The People of the State of Colorado v. Alfred Elias Moreno , 2022 CO 15 ( 2022 )

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<div><header><center><b></b><p data-paragraph-id="cd84f725fd"><span data-sentence-id="cf075b610c" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="cd84f725fd">2022 CO 15</span></p><p data-paragraph-id="ad01fd5d08"><span data-sentence-id="02a8fcd426" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="ad01fd5d08"> The People of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant <br /> v.</span><span data-sentence-id="55b503248b" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="ad01fd5d08"> <br /> Alfred Elias Moreno, Defendant-Appellee </span></p><p data-paragraph-id="4e03210b78">No. 21SA181</p><p data-paragraph-id="44f91532a1"><span data-sentence-id="44f91532a1" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="44f91532a1">Supreme Court of Colorado, en banc</span></p><p data-paragraph-id="7207dd16ac">March 28, 2022</p></center></header><br /><!--OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE-->
<p id="AppealLine" data-paragraph-id="d674b41694"><span data-sentence-id="07cb69e4e4" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="d674b41694"> Appeal from the District Court Garfield County District Court Case No. 19CR161 Honorable James B. Boyd, Judge </span></p>
<p id="Attorney" data-paragraph-id="ba2a9e3852"><span data-sentence-id="c37943e74d" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="ba2a9e3852"> Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant: </span></p>
<p id="Attorney" data-paragraph-id="f50558376b"><span data-sentence-id="f6013f3a11" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="f50558376b"> Jefferson J. Cheney, District Attorney, Ninth Judicial District </span></p>
<p id="Attorney" data-paragraph-id="6a439f2d5a"><span data-sentence-id="dede9a62f0" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="6a439f2d5a"> Donald R. Nottingham, Chief Deputy District Attorney </span></p>
<p id="Attorney" data-paragraph-id="5dccbe4762"><span data-sentence-id="5e194433d7" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="5dccbe4762"> Glenwood Springs, Colorado </span></p>
<p id="Attorney" data-paragraph-id="f0ced0dbd2"><span data-sentence-id="48450b7abf" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="f0ced0dbd2"> Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee: </span></p>
<p id="Attorney" data-paragraph-id="80e49be4d7"><span data-sentence-id="f086a11fbe" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="80e49be4d7"> Megan A. Ring, Public Defender </span></p>
<p id="Attorney" data-paragraph-id="95f2967b78"><span data-sentence-id="13d1908b73" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="95f2967b78"> Casey Mark Klekas, Deputy Public Defender </span></p>
<p id="Attorney" data-paragraph-id="ae68f34ede"> Denver, Colorado </p>
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<p id="Judge" data-paragraph-id="b285f453eb"><span data-sentence-id="8ccf19ad6c" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="b285f453eb"> JUSTICE HOOD delivered the Opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF JUSTICE BOATRIGHT, JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ, JUSTICE GABRIEL, JUSTICE HART, JUSTICE SAMOUR, and JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER joined.</span> </p>
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<p id="MajorityOpinion" data-paragraph-id="3b9a4cc862"> <strong>OPINION</strong> </p>
<p id="MajorityJudge" data-paragraph-id="f9f5bb5699"> HOOD JUSTICE </p>
<p data-paragraph-id="9653433440"><span data-sentence-id="5a8f22a921" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="9653433440"> ¶1 In this appeal, we review a district court's order invalidating part of Colorado's harassment statute.</span><span data-sentence-id="63fc1973d3" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="9653433440"> The district court concluded that the phrase "intended to harass" in section 18-9-111(1)(e), C.R.S. (2021), unconstitutionally restricts protected speech.</span><span data-sentence-id="a2ce69de3f" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="9653433440"> We agree that this provision is substantially overbroad on its face and thus affirm the order.</span> </p>
<p data-paragraph-id="2145c11576"><span data-sentence-id="637efaf2a2" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="2145c11576"> <strong>I. Facts and Procedural History</strong> </span></p>
<p data-paragraph-id="aa31688e52"><span data-sentence-id="498ff777ec" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="aa31688e52"> ¶2 In December 2018, Alfred Moreno repeatedly emailed his ex-wife, E.M.</span><span data-sentence-id="61aa06021e" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="aa31688e52"> He asked to see his children, but he also made a series of disparaging and vulgar comments about her, saying that he hated her and that she was a "snake" and a "whore" with an "STD."</span><span data-sentence-id="1009d1c0f5" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="aa31688e52"> In response, E.M. told Moreno to stop contacting her.</span><span data-sentence-id="554e79f698" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="aa31688e52"> Undeterred, Moreno posted the following on Facebook: "To whom ever is fkng [E.M.] in my friends list.</span><span data-sentence-id="b574614e10" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="aa31688e52"> Will you please tell her to have my kids call me asap.</span><span data-sentence-id="6d032cc134" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="aa31688e52"> You can have her and the STD[.]</span><span data-sentence-id="bf71769577" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="aa31688e52"> I just want my kids to contact me.</span><span data-sentence-id="44296abd97" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="aa31688e52"> And remember that you are not there [sic] father okay.</span> Thanks homies[.]" </p>
<p data-paragraph-id="dcd8e57df8"><span data-sentence-id="1f15b76d3a" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="dcd8e57df8"> ¶3 The prosecution charged Moreno with (1) harassment under section 18-9-111(1)(e), a class three misdemeanor; and (2) habitual domestic </span></p>
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<p data-paragraph-id="e833aa5060"><span data-sentence-id="4dd98e0886" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="e833aa5060"> violence under section 18-6-801(7), C.R.S. (2021), a class five felony.</span>^{[<a href="#ftn.FN1" name="FN1" id="FN1">1</a>]} </p>
<p data-paragraph-id="f94d55839b"><span data-sentence-id="efb2e9100e" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="f94d55839b"> ¶4 Moreno moved to dismiss the harassment charge, arguing that subsection (1)(e) is unconstitutionally overbroad and vague, both facially and as applied to him, in violation of the freedom-of-speech provisions in the United States and Colorado constitutions.</span> </p>
<p data-paragraph-id="3cd5e84898"><span data-sentence-id="c868e5259b" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="3cd5e84898"> ¶5 As relevant here, section 18-9-111(1)(e) states that </span></p>
<p data-paragraph-id="d41d8cd98f"></p><blockquote>
[a] person commits harassment if, with intent to harass,
annoy, or alarm another person, he or she . . . [d]irectly or
indirectly initiates communication with a person or directs
language toward another person, anonymously or otherwise, by
telephone, telephone network, data network, text message,
instant message, computer, computer network, computer system,
or other interactive electronic medium in a manner
<em>intended to harass</em> or threaten bodily injury or
property damage, or makes any comment, request, suggestion,
or proposal by telephone, computer, computer network,
computer system, or other interactive electronic medium that
is obscene.
