alliance had not done so as
    of August 8, 2014. Therefore, if the district court assumed a
    continuing violation until June 26, 2014, the violation continued until
    at least August 8, 2014, and the record does not show when or if the
    continuing violation ended. When viewed in a light most favorable
    to [Watchdog], we conclude the complaint states a plausible claim of
    a continuing violation sufficient to withstand a Rule 12(b)(5) motion
    to dismiss based on the statute of limitations.
    Id. at ¶ 35.
    ¶16    The majority therefore reversed the district court’s order, remanded the case
    for reinstatement of Watchdog’s complaint and further proceedings, and reversed
    the award of attorney fees to Alliance and Jack. Id. at ¶¶ 36–37. Because the issue
    could arise on remand, however, the majority proceeded to address Watchdog’s
    contention that its status as a pro se party precluded the district court from
    awarding attorney fees against it. In this regard, the majority initially noted that
    the plain language of section 9 entitles the prevailing party in a private
    enforcement action to reasonable attorney fees and costs. Id. at ¶ 38. The majority
    observed, however, that section 1-45-111.5(2) requires that a court consider
    sections 13-17-102(5) and (6) before awarding fees. Id. The majority then noted
    that under section 13-17-102(6), a district court may not assess fees against a pro
    9
    se party unless the court finds that the party clearly knew or reasonably should
    have known that its action or defense, or any part thereof, was substantially
    frivolous, groundless, or vexatious. Id. The majority thus stated that if the issue
    were to arise again on remand, then the district court should make the requisite
    statutory findings before assessing fees against Watchdog. Id.
    ¶17   Judge Kapelke concurred in part and dissented in part. He agreed with the
    majority’s analysis of the meaning of the term “violation” in section 9(2)(a). Id. at
    ¶ 40 (Kapelke, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).       He disagreed,
    however, with the majority’s conclusion that Watchdog’s complaint stated “a
    ‘plausible claim for relief’ based on the need for a determination whether there
    was a ‘continuing violation.’” Id. at ¶ 41. In his view, the controlling “violation”
    dates were, as the ALJ found, (1) the March 17, 2014 due date for Alliance to
    register as a political committee and (2) the April 15, May 2, and June 5, 2014 dates
    by which Alliance was required to file its contribution and expenditure reports.
    Id. at ¶ 42.   Because Watchdog’s private enforcement action was filed on
    September 15, 2015, more than one year after all of the respective dates of
    violations determined by the ALJ, and because “[s]ection 9(2)(a) does not
    recognize any exception for ‘continuing violations,’” Judge Kapelke would have
    affirmed the district court’s order dismissing Watchdog’s complaint.           Id. at
    ¶¶ 43–44.
    10
    ¶18   Alliance then petitioned this court for certiorari review, and we granted that
    petition.
    II. Analysis
    ¶19   We begin with the applicable standard of review and principles of statutory
    interpretation.      Next, we analyze the plain language of article XXVIII,
    section 9(2)(a) of the Colorado Constitution and conclude that when “violation” is
    read in context, it plainly means the violation as adjudicated and penalized in the
    decision being enforced. Thus, because Watchdog filed its complaint to enforce
    the ALJ’s decision more than one year after any of the dates of the violations found
    and penalized in that decision, it was barred by the one-year statute of limitations.
    Finally, we turn to the attorney fees provision in section 9(2)(a) and conclude that
    that provision is self-executing and is not modified by section 13-17-102(6).
    Accordingly, we reverse the division majority’s contrary ruling, and pursuant to
    section 9(2)(a), we conclude that Alliance and Jack, as the prevailing parties in this
    case, are entitled to an award of the reasonable attorney fees that they incurred in
    the district court, on appeal in the court of appeals, and in this court.
    A. Standard of Review and Principles of Construction
    ¶20   Constitutional interpretation and statutory construction present questions
    of law that we review de novo. Gessler v. Colo. Common Cause, 
    2014 CO 44
    , ¶ 7,
    
    327 P.3d 232
    , 235.
    11
    ¶21   In construing statutes and citizen initiatives, we seek to give effect to the
    General Assembly’s and the electorate’s intent, respectively. See People v. Lente,
    
    2017 CO 74
    , ¶ 16, 
    406 P.3d 829
    , 832 (citizen initiative); Teague v. People, 
    2017 CO 66
    ,
    ¶ 8, 
    395 P.3d 782
    , 784 (statute). We read words and phrases in context, according
    them their plain and ordinary meanings. Lente, ¶ 16, 
    406 P.3d at 832
    ; Teague, ¶ 8,
    
    395 P.3d at 784
    . If the language is clear, we apply it as written and need not resort
    to other tools of statutory interpretation. Lente, ¶ 16, 
    406 P.3d at 832
    ; Teague, ¶ 8,
    
    395 P.3d at 784
    .
