Peo in Int of C.M.D , 2018 COA 172 ( 2018 )

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
SUMMARY
December 13, 2018
2018COA172
No. 16CA0385, Peo in Int of C.M.D. — Criminal Law — Sex
Offender Registration — Petition for Removal from Registry;
Constitutional Law — Eighth Amendment — Cruel and Unusual
Punishments — Fourteenth Amendment — Due Process
In this juvenile sex offender case, a division of the court of
appeals holds that the provisions of the Colorado Sex Offender
Registration Act, §§ 16-22-103(2)(a) and -113(3)(c), C.R.S. 2018,
requiring lifetime sex offender registration for juveniles who have
committed more than one sex offense do not violate due process or
constitute cruel and unusual punishment as applied to such
juveniles.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2018COA172
Court of Appeals No. 16CA0385
Mesa County District Court No. 15JD140
Honorable Thomas M. Deister, Judge
Honorable William T. McNulty, Magistrate
The People of the State of Colorado,
Petitioner-Appellee,
In the Interest of C.M.D.,
Juvenile-Appellant.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division II
Opinion by JUDGE VOGT*
Dailey and Lichtenstein, JJ., concur
Announced December 13, 2018
Cynthia H. Coffman, Attorney General, Joseph G. Michaels, Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Petitioner-Appellee
Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Ryann S. Hardman, Deputy
State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Juvenile-Appellant
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2018.
¶1 C.M.D. was adjudicated delinquent based on an incident
involving unlawful sexual contact. At sentencing, he was ordered to
register as a sex offender under the Colorado Sex Offender
Registration Act (CSORA), §§ 16-22-101 to -115, C.R.S. 2018.
Because C.M.D. had a previous adjudication for unlawful sexual
contact, the magistrate was statutorily precluded from waiving the
registration requirement, and C.M.D. is not eligible to petition to
discontinue the registration.
¶2 On appeal, C.M.D. contends that, as applied to him and
similarly situated juveniles, the CSORA violates constitutional
prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment and
constitutional due process rights. Under the circumstances of this
case, we disagree. We therefore affirm the order requiring C.M.D. to
register as a sex offender.
I. Background
¶3 At the time of the incident giving rise to the order, C.M.D. was
serving a sentence in the Department of Youth Corrections (DYC)
based on prior adjudications, one of which was also for unlawful
sexual contact. Although the incident was reported to have
occurred when C.M.D. was seventeen and a half years old, the
1
petition in delinquency was not filed until one year later, when
C.M.D. was eighteen and a half.
¶4 The petition alleged that C.M.D. had committed unlawful
sexual contact against another DYC resident, who was then
seventeen. C.M.D. had reported the incident to his case manager,
stating that he “grabbed a girl’s ass” and that he did it because he
“felt aroused and couldn’t help himself.” The victim told law
enforcement personnel that she had been in a transport van with
C.M.D. and another girl on the way to court appearances. In the
elevator at the courthouse, she felt C.M.D.’s hand brush her
bottom, but was not sure if it was intentional. She then said that
[w]hen they were leaving court getting ready to
get back in the transport van, she did not want
to sit next to C.M.D. . . . [H]e kept touching
her back throughout the drive.
She told him to stop several times and he did
not stop. He was only touching her back at
this point, but this made her mad and
uncomfortable.
When they arrived back at DYC . . . C.M.D.
scooted closer to [her], [and] grabbed her butt
two times.
¶5 The People filed a petition in delinquency alleging that C.M.D.
had committed an act which, if committed by an adult, would
2
constitute misdemeanor unlawful sexual contact under section 18-
3-404(1)(a), C.R.S. 2018. In exchange for dismissal of the charge,
C.M.D. pleaded guilty to third degree assault, § 18-3-204(1)(a),
C.R.S. 2018, with an underlying factual basis of unlawful sexual
contact. The court sentenced C.M.D. to up to six months in the
custody of the DYC, the sentence to run concurrent with his
sentences in four other cases. C.M.D. acknowledged at the plea
hearing that he knew he would be required to register as a sex
offender.