</blockquote><p data-paragraph-id="d41d8cd98f"></p>
<p data-paragraph-id="1ceea7243d"> (Emphasis added.) </p>
<p data-paragraph-id="61d9839a4a"><span data-sentence-id="b4131a116b" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="61d9839a4a"> ¶6 Although Moreno did not specify which part of subsection (1)(e) was the subject of his challenge, the district court concluded that the phrase "intended to harass" rendered the statute facially unconstitutional as vague and overbroad.</span><span data-sentence-id="cea819221e" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="61d9839a4a"> Relying mainly on this court's decisions in <em>People v. Hickman</em>, <a href="/vid/886831050" data-vids="886831050">988 P.2d 628</a> (Colo. 1999); </span></p>
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<p data-paragraph-id="d7498c1de8"><span data-sentence-id="1883871a98" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="d7498c1de8"> <em>People v. Smith</em>, <a href="/vid/886732384" data-vids="886732384">862 P.2d 939</a> (Colo. 1993); and <em>Bolles v. People</em>, <a href="/vid/888315320" data-vids="888315320">541 P.2d 80</a> (Colo. 1975), the district court reasoned that Moreno's statements were protected speech and could not be construed as true threats, a category of unprotected speech that the government may regulate.</span><span data-sentence-id="586c0e3083" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="d7498c1de8">^{[<a href="#ftn.FN2" name="FN2" id="FN2">2</a>]} It explained that the phrase "intended to harass" could allow a person to be prosecuted for alarming or annoying others by forecasting a storm or predicting political trends-concerns that prompted this court to invalidate a similar statutory provision in <em>Bolles</em>.</span><span data-sentence-id="96ea21e0bd" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="d7498c1de8"> Moreover, it determined that the statute's prohibition on communications made in a manner "intended to harass" on seemingly any "other interactive electronic medium" sweeps too broadly, covering a substantial amount of protected speech.</span><span data-sentence-id="8add9ad342" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="d7498c1de8"> The court also noted that the statute's circular language "failed to apprise persons of ordinary intelligence what conduct is prohibited," making the "intended to harass" portion of the statute unconstitutionally vague.</span><span data-sentence-id="8bc95dc346" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="d7498c1de8"> Because of these deficiencies, the court dismissed the harassment charge.</span> </p>
<p data-paragraph-id="c9c5e6a626"><span data-sentence-id="81c109f8e4" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="c9c5e6a626"> ¶7 The prosecution appealed pursuant to section 16-12-102(1), C.R.S. (2021).</span><span data-sentence-id="fd9d174327" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="c9c5e6a626"> Under section 13-4-102(1)(b), C.R.S. (2021), this court has jurisdiction to hear a direct appeal of a district court's determination that a statute is unconstitutional.</span> </p>
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<p data-paragraph-id="1c6e61e952"> <strong>II. Analysis</strong> </p>
<p data-paragraph-id="90e3c8fe03"><span data-sentence-id="2d9fd9d428" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="90e3c8fe03"> ¶8 We begin by setting out the standard of review and then briefly outlining the constitutional framework for free-speech protections.</span><span data-sentence-id="c3ba152fb6" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="90e3c8fe03"> With that background in place, we then focus on the overbreadth doctrine and apply an existing three-part test for overbreadth.</span><span data-sentence-id="683bf4df2f" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="90e3c8fe03"> After construing the statute, we hold that the phrase "intended to harass" in subsection (1)(e) is substantially overbroad on its face, impermissibly encroaching on protected speech.</span><span data-sentence-id="1c7e236081" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="90e3c8fe03"> But by invalidating that phrase, we preserve the remainder of the statute.</span><span data-sentence-id="109cea0fd0" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="90e3c8fe03"> Before concluding, we also discuss <em>Bolles</em>-a nearly fifty-year-old precedent-and its enduring lessons for the digital age.</span> </p>
<p data-paragraph-id="5205abc56f"><span data-sentence-id="9b24fb3ff8" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="5205abc56f"> <strong>A. Standard of Review</strong> </span></p>
<p data-paragraph-id="92bf6219d1"><span data-sentence-id="24d10e7346" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="92bf6219d1"> ¶9 We review a district court's order regarding a statute's constitutionality de novo.</span> <em>E-470 Pub. Highway Auth.<span data-sentence-id="56fd77b875" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="92bf6219d1"> v. Revenig</span></em>, <a href="/vid/891587429" data-vids="891587429">91 P.3d 1038</a>, 1041 (Colo. 2004).<span data-sentence-id="279c991b0e" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="92bf6219d1"> Statutes are presumptively constitutional, and </span><span data-sentence-id="3e7d9f61e6" quote="true" data-paragraph-id="92bf6219d1">"declaring a statute unconstitutional is one of the gravest duties impressed upon the courts."</span><span data-sentence-id="0e73af8a36" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="92bf6219d1"> <em>People v. Graves</em>, 2016 CO 15, ¶ 9, <a href="/vid/893899929" data-vids="893899929">368 P.3d 317</a>, 322 (quoting <em>City of Greenwood Vill.</em></span><span data-sentence-id="f4de2bd186" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="92bf6219d1"> v. Petitioners for Proposed City of Centennial, <a href="/vid/890694004" data-vids="890694004">3 P.3d 427</a>, 440 (Colo. 2000)).</span><span data-sentence-id="51b940e8e6" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="92bf6219d1"> A litigant challenging the validity of a statute must prove the statute is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.</span> <em>Id.</em> </p>
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<p data-paragraph-id="b32227b194"><span data-sentence-id="d10ae68458" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="b32227b194"> <strong>B. Constitutional Framework</strong> </span></p>
<p data-paragraph-id="e98a77d16e"> <strong>1.<span data-sentence-id="29e8cc3388" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="e98a77d16e"> Free-Speech Protections</span></strong> </p>