    B. “Violation” Under Section 9(2)(a)
    ¶22   Article XXVIII of the Colorado Constitution concerns campaign and
    political finance and, among other things, establishes campaign contribution and
    expenditure reporting requirements and provides for private enforcement of
    certain of its mandates.
    ¶23   As pertinent here, section 9(2)(a) of article XXVIII addresses the process and
    requirements for private enforcement. That section provides:
    Any person who believes that a violation of section 3, section 4,
    section 5, section 6, section 7, or section 9(1)(e), of this article, or of
    sections 1-45-108, 1-45-114, 1-45-115, or 1-45-117 C.R.S., or any
    successor sections, has occurred may file a written complaint with the
    secretary of state no later than one hundred eighty days after the date
    of the alleged violation. The secretary of state shall refer the complaint
    to an administrative law judge within three days of the filing of the
    complaint. The administrative law judge shall hold a hearing within
    fifteen days of the referral of the complaint, and shall render a decision
    within fifteen days of the hearing. The defendant shall be granted an
    12
    extension of up to thirty days upon defendant’s motion, or longer
    upon a showing of good cause. If the administrative law judge
    determines that such violation has occurred, such decision shall include
    any appropriate order, sanction, or relief authorized by this article.
    The decision of the administrative law judge shall be final and subject
    to review by the court of appeals, pursuant to section 24-4-106(11),
    C.R.S., or any successor section. The secretary of state and the
    administrative law judge are not necessary parties to the review. The
    decision may be enforced by the secretary of state, or, if the secretary
    of state does not file an enforcement action within thirty days of the
    decision, in a private cause of action by the person filing the
    complaint. Any private action brought under this section shall be
    brought within one year of the date of the violation in state district
    court. The prevailing party in a private enforcement action shall be
    entitled to reasonable attorneys fees and costs.
    § 9(2)(a) (emphases added).3
    ¶24   Both parties, as well as the division below, agree that section 9(2)(a) requires
    private enforcement actions to be brought within one year of the date of “the
    violation.” They disagree, however, as to the meaning of “the violation” for
    3 In Holland v. Williams, No. 16-cv-00138-RM-MLC, 
    2018 WL 2938320
    , at *8–9,
    11–13 (D. Colo. June 12, 2018), the United States District Court (1) granted the
    plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and found the private enforcement
    provision of section 9(2)(a) to be facially unconstitutional and (2) declined to enter
    judgment pending further proceedings on the plaintiff’s motion for a permanent
    injunction. Apparently, the defendant did not appeal that decision, but the case
    ended before the court ruled on the permanent injunction motion. This decision
    is not binding on this court, see Ahart v. Colo. Dep’t of Corrs., 
    964 P.2d 517
    , 522 (Colo.
    1998), and we need not address the constitutionality of section 9(2)(a)’s
    enforcement provision (an issue that neither party briefed here), because,
    assuming the provision is constitutional, Watchdog’s enforcement action is
    time-barred.
    13
    purposes of determining when the one-year limitation period accrues. Alliance
    argues that under the plain meaning of section 9(2)(a), the one-year limitation
    period begins to run as of the dates of violation found and penalized in the ALJ’s
    decision. Watchdog, in contrast, argues that the plain meaning of “violation”
    means the “last act” of breaking or dishonoring the FCPA, which can continue post
    judgment. We agree with Alliance.
    ¶25   Under section 9(2)(a), “[a]ny person who believes that a violation” has
    occurred can file a complaint with the Secretary, who then refers the case to an
    ALJ, who must hold a hearing within fifteen days of the referral and render a
    decision within fifteen days of the hearing.          (Emphasis added.)       “If the
    administrative law judge determines that such violation has occurred, such decision
    shall include any appropriate order, sanction, or relief authorized by this article.”
    
    Id.
     (emphases added).
    ¶26   Thereafter, the Secretary may enforce the decision, but if the Secretary does
    not file an enforcement action within thirty days of the decision, then the person
    filing the complaint may file a private enforcement action.         
    Id.
     This action,
    however, must be brought within one year of “the date of the violation.” 
    Id.
    (emphasis added).     In our view, “the violation” referred to in the provision
    establishing a one-year statute of limitations refers to the violation found and
    penalized in the ALJ’s decision. That violation, in turn, refers back to the violation
    14
    alleged in the campaign finance complaint. Such a reading is not only consistent
    with section 9(2)(a)’s plain language, but also it is consistent with the notion of
    enforcing the ALJ’s order. Section 9(2)(a) allows a party to seek to enforce only an
    ALJ’s decision. It does not authorize a party to enforce a violation that the ALJ did
    not find or that has not occurred yet.
