v. Alemayehu , 2021 COA 69 ( 2021 )

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
SUMMARY
May 20, 2021
2021COA69
No. 17CA1745, People v. Alemayehu — Constitutional Law —
Fourth Amendment — Search and Seizures — Warrantless
Search — Plain View Exception
A division of the court of appeals considers a rather intricate
Fourth Amendment issue involving the application of the plain view
seizure exception to justify a warrantless seizure and search of
several prescription pill bottles found in a compartment of an
opened car door. Because the division concludes that the police
illegally seized, then searched, the pill bottles, the illegal drugs
found therein must be suppressed and the matter remanded for a
new trial.
Otherwise, the division addresses issues pertaining to the
sufficiency of evidence to support a conviction for possession of a
controlled substance; the admissibility of statements purportedly
obtained from the defendant in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966); the admission of footage from four deputies’ body
cameras; and prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2021COA69
Court of Appeals No. 17CA1745
Douglas County District Court No. 16CR1131
Honorable Shay K. Whitaker, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Henoke Alemayehu,
Defendant-Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART,
AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division I
Opinion by JUDGE DAILEY
Berger and Tow, JJ., concur
Announced May 20, 2021
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Gabriel P. Olivares, Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Karen Mahlman Gerash,
Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant, Henoke Alemayehu, appeals the judgment of
conviction entered on jury verdicts finding him guilty of failing to
report an accident and possession of a controlled substance
(oxycodone). In this case we consider the validity of a warrantless
search and seizure of several prescription pill bottles found in a
visible compartment of an opened car door. Because we conclude
that the police illegally seized and searched those bottles, we
reverse Alemayehu’s conviction for possession of a controlled
substance and remand for a new trial on that count. We otherwise
affirm Alemayehu’s conviction for failing to report an accident.
I. Background
¶2 Alemayehu backed into another car in a Target parking lot, left
a torn lottery ticket — instead of his name and phone number — on
the other car’s window, and parked twenty to thirty yards away in
the same lot with the engine running.
¶3 A bystander reported the accident to a Douglas County
Sheriff’s deputy (Lieutenant Paul Rogers) who, along with another
deputy, happened to be nearby responding to an unrelated
accident. Lieutenant Rogers approached Alemayehu and ordered
him to turn off his engine. Instead, Alemayehu got out of his car,
1
leaving the driver’s side door open and his engine still running.
When Alemayehu told Lieutenant Rogers that he had “left a note,”
Lieutenant Rogers responded that the note had no information on
it. Alemayehu then said that he had mistakenly put the wrong
piece of paper on the car he had hit. However, the second piece of
paper that Alemayehu produced had a fake name and phone
number on it.
¶4 Lieutenant Rogers called for backup and directed Alemayehu
to stand and stay next to a shopping cart return. Other deputies
arrived on the scene too. Lieutenant Rogers reached into
Alemayehu’s car and turned it off. At some point, it appears a
deputy closed the car door. But, when asked for his registration
and insurance, Alemayehu directed Deputy Jeff Creighton to the
driver’s sun visor area. Deputy Creighton then opened the driver’s
door again to look there.
¶5 Deputy Brad Proulx walked over to the open driver’s door and
looked at it. Inside a pocket at the bottom of the driver’s side door,
he saw unlabeled orange prescription pill bottles. He pointed them
out to Deputy Creighton, who said, “Yeah, I saw these without any
labels.”
2
¶6 Deputy Proulx took three bottles out of the compartment and
asked Alemayehu, “What are all these pills?” After giving an evasive
answer and being asked multiple times if the pills were his,
Alemayehu denied ownership of the pills, saying, instead, that they
belonged to a lawyer friend who had hurt his back, was taking
medication, and had left them in the car.
¶7 Deputy Proulx opened the pill bottles, looked at the pills, and
after researching their imprint code on his cell phone, determined
that they were oxycodone.
¶8 Meanwhile, Deputy Creighton had walked to the passenger
side of the car and looked in the glove box for Alemayehu’s
registration and insurance paperwork. There, he came upon
another bottle of pills.1
1 At trial and at the suppression hearing, Deputy Creighton testified
that this pill bottle also lacked a label and was one of the three
bottles with oxycodone. However, Deputy Creighton’s body camera
footage — which was admitted both at the suppression hearing and
at trial — clearly shows that the bottle in the glove box was a
fourth, labeled bottle and that, rather than opening it, he inspected
its exterior and tossed it back into the car.
The three bottles identified at trial as containing oxycodone — and
shown on the body cameras — all appear to have come from the
compartment in the driver’s side door.
3
¶9 The deputies then arrested Alemayehu.
¶ 10 At trial, Alemayehu did not testify or present any witnesses.
His theory of defense, however, was that the deputies “made up
their mind[s] very early that [Alemayehu] had committed a traffic
crime” after talking to witnesses and before engaging with him.
Regarding the controlled substance charge, he argued that he did
not know the pills were a controlled substance.
¶ 11 The jury convicted Alemayehu as charged and he was
sentenced to a term of two years’ probation.
¶ 12 On appeal, Alemayehu contends that the trial court erred by
(1) concluding that the prosecution had presented sufficient
evidence to support a conviction on the possession of a controlled
substance charge; (2) not suppressing evidence related to the
discovery of oxycodone in his car; (3) not suppressing statements he
made to the deputies in the parking lot; (4) admitting four DVDs of
the deputies’ body camera footage; (5) allowing prosecutorial
misconduct during closing argument; and (6) responding to a jury
inquiry.
¶ 13 We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to sustain
Alemayehu’s conviction for possession of a controlled substance.
4
But because his second contention has merit, we reverse that
conviction and remand for a new trial on the underlying count. We
reject all but the last of Alemayehu’s remaining contentions,
inasmuch as they could affect his conviction for failing to report an
accident. As to the last contention, we do not address it because it
is not likely to recur on retrial.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
¶ 14 A person commits the crime of possession of a controlled
substance if he knowingly possesses a controlled substance. § 18-
18-403.5, C.R.S. 2020. “The ‘knowing’ element applies both to
knowledge of possession, and to knowledge that the thing
possessed is a controlled substance.” People v. Perea, 126 P.3d
241, 244 (Colo. App. 2005) (citations omitted). It does not, however,
require “that [a defendant] know the precise controlled substance
possessed.” Id. at 245.
¶ 15 Alemayehu contends the evidence was insufficient to sustain
his conviction for possession of a controlled substance because (1)
in his statements to the deputies, he “denied knowledge of the
contents of the pill bottles” and “never affirmed knowledge of their
5
contents”; and (2) “the prosecution never proved he had such
knowledge.” We are not persuaded.2
¶ 16 Part of Alemayehu’s contention appears to assume that the
jury had to believe what he told the deputies. This is not the case.
Cf. People v. Kessler, 2018 COA 60, ¶ 12 (“[A] fact finder is not
required to accept or reject a witness’s testimony in its entirety; it
may believe all, part, or none of a witness’s testimony. . . .”)
(emphasis added).