<p data-paragraph-id="3ffc48f9b4"><span data-sentence-id="459532d3da" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="3ffc48f9b4"> ¶10 Because section 18-9-111(1)(e) prohibits certain types of communications, it implicates the free-speech protections afforded by the United States and Colorado constitutions.</span><span data-sentence-id="5504653ba7" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="3ffc48f9b4"> <em>See Smith</em>, 862 P.2d at 941.</span><span data-sentence-id="816d842b68" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="3ffc48f9b4"> Moreno invokes both constitutions, which respectively provide that </span><span data-sentence-id="73afb689b9" quote="true" data-paragraph-id="3ffc48f9b4">"no law 'abridging' or 'impairing' freedom of speech shall be enacted."</span> <em>Id.<span data-sentence-id="5c35917224" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="3ffc48f9b4"></span></em> (quoting U.S. Const. amend. I; Colo. Const. art. II, § 10).<span data-sentence-id="aaf59156a0" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="3ffc48f9b4"> Still, the right to free speech is not absolute, and the government may create, and courts have upheld, statutes proscribing certain categories of <em>un</em>protected speech like fighting words, true threats, and obscenity.</span>^{[<a href="#ftn.FN3" name="FN3" id="FN3">3</a>]} <em>See id.<span data-sentence-id="ce460c7737" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="3ffc48f9b4"></span></em>; <em>see also United States v. Stevens</em>, <a href="/vid/889387193" data-vids="889387193">559 U.S. 460</a>, 468-69 (2010). </p>
<p data-paragraph-id="3e898fa439"><span data-sentence-id="acddfd84ab" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="3e898fa439"> ¶11 A statute restricting speech must be carefully crafted and narrowly drawn to carry out legitimate and constitutional legislative goals.</span><span data-sentence-id="1b51d33d79" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="3e898fa439"> <em>See Smith</em>, 862 P.2d at 941; <em>Bolles</em>, 541 P.2d at 82.</span><span data-sentence-id="a817c31b6c" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="3e898fa439"> Even if a statute aims to proscribe only unprotected </span></p>
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<p data-paragraph-id="e56fdb2a1c"><span data-sentence-id="e1d50497e4" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="e56fdb2a1c"> speech, it may be struck down as facially overbroad if it <em>substantially</em> infringes upon constitutionally protected speech.</span><span data-sentence-id="95084bca13" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="e56fdb2a1c"> <em>Smith</em>, 862 P.2d at 941; <em>see also Broadrick v. Oklahoma</em>, <a href="/vid/889094570" data-vids="889094570">413 U.S. 601</a>, 615 (1973).</span> </p>
<p data-paragraph-id="e120ed23a3"><span data-sentence-id="0731bcb261" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="e120ed23a3"> ¶12 These bedrock notions hold true irrespective of whether the communication occurs in person or electronically.</span><span data-sentence-id="17823a0a1a" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="e120ed23a3"> As the Supreme Court has explained, </span><span data-sentence-id="c896f4bb13" quote="true" data-paragraph-id="e120ed23a3">"whatever the challenges of applying the Constitution to ever-advancing technology, 'the basic principle[] of freedom of speech . . ., like the First Amendment's command, do[es] not vary' when a new and different medium for communication appears."</span> <em>Brown v. Ent. Merchs.<span data-sentence-id="63f21cf37e" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="e120ed23a3"> Ass'n</span></em>, <a href="/vid/891384085" data-vids="891384085">564 U.S. 786</a>, 790 (2011) (quoting <em>Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson</em>, <a href="/vid/889256576" data-vids="889256576">343 U.S. 495</a>, 503 (1952)). </p>
<p data-paragraph-id="1682fad209"><span data-sentence-id="d49629ff61" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="1682fad209"> ¶13 Although courts often examine overbreadth and vagueness together, they are distinct doctrines that spring from different constitutional guarantees.</span><span data-sentence-id="c5d9add846" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="1682fad209"> <em>Graves</em>, ¶¶ 21-24, 368 P.3d at 325-26.</span><span data-sentence-id="cac8471d6a" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="1682fad209"> While vagueness protection derives from the Due Process Clause and "concerns the lack of clarity in the language of a statute," overbreadth protection derives from the First Amendment and "concerns the reach of a statute and its encroachment upon constitutionally protected speech."</span> <em>Id.<span data-sentence-id="e77c39982d" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="1682fad209"></span></em> at ¶¶ 23-24, 368 P.3d at 325-26.<span data-sentence-id="40573b3b0e" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="1682fad209"> When a litigant brings a facial challenge on </span></p>
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<p data-paragraph-id="cdc5ccdb2c"><span data-sentence-id="94841b95d8" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="cdc5ccdb2c"> both overbreadth and vagueness grounds, we begin with the overbreadth analysis.</span>^{[<a href="#ftn.FN4" name="FN4" id="FN4">4</a>]} <em>See id.<span data-sentence-id="992f6e0710" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="cdc5ccdb2c"></span></em> at ¶ 25, 368 P.3d at 326. </p>
<p data-paragraph-id="0faeee68a9"> <strong>2.<span data-sentence-id="f843bf21d9" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="0faeee68a9"> Overbreadth Doctrine</span></strong> </p>
<p data-paragraph-id="7c2c3ccb9e"><span data-sentence-id="461675a378" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="7c2c3ccb9e"> ¶14 The overbreadth doctrine establishes contours for the free-speech provisions of our state and federal constitutions.</span> "<span data-sentence-id="ad0c7b12b0" quote="true" data-paragraph-id="7c2c3ccb9e">[A] statute is facially overbroad if it sweeps so comprehensively as to substantially include within its proscriptions constitutionally protected speech."</span><span data-sentence-id="2682f88e88" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="7c2c3ccb9e"> <em>Bolles</em>, 541 P.2d at 82.</span> </p>
<p data-paragraph-id="e2affbae67"><span data-sentence-id="5af875f703" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="e2affbae67"> ¶15 The prosecution contends that Moreno lacks standing to bring this facial challenge because his conduct is clearly regulated by the statute, and therefore, he should not be able to attack the statute on the ground that prosecution of another defendant under the statute would be unconstitutional.</span> But <span data-sentence-id="27d6ea1da2" quote="true" data-paragraph-id="e2affbae67">"this rule of standing is changed when the statute in question regulates speech.</span><span data-sentence-id="648de41d0d" quote="true" data-paragraph-id="e2affbae67"> In such cases, a defendant is granted standing to assert the First Amendment rights of others."</span> </p>
