Inv. Family Ltd. P'ship v. City of Littleton , 2019 COA 127 ( 2019 )

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
SUMMARY
August 22, 2018
2019COA127
No. 2018CA0647 Burger Inv. Family Ltd. P’ship v. City of
Littleton — Courts and Court Procedure — Jurisdiction of
Courts — Subject Matter Jurisdiction; Municipal Law — Home
Rule Cities — Littleton City Charter
A division of the court of appeals considers the application of
North Avenue Ctr. v. City of Grand Junction, 140 P.3d 308, 310
(Colo. App. 2006) and Town of Frisco v. Baum, 90 P.3d 845 (Colo.
2014), to determine whether the Littleton Municipal Court had
exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of the city’s charter
and ordinances.
The division concludes that, although the relevant language in
the city’s charter is ambiguous, the city council’s and voters’ intent
— following the decision in Town of Frisco — was to limit the
jurisdiction of its municipal courts to only criminal matters. Thus,
a challenge to the city’s approval of an amendment to a planned
development plan was properly filed in the district court, rather
than the municipal court.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2019COA127
Court of Appeals No. 18CA0647
Arapahoe County District Court No. 17CV31948
Honorable Elizabeth Beebe Volz, Judge
Burger Investments Family Limited Partnership; A & S Burger Investments,
LLC; 1241 LLC; 1221 LLC; and 1201 LLC,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
City of Littleton; Littleton City Council; and Stone Creek Real Estate Partners,
LLC,
Defendants-Appellees.
JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division A
Opinion by JUDGE TAUBMAN
Bernard, C.J., and Davidson*, J., concur
Announced August 22, 2019
Foster, Graham, Milstein & Calisher, LLP, Chip G. Schoneberger, Denver,
Colorado, for Plaintiffs-Appellants
The Law Office of Steven J. Dawes, LLC, Steven J. Dawes, Denver, Colorado,
for Defendants-Appellees City of Littleton and Littleton City Council
Fairfield and Woods, P.C., Karen V. Reutzel, Jessica Alizadeh, Denver,
Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee Stone Creek Real Estate Partners, LLC
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2018.
¶1 This case presents the question whether the district court
properly dismissed the complaint of plaintiffs — Burger Investments
Family Limited Partnership and other entities1 — for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction where the City of Littleton’s charter vests
exclusive original jurisdiction in its municipal court over all
violations of the charter and ordinances of the city. Because we
conclude the charter provision at issue does not apply to civil cases,
we reverse the district court’s judgment and remand the case for
the court to reinstate Burger’s complaint.
I. Background
¶2 Defendant, Stone Creek Real Estate Partners, LLC, applied to
the City of Littleton2 for approval of an amendment to a planned
development plan that would allow for assisted living, memory care,
and accessory uses commonly associated with assisted living and
memory care facilities (“Application”). After a public hearing, the
1 The plaintiffs are Burger Investments Family Limited Partnership;
A&S Burger Investments, LLC; 1241 LLC; 1221 LLC; and 1201 LLC.
For ease of reference, we refer to the plaintiffs collectively as
“Burger.”
2 The defendants are Stone Creek Real Estate Partners, LLC, the
City of Littleton, and the Littleton City Council. For ease of
reference, we refer to the defendants collectively as “Littleton.”
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Littleton City Council found that the proposed amendment to the
planned development plan conformed to the development standards
of the Planned Development Amendment criteria specified in the
city code; thus, it passed an ordinance approving the Application.
¶3 Burger owns property adjacent to the subject parcel and filed
a complaint in the district court under C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) to review
the city council’s decision. In its complaint, Burger alleged that the
city council’s decision violated specific provisions of the city’s code
and that its actions in approving the Application were “contrary to
law [and] contrary to the Code.”
¶4 Littleton moved to dismiss Burger’s complaint for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. It argued that pursuant to section 58 of
Littleton’s charter and Town of Frisco v. Baum, 90 P.3d 845 (Colo.
2004), the Littleton municipal courts have exclusive original
jurisdiction to address the city council’s decision.
¶5 In pertinent part, section 58 of the City of Littleton’s Charter
states, “There shall be a municipal court vested with exclusive
original jurisdiction of all violations of the Charter and the
ordinances of the City.”
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¶6 The district court concluded that Burger’s complaint alleged
violations of specific ordinances; thus, exclusive original jurisdiction
lay with the municipal court. Accordingly, the district court
dismissed Burger’s Rule 106(a)(4) action for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, and this appeal followed.