¶ 17 Further,
[i]n assessing the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting a guilty verdict, a reviewing court
must determine whether any rational trier of
fact might accept the evidence, taken as a
whole and in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, as sufficient to support a finding
of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
2 In a separate argument, Alemayehu contends that the court erred
in admitting any evidence pertaining to the discovery of oxycodone
in his car. In reviewing a sufficiency of evidence contention, an
appellate court must consider evidence that should have been
excluded at trial. See, e.g., People v. Ramirez, 155 P.3d 371, 377
(Colo. 2007) (“Whether the evidence is sufficient to support a
judgment is a separate question from whether the evidence should
be admitted in the first place.”); People v. Hard, 2014 COA 132, ¶ 39
(“In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must consider all
the evidence admitted at trial, including the erroneously admitted
evidence . . . .”).
6
People v. Atencio, 140 P.3d 73, 75 (Colo. App. 2005).
¶ 18 In undertaking this analysis, we recognize that (1) “[a]n actor’s
state of mind is normally not subject to direct proof and must be
inferred from his or her actions and the circumstances surrounding
the occurrence,” People v. Joosten, 2018 COA 115, ¶ 26 (citation
omitted); (2) the prosecution must be given the benefit of every
inference that may fairly be drawn from the evidence, Kessler, ¶ 12;
(3) “[i]f there is evidence upon which one may reasonably infer an
element of the crime, the evidence is sufficient to sustain that
element,” id. (quoting People v. Chase, 2013 COA 27, ¶ 50); and (4)
“[w]here reasonable minds could differ, the evidence is sufficient to
sustain a conviction,” People v. Bondurant, 2012 COA 50, ¶ 58
(citation omitted).
¶ 19 When a “defendant has exclusive possession of the premises in
which drugs are found, the jury may infer knowledge from the fact
of possession.” People v. Yeadon, 2018 COA 104, ¶ 25 (citation
omitted), aff’d and remanded, 2020 CO 38. “[K]nowledge can be
inferred from the fact that the defendant is the driver and sole
occupant of a vehicle, irrespective of whether he is also the vehicle’s
owner.” Id.7
¶ 20 Here, Alemayehu’s knowledge that he possessed the pills and
that they were a controlled substance can readily be inferred from
the following facts: (1) he was the owner, driver, and sole occupant
of the car; (2) he was in close proximity to the visible bottles of
oxycodone in the driver’s side pocket; and (3) his statements to the
deputies indicated he was aware of the nature of the pills by
attributing their ownership to someone else, noting their purpose
was to relieve back pain, and intimating that he needed to move
them out of view since he used the car for work.
¶ 21 The evidence was, then, sufficient to sustain Alemayehu’s
conviction for possession of a controlled substance. See, e.g.,
Yeadon, ¶¶ 27-29 (discovery of methamphetamine in driver’s side
pocket was sufficient to support driver’s conviction for knowing
possession of a controlled substance).
III. Seizure and Search of Closed Prescription Bottles
¶ 22 Alemayehu contends that the trial court erred by not
suppressing evidence that, according to him, was obtained as a
result of an illegal seizure and search of the pill bottles. We agree.
¶ 23 When reviewing a trial court’s suppression ruling, we are
limited to considering only evidence presented at the suppression
8
hearing. Moody v. People, 159 P.3d 611, 614 (Colo. 2007); accord
People v. Bryant, 2018 COA 53, ¶ 19.
¶ 24 The trial court’s rulings present mixed questions of fact and
law. People v. Gutierrez, 2020 CO 60, ¶ 11. Ordinarily, we defer to
the trial court’s findings of fact when they are supported by the
record but review its legal conclusions de novo. People v. Pappan,
2018 CO 71, ¶ 6 (search and seizure issues). Our analysis is not,
however, limited to the factual findings that form the basis of the
trial court’s order; we may also consider undisputed facts evident in
the record. See Gutierrez, ¶ 11. Further, where pertinent
circumstances
“are audio- and video-recorded, and there are
no disputed facts outside the recording
controlling the issue of suppression, we are in
a similar position as the trial court to
determine whether the [evidence] should be
suppressed.” Thus, we may undertake an
independent review of the audio or video
recording. . . .
People v. Davis, 2019 CO 84, ¶ 18 (quoting People v. Kutlak, 2016
CO 1, ¶ 13); see People v. Chavez-Barragan, 2016 CO 66, ¶ 5 n.1
(noting, in a search and seizure context, that the supreme court
had “independently reviewed the [dashboard camera] recording as
9
we have done in other cases”); People v. Platt, 81 P.3d 1060, 1067
(Colo. 2004) (“When considering recorded statements — whether
documentary, audio-taped, or video-taped — the trial and appellate
courts are in a similar review position.”).
A. Facts
¶ 25 Lieutenant Rogers and Deputies Creighton, Proulx, and Ryan
Wolfe testified at the suppression hearing. A DVD of footage
captured on the four body cameras worn by them, and still photos
from Lieutenant Rogers’s and Deputy Proulx’s body camera footage,
were also admitted into evidence.
¶ 26 Even though Deputy Creighton can be heard saying in Deputy
Proulx’s body camera footage, “Yeah, I saw these without any
labels” (emphasis added), the deputies’ testimony at the hearing
was that only “a bottle” lacking a proper label was clearly visible
without having to be picked up or manipulated by them. A still
photo from Deputy Proulx’s body camera footage shows two bottles
(and perhaps a third).3 However, only one bottle in the photo visibly
3 The still photo is attached to this opinion as Appendix A. The
pink lines on the photo were added by the division to show where
the bottles were located.
10
has its label missing. There is, so far as we can tell, no evidence of
more than one bottle with its label visibly missing prior to Deputy
Proulx picking them up and looking at them.
¶ 27 The trial court denied Alemayehu’s motion to suppress
evidence because
 From the one picture, a pill bottle in the “driver’s side
door” is visible and “does not contain a prescription label”
but instead, “what appears to have been some type of
either a torn label or some type of labeling or paper that
was on that has since been removed.”
 “Based on the officer’s training and experience . . . that
often illegal narcotics are kept in prescription drug
containers . . . there was reasonable suspicion based on
the [plain view] observation of that prescription bottle
and the observation that the label on that prescription
bottle had been removed for the officer to conduct further
investigation regarding that particular pill bottle.”
 “Upon that further investigation,” the deputies learned
that “the substance contained within that pill bottle is
[oxycodone].”
11
¶ 28 The trial court also found that Deputy Creighton’s subsequent
search of Alemayehu’s glove box was reasonable under Arizona v.
Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 351 (2009), as a search of a car incident to
arrest:
[B]ased on the location of the original pill
bottles in the door of the vehicle it would have
potentially subjected the entire vehicle to a
more thorough search, indicating that there
was a reason to search for further evidence of
a crime, having located the pill bottles in the
door.
B. Analysis
¶ 29 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures by
law enforcement. Gutierrez, ¶ 13. A warrantless search or seizure
is presumptively invalid unless justified by one of the established
exceptions to the warrant requirement. People v. Cattaneo, 2020
COA 40, ¶ 17.