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<p data-paragraph-id="45f2c82bd7"><span data-sentence-id="4c56b1d192" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="45f2c82bd7"> <em>People v. Weeks</em>, <a href="/vid/888334890" data-vids="888334890">591 P.2d 91</a>, 94 (Colo. 1979).</span><span data-sentence-id="c2e4f66d9b" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="45f2c82bd7"> Thus, regardless of whether a litigant's speech is constitutionally protected, he may challenge a law as overbroad.</span><span data-sentence-id="4abbe8b142" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="45f2c82bd7"> <em>People v. Baer</em>, <a href="/vid/891149590" data-vids="891149590">973 P.2d 1225</a>, 1231 (Colo. 1999).</span><span data-sentence-id="e5abbd10c0" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="45f2c82bd7"> This departure from typical standing rules recognizes that </span><span data-sentence-id="b4f8ae4069" quote="true" data-paragraph-id="45f2c82bd7">"the very existence of an overly broad statute may deter others from exercising their First Amendment rights."</span><span data-sentence-id="6cc37a6189" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="45f2c82bd7"> <em>Graves</em>, ¶ 13, 368 P.3d at 323.</span><span data-sentence-id="4a9c73d3c1" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="45f2c82bd7"> Allowing litigants to challenge a statute as facially overbroad thus protects the rights of us all.</span> <em>Id.<span data-sentence-id="acb1eb8531" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="45f2c82bd7"></span></em>; <em>Hickman</em>, 988 P.2d at 634 n.4. </p>
<p data-paragraph-id="98f0257e1d"><span data-sentence-id="8f2aff5871" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="98f0257e1d"> ¶16 Despite the broad standing we confer on litigants to press the right to freedom of speech, we must also respect the legislature's efforts to regulate abusive behavior.</span><span data-sentence-id="93d363543c" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="98f0257e1d"> Indeed, the overbreadth doctrine is "strong medicine" that we employ "only as a last resort."</span><span data-sentence-id="1c192473ab" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="98f0257e1d"> <em>Graves</em>, ¶ 13, 368 P.3d at 323 (quoting <em>New York v. Ferber</em>, <a href="/vid/885460314" data-vids="885460314">458 U.S. 747</a>, 769 (1982)).</span><span data-sentence-id="6d5b8da26d" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="98f0257e1d"> While "the threat of enforcement of an overbroad law deters people from engaging in constitutionally protected speech, . . . invalidating a law that in some of its applications is perfectly constitutional-particularly a law directed at conduct so antisocial that it has been made criminal-has obvious harmful effects."</span><span data-sentence-id="bd6c7d8b27" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="98f0257e1d"> <em>United States v. Williams</em>, <a href="/vid/895336628" data-vids="895336628">553 U.S. 285</a>, 292 (2008).</span><span data-sentence-id="2241e137a4" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="98f0257e1d"> In balancing these priorities, the Supreme Court and this court have emphasized the requirement that a statute's overbreadth be "real and substantial" in relation to its plainly legitimate sweep.</span><span data-sentence-id="1220640c80" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="98f0257e1d"> <em>Graves</em>, ¶ 14, 368 P.3d at 323; <em>see also Williams</em>, 553 U.S. at 292.</span> </p>
<p data-paragraph-id="d41d8cd98f"></p><div class="pagebreak"><span class="number">10</span></div><p data-paragraph-id="d41d8cd98f"></p>
<p data-paragraph-id="c108a770af"><span data-sentence-id="224ad40ed1" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="c108a770af"> ¶17 To accomplish this, overbreadth analysis consists of three steps.</span><span data-sentence-id="84e4d49078" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="c108a770af"> First, we must construe the challenged statute to establish its scope.</span><span data-sentence-id="1d281ba603" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="c108a770af"> <em>Graves,</em> ¶ 15, 368 P.3d at 323-24; <em>see also Williams</em>, 553 U.S. at 293 (explaining that </span><span data-sentence-id="d22b3b3de4" quote="true" data-paragraph-id="c108a770af">"it is impossible to determine whether a statute reaches too far without first knowing what the statute covers")</span>.<span data-sentence-id="34e23ab713" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="c108a770af"> Second, we determine whether the statute, as construed, prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech.</span><span data-sentence-id="b4bfc17c4b" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="c108a770af"> <em>Graves</em>, ¶ 15, 368 P.3d at 324; <em>see also</em> <em>Williams</em>, 553 U.S. at 297.</span><span data-sentence-id="780d5b9210" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="c108a770af"> Third, if possible, we apply a limiting construction or partial invalidation to honor the legislature's choices while preserving the statute's constitutionality.</span><span data-sentence-id="20ad1c9bb8" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="c108a770af"> <em>Graves</em>, ¶ 16, 368 P.3d at 324.</span> </p>
<p data-paragraph-id="9e3819d930"> <strong>C. Application</strong> </p>
<p data-paragraph-id="85004f8043"> <strong>1.<span data-sentence-id="29e97fc2e1" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="85004f8043"> Construing Section 18-9-111(1)(e)</span></strong> </p>
<p data-paragraph-id="e03c028e62"><span data-sentence-id="a02412bc80" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="e03c028e62"> ¶18 When construing a statute, our aim is to ascertain and give effect to the General Assembly's intent.</span><span data-sentence-id="0a52d504b0" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="e03c028e62"> <em>Graves</em>, ¶ 27, 368 P.3d at 326.</span><span data-sentence-id="acb8ea2ee2" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="e03c028e62"> We look to the plain meaning of a statute's terms to determine whether they cover protected communications.</span><span data-sentence-id="54a86e37bf" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="e03c028e62"> <em>Hickman</em>, 988 P.2d at 642.</span> </p>
<p data-paragraph-id="4afb1cd2af"><span data-sentence-id="b24c8ad1ec" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="4afb1cd2af"> ¶19 In construing the phrase "intended to harass" in subsection (1)(e), <em>Hickman</em> is instructive.</span><span data-sentence-id="8809b82d0b" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="4afb1cd2af"> The prosecution charged Hickman with witness retaliation.</span><span data-sentence-id="08a2f8c5b7" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="4afb1cd2af"> <em>Hickman</em>, 988 P.2d at 632.</span><span data-sentence-id="ecdc4c7f5e" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="4afb1cd2af"> In examining the statute defining that offense, we concluded that the term "act of harassment" was unconstitutionally overbroad.</span> <em>Id.<span data-sentence-id="0e5ef49c24" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="4afb1cd2af"></span></em> We noted that "[t]he term 'harassment' is synonymous with 'vex,' 'trouble,' or </p>