    ¶27   In his decision, the ALJ found that Alliance was required to register as a
    political committee by March 17, 2014, and that Alliance’s applicable contribution
    and expenditure reports were due on April 15, May 2, and June 5, 2014. The ALJ
    subsequently calculated penalties for each violation based on the numbers of days
    that had elapsed between the due dates of the filings and the first date of the
    administrative hearing, which occurred on June 26, 2014. Accordingly, the latest
    date on which the ALJ found a specific violation was June 5, 2014, and the latest
    date for which the ALJ imposed a penalty was June 26, 2014. As a result, the latest
    date on which the ALJ could be said to have found a violation was June 26, 2014,
    and therefore, Watchdog’s private cause of action accrued no later than that date,
    giving Watchdog until, at the latest, June 26, 2015, to file any private enforcement
    action.
    ¶28   Because Watchdog did not file its complaint until September 15, 2015,
    however, we conclude that its enforcement action was untimely.
    15
    ¶29   We are not persuaded otherwise by Watchdog’s contention that it had
    alleged a continuing violation and therefore its cause of action did not accrue until
    October 8, 2014, the date on which Alliance registered and filed the required
    reports. Although it is not clear to us that Watchdog, in fact, alleged a continuing
    violation in its complaint, assuming without deciding that it did, the ALJ’s
    decision did not find a continuing violation but rather found and penalized
    violations through and including June 26, 2014, and as noted above, this is the
    latest date on which Watchdog’s cause of action can be said to have accrued.
    ¶30   Nor are we persuaded by Watchdog’s contention that it may be impossible
    for parties to file a timely enforcement action because the statute of limitations
    could run prior to the entry of judgment or the final appellate mandate regarding
    the administrative proceeding. In support of this contention, Watchdog asserts
    that a private party may only file an enforcement action if the Secretary chooses
    not to file one. Watchdog further notes that the Secretary cannot file an
    enforcement action until the appellate mandate arising from the administrative
    proceeding issues because the district court would lack jurisdiction over such an
    action while an appeal concerning the administrative proceeding is pending.
    Accordingly, Watchdog contends that allowing the statute of limitations to begin
    to run from the date of the violation found and penalized in the ALJ’s decision
    would create an absurd result because the one-year statute of limitations could
    16
    expire while the appeal from the administrative proceeding is pending, thus
    eliminating any opportunity to file an enforcement action. For three reasons, we
    disagree.
    ¶31   First, section 9(2)(a) does not state that the one-year statute of limitations
    begins to run from the date of the appellate mandate. It says, “Any private action
    brought under this section shall be brought within one year of the date of the
    violation in state district court.” § 9(2)(a) (emphasis added).
    ¶32   Second, Watchdog has provided no applicable authority, and we have seen
    none, to support its contention that a district court would lack jurisdiction over an
    enforcement action while an appeal concerning the administrative proceeding is
    pending. A district court generally loses jurisdiction when the case before that court
    is on appeal. Schnier v. Dist. Court, 
    696 P.2d 264
    , 267 (Colo. 1985) (“Generally, the
    filing of a notice of appeal divests the trial court of jurisdiction, although this rule
    is subject to a number of exceptions.”). Here, in contrast, the enforcement action
    would be filed as a separate action, and a court does not lack jurisdiction due to the
    fact that a related case is on appeal. See Globe Indem. Co. v. Wrenn Ins. Agency of
    Mo., 
    816 F. Supp. 1379
    , 1381 (W.D. Mo. 1993) (“It is well settled that the fact that a
    case is proceeding in one court does not necessarily defeat jurisdiction of a parallel
    case in another court.”).
    17
    ¶33   Third, if need be, a party filing an enforcement action can protect its rights
    by timely filing the enforcement action and then asking the court to stay that action
    pending the disposition of the appeal concerning the administrative proceeding.
    Such a procedure would be consistent with the constitution’s plain language, and
    it would avoid the absurd result that Watchdog posits.
    ¶34   For these reasons, we conclude that Watchdog’s enforcement action here is
    time-barred.
    C. Attorney Fees Under Section 9(2)(a)
    ¶35   Alliance argues that if it prevails on appeal, then it is entitled to attorney
    fees under section 9(2)(a) and that the division erred in concluding that section
    13-17-102(6) effectively modifies section 9(2)(a). We agree with both points.
    ¶36   As noted above, section 9(2)(a) provides, in pertinent part, “The prevailing
    party in a private enforcement action shall be entitled to reasonable attorneys fees
    and costs.”