¶ 30 The People rely on the “plain view” exception, see People v.
Swietlicki, 2015 CO 67, ¶ 18, combined (in the case of the pill bottle
in the glove box) with a (type of) “vehicle paperwork” exception, see
People v. Pryor, 896 N.Y.S.2d 575, 581-82 (Sup. Ct. 2009), to justify
the deputies’ seizure of the pill bottles. They rely on the
12
“automobile” exception, see People v. Allen, 2019 CO 88, ¶ 16, to
justify their warrantless search of the pill bottles. See, e.g., United
States v. Murillo-Salgado, 854 F.3d 407, 417 (8th Cir. 2017)
(recognizing that a search of the concealed contents of a seized
container must be either accompanied by a search warrant or
justified by an exception to the warrant requirement); United States
v. Davis, 690 F.3d 226, 233-34 (4th Cir. 2012) (same); United States
v. Jackson, 381 F.3d 984, 989 (10th Cir. 2004) (same).4
4 The People relied on the “plain view” exception — but not the
“vehicle paperwork” or “automobile” exceptions — in the trial court.
See People v. Aarness, 150 P.3d 1271, 1277 (Colo. 2006) (“On
appeal, a party may defend the trial court’s judgment on any
ground supported by the record, whether relied upon or even
considered by the trial court.”).
For good reason, the People do not rely on the trial court’s
alternative ground for upholding the deputies’ seizure and searches
of the pill bottles via the inventory exception: the People never
attempted to show that an impoundment of Alemayehu’s car before
the discovery of the unlabeled pill bottles would have been
reasonable, see People v. Brown, 2016 COA 150, aff’d, 2018 CO 27,
much less that the car would have been impounded and inventoried
pursuant to standard criteria in departmental regulations, see
People v. Milligan, 77 P.3d 771, 776-77 (Colo. App. 2003).
13
1. Seizure of the Pill Bottles in the Driver’s Side Pocket:
the Plain View Exception
¶ 31 The People rely on the plain view exception as justification for
the deputies’ seizure of the pill bottles in the driver’s side pocket.
Under the plain view exception, a warrantless
seizure of a container is reasonable for Fourth
Amendment purposes if police observed the
container in plain view and if the seizure
satisfies three requirements: (1) the police were
lawfully in the position from which they viewed
the container, (2) the incriminating nature of
the container was immediately apparent, and
(3) the police had a lawful right of access to the
container.
Swietlicki, ¶ 19.
¶ 32 However, the fact that a container is lawfully seized under the
plain view exception does not automatically mean that it may be
opened and searched without a warrant. The Fourth Amendment
provides protection to the owner of a container that conceals its
contents from plain view, and a search of the concealed contents of
a seized container must be either accompanied by a search warrant
or justified by an exception to the warrant requirement.5 Jackson,
5Although the pill bottle here was translucent enough to see that it
contained pill-shaped objects, it was opaque in that it concealed the
specific appearance or identity of the pills.
14
381 F.3d at 989 (a container may be properly be searched without a
warrant, independent of lawfulness of its seizure, if its contents are
apparent or a “foregone conclusion”); see also, e.g., Murillo-Salgado,
854 F.3d at 417 (same); Davis, 690 F.3d at 233-34 (same); Clay v.
State, 725 S.E.2d 260, 269 (Ga. 2012) (same); State v. Holmes, 139
N.E.3d 574, 590 (Ohio Ct. App. 2019) (same); State v. Cardwell, 778
S.E.2d 483, 492 (S.C. Ct. App. 2015) (same); Vassar v. State, 99
P.3d 987, 995 (Wyo. 2004) (same).
¶ 33 Alemayehu does not dispute that the first and third elements
of the plain view seizure exception were satisfied. His argument is
with the application of the second element, that is, whether the
incriminating nature of the plainly visible pill bottles was
“immediately apparent” to the deputies.
A naked reading of this phrase could fairly
lead to the conclusion that, for the
incriminating nature of an object to be
“immediately apparent,” the seizing officer
must experience a split-second revelation — a
product not of thought but of reflex — in which
he knows, at the moment he lays eyes upon
the object, that the object is incriminating.
But more than three decades of jurisprudence
conclusively forecloses such an interpretation.
Instead, the Supreme Court has long equated
this language to probable cause. More
15
specifically, what has been required is that the
seizing officer have “probable cause to
associate the item with criminal activity
without conducting a further search.”
Swietlicki, ¶¶ 21-22 (citations omitted); see 2 Wayne R.
LaFave, Search & Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment
§ 4.11(d), Westlaw (6th ed. database updated Sept. 2020) (“It must
be emphasized that the ‘immediately apparent’ requirement relates
only to probable cause, not certainty. That is, if the police are able
to establish probable cause that the object is a fruit,
instrumentality or evidence of crime without [searching it], this is
all that is required . . . .”) (footnotes omitted).
¶ 34 The trial court did not find that, upon discovering that the
prescription bottle was unlabeled, the deputies had probable cause
to associate it with criminal activity. It found that the deputies had
“reasonable suspicion” to continue investigating the pills’ nature.
¶ 35 “Reasonable suspicion” is not the same as “probable cause.”
The reasonable suspicion standard is satisfied if the “police possess
some minimal level of objective suspicion (as distinguished from a
mere hunch or intuition)” that a person is committing, has
16
committed, or is about to commit a crime. People v. Polander, 41
P.3d 698, 703 (Colo. 2001).
¶ 36 Probable cause “is [a] more demanding [standard] than
reasonable suspicion.” People v. McKnight, 2019 CO 36, ¶ 51.
Probable cause exists “when, under the totality of the
circumstances, the objective facts and circumstances warrant the
belief by a reasonable and prudent person, in light of that person’s
training and experience,” that the object viewed is associated with
criminal activity. See People v. McKay, 10 P.3d 704, 706 (Colo. App.
2000) (assessing probable cause to arrest).
“The probable cause standard does not lend
itself to mathematical certainties and should
not be laden with hypertechnical
interpretations or rigid legal rules.”
Instead, . . . we are required to “make a
practical, common-sense decision whether a
fair probability exists that a search of a
particular place will reveal contraband or
evidence of a crime.” Thus, a fair probability
does not refer to a “mathematical probability”;
“[r]ather, probable cause must be equated with
reasonable grounds.” As such, a probable
cause determination is “based on factual and
practical considerations of everyday life on
which reasonable and prudent people, not
legal technicians, act.”
17
People v. Bailey, 2018 CO 84, ¶ 21 (alteration in original) (citations
omitted); see also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983)
(“[P]robable cause is a fluid concept — turning on the assessment of
probabilities in particular factual contexts — not readily, or even
usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.”).
¶ 37 Whether probable cause for a warrantless search or seizure
existed is a question of law that we review de novo. People v.
Matheny, 46 P.3d 453, 461 (Colo. 2002).
¶ 38 In evaluating probable cause, due consideration should be
given to a law enforcement officer’s experience and training.