¶6 As noted, this was not C.M.D.’s first adjudication for an
offense with an underlying factual basis of unlawful sexual contact.
He had previously been adjudicated for sexually assaulting his
sister over the course of three to five years, beginning when she was
approximately four years old and he was approximately six years
old. The conduct giving rise to the adjudication included forced oral
sex, digital penetration of the vagina, and attempted penile-vaginal
intercourse. At sentencing in this case, the magistrate noted that
he had no discretion to decline to impose the sex offender
registration requirement, and then commented:
3
Even if I’d had discretion, I would feel
somewhat conflicted about not requiring
[C.M.D.] to register. . . . [C]onsidering some of
the factors if I were allowed to under [section
16-22-103(5)(a)], considering that, certainly
lifetime registration would seem unfairly
punitive under these circumstances.
But, it’s not the adjudication for this offense
that makes it unfairly – that makes it lifetime.
It’s the – of course, the existence of the other
offense. But, the risk to the community may
require that registration. And so, if I had that
discretion, I’m not sure that I would actually
go – and exercise that discretion.
¶7 C.M.D. petitioned for district court review of the magistrate’s
order, arguing, among other things, that requiring him to register
as a sex offender amounted to cruel and unusual punishment. The
district court disagreed, citing cases holding that the requirement to
register is not punishment, and adding:
However, even if the requirement to register
were punishment, such a requirement here
would neither be unfairly punitive nor cruel
and unusual because of the Juvenile’s prior
adjudication for unlawful sexual behavior.
With two adjudications for this type of
behavior, community safety requires
registration. Such conclusion is necessary
because the statute specifically permits the
exception for only someone who has no prior
for this type of behavior.
4
II. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
¶8 C.M.D. contends that mandatory, lifetime sex offender
registration under CSORA violates federal and state constitutional
prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment, as applied to
him and similarly situated juveniles. We disagree.
A. Standard of Review
¶9 We review the constitutionality of a statute de novo. See
People v. Sabell, 2018 COA 85, ¶ 46. Statutes are presumed to be
constitutional. Qwest Servs. Corp. v. Blood, 252 P.3d 1071, 1083
(Colo. 2011). Thus, the burden is on the party challenging a statute
to prove that it is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.;
People v. Dash, 104 P.3d 286, 290 (Colo. App. 2004).
B. CSORA
¶ 10 The CSORA provides that “any person who is convicted in the
state of Colorado of unlawful sexual behavior or of another offense,
the underlying factual basis of which involves unlawful sexual
behavior . . . shall be required to register” as a sex offender. § 16-
22-103(2)(a), C.R.S. 2018. This registration requirement applies
equally to adult convictions and to juvenile adjudications based on
5
the commission of any act that may constitute unlawful sexual
behavior. § 16-22-103(4).
¶ 11 Section 16-22-103(5)(a) permits sentencing courts to exempt
offenders from the registration requirement if the court determines
that the requirement would be unfairly punitive and that exempting
the person would not pose a significant risk to the community.
However, this provision applies only if the person was under
eighteen at the time of the commission of the offense and had not
been previously charged with unlawful sexual behavior. Id.
¶ 12 Additionally, section 16-22-113(1), C.R.S. 2018, outlines
circumstances in which offenders may petition the court to
discontinue the registration requirement. However, the option to
discontinue registration is not available to persons with more than
one conviction or adjudication for unlawful sexual behavior. § 16-
22-113(3)(c); see People v. Atencio, 219 P.3d 1080, 1082 (Colo. App.
2009).
¶ 13 As noted, neither of these options was available to C.M.D.
because of his previous adjudication for unlawful sexual behavior.
Thus, the court was statutorily required to order C.M.D. to register
as a sex offender for the rest of his life.
6
C. The CSORA Is Not Punishment
¶ 14 The United States and Colorado Constitutions prohibit cruel
and unusual punishment. U.S. Const. amend. VIII; Colo. Const.
art. II, § 20.
