v. Harrison ( 2019 )

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
SUMMARY
May 2, 2019
2019COA63
No. 17CA1372, People v. Harrison — Criminal Law —
Affirmative Defenses — Immunity for Persons Who Suffer or
Report an Emergency Drug or Alcohol Overdose Event
A division of the court of appeals considers whether there was
sufficient evidence to disprove defendant’s immunity under section
18-1-711, C.R.S. 2018, which provides immunity from arrest or
prosecution for those who suffer or report an emergency drug or
alcohol overdose. Interpreting the statute’s plain language for the
first time in a published opinion, the division concludes that section
18-1-711(5) defines an “emergency drug or alcohol overdose event”
under a reasonable person standard, considering what a layperson
would reasonably believe to be a drug or alcohol overdose that
requires medical assistance at the time the 911 call is made. Thus,
the division concludes that neither the subjective belief of the
person reporting the overdose event (as to whether an overdose is in
fact occurring), nor events that occur after the 911 call is made
(such as the defendant’s ultimate need for medical assistance) are
relevant to determining whether the defendant is immune under the
statute.
Applying the objective definition contained in section 18-1-
711(5) to the facts of this case, the division concludes the
prosecution presented no relevant evidence to disprove that an
emergency drug overdose was reported, leading to defendant’s
arrest. Accordingly, the division finds insufficient evidence to
disprove defendant’s immunity from prosecution under section 18-
1-711 and thus vacates defendant’s convictions.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2019COA63
Court of Appeals No. 17CA1372
Jefferson County District Court No. 16CR3708
Honorable Christopher C. Zenisek, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Brittany Page Harrison,
Defendant-Appellant.
JUDGMENT VACATED
Division III
Opinion by JUDGE ROMÁN
Webb and Freyre, JJ., concur
Announced May 2, 2019
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Trina K. Taylor, Assistant Attorney General,
Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Jessica Sommer, Deputy State
Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant, Brittany Page Harrison, appeals the judgment of
conviction entered after a jury found her guilty of possession of a
controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia.
Because we conclude the evidence at trial was insufficient to
disprove the affirmative defense of immunity for persons suffering a
drug overdose under section 18-1-711, C.R.S. 2018, we vacate the
judgment.
I. Background
¶2 Defendant and her friend, A.M., entered a Burger King
restaurant, ordered a meal, and sat down at a booth. About an
hour and a half later, staff at the restaurant noticed defendant and
A.M. had not touched their food and were slumped over each other,
“asleep.” An employee made multiple attempts to wake them by
yelling at them, shaking them, and banging on the table. Still,
defendant and A.M. did not move or open their eyes. A short while
later, the general manager called 911 because she was “concerned
for their well-being” and worried “something [could] be wrong.”1
1 The general manager did not specify exactly how much time
lapsed between her staff’s first attempt to wake defendant and when
she called 911. However, she testified that after the first attempt,
1
¶3 When a police corporal arrived, defendant and A.M. were still
unconscious. However, the corporal was able to wake defendant by
announcing himself and shaking her forcefully. At that point,
defendant was sluggish and confused. Because A.M. still did not
wake up, the corporal called paramedics.
¶4 Defendant gave the corporal her identification and told him
that she had not used drugs that day. But, a second police officer
arrived on the scene and noticed defendant “looked to be under the
influence of some substance.”
¶5 Defendant gave the corporal permission to search her purse.
He found a baggie with a tar-type substance in it, a syringe, a
spoon, a torch, and tin-foil with burn marks. The substance in the
baggie later tested positive for heroin.
¶6 Defendant also consented to a search of her backpack, which
contained two glass pipes, a lighter, butane fluid, two butane
torches, aluminum foil, and another baggie containing a powdery
substance that later tested positive for methamphetamine.
she and her employee “went on a little bit,” then tried to wake them
again. It was after this second attempt to wake defendant and A.M.
that the manager called 911.
2
¶7 When paramedics arrived, A.M., who was still unconscious,
was taken to the hospital. Defendant was taken into custody.
¶8 The prosecution charged defendant with two counts of
possession of a controlled substance and one count of possession of
drug paraphernalia.
¶9 The jury convicted defendant as charged.