II. The City of Littleton’s Charter and Burger’s Complaint
¶7 Burger argues that the district court erred in its interpretation
of the city’s charter as vesting the municipal court with exclusive
original jurisdiction over Burger’s Rule 106(a)(4) appeal of the city
council’s decision to approve the Application. In support of this
argument, Burger contends that, for the City of Littleton to divest
the district court of jurisdiction over appeals pursuant to Rule
106(a)(4) and grant exclusive jurisdiction to its own municipal
court, broader language is required than that contained in section
58 of the city’s charter. We agree.
A. Standard of Review
¶8 In an appeal of a Rule 106(a)(4) proceeding, the appellate court
is in the same position as the district court concerning review of a
governmental body’s decision. Shupe v. Boulder Cty., 230 P.3d
1269, 1272 (Colo. App. 2010). “The appellate court is not bound by
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any determination made by the trial court, but reviews the issues
presented to that court de novo.” Leichliter v. State Liquor Licensing
Auth., 9 P.3d 1153, 1155 (Colo. App. 2000). Generally, our review
is limited to whether the governmental body’s decision was an
abuse of discretion, based on the evidence in the record before that
body, or was made in excess of its jurisdiction. Whitelaw v. Denver
City Council, 2017 COA 47, ¶ 7, 405 P.3d 433, 437.
¶9 However, as here, when the parties dispute only the
characterization of the complaint at issue and not the jurisdictional
facts alleged within it, the trial court decides the jurisdictional
question as a matter of law, and review that decision de novo. City
of Boulder v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo., 2018 CO 59, ¶ 14, 420 P.3d
289, 293.
B. Applicable Law
¶ 10 District courts are courts of general jurisdiction authorized to
hear all civil matters unless otherwise excepted in the state
constitution. Colo. Const. art. VI, § 9(1); N. Ave. Ctr., L.L.C. v. City
of Grand Junction, 140 P.3d 308, 310 (Colo. App. 2006). One such
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exception allows home rule cities3 to create municipal courts and to
vest them with exclusive jurisdiction over matters of local and
municipal concern. N. Ave., 140 P.3d at 310.
¶ 11 When a home rule city exercises jurisdiction to address
matters of local and municipal concern in its municipal court, the
district court is divested of subject matter jurisdiction over those
matters. Town of Frisco, 90 P.3d at 849 (noting that the
constitution specifically allows a municipality to limit the
jurisdiction of the district courts).
¶ 12 Accordingly, so that there is no conflict between the
jurisdiction of state courts and that of municipal courts, the
Colorado Constitution limits the jurisdiction of municipal courts to
local and municipal matters. Id. at 848. Moreover, within the
sphere of matters of local and municipal concern, a municipal court
may only exercise the jurisdiction expressly granted to it in a
charter or ordinance. Id. (“When the municipal court attempts to
3 “Article XX, Section 6, of the state constitution, adopted by the
voters in 1912, granted ‘home rule’ to municipalities opting to
operate under its provisions and thereby altered the basic
relationship of such municipalities to the state.” City & Cty. of
Denver v. State, 788 P.2d 764, 766 (Colo. 1990).
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exercise jurisdiction over matters outside either of [these]
categories, we have found them to be exceeding their authority.”).
¶ 13 When interpreting a city charter, we construe it using the
rules of statutory interpretation. Roybal v. City & Cty. of Denver,
2019 COA 8, ¶ 11, 436 P.3d 604, 608; Mahaney v. City of
Englewood, 226 P.3d 1214, 1217 (Colo. App. 2009). When the
language of a charter provision is clear, we construe it according to
its plain meaning. N. Ave., 140 P.3d at 311. We give effect to every
word and do not adopt a construction that renders any term
superfluous. Id.
¶ 14 Conversely, if the language of a city charter is ambiguous, we
may ascertain its meaning by looking at extrinsic sources. Cook v.
City & Cty. of Denver, 68 P.3d 586, 588 (Colo. App. 2003). These
sources include legislative history, the consequences of a given
construction, the legislative declaration of purpose, and the end to
be achieved by the statute. McLaughlin v. Oxley, 2012 COA 114, ¶
10, 297 P.3d 1007, 1009.
C. Analysis
¶ 15 As a home rule municipality, the City of Littleton has the
authority, under the state constitution, to vest its municipal court
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with jurisdiction over matters of local and municipal concern. It is
undisputed that Burger’s Rule 106 action raises issues of local or
municipal concern. However, because municipal courts may only
exercise jurisdiction expressly granted to them, the dispositive issue
is whether the city’s charter confers exclusive jurisdiction on its
municipal court for matters pertaining to Burger’s Rule 106 action,
thereby divesting the district court of subject matter jurisdiction.