¶ 15 To decide whether this prohibition is implicated, we must first
determine whether the challenged requirement is punishment. See
People in Interest of J.O., 2015 COA 119, ¶ 21. In making this
determination, we initially look to the statute to see whether the
legislature intended the requirement to be punishment. See Smith
v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92 (2003) (legislative intent as expressed in
statute supported conclusion that Alaska sex offender registration
statute was non-punitive). Where the legislature has clearly stated
its intent to create a non-punitive regulatory scheme, “‘only the
clearest proof’ will suffice to override legislative intent and
transform what has been denominated a civil remedy into a
criminal penalty.” Id. at 92 (quoting Hudson v. United States, 522
U.S. 93, 100 (1997)).
¶ 16 The CSORA states:
The general assembly finds that persons
convicted of offenses involving unlawful sexual
behavior have a reduced expectation of privacy
7
because of the public’s interest in public
safety. The general assembly further finds
that the public must have access to
information concerning persons convicted of
offenses involving unlawful sexual behavior
that is collected pursuant to this article to
allow them to adequately protect themselves
and their children from these persons. The
general assembly declares, however, that, in
making this information available to the public
. . . it is not the general assembly’s intent that
the information be used to inflict retribution or
additional punishment on any person
convicted of unlawful sexual behavior . . . .
§ 16-22-112(1), C.R.S. 2018.
¶ 17 Consistent with the legislature’s stated intent, divisions of this
court have uniformly held that sex offender registration is not
punishment. See J.O., ¶¶ 21-30; People v. Carbajal, 2012 COA 107,
¶ 37; People v. Sowell, 327 P.3d 273, 277 (Colo. App. 2011); People
v. Tuffo, 209 P.3d 1226, 1230 (Colo. App. 2009); People v.
Montaine, 7 P.3d 1065, 1067 (Colo. App. 1999). Such registration is
not part of a defendant’s sentence but is instead a collateral civil
requirement intended as a public safety measure. See Carbajal,
¶ 37; Montaine, 7 P.3d at 1067.
¶ 18 Except for J.O., the cited Colorado cases all deal with adult
offenders. As C.M.D. correctly points out, a different analysis may
8
be called for if the offender is a juvenile. The Supreme Court has
recognized that “children are constitutionally different from adults
for purposes of sentencing,” Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471
(2012), and it has struck down laws permitting imposition of the
death penalty and mandatory life-without-parole sentences for
juveniles as violative of the Eighth Amendment. See id.¶ 19 In J.O., the division rejected the juvenile’s argument that,
under the Miller line of cases, the Eighth Amendment prohibits the
possibility of lifetime sex offender registration for juveniles. After
reviewing Colorado precedent holding that sex offender registration
is not punishment, the division concluded that, even as applied to
juveniles, such registration does not constitute punishment;
therefore, it was unnecessary to address whether registration was
cruel and unusual. J.O., ¶ 30. The J.O. division also noted that
“[m]ost jurisdictions to have addressed this issue continue to hold
that sex offender registration for a juvenile is not punitive.” Id. at
¶ 24.
9
¶ 20 We agree with the analysis and the result in J.O.1 We are not
persuaded to reach a different conclusion based on cases from
other jurisdictions cited by C.M.D. See, e.g., Doe v. State, 111 A.3d
1077, 1100 (N.H. 2015) (punitive effects of New Hampshire sex
offender registration system outweighed non-punitive legislative
intent; therefore, retroactive application of sex offender registration
requirements violated prohibition against ex post facto laws as
applied to petitioner); In re C.P., 967 N.E.2d 729, 732 (Ohio 2012)
(statute imposing automatic lifelong registration and notification
requirements on juvenile sex offenders was cruel and unusual
punishment and a violation of due process).
¶ 21 Nor do we agree with C.M.D. that, if we assess the issue under
the intent-effects test of Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S.
144, 168 (1963), we would conclude, as the United States District
Court did in Millard v. Rankin, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1211 (D. Colo.