II. Standard of Review and Legal Authority
¶ 10 The prosecution must prove all elements of a crime beyond a
reasonable doubt to satisfy due process. Montez v. People, 2012 CO
6, ¶ 21 (citing U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Colo. Const. art. II,
§ 25). This includes the burden of disproving “issues involved in
affirmative defenses.” Montoya v. People, 2017 CO 40, ¶ 24; see
also People v. Pickering, 276 P.3d 553, 555 (Colo. 2011) (noting that
an affirmative defense “admit[s] the defendant’s commission of the
elements of the charged act, but seek[s] to justify, excuse, or
mitigate the commission of the act”). That is, “if presented evidence
raises the issue of an affirmative defense, the affirmative defense
effectively becomes an additional element, and . . . the prosecution
bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the
affirmative defense is inapplicable.” Pickering, 276 P.3d at 555.
3
¶ 11 Section 18-1-711 provides an affirmative defense, under
certain circumstances, for persons who suffer or report an
emergency drug or alcohol overdose. For this affirmative defense to
apply, the following conditions must be met:
(1) The person reports in good faith an
emergency drug or alcohol overdose event
to a law enforcement officer, to the 911
system, or to a medical provider;
(2) The person remains at the scene of the
event until a law enforcement officer or an
emergency medical responder arrives or
the person remains at the facilities of the
medical provider until a law enforcement
officer arrives;
(3) The person identifies himself or herself to,
and cooperates with, the law enforcement
officer, emergency medical responder, or
medical provider; and
(4) The offense arises from the same course of
events from which the emergency drug or
alcohol overdose event arose.
§ 18-1-711(1)(a)-(d). As long as these conditions are met, immunity
extends to both the person who called 911 and “to the person who
suffered the emergency drug or alcohol overdose event.” § 18-1-
711(2).
4
¶ 12 An “emergency drug or alcohol event” is defined as:
an acute condition including, but not limited
to, physical illness, coma, mania, hysteria, or
death resulting from the consumption or use
of a controlled substance, or of alcohol, or
another substance with which a controlled
substance or alcohol was combined, and that a
layperson would reasonably believe to be a
drug or alcohol overdose that requires medical
assistance.
§ 18-1-711(5).
¶ 13 We review the record de novo to determine whether the
evidence before a jury was sufficient both in quantity and quality to
sustain a conviction. Dempsey v. People, 117 P.3d 800, 807 (Colo.
2005). In doing so, we must “determine whether the evidence,
viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was both
substantial and sufficient to support the conclusion by a reasonable
mind that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”
People v. Griego, 2018 CO 5, ¶ 24.
¶ 14 “An appellate court is not permitted to act as a ‘thirteenth
juror’ and set aside a verdict because it might have drawn a
different conclusion had it been the trier of fact.” People v.
Arzabala, 2012 COA 99, ¶ 13 (citation omitted). Instead, we afford
the prosecution the benefit of every reasonable inference that might
5
be fairly drawn from the evidence and, where reasonable minds
could differ, deem the evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction.
People v. Kessler, 2018 COA 60, ¶ 12.
¶ 15 Issues of statutory construction are also reviewed de novo.
People v. Smith, 254 P.3d 1158, 1161 (Colo. 2011). When
interpreting a statute, our primary task is to ascertain and give
effect to the intent of the General Assembly. People v. Diaz, 2015
CO 28, ¶ 12. To determine legislative intent, we first examine the
plain language of the statute. Klinger v. Adams Cty. Sch. Dist. No.
50, 130 P.3d 1027, 1031 (Colo. 2006). “We read words and phrases
in context and construe them literally according to common usage
unless they have acquired a technical meaning by legislative
definition.” Id. If the language is clear and unambiguous, no
further analysis is needed. Id.
III. Discussion
¶ 16 It is undisputed that police discovered defendant in possession
of controlled substances and drug paraphernalia after the manager
called 911 out of concern for defendant’s well-being. The manager
testified that her employee banged loudly on the table in an effort to
wake defendant and A.M., but they did “not even [f]linch.” At that
6
point, her “motherly instinct” gave her “concerns that something
was wrong,” and she thought “maybe we need to get help.” She
“called 911 and explained that . . . [she] could not wake [defendant
and A.M.] up and [she] was concerned for their well-being.” Based
on these facts, the trial court agreed to instruct the jury on the
affirmative defense of immunity for persons who suffer an
emergency drug or alcohol overdose event. The jury found
defendant guilty.