¶ 16 In Town of Frisco, the supreme court analyzed the terms of
Frisco’s city charter delegating authority to its municipal court to
hear “all matters arising under [Frisco’s] Charter, the ordinances,
and other enactments of the Town.” 90 P.3d at 846. Because the
Town of Frisco’s charter vested its municipal court with jurisdiction
over all matters arising under the town’s ordinances, and the
plaintiff’s Rule 106(a)(4) action alleged violations of the town’s
ordinances, the supreme court concluded that, by its plain
language, the charter vested Frisco’s municipal court with exclusive
original jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s Rule 106 action. Id. at 850.
Accordingly, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.
Id.
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¶ 17 By contrast, in North Avenue, where a city’s charter language
was similarly at issue, a division of this court interpreted the
charter to vest the municipal court with exclusive jurisdiction over
“all causes arising under” the city’s ordinances “for a violation
thereof.” 140 P.3d at 311. The division concluded that the
plaintiff’s request for a variance (and the city’s denial thereof) did
not allege a “violation” of the city’s ordinances, and therefore, the
case was properly before the district court. Id.
¶ 18 Though, as noted, we review the district court’s order de novo,
we agree with its determination that the circumstances of this case
are distinguishable from those of North Avenue. However, as the
district court observed,
[t]o the extent that North Avenue narrows the
ruling in Town of Frisco by finding that there is
a meaningful difference between charters that
give municipal courts jurisdiction over “all
matters” arising from the city’s charter, codes
or ordinances and charters that limit
jurisdiction to “violations” of the same, the
court agrees that this case falls under the
narrower interpretation presented by North
Avenue.
¶ 19 In light of Town of Frisco and North Avenue, we must interpret
section 58 of the City of Littleton’s charter. Burger contends that
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the section’s language, “all violations of the Charter and the
ordinances of the City” limits its reach to criminal or quasi-criminal
cases. In contrast, Littleton maintains that section 58 is not so
limited, relying on provisions of the Littleton Municipal Code.
¶ 20 We conclude that these two interpretations are reasonable,
and, therefore, section 58 of the city’s charter is ambiguous.
Accordingly, we must look to legislative history and other factors to
determine its meaning. See McLaughlin, ¶ 10, 297 P.3d at 1009.
¶ 21 A review of the “legislative history” of section 58 of the city’s
charter persuades us that Burger’s interpretation is correct. The
minutes of the Littleton City Council of August 17, 2004, show
conclusively that the council unanimously approved a motion to
modify section 58 of the charter to ensure that the municipal court
did not have jurisdiction in civil cases. That action was taken
following the supreme court’s decision in Town of Frisco. As the
council minutes reflect, the ordinance, before its amendment, “was
essentially the same as the Frisco Charter provision.” Minutes of
Proceedings, Littleton City Council, Aug. 17, 2004, No. 7. Because
the municipal court had dealt almost exclusively with criminal
matters, the amendment “would maintain jurisdiction in the
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municipal court of all violations of the City Code but would
eliminate jurisdiction for any civil cause or matter arising under the
Charter or ordinance of the city.” Id.
¶ 22 According to the minutes, one council member asked that an
article be placed in the Littleton Report, a local newsletter, to
explain the matter to voters, who were asked to approve the
amendment in the November 2004 elections. The October 2004
issue of the Littleton Report informed the voters as follows:
A recent Colorado Supreme Court decision
involving the town of Frisco, Colorado provided
that the Frisco Municipal Court would have
“exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters
under the Charter, the ordinances and other
enactments of the Town.” For cities like
Littleton, that have provisions similar or
identical to the Frisco provision, civil
jurisdiction on many municipal matters will
have to be filed in the Municipal Court first.
Municipal Courts, since their inception, have
dealt almost exclusively with criminal matters.
Up to this point, all challenges to municipal
matters, arising under the city code[,] have
generally been resolved in State District Court.
The decision of the Supreme Court now raises
the possibility of those cases being filed in
Municipal Court. This would create many
problems for the city, not the least of which are
increased costs, the possibility of having to
hire additional court personnel to handle the
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increased number of cases, and adding one
more layer of court review and delay in a case.4
¶ 23 At the election, the voters approved what was denominated as
Question 2C, thereby amending section 58 of the charter. This
approval makes it clear that both the city council and the voters
intended the amendment to limit the jurisdiction of the Littleton
Municipal Court to criminal cases.
¶ 24 Accordingly, we conclude that the district court erred in
concluding that the municipal court has exclusive original
jurisdiction over Burger’s complaint and in dismissing the
complaint. We therefore remand the case to the district court to
reinstate the complaint.
III. Conclusion
¶ 25 The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for the
court to reinstate Burger’s complaint.
CHIEF JUDGE BERNARD and JUDGE DAVIDSON concur.
4 Littleton Report, City of Littleton, October 2004, p.1.
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