1 We do not agree with C.M.D. that J.O. is distinguishable because
the juvenile in that case could later petition to discontinue
registration. Although the division so stated in distinguishing an
Ohio case, see People in Interest of J.O., 2015 COA 119, ¶ 29, it is
not entirely clear whether, in light of section 16-22-113(3)(c), C.R.S.
2018, the statement is accurate. In any event, we decline to depart
from the result in J.O. on this basis.
10
2017), that, despite the stated legislative intent, the CSORA is
punitive in effect.
¶ 22 Under the Kennedy test, courts are to consider the following:
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative
disability or restraint, whether it has
historically been regarded as a
punishment, whether it comes into play only
on a finding of scienter, whether its operation
will promote the traditional aims of
punishment — retribution and
deterrence, whether the behavior to which it
applies is already a crime, whether an
alternative purpose to which it may rationally
be connected is assignable for it, and whether
it appears excessive in relation to the
alternative purpose assigned.
Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168 (footnotes omitted). The Supreme Court
applied this test in Smith, 538 U.S. at 92, and concluded that the
Alaska sex offender registration requirement was not punishment.2
¶ 23 Applying this test to the CSORA, we also conclude that the
statute is not punitive. First, the statute itself does not impose an
“affirmative disability or restraint.” Id. at 99 (quoting Kennedy, 372
2 In Doe v. State, 189 P.3d 999, 1019 (Alaska 2008), the Alaska
Supreme Court weighed the Kennedy factors and came to a
contrary conclusion, finding that Alaska’s sex offender registration
statute was punitive in effect and thus violated state constitutional
ex post facto prohibitions as applied to the adult defendant.
11
U.S. at 168). Unlike prison, probation, or parole, registration does
not limit where offenders may live or where they may work,
although local ordinances may do so. See id. at 101. Second, as
discussed above, sex offender registration has not historically been
regarded as a punishment in Colorado. Third, although sex
offender registration is required regardless of a finding of scienter,
this factor carries “little weight.” Id. at 105. Fourth, the statute’s
operation does not “promote the traditional aims of punishment —
retribution and deterrence.” Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168. Those aims
are primarily furthered by imposition of the sentence associated
with the offense, not the associated registration requirement. Fifth,
although the conduct to which registration applies is already a
crime, that crime carries its own punishment; any punishment
arising from a failure to register results from a proceeding separate
from the original offense. Smith, 538 U.S. at 102. Finally, the
stated and rational purpose of sex offender registration is to protect
the public, and requiring registration is not excessive in light of this
purpose.
¶ 24 Although we conclude that the CSORA is not punishment even
if analyzed under the Kennedy factors, we recognize that the federal
12
court in Millard, on which C.M.D. relies, reached a contrary
conclusion. In that case, three registered sex offenders testified to
specific adverse consequences they had suffered — including forced
changes of residence, one man’s exclusion from his own children’s
school, and difficulties in obtaining or maintaining employment —
as a result of the registration requirement. The court observed that
such evidence of “actual adverse consequences” of sex offender
registration was relevant to the plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment claim.
265 F. Supp. 3d at 1222. After acknowledging the non-punitive
legislative intent of the CSORA, the court concluded that, based on
the testimony, the statute’s effects on the three plaintiffs before it
were clearly punitive. Id. at 1226.
¶ 25 In this case, there is no evidence before us of any such adverse
effects on C.M.D. At this point, the effects of registration on C.M.D.
remain speculative, and it would be premature for us to base a
decision on circumstances that may not in fact occur. See, e.g.,
Olivas-Soto v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 143 P.3d 1178, 1180
(Colo. App. 2006) (“Generally, ripeness tests whether an issue is
real, immediate, and fit for adjudication. Under that doctrine,
adjudication should be withheld for uncertain or contingent future
13
matters that suppose a speculative injury which may never occur.”);
see also People v. Higgins, 2016 CO 68, ¶ 13 (declining to address
contentions that were based on hypothetical fact situations or that
would require findings as to facts that had not yet occurred); People
v. Oglethorpe, 87 P.3d 129, 134 (Colo. App. 2003) (argument
regarding release of sex offenders to parole was premature where
defendant was not currently eligible for parole).