¶ 17 On appeal, defendant asserts that there was insufficient
evidence to support the jury’s verdict because the prosecution failed
to meet its burden of disproving the applicability of section 18-1-
711. Specifically, defendant argues the prosecution did not
disprove any of the following requirements: (1) that the manager
made a good faith report of an emergency drug overdose event, as it
is defined under section 18-1-711(5); (2) that the manager remained
at the scene until police arrived; (3) that the manager cooperated
with law enforcement; or (4) that the charged offenses arose out of
the same course of events as the overdose event.
¶ 18 Importantly, only the first element of the immunity statute is
disputed here. The People do not dispute that the manager called
7
911 in good faith, remained at the scene, and cooperated with law
enforcement, nor that defendant’s charges arose from the
underlying overdose event. Instead, the People argue that the
evidence was substantial and sufficient to disprove the first
condition of section 18-1-711(1)(a) — namely, that the manager
reported an “emergency drug or alcohol overdose event,” as it is
defined under subsection (5) of the immunity statute.
¶ 19 Even applying the deferential standard in favor of the
prosecution involved in sufficiency of the evidence review, see
United States v. Bevans, 117 F.3d 1429 (10th Cir. 1997), we agree
with defendant that the evidence was insufficient to sustain her
convictions.
¶ 20 Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the
evidence at trial showed the following:
• When defendant and A.M. entered the Burger King and
ordered food, nothing about them stood out to the
manager except that they were young, had backpacks,
and “looked tired.”
8
• But, after discovering defendant and A.M. asleep and
unresponsive, the manager became worried and called
911.
• When asked whether she called 911 in “panic mode,” the
manager testified that she called for assistance because
she did not know what to do.
• The manager did not have prior experience with anyone
on drugs or alcohol and it “never really crossed [her]
mind” that defendant was experiencing a drug overdose.
• The call was dispatched to 911 as a “welfare check.”
• Paramedics were not initially dispatched to the scene,
and defendant did not receive medical attention.
• The corporal was able to wake defendant and by the time
the second officer arrived, defendant was eating a
hamburger and answering police questions.
• After police arrived, the manager assumed the situation
“was okay.”
¶ 21 Drawing every reasonable inference from these facts in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude the evidence
showed that (1) the manager did not subjectively believe an
9
emergency overdose was occurring when she called 911 and (2)
defendant did not ultimately require medical attention.
Nonetheless, we conclude the evidence was insufficient to disprove
the manager’s report of an emergency overdose event in this case.
¶ 22 First, section 18-1-711(5) defines an “emergency drug or
alcohol overdose event” objectively, based on what “a layperson
would reasonably believe to be a drug or alcohol overdose that
requires medical assistance.” See Black’s Law Dictionary 1624
(10th ed. 2014) (defining an “objective standard” as “[a] legal
standard that is based on conduct and perceptions external to a
particular person” and a “subjective standard” as “[a] legal standard
that is peculiar to a particular person and based on the person’s
individual views and experiences”). Therefore, the manager’s
subjective knowledge or ignorance about the cause of defendant’s
condition is not relevant to the applicability of section 18-1-711(5).
See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 271 (2011) (holding that
where police are required to examine circumstances that “‘would
have affected how a reasonable person’ in the suspect’s position
‘would perceive his or her freedom to leave,’ . . . . ‘the ‘subjective
views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person
10
being questioned’ are irrelevant”) (citation omitted). Rather, under
the statute’s plain language, immunity must apply so long as the
person reporting the event reports in good faith an “acute condition”
that a reasonable person would believe to be a drug or alcohol
overdose.
¶ 23 To read section 18-1-711(5) differently — such as to require
the person reporting the overdose to subjectively perceive an
emergency overdose — would necessitate reading terms into the
statute “that simply are not there.” People v. Benavidez, 222 P.3d
391, 393-94 (Colo. App. 2009) (emphasizing that “in interpreting a
statute, we must accept the General Assembly’s choice of
language”). This is particularly inappropriate given that the
legislature expressly included a subjective requirement in an
adjacent section of the immunity statute at issue in this case.
Specifically, section 18-1-712(2), C.R.S. 2018, grants immunity for
persons administering an opiate antagonist “to an individual the
person believes to be suffering an opiate-related drug overdose
event.” (Emphasis added.) See United States v. Pauler, 857 F.3d
1073, 1077 (10th Cir. 2017) (“[D]rawing meaning from silence is
particularly inappropriate . . . [when] Congress has shown that it
11
knows how to [address an issue] in express terms.” (quoting
Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 103 (2007))).2
¶ 24 Second, and likewise, events that occurred after the manager’s
911 call are irrelevant to the jury’s determination of whether a
reasonable person would have perceived a drug overdose event at
the time the 911 call was made. Section 18-1-711(1)(a) only
requires that the person reporting the overdose event do so “in good
faith,” based on the caller’s state of mind at the time of the 911 call.