<p data-paragraph-id="d41d8cd98f"></p><div class="pagebreak"><span class="number">11</span></div><p data-paragraph-id="d41d8cd98f"></p>
<p data-paragraph-id="6692d14a9c"> 'annoy, '" <em>id.<span data-sentence-id="c68e8f36a3" quote="true" data-paragraph-id="6692d14a9c"></span></em> at 642 (quoting <em>Webster's Third New International Dictionary</em> (1986)), and that it was defined "<span data-sentence-id="4ac202af53" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="6692d14a9c">as conduct that is directed at a specific person that 'annoys, alarms, or causes substantial emotional distress and serves no legitimate purpose, '"</span> <em>id.<span data-sentence-id="766c96b877" quote="true" data-paragraph-id="6692d14a9c"></span></em> (quoting <em>Black's Law Dictionary</em> (7th ed. 1999)).<span data-sentence-id="dcf57b36f0" quote="true" data-paragraph-id="6692d14a9c"> We reasoned that this "</span><span data-sentence-id="0fa437ac24" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="6692d14a9c">broad meaning" applied to a wide range of protected communications, including forecasting a storm or engaging in political discourse.</span> <em>Id.<span data-sentence-id="ad297b6ffc" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="6692d14a9c"></span></em>; <em>see also Bolles</em>, 541 P.2d at 83 (explaining that although forecasting the weather or predicting political trends could alarm (i.e., harass) a person, those are still protected communications). </p>
<p data-paragraph-id="45ee0a5d27"><span data-sentence-id="340d8c93b6" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="45ee0a5d27"> ¶20 Fast forward two decades, and we see that modern definitions of the terms "harass" and "harassment" are not so different.</span><span data-sentence-id="3eeb3b1dc5" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="45ee0a5d27"> Merriam-Webster defines the verb "harass" as to: "exhaust, fatigue"; "to annoy persistently"; and "to create an unpleasant or hostile situation for[, ] especially by uninvited and unwelcome verbal . . . conduct."</span><span data-sentence-id="f14a4b6413" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="45ee0a5d27"> https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/harass [https://perma.cc/5LTT-TZUE].</span><span data-sentence-id="e583f9f392" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="45ee0a5d27"> The definition of "harassment" in Black's Law Dictionary means "[w]ords, conduct, or action (usu.</span><span data-sentence-id="c2e9d2efcc" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="45ee0a5d27"> repeated or persistent) that, being directed at a specific person, annoys, alarms, or causes substantial emotional distress to that person and serves no legitimate purpose; purposeful vexation."</span> (11th ed. 2019).<span data-sentence-id="e027ddce96" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="45ee0a5d27"> As in <em>Hickman</em>, we conclude that this broad meaning of the term "harass" covers protected speech.</span> </p>
<p data-paragraph-id="d41d8cd98f"></p><div class="pagebreak"><span class="number">12</span></div><p data-paragraph-id="d41d8cd98f"></p>
<p data-paragraph-id="70197aefcd"> <strong>2.<span data-sentence-id="f898f47e53" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="70197aefcd"> Section 18-9-111(1)(e)'s Substantial Sweep</span></strong> </p>
<p data-paragraph-id="d5f1c1654e"><span data-sentence-id="dd510afadc" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="d5f1c1654e"> ¶21 In evaluating the provision's sweep, we examine whether subsection (1)(e) impermissibly restricts a substantial amount of protected speech.</span><span data-sentence-id="d0b4b0ace7" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="d5f1c1654e"> <em>See Hickman</em>, 988 P.2d at 642-43; <em>Smith</em>, 862 P.2d at 942; <em>Bolles</em>, 541 P.2d at 82-83.</span><span data-sentence-id="d360bfc69e" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="d5f1c1654e"> That is to say, the primary concern here isn't the invasive medium the government seeks to regulate-omnipresent electronic communication-but how much the statute impinges on or potentially chills speech.</span><span data-sentence-id="cee9415872" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="d5f1c1654e"> Today's technology merely amplifies this old-fashioned problem.</span> </p>
<p data-paragraph-id="8631bcc258"><span data-sentence-id="4cd2c2e10d" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="8631bcc258"> ¶22 Cyberspace is the modern public square, and it is teeming with eager listeners.</span> <span data-sentence-id="9c7e29f2a1" quote="true" data-paragraph-id="8631bcc258">"While in the past there may have been difficulty in identifying the most important places (in a spatial sense) for the exchange of views, today the answer is clear.</span><span data-sentence-id="0a6f6660d1" quote="true" data-paragraph-id="8631bcc258"> It is cyberspace-the 'vast democratic forums of the Internet' in general and social media in particular."</span><span data-sentence-id="e319a26b7e" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="8631bcc258"> <em>Packingham v. North Carolina</em>, <a href="/vid/886865423" data-vids="886865423">137 S.Ct. 1730</a>, 1735 (2017) (citations omitted) (quoting <em>Reno v. ACLU</em>, <a href="/vid/889589831" data-vids="889589831">521 U.S. 844</a>, 868 (1997)).</span><span data-sentence-id="66b7145bea" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="8631bcc258"> On far-reaching social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter, users worldwide can debate almost any topic.</span> <em>Id.</em> at 1735-36. </p>
<p data-paragraph-id="46279e682a"><span data-sentence-id="06894e9061" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="46279e682a"> ¶23 Such electronic communication is often useful, typically innocuous, but sometimes derogatory.</span><span data-sentence-id="33a763f2a7" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="46279e682a"> And when the unrestrained choose to lob insults into the digital arena, those insults can metastasize.</span><span data-sentence-id="0d69c50ad3" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="46279e682a"> Casual slights spread and intensify.</span><span data-sentence-id="d21ea63458" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="46279e682a"> Nevertheless, "First [A]mendment protection is not limited to amiable </span></p>
<p data-paragraph-id="d41d8cd98f"></p><div class="pagebreak"><span class="number">13</span></div><p data-paragraph-id="d41d8cd98f"></p>
<p data-paragraph-id="9156e92484"> communications."<span data-sentence-id="0bf766ba88" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="9156e92484"> <em>State v. Brobst</em>, <a href="/vid/898563152" data-vids="898563152">857 A.2d 1253</a>, 1256 (N.H. 2004) (quoting <em>People v. Klick</em>, <a href="/vid/886572994" data-vids="886572994">362 N.E.2d 329</a>, 332 (Ill. 1977)) (alterations omitted).</span> </p>