¶ 26 Under the facts of this case, we are not persuaded to depart
from established Colorado precedent holding that the sex offender
registration requirement is not punishment. We therefore do not
reach the question whether such requirement is cruel or unusual.
See J.O., ¶ 30.
¶ 27 In sum, we cannot conclude that requiring lifetime sex
offender registration for C.M.D., who has been adjudicated for a
previous sex offense, violates constitutional guarantees against
cruel and unusual punishment and warrants disregarding the
legislature’s unequivocally stated concern for public safety.
¶ 28 However, in so concluding, we acknowledge that C.M.D. has
cited persuasive studies addressing the debilitating effects of sex
offender registration on juveniles and the questionable public safety
14
value of such registration. See Catherine L. Carpenter, Throwaway
Children: The Tragic Consequences of a False Narrative, 45 Sw. L.
Rev. 461, 489-90 (2016); Amy E. Halbrook, Juvenile Pariahs, 65
Hastings L.J. 1, 13 (2013); Elizabeth J. LeTourneau et al., Effects of
Juvenile Sex Offender Registration on Adolescent Well-Being: An
Empirical Examination, 24 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 105 (Feb. 2018);
Nastassia Walsh & Tracy Velazquez, Registering Harm: The Adam
Walsh Act and Juvenile Sex Offender Registration, The Champion 20
(Dec. 2009); Franklin E. Zimring et al., Investigating the Continuity
of Sex Offending: Evidence from the Second Philadelphia Birth
Cohort, 26 Just. Q. 58, 69-72 (Mar. 2009),
https://perma.cc/8MGW-JTFT; Human Rights Watch, Raised on
the Registry, The Irreparable Harm of Placing Children on Sex
Offender Registries in the US (May 2013), https://perma.cc/B3E9-
AT5S; MacArthur Foundation, Juvenile Justice in a Developmental
Framework: A 2015 Status Report 37 (Dec. 2015),
https://perma.cc/KSR7-2G2W. In our view, these studies raise
valid policy concerns that should be considered by the legislature.
15
III. Due Process
¶ 29 C.M.D. contends that mandatory, lifetime sex offender
registration under the CSORA, as applied to him and similarly
situated juveniles, violates federal and state constitutional due
process protections. Again, we disagree.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶ 30 Challenges to the constitutionality of a statute are generally
reviewed de novo. Hinojos-Mendoza v. People, 169 P.3d 662, 668
(Colo. 2007). C.M.D. did not raise this as-applied challenge in the
juvenile court. Although we could therefore decline to consider it,
we will, in the interest of judicial economy, briefly address
contentions that do not require further factual development. See id.
at 667; People v. Mountjoy, 2016 COA 86, ¶¶ 36-38 (citing cases
explaining why developed record and findings of fact are necessary
to permit appellate review of as-applied constitutional challenge).
¶ 31 The Due Process Clauses of the United States and Colorado
Constitutions guarantee that no person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend.
XIV; Colo. Const. art. II, §. 25. When a statute infringes on a
recognized liberty or property interest, the government must prove
16
that the statute is necessary to promote a compelling government
interest. People v. Young, 859 P.2d 814, 818 (Colo. 1993). Where
no fundamental right is implicated, however, the government need
only prove that the challenged statute bears a rational relationship
to a legitimate government interest. Id.B. Analysis
¶ 32 C.M.D. argues that the registration requirement deprives
juveniles of their “liberty interests in living, associating with families
and friends, and circulating in society without the well-established
burdens imposed by CSORA,” and that it deprives juveniles of their
right to privacy by making information public that would otherwise
be kept private. We find no due process violation.