See Black’s Law Dictionary 808 (10th ed. 2014) (defining “good
faith” as “[a] state of mind consisting in . . . honesty in belief or
purpose . . . or . . . absence of intent to defraud or to seek
unconscionable advantage”); see also People v. Randolph, 4 P.3d
477, 483 (Colo. 2000) (noting, in the context of the admissibility of
2 Notably, other states have also chosen to include a subjective
requirement in their drug overdose immunity statutes. See Conn.
Gen. Stat. § 21a-267(e)(2) (West 2011) (providing immunity to any
person “for whom another person, in good faith, seeks medical
assistance, reasonably believing such person is experiencing an
overdose”) (emphasis added); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 4254(a)(1)
(2018) (defining “drug overdose” as “an acute condition resulting
from or believed to be resulting from the use of a regulated drug
that a layperson would reasonably believe requires medical
assistance”) (emphasis added).
12
evidence seized by police, that a “‘[g]ood faith mistake’ means a
reasonable judgmental error concerning the existence of facts . . .
which if true would be sufficient” to meet the legal requirement
(quoting § 16-3-308, C.R.S. 2018)) (emphasis added). Thus,
evidence of defendant’s condition after police arrived — including
that she did not ultimately require medical attention — is not
sufficient to disprove her immunity as an affirmative defense.
¶ 25 In other words, the only relevant evidence to aid the jury in
determining whether section 18-1-711 applied was that, at the time
the manager called 911, defendant had entered the restaurant,
ordered her food, and then become unconscious and unresponsive
for a prolonged period. Although the jury was entitled to determine
whether a reasonable person would perceive a drug overdose event
under these circumstances, we conclude the evidence was
insufficient to support a fair-minded conclusion that this element
was not met. See People v. Perez, 2016 CO 12, ¶ 24 (“Evidence is
sufficient to sustain a conviction if the quantity and quality of the
relevant evidence would support a fair-minded jury’s finding ‘that
the guilt of the accused has been established beyond a reasonable
doubt with regard to each essential element of the crime.’” (quoting
13
People v. Gonzales, 666 P.2d 123, 17-28 (Colo. 1983))) (emphasis
added).
¶ 26 Specifically, even viewing the facts in the prosecution’s favor,
we conclude a layperson would have reasonably concluded that
defendant was suffering an acute condition caused by a drug or
alcohol overdose. Section 18-1-711(5) specifically includes a “coma”
among the nonexclusive list of acute conditions that can be caused
by an “emergency drug or alcohol overdose event.” See People v.
Delgado, 153 Cal. Rptr. 3d 260, 266 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013) (“[A] coma
is defined as ‘profound unconsciousness caused by disease, injury,
or poison.’” (quoting Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 246
(11th ed. 2006))); see also Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary,
https://perma.cc/66JJ-TNVS (defining “acute” as “characterized by
sharpness or severity of sudden onset”).
¶ 27 True, other medical conditions may cause unresponsiveness
such as displayed by defendant and her companion. But the
prosecution did not present any evidence of the range or prevalence
of such conditions, especially among young people. Instead, the
jury was left to consider — unaided by expert testimony — what a
reasonable person would believe had caused two young people
14
sitting together to lapse into unconsciousness simultaneously, at
mid-morning, and in a public place. In an era of chronic opioid
abuse, the prosecution was required to do more than argue
inferences. See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
Opioids Portal, https://perma.cc/7SEY-VBVD (noting that drug
overdoses are “a leading cause of injury-related death in the United
States” and that “[o]f those deaths, almost 68% involved a
prescription or illicit opioid”).
¶ 28 For these reasons, we conclude the evidence at trial was
insufficient to disprove that a reasonable person in the manager’s
position would have believed that an “emergency drug or alcohol
overdose event” may be occurring.
¶ 29 Because the prosecution did not meet its burden to prove the
inapplicability of the affirmative defense of immunity under section
18-1-711 in this case, we vacate defendant’s convictions. See
Pickering, 276 P.3d at 555.
¶ 30 In light of this determination, we need not address defendant’s
remaining contentions on appeal.
IV. Conclusion
¶ 31 The judgment is vacated.
15
JUDGE WEBB and JUDGE FREYRE concur.
16