    ¶37   Section 13-17-102(6) provides:
    No party who is appearing without an attorney shall be assessed
    attorney fees unless the court finds that the party clearly knew or
    reasonably should have known that his action or defense, or any part
    thereof, was substantially frivolous, substantially groundless, or
    substantially vexatious; except that this subsection (6) shall not apply
    to situations in which an attorney licensed to practice law in this state
    is appearing without an attorney, in which case, he shall be held to
    the standards established for attorneys elsewhere in this article.
    18
    ¶38   The question before us is whether section 13-17-102(6) can be construed as
    imposing a legislative limitation on section 9(2)(a).
    ¶39   In Yenter v. Baker, 
    248 P.2d 311
    , 314 (Colo. 1952), we made clear that a facially
    self-executing provision of our constitution is not subject to legislative restriction
    or curtailment:
    A constitutional provision is a higher form of statutory law which the
    people may provide shall be self-executing; the object being to put it
    beyond the power of the Legislature to render it nugatory by refusing
    to pass laws to carry it into effect.
    An equally important object of self-execution is to put it beyond the
    power of the legislature to render it nugatory by passing restrictive
    laws.
    Only such legislation is permissible as is in furtherance of the
    purpose, or as will facilitate the enforcement, of such provision, and
    legislation which will impair, limit or destroy rights granted by the
    provision is not permissible.
    If a constitutional provision is self-enforcing . . . then any legislation
    respecting the provision must facilitate enforcement and not curtail
    or limit any right created and conferred by the provision. If a
    legislative act undertakes to limit the provisions of the Constitution,
    then in a contest, the Constitution survives and the act falls.
    The power to impair would be the power to destroy.
    (Alteration in original) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted.)
    ¶40   The question thus becomes whether section 9(2)(a) is self-executing. A
    constitutional provision is self-executing when it appears to take immediate effect
    and no further action by the legislature is required to implement the right given.
    19
    Developmental Pathways v. Ritter, 
    178 P.3d 524
    , 531 (Colo. 2008). “Constitutional
    provisions are presumed to be self-executing,” and “[t]his presumption is even
    more appropriate when considering initiated amendments.”                   Davidson v.
    Sandstrom, 
    83 P.3d 648
    , 658 (Colo. 2004).
    ¶41   Because section 9(2)(a) appears to take immediate effect and no further
    action by the legislature is required to implement it, we conclude that it is
    self-executing.   Therefore, section 13-17-102(6) cannot be read as imposing a
    limitation on section 9(2)(a)’s applicability.
    ¶42   In reaching this conclusion, we are not persuaded by Watchdog’s argument
    that under section 1-45-111.5(2) of the FCPA, section 9(2)(a) requires an analysis of
    whether attorney fees can be awarded against a pro se party. Section 1-45-111.5(2)
    provides, in pertinent part, “[N]o attorney fees may be awarded under this
    subsection (2) unless the court or hearing officer, as applicable, has first considered
    and issued written findings regarding the provisions of section 13-17-102(5) and
    (6).” (Emphasis added.) Here, however, the district court did not award attorney
    fees under section 1-45-111.5(2). Rather, the court awarded fees directly under
    article XXVIII, section 9(2)(a) of the Colorado Constitution. Moreover, for the
    same reasons that section 13-17-102(6) cannot be construed to limit section 9(2)(a),
    section 1-45-111.5(2) cannot be construed as imposing a legislative limitation on
    that self-executing constitutional provision.
    20
    ¶43     Accordingly, under the plain language of section 9(2)(a), Alliance and Jack,
    as the prevailing parties here, are entitled to an award of their reasonable attorney
    fees.
    III. Conclusion
    ¶44     For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that for purposes of the one-year
    statute of limitations set forth in article XXVIII, section 9(2)(a) of the Colorado
    Constitution, the “violation” that starts the time for filing a private enforcement
    action is the violation that the ALJ found and penalized in the decision to be
    enforced. Here, because that violation occurred, at the latest, on June 26, 2014,
    Watchdog’s enforcement action, which was not filed until September 15, 2015, was
    time-barred.
    ¶45     We further conclude that the fee-shifting provision in section 9(2)(a) is
    self-executing and therefore cannot be construed to be limited by section
    13-17-102(6). Accordingly, as the prevailing parties here, Alliance and Jack are
    entitled to an award of the reasonable attorney fees that they incurred in the
    district and appellate courts in this case, and we remand the case with instructions
    that the matter be returned to the district court for a determination of the
    reasonable fees to be awarded.
    ¶46     The judgment is therefore reversed, and this case is remanded for further
    proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    21