Henderson v. People, 879 P.2d 383, 392 (Colo. 1994); see United
States v. Guerrero, 472 F.3d 784, 787 (10th Cir. 2007) (Officers may
“draw on their own experience and specialized training to make
inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information
available to them that ‘might well elude an untrained person.’”
(quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002))).
¶ 39 At the suppression hearing, Deputy Proulx testified that,
based on his experience and training, people “can sometimes” carry
illegal pills in pill bottles, so he’ll “look to see if the name is to the
person we’re in contact with.” Here, he could see, without having to
18
move the bottle, that there was “no label” on it and “it’s illegal to
have pills in a bottle without a label on it.”
¶ 40 Neither the prosecution in the trial court nor the People on
appeal, however, have identified a statutory provision prohibiting
the removal or alteration of labels per se on prescription bottles.
¶ 41 Deputy Creighton testified about the significance of a missing
label on a prescription pill bottle, too. When asked what a
prescription pill bottle with a torn-off label indicated, he responded,
Oftentimes it could be something as simple as
the label being just torn accidentally but more
often than not it is a situation where the pill
container either belongs to someone else than
the person in possession of it or the substance
inside the pill container is no longer the same
substance that was originally prescribed in the
container.
¶ 42 The People assert that Deputy Creighton’s “more often than
not” scenario provides probable cause to believe that Alemayehu
violated section 18-18-413, C.R.S. 2020, which states,
[a] person to whom or for whose use any
controlled substance has been prescribed or
dispensed by a practitioner may lawfully
possess it, but only in the container in which it
was delivered to him unless he is able to show
that he is the legal owner or a person acting at
the direction of the legal owner of the
controlled substance.
19
¶ 43 However, as Alemayehu points out,
[t]he statute allows possession of a controlled
substance so long as it is in the container in
which it was delivered. But here, whether the
bottles contained a controlled substance is the
query, and the deputies did not know and
could not learn their contents absent further
investigation beyond what [they could see].
¶ 44 Deputy Creighton did agree that, based on his training and
experience, “it would be reasonable to say there may be illegal drugs
or narcotics in that pill bottle.”
¶ 45 But did that testimony warrant a finding of probable cause to
believe the pill bottles were associated with criminal activity?
¶ 46 To be sure, there is something to be said for the idea that “[a]
prescription bottle bearing anything other than the defendant’s
name would indicate that the defendant is in possession of drugs
belonging to someone other than himself.” State v. Grevas, 881
N.E.2d 946, 953 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 2007) (concluding that this
circumstance alone “gave the officer the requisite probable cause to
seize the prescription bottles”).
¶ 47 But most authorities reject the idea that an unlabeled pill
bottle, in and of itself, constitutes probable cause for a search or
seizure. See State v. Meichel, 290 So. 2d 878, 880 (La. 1974) (“[T]he
20
testimony of the officer making the seizure is clearly to the effect
that he did not know the nature of the pills until after he had
picked up the bottle and examined it. He did not know at the time
he saw the pills that there was a probability that they were
contraband and probably evidence.”); see also United States v.
Crawford, No. 3:19-CR-65-TAV-DCP, 2020 WL 2029959, at *9 (E.D.
Tenn. Apr. 6, 2020) (unpublished report and recommendation)
(“[T]he Court does not find that the ‘intrinsic nature’ of the pill
bottle [with its wrapper torn and partially off] led to probable cause
to believe that it is contraband. Even if the pill bottle appeared
suspicious to law enforcement, further investigation would have
been required to establish probable cause as to its association with
criminal activity.”) (citations omitted), adopted, 2020 WL 2025612(E.D. Tenn. Apr. 27, 2020) (unpublished order); United States v.
Cooks, 222 F. Supp. 3d 965, 966-72 (D. Kan. 2016) (officer finding
pill bottle with missing label in console created only a reasonable
articulable suspicion of criminal activity); People v. Williamson, 608
N.E.2d 943, 950 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (“While there is a chance a
prescription bottle [without the defendant’s name on it] may contain
a controlled substance, it is equally, if not more, likely to contain a
21
number of innocent objects such as a valid prescription, aspirin,
thumbtacks or nothing at all. Probable cause requires more than
simply having seen an item associated with criminal activity on an
earlier occasion.”), abrogated on other grounds by People v. Gipson,
786 N.E.2d 540 (Ill. 2003); Corwin v. State, 962 N.E.2d 118, 124
(Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (“The altered label might create reasonable
suspicion to further investigate the identity of the true owner of the
bottle. But the State has not demonstrated the altered label created
probable cause to arrest [defendant] for illegal possession of a
controlled substance before [the officer] opened the bottle to see the
pills.”); Commonwealth v. Hudson, 92 A.3d 1235, 1243 n.6 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2014) (In a case involving police observation of two
prescription pill bottles with their labels partially removed, the
court stated, “[i]n none of the above-cited cases did the courts find
that the mere observation of a container or package, the likes of
which an officer has known, in the past, to contain narcotics, was
sufficient to establish probable cause.”), abrogation on other grounds
recognized by Commonwealth v. Byrd, 185 A.3d 1015 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2018).
22
¶ 48 Most of the authorities require other “unusual” circumstances
in addition to these types of pill bottles to support a finding of
probable cause. See State v. Cheatwood, 267 So. 3d 882, 887-88
(Ala. Crim. App. 2018) (“The surrounding circumstances, namely,
the fact that [the defendant] smelled of alcohol, that he admitted to
drinking alcohol, and that he was passed out in a public place, gave
rise to a ‘practical, nontechnical’ probability that the unlabeled pill
bottle he carried contained contraband.”) (citation omitted); Ball v.
United States, 803 A.2d 971, 982 (D.C. 2002) (“[A]lthough neither
the officer’s recognition of the object in appellant’s pocket as a
medicine bottle that could be used to conceal drugs nor appellant’s
conduct independently establish probable cause in this case, the
combination of the officer’s plain feel of the medicine bottle, the fact
that the bottle was a large plastic container, the officer’s experience
with the packaging of narcotics in this kind of container and, most
important, the defendant’s numerous attempts to access the pocket
where the medicine bottle was detected despite the officer’s multiple
orders to the contrary, satisfy us that the officer could reasonably
infer that the medicine bottle contained contraband and was thus
authorized to seize the medicine bottle from appellant’s jacket
23
pursuant to the ‘plain feel’ exception to the warrant requirement.”)
(citation omitted); State v. Miguel, 263 So. 3d 873, 875 (La.
2019) (The officer was aware that the driver was driving with a
suspended driver’s license, the vehicle had a fraudulent license
plate, the driver and his passengers all disclaimed ownership of the
pill bottle, and the driver admitted that he recently smoked
marijuana, which, “in conjunction with the suspiciously torn label,
when weighed by an experienced law enforcement officer, provided
probable cause to believe the prescription bottle contained
contraband.”); State v. Renaudin, No. 2007 KA 2359, 2008 WL
2065936, at *3 (La. Ct. App. May 2, 2008) (“The report of the
defendant’s erratic driving; the defendant’s droopy, glazed eyes and
slurred speech; and the veiled discarding of a pill bottle with
a torn off label all contributed to the totality of the evidence
supporting [the deputy’s] probable cause.”).