<p data-paragraph-id="6fdd41f749"><span data-sentence-id="96da3f1930" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="6fdd41f749"> ¶24 On the contrary, people often legitimately communicate in a manner "intended to harass" by persistently annoying or alarming others to emphasize an idea or prompt a desired response.</span> <em>Id.</em> at 1255-56.<span data-sentence-id="ce58edf884" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="6fdd41f749"> For example, subsection (1)(e) could prohibit communications made by email or social media about the need to combat a public health threat, or to seek shelter from an imminent tornado, or to respond to an active-shooter situation.</span><span data-sentence-id="bc37a3da82" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="6fdd41f749"> Or consider more routine communications on the web: negative restaurant reviews left on Google or Yelp, irate emails sent to service providers (contractors, plumbers, etc.), diatribes posted on public officials' social media accounts by disgruntled constituents, or antagonistic comments left on news sites.</span><span data-sentence-id="0fbd335370" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="6fdd41f749"> <em>See Brobst</em>, 857 A.2d at 1255-56; <em>Ex parte Barton</em>, <a href="/vid/888154196" data-vids="888154196">586 S.W.3d 573</a>, 584-85 (Tex.</span> App.<span data-sentence-id="c2d33c5478" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="6fdd41f749"> 2019), (noting the staggering breadth of electronic communication covered by Texas's harassment statute and holding it overbroad), <em>pet.</em></span><span data-sentence-id="d41a8cd5d6" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="6fdd41f749"> granted; <em>State v. Chen</em>, <a href="/vid/885940861" data-vids="885940861">615 S.W.3d 376</a>, 382-83 (Tex.</span> App. 2020) (same).<span data-sentence-id="e930863d94" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="6fdd41f749"> In fact, the statute could even intrude into highly personal family squabbles.</span><span data-sentence-id="aaaeac3d11" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="6fdd41f749"> <em>Compare Brobst</em>, 857 A.2d at 1256 (holding New Hampshire's telephone harassment statute overbroad because "the prohibition of all telephone calls placed with the intent to alarm encompasses too large an area of protected speech"), <em>with Lehi City v. Rickabaugh</em>, <a href="/vid/894569729" data-vids="894569729">487 P.3d 453</a>, 461-62 (Utah Ct.</span> App. 2021) </p>
<p data-paragraph-id="d41d8cd98f"></p><div class="pagebreak"><span class="number">14</span></div><p data-paragraph-id="d41d8cd98f"></p>
<p data-paragraph-id="d8ce493863"><span data-sentence-id="e186ce3605" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="d8ce493863"> (holding Utah's electronic communication harassment statute, which was limited in scope to communications made in a "manner likely to provoke a violent or disorderly response" was not overbroad).</span> </p>
<p data-paragraph-id="2c431cab42"><span data-sentence-id="81ed91b986" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="2c431cab42"> ¶25 Although subsection (1)(e) mainly targets unprotected speech like true threats and obscenity, its restriction on communication made in a manner "intended to harass" encompasses a substantial amount of protected speech.</span><span data-sentence-id="df4c6c0412" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="2c431cab42"> This brings us to whether the statutory subsection can be salvaged.</span> </p>
<p data-paragraph-id="eea2ea60d8"> <strong>3.<span data-sentence-id="c1432cafdb" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="eea2ea60d8"> Preserving Subsection (1)(e)</span></strong> </p>
<p data-paragraph-id="e4f5409010"><span data-sentence-id="acaa24f753" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="e4f5409010"> ¶26 We see no available limiting construction that would sufficiently narrow the phrase "intended to harass" to render it constitutional.</span><span data-sentence-id="b44371c074" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="e4f5409010"> <em>See Hickman</em>, 988 P.2d at 636-43 (supplying a limiting construction for the term "threat" but concluding no limiting construction would sufficiently narrow the phrase "act of harassment" in section 18-8-706, C.R.S. (1998)).</span><span data-sentence-id="2f43d2fdec" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="e4f5409010"> Viewed in its entirety, the rest of the harassment statute forecloses this approach by proscribing other forms of unprotected speech, leaving no alternative, constitutional construction to ascribe to the phrase at issue.</span><span data-sentence-id="575d068f93" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="e4f5409010"> <em>See Smith</em>, 862 P.2d at 943-44 ("In construing a statute, we presume that every part . . . was intended to be effective."</span><span data-sentence-id="f885eaaf79" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="e4f5409010"> (quoting <em>Thiret v. Kautzky</em>, <a href="/vid/890362052" data-vids="890362052">792 P.2d 801</a>, 807 (Colo. 1990))).</span><span data-sentence-id="550d900a80" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="e4f5409010"> Subsection (1)(e)'s other terms prohibit true threats and obscenity, and we previously held that subsection (1)(h) outlaws fighting words, <em>see People ex rel.</em></span> VanMeveren v. Cnty.<span data-sentence-id="36ad63c67f" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="e4f5409010"> Ct., <a href="/vid/889476031" data-vids="889476031">551 P.2d 716</a>, 719 (Colo. 1976).</span> Thus, the term </p>
<p data-paragraph-id="d41d8cd98f"></p><div class="pagebreak"><span class="number">15</span></div><p data-paragraph-id="d41d8cd98f"></p>
<p data-paragraph-id="5dda45ea27"><span data-sentence-id="790ccd586d" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="5dda45ea27"> "intended to harass" in subsection (1)(e) impermissibly leaches into areas of protected speech.</span><span data-sentence-id="a6127861fa" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="5dda45ea27"> With no alternative, constitutional construction available, we turn to whether a partial invalidation can save subsection (1)(e).</span> </p>
<p data-paragraph-id="aa851c8342"> ¶27 <span data-sentence-id="17e2131a71" quote="true" data-paragraph-id="aa851c8342">"A court may sever one section of a statute from the whole if 'partial invalidation will rid the statute of the constitutional infirmity of overbreadth.'"</span><span data-sentence-id="b2eca804b6" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="aa851c8342"> <em>Hickman</em>, 988 P.2d at 643 (quoting <em>People v. Ryan</em>, <a href="/vid/893350177" data-vids="893350177">806 P.2d 935</a>, 940 (Colo. 1991)).</span><span data-sentence-id="fc96e7bd0d" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="aa851c8342"> We need not, and thus do not, invalidate the entire statute.</span><span data-sentence-id="a42d512115" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="aa851c8342"> Instead, we hold only that the phrase "intended to harass" in subsection (1)(e) is unconstitutionally overbroad.</span><span data-sentence-id="77f84734c8" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="aa851c8342"> Our partial invalidation does nothing to disturb the other prohibitions in subsection (1)(e) against communications that are made </span><span data-sentence-id="26e0a6b1ab" quote="true" data-paragraph-id="aa851c8342">"in a manner intended to . . . threaten bodily injury or property damage . . . or that [are] obscene."</span><span data-sentence-id="0cac7fb125" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="aa851c8342">^{[<a href="#ftn.FN5" name="FN5" id="FN5">5</a>]}§ 18-9-111(1)(e).</span> </p>
<p data-paragraph-id="d41d8cd98f"></p><div class="pagebreak"><span class="number">16</span></div><p data-paragraph-id="d41d8cd98f"></p>
<p data-paragraph-id="1d7583f765"> 4. <em>Bolles</em> 2.0? </p>
<p data-paragraph-id="5108fea89f"><span data-sentence-id="fc978e0d5e" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="5108fea89f"> ¶28 Our holding today might be summarized simply as "<em>Bolles</em> goes digital."</span><span data-sentence-id="06dd54cdc4" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="5108fea89f"> <em>Bolles</em> dealt with the 1973 version of section 18-9-111(1)(e), which stated in relevant part: "A person commits harassment if, with intent to harass, annoy, or alarm another person, he . . . [c]ommunicates with a person, anonymously or otherwise, by telephone, telegraph, mail, or any other form of communication, in a manner likely to harass or cause alarm."</span><span data-sentence-id="1b12c5e704" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="5108fea89f"> <em>Bolles</em>, 541 P.2d at 81 n.1 (quoting § 18-9-111(1)(e), C.R.S. (1973)).</span><span data-sentence-id="dc0aaac6bc" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="5108fea89f"> Bolles was charged with harassment under subsection (1)(e) for mailing anti-abortion material to approximately 2, 400 Boulder County residents.</span><span data-sentence-id="6fe4d5d54f" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="5108fea89f"> <em>Bolles</em>, 541 P.2d at 81.</span><span data-sentence-id="0d5d4d645b" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="5108fea89f"> He challenged the statute as unconstitutionally overbroad and vague, and this court concluded that subsection (1)(e) was facially overbroad and thus unconstitutional.</span><span data-sentence-id="6fe4d5d54f" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="5108fea89f"> <em>Bolles</em>, 541 P.2d at 81.</span> </p>
<p data-paragraph-id="97e2cd6725"><span data-sentence-id="a75c4d6635" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="97e2cd6725"> ¶29 The <em>Bolles</em> court began its analysis by recognizing the "delicate and vulnerable nature" of free-speech protections and the responsibility of courts to closely inspect "state action which has the effect of curtailing or 'chilling' free expression."</span> <em>Id.<span data-sentence-id="cf38256a64" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="97e2cd6725"></span></em> at 82 (quoting <em>People v. Vaughan</em>, <a href="/vid/889197071" data-vids="889197071">514 P.2d 1318</a>, 1323 (Colo. 1973)).<span data-sentence-id="b3a01ef057" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="97e2cd6725"> Recognizing that in the area of free speech, statutes must be carefully crafted and </span></p>
<p data-paragraph-id="d41d8cd98f"></p><div class="pagebreak"><span class="number">17</span></div><p data-paragraph-id="d41d8cd98f"></p>
<p data-paragraph-id="58e19c1226"><span data-sentence-id="887ee5231d" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="58e19c1226"> narrowly drawn, we concluded that, while the statute at issue could </span><span data-sentence-id="8abaa81b8f" quote="true" data-paragraph-id="58e19c1226">"be relied upon to punish for obscene, libelous, [or] riotous communication[, ] which is probably constitutionally permissible[, ] . . . [it] could also be used to prosecute for communications that cannot be constitutionally proscribed."</span> <em>Id.</em> </p>
<p data-paragraph-id="ca0bd561eb"><span data-sentence-id="1bb187827e" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="ca0bd561eb"> ¶30 Indeed, a fundamental purpose of free speech in our system of government is to debate ideas.</span> <em>Id.</em> at 83.<span data-sentence-id="b9e2666413" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="ca0bd561eb"> These debates may be vigorous and high-minded but may at times devolve into vituperative attacks.</span> <span data-sentence-id="fceafaf140" quote="true" data-paragraph-id="ca0bd561eb">"Speech is often provocative and challenging.</span><span data-sentence-id="aa5afdf3f1" quote="true" data-paragraph-id="ca0bd561eb"> It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects."</span> <em>Id.<span data-sentence-id="366b79581c" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="ca0bd561eb"></span></em> (quoting <em>Terminiello v. City of Chicago</em>, <a href="/vid/891134995" data-vids="891134995">337 U.S. 1</a>, 4 (1949)).<span data-sentence-id="0e7352aa3f" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="ca0bd561eb"> But as the <em>Bolles</em> court aptly observed, if such speech could be restricted, </span><span data-sentence-id="763be50d50" quote="true" data-paragraph-id="ca0bd561eb">"the protection of the First Amendment would be a mere shadow."</span> <em>Id.</em> </p>
<p data-paragraph-id="a2401d5222"><span data-sentence-id="19f7121226" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="a2401d5222"> ¶31 The 1973 version of subsection (1)(e) and the current iteration are similarly expansive.</span><span data-sentence-id="591068de1d" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="a2401d5222"> While in 1973 the statute applied to "any other form of communication," now it applies to almost any form of electronic communication.</span><span data-sentence-id="9acafbec74" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="a2401d5222"> <em>Cf. People v. McBurney</em>, <a href="/vid/890168785" data-vids="890168785">750 P.2d 916</a>, 919 (Colo. 1988) (upholding yet another version of subsection (1)(e), containing the term "in a manner intended to harass," because it was limited to land-line telephones; and distinguishing <em>Bolles</em>, explaining that because the statute in <em>Bolles</em> applied to any form of communication it "contained no particularized standards to limit the scope of the offense").</span> </p>
<p data-paragraph-id="d41d8cd98f"></p><div class="pagebreak"><span class="number">18</span></div><p data-paragraph-id="d41d8cd98f"></p>