¶ 49 In light of these authorities, we conclude that the mere
observation of an unlabeled prescription pill bottle did not provide
the deputies with probable cause to associate it with criminal
24
activity.6 Consequently, unless there were other unusual
circumstances which would have elevated the deputies’ suspicion to
probable cause, the deputies would have lacked the authority to
seize the item for further inspection under the plain view exception.
¶ 50 The People assert that there were such “other” circumstances.
They point to Alemaheyu’s having “just been in an accident, left a
fake name and number, [driven] to the other end of the parking lot,
6At trial, Deputy Proulx testified that “the first thing [he] noticed”
about the open driver’s side door was that there were “multiple pill
containers” that “didn’t have a label on them.” (Emphasis added.)
And Deputy Creighton is overheard on Deputy Proulx’s body
camera footage saying, “Yeah, I saw these without any labels” before
Deputy Proulx picked up the first bottle.
But both deputies testified at the suppression hearing that they had
noticed only a bottle with a missing label. Deputy Creighton
testified that only “that bottle” caught his attention “from the way it
was arranged and that the label had been torn off”; Deputy Proulx
similarly testified that he saw “a pill bottle” with “no label on [it].”
(Emphasis added.)
Had evidence been presented at the suppression hearing that the
deputies had seen, without touching or otherwise moving anything
in the driver’s side pocket, multiple unlabeled pill bottles, we might
have reached a different conclusion about the existence of probable
cause. But we have found no such evidence in the testimony,
pictures, or body camera footage presented at the suppression
hearing. See Moody v. People, 159 P.3d 611, 616 (Colo. 2007)
(When reviewing a trial court’s suppression ruling, we are limited to
considering only “evidence presented at the suppression hearing.”).
25
and [failed] to comply with the deputies’ requests. Thus, it would
have been reasonable for them to believe that he was under the
influence of a controlled substance.”
¶ 51 We are not persuaded. Unlike slurred speech, inability to
perform physical maneuvers easily, or even nonsensical actions or
answers, the circumstances on which the People rely, hardly (much
less naturally) point to someone who others would suspect to be
under the influence of an intoxicating substance.
¶ 52 Consequently, we conclude that the trial court erred by
determining that the deputies were authorized to seize (and,
consequently, search) the pill bottles found in the driver’s side
pocket of Alemayehu’s car.
2. Seizure of the Pill Bottle in the Glove Box:
the Vehicle Documentation and Plain View Exceptions
¶ 53 What, though, about the pill bottle found in the glove box?
The People argue that (1) the deputies’ search of the glove box was
justifiable under a type of “vehicle paperwork” exception and (2) the
deputies’ seizure of the pill bottle was proper under the plain view
exception.
26
¶ 54 The propriety of a warrantless search of an automobile’s glove
box for vehicle paperwork has been approved in, for instance, New
York, see Pryor, 896 N.Y.S.2d at 581-82, and New Jersey, see State
v. Terry, 179 A.3d 378, 388 (N.J. 2018) (Consistent with the Fourth
Amendment, “[w]hen the operator of a vehicle is unable or unwilling
to produce the registration or ownership papers . . . [the police may
engage in] a quick, pinpointed search for the documents in the
glove compartment . . . .”).
¶ 55 The California Supreme Court, however, has rejected this type
of police action. See People v. Lopez, 453 P.3d 150, 152 (Cal. 2019)
(“Considering the issue in light of more recent decisions from both
the United States Supreme Court and our sister states, we now
conclude that the desire to obtain a driver’s identification following
a traffic stop does not constitute an independent, categorical
exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.”).
¶ 56 Even if we were to endorse this exception, it would not benefit
the People in this case. Application of the exception would, at most,
put the deputy in a legitimate position from which he could “plainly
view” a pill bottle. But, as noted earlier, that does not automatically
mean that he could pick up the pill bottle and search it. Its
27
incriminating nature had to be “immediately apparent,” that is, the
deputy had to have probable cause to associate it with criminal
activity. See Swietlicki, ¶ 19. But, as discussed above, the lack of a
proper label on a pill bottle7 would not, in and of itself, have made
its incriminating nature “immediately apparent” to the deputy.
¶ 57 Nor, contrary to the People’s argument, would the deputies
have had additional grounds for associating the pill bottle found in
the glove box with criminal activity because (1) the deputies had
seized the three unlabeled pill bottles in the driver’s side pocket or
(2) it was seized after Alemayehu had told Deputy Proulx that the
initial unlabeled pill bottles contained someone else’s medication.
Both circumstances either involved or arose as a result of, and
indeed were linked closely in time to, the initial, illegal seizure of the
pill bottles in the driver’s door. See People v. Dyer, 2019 COA 161,
¶ 27 (“[T]he caseworkers’ observations, the paramedics’
observations, and [the defendant’s] statements during the hospital
interview were all obtained by exploiting the caseworkers’ and police
officers’ illegal entries into [the defendant’s] home. The
7 If, indeed, it was unlabeled. See supra note 1.
28
exclusionary rule therefore required suppression of all of this
evidence.”).
¶ 58 Consequently, the trial court also erred by determining that
the deputies were authorized to seize — much less search — the pill
bottle in the glove box.
C. Harmless or Reversible Error
¶ 59 Because the error in admitting illegally seized evidence was
one of constitutional magnitude, we must reverse unless we are
persuaded that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. People
v. Harmon, 284 P.3d 124, 128 (Colo. App. 2011). An error is not
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if there is a reasonable
possibility that the defendant could have been prejudiced. People v.
Stroud, 2014 COA 58, ¶ 6.
¶ 60 Here, the improperly seized oxycodone evidence was critical to
the prosecution’s case on the possession of a controlled substance
count. Consequently, the admission of that evidence cannot be
considered harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See McKnight,
¶ 60 (determining that an unconstitutional search was not
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where the search uncovered
the drug evidence used to convict the defendant). Thus,
29
Alemayehu’s conviction for possession of a controlled substance
must be reversed and the matter remanded for a new trial.
IV. Alemayehu’s Statements
¶ 61 Alemayehu contends that the trial court erred in admitting
statements the deputies obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966). We disagree.
¶ 62 Notably, we assess Alemayehu’s contention under the same
standards of review used in evaluating his search and seizure
contention: the admissibility of his statements presents a mixed
question of law and fact, and we may consider undisputed evidence
and undertake independent review of audio and video recordings.
See Davis, 2019 CO 84, ¶ 18.
A. Facts
¶ 63 From the testimony and the body camera footage introduced
at the suppression hearing, we glean the following facts:
¶ 64 Upon approaching Alemayehu in the parking lot, Lieutenant
Rogers directed him to “turn [his] car off.” Instead, Alemayehu got
out of his car and left it running. Lieutenant Rogers directed him to
stand at a nearby shopping cart return.