<p data-paragraph-id="113a2f10c5"><span data-sentence-id="db3a520f08" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="113a2f10c5"> ¶32 While we sympathize with those who become the target of gratuitous and unfounded insults, we are not persuaded by the prosecution's privacy argument.</span> <span data-sentence-id="d9e7508f8c" quote="true" data-paragraph-id="113a2f10c5">"The ability of government, consonant with the Constitution, to shut off discourse solely to protect others from hearing it is . . . dependent upon a showing that substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner."</span><span data-sentence-id="680f6cfc58" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="113a2f10c5"> <em>Cohen v. California</em>, <a href="/vid/888750171" data-vids="888750171">403 U.S. 15</a>, 21 (1971).</span><span data-sentence-id="9e586ba23e" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="113a2f10c5"> Even in <em>Bolles</em>, where the defendant mailed highly disturbing materials to people's homes, we concluded that </span><span data-sentence-id="7937e84050" quote="true" data-paragraph-id="113a2f10c5">"the intrusion into the recipient's privacy is only minimal since he is not only free to discard at once any mail that he does not wish to receive, but can also ensure that he will not receive any more like it from the sender."</span> <a href="/vid/895788039" data-vids="895788039">541 P.2d at 84</a>.<span data-sentence-id="4b4d6a3d43" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="113a2f10c5"> Likewise, today, the swipe of a finger can often block, or at least delete, unwanted electronic communication.</span><span data-sentence-id="d1ae7209ae" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="113a2f10c5"> This is a small price to pay for freedom of speech.</span>^{[<a href="#ftn.FN6" name="FN6" id="FN6">6</a>]} </p>
<p data-paragraph-id="c35c5da334"> <strong>III. Conclusion</strong> </p>
<p data-paragraph-id="6d7ef95ad4"><span data-sentence-id="0307ba4b60" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="6d7ef95ad4"> ¶33 We hold that the phrase "intended to harass" in subsection (1)(e) is unconstitutionally overbroad and affirm the district court's order dismissing Moreno's harassment charge.</span> </p>
<p data-paragraph-id="d41d8cd98f"></p><div class="pagebreak"><span class="number">19</span></div><p data-paragraph-id="d41d8cd98f"></p>
<p data-paragraph-id="796feb9692"> <small>---------</small> </p>
<p data-paragraph-id="ff6cb15c8b"> <small>Notes:</small> </p>
<p data-paragraph-id="9272d441ef"><span data-sentence-id="eaade18bc0" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="9272d441ef"> <small>^{[<a href="#FN1" name="ftn.FN1" id="ftn.FN1">1</a>]} If the harassment charge constitutes an act of domestic violence as defined in section 18-6-800.3, C.R.S. (2021), it can trigger the sentence enhancer in section 18-6-801(7).</small></span> </p>
<p data-paragraph-id="1ee639165b"><span data-sentence-id="5b0978ee97" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="1ee639165b"> <small>^{[<a href="#FN2" name="ftn.FN2" id="ftn.FN2">2</a>]} On appeal to this court, the prosecution abandoned the argument that Moreno's statements constituted true threats or any other category of unprotected speech.</small></span> </p>
<p data-paragraph-id="dd189693e9"><span data-sentence-id="5de873e230" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="dd189693e9"> <small>^{[<a href="#FN3" name="ftn.FN3" id="ftn.FN3">3</a>]} The government may also regulate speech outside of these traditional unprotected categories (e.g., time, place, or manner restrictions) but subject to the appropriate level of scrutiny (strict scrutiny for content-based regulations and intermediate scrutiny for content-neutral regulations).</small></span><span data-sentence-id="9034d10ac3" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="dd189693e9"> <em>See, e.g.</em>, <em>Denver Publ'g. Co. v. City of Aurora</em>, <a href="/vid/890392238" data-vids="890392238">896 P.2d 306</a>, 308 (Colo. 1995) (holding content-neutral city ordinance proscribing direct solicitation of vehicle occupants traveling on city streets, in this case solicitation by newspaper hawkers, was narrowly tailored to advance significant governmental interest in traffic movement and safety).</span> </p>
<p data-paragraph-id="4c3fc9e593"><span data-sentence-id="e999e8c08c" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="4c3fc9e593"> <small>^{[<a href="#FN4" name="ftn.FN4" id="ftn.FN4">4</a>]} Moreno suggests that a scrutiny analysis could be employed instead.</small></span><span data-sentence-id="8b4ff7247e" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="4c3fc9e593"> While it appears that "</span><span data-sentence-id="9db0de68d1" quote="true" data-paragraph-id="4c3fc9e593">[t]he relationship of these two modes of free-speech analysis has never been adequately explained by the Supreme Court[, ] . . . facial overbreadth analysis has been most commonly and sensibly used, in the First Amendment arena, in cases involving regulations directed at unprotected categories of speech."</span><span data-sentence-id="107c87c9ca" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="4c3fc9e593"> Marc Rohr, <em>Parallel Doctrinal Bars: The Unexplained Relationship Between Facial Overbreadth and "Scrutiny" Analysis in the Law of Freedom of Speech</em>, 11 Elon L. Rev. 95, 109, 129 (2019); <em>see also Peck v. McCann</em>, <a href="/vid/899554388" data-vids="899554388">525 F.Supp.3d 1316</a>, 1339 (D. Colo. 2021) (noting that </span><span data-sentence-id="194e4f3256" quote="true" data-paragraph-id="4c3fc9e593">"the Supreme Court itself has not provided clear guidance on when and how scrutiny tests versus overbreadth should apply")</span>. </p>
<p data-paragraph-id="b4c09b9b0d"><span data-sentence-id="ff17717629" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="b4c09b9b0d"> <small>^{[<a href="#FN5" name="ftn.FN5" id="ftn.FN5">5</a>]} Although we identify the challenged phrase, consistent with the district court, as "intended to harass," the effect of our ruling is to excise only the words "harass or" from subsection (1)(e) as indicated by strikethrough font below:</small> </span></p>
<p data-paragraph-id="d41d8cd98f"></p><blockquote>
<small>A person commits harassment if, with intent to harass,
annoy, or alarm another person, he or she . . . [d]irectly or
indirectly initiates communication with a person or directs
language toward another person, anonymously or otherwise, by
telephone, telephone network, data network, text message,
instant message, computer, computer network, computer system,
or other interactive electronic medium in a manner intended
to harass or threaten bodily injury
or property damage, or makes any comment, request,
suggestion, or proposal by telephone, computer, computer
network, computer system, or other interactive electronic
medium that is obscene.</small>
</blockquote><p data-paragraph-id="d41d8cd98f"></p>
<p data-paragraph-id="0dc54d5f5d"><span data-sentence-id="718ad2fff7" quote="false" data-paragraph-id="0dc54d5f5d"> <small>^{[<a href="#FN6" name="ftn.FN6" id="ftn.FN6">6</a>]} Because we resolve this matter on overbreadth grounds, we don't address vagueness.</small></span> </p>
<p data-paragraph-id="796feb9692"> <small>---------</small> </p></div>
</div>
</div>