30
¶ 65 Four other deputies arrived on the scene. At most, only three
interacted with Alemayehu at any one time.8
¶ 66 A few times, Alemayehu started to walk away from the
shopping cart return and was told by one or more of the deputies to
“get back against the rail,” to “[s]tay leaning against the rail,” or to
“[s]tay there.”
¶ 67 Deputy Creighton asked about the torn lottery ticket that
Alemayehu had left on the windshield of the car he’d hit: “[S]o you
really thought this was a note? . . . Explain to me how you can put
this in someone’s car and not see that this is not a note.” When
Alemayehu responded that he had left the lottery ticket by mistake,
Deputy Creighton said, “That’s bullshit, dude, I’m gonna call it out,
alright?” He added, sarcastically, “That’s a good story, okay,” in
response to Alemayehu’s attempted explanation. While Deputy
Creighton looked for vehicle paperwork in the driver’s sun visor
area, as Alemayehu had suggested, Deputy Wolfe offered
Alemayehu a “piece of advice”: that “this particular cop really
8 One of them, Deputy Mark O’Harold, arrived later to take
inventory of Alemayehu’s car and did not, so far as we can tell, have
any interaction with Alemayehu.
31
doesn’t like being lied to.” Deputy Wolfe also said, “We know
exactly what happened . . . . It’s all on tape so we know you’re
lying.”
¶ 68 Deputy Creighton then questioned Alemayehu about the name
“Danny” appearing on the note Alemayehu said he meant to leave
on the windshield. When Alemayehu answered that “Danny” was
his nickname, Deputy Creighton replied that “those level of lies
you’re getting yourself into aren’t helping you, sir.” After Deputy
Creighton unsuccessfully attempted to contact someone at the
phone number written on the same note, he told Alemayehu that he
was “tired of excuses,” had “listened to enough garbage already,”
and knew “this was horse crap.”
¶ 69 Deputy Wolfe then interjected, “At this point, unless the truth
comes out, I’m going to recommend that we start looking at
attempting to influence a public official, which is a criminal act.
Because that’s a bunch of nonsense.”
¶ 70 After the prescription pill bottles were found in the driver’s
side pocket, Deputy Proulx questioned Alemayehu about the type of
pills, whether they were his, how he had gotten them, and whether
he owned the car in which the pills were found. Alemayehu
32
admitted that he was the owner of the car. He said he did not know
what the pills were, as he did not “do drugs” or take “any”
medication and the pills belonged to a friend with an injured back
who had left the pills in his car, so he moved the pills out of sight
because he used the car for work.
¶ 71 The deputies arrested Alemayehu approximately seventeen
minutes after first contacting him. They did not advise him of any
constitutional rights until after they arrested him.
¶ 72 The trial court denied Alemayehu’s motion to suppress his
statements, finding that
 the statements were made “during the course of the
investigation” into an “alleged hit-and-run accident”;
 although several officers were present, “most of the
officers, with the exception of Deputy Creighton” were “at
a further distance from the defendant, some standing
toward the back of the vehicle in question”;
 “[t]he officers are also engaged in several other matters
that are going on,” such as speaking with the victim of
the alleged hit-and-run, and locating the pill bottles in
33
the car, rather than “being up close or being with the
defendant specifically”; and
 “from the body cams themselves it doesn’t appear to be
anything coercive that that the police officers have done
other than conducting their investigation and questioning
the defendant regarding the situation and, in particular,
on the piece of paper that was left on the victim’s
vehicle.”
B. Analysis
¶ 73 Under Miranda, the prosecution may not use in its case-in-
chief a statement obtained by law enforcement during custodial
interrogation unless the suspect was warned about and validly
waived certain Fifth Amendment rights. 384 U.S. at 444; see People
v. Wood, 135 P.3d 744, 749 (Colo. 2006) (same).9 Two prerequisites
must therefore exist before a Miranda warning is required: the
9 “[T]he person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent,
that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against
him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either
retained or appointed.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444
(1966).
34
defendant must be in custody and subjected to interrogation by law
enforcement. People v. Padilla, 2021 CO 18, ¶ 15.
¶ 74 For good reason, the People do not dispute that Alemayehu
was subjected to interrogation. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S.
291, 301 (1980) (Interrogation refers “not only to express
questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the
police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody)
that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response from the suspect.”) (footnotes omitted);
accord People v. Bonilla-Barraza, 209 P.3d 1090, 1094 (Colo. 2009).
Consequently, we limit our analysis to whether Alemayehu was in
custody.
¶ 75 In the Miranda context, “‘custody’ is a term of art that specifies
circumstances that are thought generally to present a serious
danger of coercion.” Davis, 2019 CO 84, ¶ 17 (quoting Howes v.
Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 508-09 (2012)). A person is not, for Miranda
purposes, in custody simply because a reasonable person in his or
her position would believe he or she was not free to leave the
presence of the police. People v. Stephenson, 159 P.3d 617, 620
(Colo. 2007). A person is in custody for Miranda purposes only
35
when a reasonable person in the suspect’s position “would believe
himself to be deprived of his freedom of action to the degree
associated with a formal arrest.” Davis, 2019 CO 84, ¶ 17
(quoting People v. Hankins, 201 P.3d 1215, 1218 (Colo. 2009)).
¶ 76 In deciding whether a reasonable person in the suspect’s
position would believe himself to be deprived of his freedom of
action, a court considers the totality of the circumstances,
including (1) the time, place, and purpose of the encounter; (2) the
persons present during the interrogation; (3) the words spoken by
the officer to the defendant; (4) the officer’s tone of voice and general
demeanor; (5) the length and mood of the interrogation; (6) whether
any limitation of movement or other form of restraint was placed on
the defendant during the interrogation; (7) the officer’s response to
any questions asked by the defendant; (8) whether directions were
given to the defendant during the interrogation; and (9) the
defendant’s verbal or nonverbal response to such directions. Id. at
¶ 19 (citing Mumford v. People, 2012 CO 2, ¶ 13).10 “None of these
10 The supreme court has recognized that these factors are of
limited use to a Miranda custody determination because they
primarily address whether a person has been “stopped” rather than
36
factors alone is determinative.” People v. Pleshakov, 2013 CO 18,
¶ 20.
¶ 77 Alemayehu points to the following circumstances as indicative
of custody:
 Four uniformed and armed deputies were present.
 At times, three of them were standing with Alemayehu.
 The deputies had restrained his freedom of movement by
ordering him to remain at a certain place (the shopping
cart return).
 The deputies were accusatory and confrontational with
him, as well as dismissive of the credibility of his
responses and explanations.
 One of the deputies threatened to have him charged with
attempting to influence a public servant.
¶ 78 The presence of four to five deputies would not, in and of itself,
lead a reasonable person to believe that he or she had been
whether he has been subjected to a degree of restraint associated
with an arrest. See People v. Figueroa-Ortega, 2012 CO 51, ¶ 8.
37
subjected to restraint akin to a formal arrest.11 See People v.
Barraza, 2013 CO 20, ¶ 20 (holding the defendant was not in
custody, despite the presence of four officers). And in People v.
Figueroa-Ortega, 2012 CO 51, the supreme court rejected a trial
court’s determination that a detective had engaged in custodial
interrogation when he “confronted the defendant with the evidence
against him, indicated his confidence in the defendant’s guilt and
that he was merely seeking a confession, and told the defendant
that he would be charged for the burglary”:
The extent to which a police officer’s tone of
voice and demeanor can be characterized as
confrontational and accusatory is more
typically relevant to the determination whether
an encounter is consensual or is more
appropriately categorized as one in which a
reasonable person would feel he was not free
to leave. And while notifying a person who has
already been seized that he will be charged
with an arrestable offense before being
released may well elevate the seizure beyond
an investigatory stop, merely confronting a
11This is particularly true since the deputies, for the most part,
kept their distance and did not crowd Alemayehu. Most of his
interaction was with only two of the deputies and he never
interacted with more than three at one time. Cf. People v.
Pleshakov, 2013 CO 18, ¶ 30 (holding that the defendant was not in
custody because, “[a]lthough there were four officers present at the
scene,” the police officer and the defendant “conversed alone while
the remaining officers engaged in other tasks”).
38
suspect with the evidence against him and
threatening, no matter how confidently, to
charge him with a crime at some point in the
future does not, by itself, constitute an
infringement on his liberty, much less the kind
of infringement associated with a formal
arrest.
Id. at ¶¶ 9-10.
¶ 79 More pertinent, we think, are that the following occurred prior
to Alemayehu’s arrest.
 The deputies were investigating a report of a hit-and-run
accident.
 The deputies spoke with Alemayehu for only about
seventeen minutes, in a public place, in the middle of the
day. See People v. Begay, 2014 CO 41, ¶ 27 (The
defendant “was questioned in a public setting, near a
road, where passersby could see him, . . . for less than
[twenty] minutes . . . .”).
 Alemayehu “was neither patted down nor handcuffed,”
id., or otherwise touched.
 “[H]e was not told that he was under arrest” or would not
be released. See id.39
¶ 80 Considering the totality of the circumstances, we conclude
that a reasonable person in Alemayehu’s position would not believe
he had been deprived of freedom of action to the degree associated
with a formal arrest. Because Alemayehu had not been subjected
to “custodial” interrogation, then, the deputies were not required to
advise him of his Miranda rights. Consequently, the trial court
properly determined that Alemayehu’s statements were not
inadmissible on Miranda grounds.
V. Evidentiary Issues
¶ 81 Alemayehu contends that the trial court reversibly erred by
admitting into evidence at trial redacted footage from four deputies’
body cameras.12 We disagree.
12 As at the suppression hearing, footage was presented from the
body cameras of Lieutenant Rogers and Deputies Creighton and
Proulx. Unlike at the suppression hearing, however, Deputy Wolfe,
did not testify at trial nor was footage from his body camera
admitted. The footage from the fourth body camera admitted at
trial came from Deputy O’Harold, who testified to inventorying
Alemayehu’s car after his arrest. Deputy O’Harold had not
interacted with Alemayehu at all; consequently, no statements were
recorded on Deputy O’Harold’s camera. Indeed, he was alone and
did not speak during the recording.
40
¶ 82 In footage from his body camera, Lieutenant Rogers is
overheard saying to the victim of the accident that Alemayehu
“doesn’t want to cooperate” and saying to the witness that
Alemayehu was “a piece of work.”13
¶ 83 In footage from his body camera, Deputy Creighton is shown
confronting Alemayehu about the lottery ticket and the “note” with
a name and number on it. He tells Alemayehu that his responses
were “excuses,” “B.S.,” “horse crap,” and that “these levels of lies
that you’re getting yourself into aren’t helping you sir.” Then,
Deputy Creighton asks Alemayehu, “[A]re we ready for the truth?”
¶ 84 Also in the footage from Deputy Creighton’s body camera,
Deputy Wolfe is recorded saying to Alemayehu, “At this point,
unless the truth comes out, I’m going to recommend that we start
looking at attempting to influence a public official, which is a
criminal act. Because that’s a bunch of nonsense.”
13 Alemayehu’s opening brief asserts that Lieutenant Rogers also
said Alemayehu “doesn’t want to accept responsibility.” However,
we were unable to locate that phrase at or near the place in the
footage cited by Alemayehu. See Pastrana v. Hudock, 140 P.3d 188,
189 (Colo. App. 2006) (“[W]e will not search the record for evidence
to support allegations of error.”).
41
¶ 85 Alemayehu asserts that these parts of the footage contained (1)
hearsay, the admission of which violated his constitutional right to
confront adverse witnesses; and (2) impermissible comments about
his veracity.
¶ 86 Because Alemayehu did not object to the admission of any of
the body camera footage at trial, reversal is not warranted in the
absence of plain error. People v. Ujaama, 2012 COA 36, ¶ 38.
¶ 87 Plain error is error that is both “obvious” and “substantial.”
Hagos v. People, 2012 CO 63, ¶ 14. For plain error purposes, to be
“obvious,” an error must ordinarily contravene (1) a clear statutory
command; (2) a well-settled legal principle; or (3) Colorado case law.
Scott v. People, 2017 CO 16, ¶ 16. “An error is substantial if it
‘undermined the fundamental fairness of the trial itself so as to cast
serious doubt on the reliability of the judgment of conviction.’”
People v. Koper, 2018 COA 137, ¶ 43 (citation omitted).
A. Hearsay and Confrontation
¶ 88 “‘Hearsay’ is a statement other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence
to prove the truth of the matter asserted,” CRE 801(c), and is
42
generally inadmissible unless it falls within an exception to the rule
against hearsay, People v. Phillips, 2012 COA 176, ¶ 61.
A statement made by a party is not hearsay if
it is offered against that party. CRE
801(d)(2)(A). And statements offered for other
purposes — such as showing the statement’s
effect on the listener or to give context to a
defendant’s statements — are not offered for
their truth and are not hearsay.
People v. Abad, 2021 COA 6, ¶ 52; see also, e.g., People v. Faussett,
2016 COA 94M, ¶ 47 n.8.
¶ 89 All but one of the deputies’ statements referenced above were
admissible as nonhearsay to provide context for Alemayehu’s
statements. And the admission of those statements did not
implicate Alemayehu’s confrontation rights. See, e.g., Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 n.9 (2004) (“The [Confrontation]
Clause . . . does not bar the use of testimonial statements for
purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted.”);
People v. Godinez, 2018 COA 170M, ¶ 78 (“[T]he admission of
nonhearsay does not implicate a defendant’s confrontation rights
under either the United States or Colorado Constitutions.”).
¶ 90 These authorities and this line of reasoning would not, of
course, apply to Lieutenant Rogers’s statement to the victim of the
43
accident that Alemayehu “doesn’t want to cooperate” and was “a
piece of work.” Even if that statement qualified as hearsay,
however, its admission would not violate Alemayehu’s confrontation
rights, given that Lieutenant Rogers testified at trial and was
subject to cross-examination. See People v. Acosta, 2014 COA 82,
¶ 82 (“Where a witness testifies at trial and is therefore subject to
cross-examination, admission of the witness’s prior out-of-court
statements does not violate a defendant’s Confrontation Clause
rights.”). Nor would its admission constitute plain error: in light of
the other evidence in the case,14 the error would not cast serious
doubt on the reliability of Alemayehu’s conviction for leaving the
scene of an accident.
B. Veracity Evidence
¶ 91 “A witness may not opine with respect to whether another
person was telling the truth on a specific occasion.” People v.
Cernazanu, 2015 COA 122, ¶ 11.
14That is, the physical lottery ticket and fake number, the
testimony of witnesses to the accident, and Alemayehu’s own
conduct when confronted by the deputies.
44
¶ 92 But that rule does not appear to have been crossed in any
“obvious” manner here.
¶ 93 In People v. Cardman, 2016 COA 135, cert. granted, judgment
vacated, and case remanded on other grounds, No. 16SC789, 2017
WL 1369883 (Colo. Apr. 10, 2017) (unpublished order), another
division of this court rejected the identical argument made here. In
that case, the “recording of the interview admitted at trial included
the detective’s assertions that he believed the victim and did not
believe defendant’s denials of the victim’s allegations . . . .” Id. at
¶ 85. The division analyzed the problem thusly:
In Davis v. People, 2013 CO 57, ¶¶ 1, 17, 310
P.3d 58, the Colorado Supreme Court held
that a law enforcement officer may
testify about his perception of a witness’s
credibility during an investigative interview if
the testimony is offered to provide context for
the officer’s interrogation tactics and
investigative decisions rather than as a
comment on the witness’s credibility. It
necessarily follows that similar statements by
police officers made during the interrogation
itself are admissible for the same purpose.
Here, the statements made by the detective
during the interview fall within the purview
of [Davis v. People, 2013 CO 57]. The
detective told defendant numerous times
during the interview that he did not believe
him after defendant had denied certain sexual
45
contact with the victim, and the detective also
said that he believed at least some of the
victim’s allegations.
Id. at ¶¶ 88-89 (emphasis added).
¶ 94 We recognize that the division’s judgment was vacated by the
supreme court. But it was vacated on an entirely different ground
(i.e., the voluntariness of statements to the police) from the one at
issue here. With respect to the matter at issue here, we find the
division’s rationale persuasive and, adopting it as our own,
conclude that Alemayehu is not entitled to reversal on this
ground.15
15 We note that Alemayehu also similarly challenges that part of
Lieutenant Rogers’s trial testimony where, again without any
objection from the defense, Lieutenant Rogers answered “no” when
asked if Alemayehu had “plausible” explanations for (1) why he
hadn’t pulled back into the same parking space he’d been in near
the accident and (2) why he had left a piece of a lottery ticket on the
car. Lieutenant Rogers’s testimony may well amount to a comment
on Alemayehu’s truthfulness on another occasion. Cf. People v.
Gaffney, 769 P.2d 1081, 1085-86 (Colo.1989) (holding inadmissible
a doctor’s testimony that a child victim’s description of a sexual
crime was “very believable”); People v. Cook, 197 P.3d 269, 276
(Colo. App. 2008) (holding that the trial court erred when it allowed
an investigating officer to expressly state, on multiple occasions,
that victims were “credible” in their accusations). But if error, it
was not “obvious” (and hence, “plain”) error, though, because of
case law allowing police to testify about “why they took particular
actions even if their testimony ‘touches upon prohibited subjects.’”
46
¶ 95 Even though reversal is not warranted on this basis here, a
cautionary warning is: a “course of investigation” type exception is
not a blank check authorizing the admission generally of otherwise
improper testimony by police officers. See People v. Vialpando,
2020 COA 42, ¶¶ 62-66 (cert. granted on other grounds Oct. 12,
2020); United States v. Cass, 127 F.3d 1218 (10th Cir. 1977); 2
Kenneth S. Broun et al., McCormick on Evidence § 249, Westlaw
(8th ed. database updated Jan. 2020).
VI. Prosecutorial Misconduct
¶ 96 Alemayehu contends that reversal is required because of
prosecutorial misconduct. We disagree.
¶ 97 During closing argument, the prosecutor, in discussing
Alemayehu’s interaction with the deputies, said, “He’s walking
away. He’s refusing to provide his information. . . . He’s escalating
things to that point. And then he subsequently starts
manufacturing these lies, members of the jury, and —”
People v. Godinez, 2018 COA 170M, ¶ 78 (quoting People v. Penn,
2016 CO 32, ¶ 32); see Davis v. People, 2013 CO 57, ¶¶ 1, 17. As
explained above, Deputy Creighton testified that he confronts
someone with their own inconsistent statements. It is just as
possible that the other deputies, such as Lieutenant Rogers, used
the same tactic, which would make the statements nonhearsay.
47
¶ 98 At that point, defense counsel objected, and the trial court
ordered the prosecutor to “[r]ephrase.” The prosecutor then said
Alemayehu “starts manufacturing these untruths. And the officers
are responding to that. They’re getting frustrated because he keeps
telling them things that are just not the case.”
¶ 99 Defense counsel did not object further or ask for any further
relief.
¶ 100 On appeal, Alemayehu argues that the prosecutor committed
misconduct when he asserted that he “start[ed] manufacturing
these lies.” He is correct. See Crider v. People, 186 P.3d 39, 41
(Colo. 2008) (“[I]t is improper for a lawyer to use any form of the
word ‘lie’ in characterizing for a jury a witness’s testimony or his
truthfulness.”). But he is not entitled to relief.
¶ 101 By ordering the prosecutor to rephrase the comment, the trial
court sustained (without explicitly using that word) Alemayehu’s
objection to it. See State v. Hartley, 414 S.E.2d 182, 186 (S.C. Ct.
App. 1992). Because Alemayehu requested no additional relief, we
will not consider this alleged error further. See People v. Douglas,
2012 COA 57, ¶ 65 (declining to review allegedly improper comment
48
by prosecutor where the defendant’s objection to the comment was
sustained and he requested no further relief).
VII. Jury Inquiry
¶ 102 Finally, Alemayehu contends that the trial court erred by
responding to a jury inquiry about the elemental instruction for
possession of a controlled substance by simply redirecting the jury
back to the original instructions. Because, however, this issue
affects only the possession of controlled substances conviction,
which we have reversed, and we have no basis for assuming that
the issue will arise on retrial, we do not address it.
VIII. Disposition
¶ 103 That part of the judgment pertaining to Alemayehu’s
conviction for possession of a controlled substance is reversed and
the matter is remanded for a new trial on that count; that part of
the judgment pertaining to Alemayehu’s conviction and sentence for
failure to report an accident is affirmed.
JUDGE BERGER and JUDGE TOW concur.
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APPENDIX A
1