¶ 33 Colorado courts have consistently held that adults convicted of
crimes have no fundamental right to freedom from incarceration,
see id., and they have rejected due process challenges by sex
offenders claiming that their liberty interests are violated by the
Colorado Sex Offender Lifetime Supervision Act of 1998 (SOLSA), §§
18-1.3-1001 to -1012, C.R.S. 2018. See, e.g., Dash, 104 P.3d at
290 (“An adult criminal offender has no fundamental liberty interest
in freedom from incarceration. Classification of sex offenders under
17
[SOLSA] neither creates a suspect class nor infringes upon a
fundamental right.”) (citation omitted); Oglethorpe, 87 P.3d at 134(under rational basis test, SOLSA serves legitimate governmental
interests in protecting public from untreated sex offenders); see also
People v. Torrez, 2013 COA 37, ¶ 88 (collecting cases).
¶ 34 Although we are unaware of any Colorado cases addressing
substantive due process challenges to the CSORA, we perceive no
basis for applying a different standard to the claimed liberty interest
challenge raised by C.M.D. Thus, we do not view C.M.D.’s claim as
implicating a fundamental right, and we have already recognized
that the CSORA’s stated purpose of protecting the public is rational.
¶ 35 Nor can C.M.D. establish a substantive due process violation
based on an asserted infringement of his right to privacy. An
alleged invasion of privacy or resulting harm to reputation does not,
without more, invoke due process protections. See Paul v. Davis,
424 U.S. 693, 701-12 (1976) (police chief’s distribution of flyer
identifying plaintiff as a shoplifter did not deprive plaintiff of right to
privacy or implicate rights protected by due process provisions);
United States v. Juvenile Male, 670 F.3d 999, 1012 (9th Cir. 2012)
(juveniles’ challenge to sex offender registration requirements as
18
violative of their right to privacy did not implicate any substantive
due process rights; collecting cases); see also § 16-22-112(1) (“The
general assembly finds that persons convicted of offenses involving
unlawful sexual behavior have a reduced expectation of privacy
because of the public’s interest in public safety.”); People v. D.K.B.,
843 P.2d 1326, 1330 (Colo. 1993) (“Neither this court nor the
United States Supreme Court has held that a convicted person has
a right to privacy in his arrest and conviction records.”).
¶ 36 We do not agree with C.M.D. that we should find a privacy
violation here because, as a juvenile, he has a greater expectation of
privacy in his records than do adults. First, it is not necessarily
true that juveniles have greater privacy rights than adults. See
People in Interest of J.M., 768 P.2d 219, 222 (Colo. 1989)
(constitutional rights of adults and juveniles are not co-extensive,
and state has broader authority to control and supervise the
activities of children; collecting cases, including those involving
privacy and procedural due process rights of minors). Second,
while information regarding C.M.D. may in fact be available from
other websites, the internet posting required under the CSORA is
expressly limited to registered sex offenders who have been
19
“convicted as an adult” of two or more enumerated felonies. § 16-
22-111(1)(c), C.R.S. 2018.
¶ 37 C.M.D. also appears to raise a procedural due process claim,
arguing that “CSORA deprives juveniles of the right to present
evidence or to be heard regarding their potential for rehabilitation.”
In People in Interest of C.B.B., 75 P.3d 1148, 1151 (Colo. App.
2003), a division of this court rejected a similar argument, holding
that a juvenile sex offender has no procedural due process right to a
hearing to prove that he is not currently dangerous before being
required to register as a sex offender under the CSORA. The
division reasoned that, because the duty to register is triggered by a
conviction, the offender’s current level of dangerousness is
immaterial under the statutory scheme. Id. at 1150-51; see Conn.
Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 8 (2003) (“[Persons] who
assert a right to a hearing under the Due Process Clause must
show that the facts they seek to establish in that hearing are
relevant under the statutory scheme.”).
¶ 38 Similarly, here, C.M.D.’s potential for rehabilitation is
irrelevant to the registration requirement under the statute as
20
currently written.3 Nor is that requirement based on an
“irrebuttable presumption” that juveniles generally have a high risk
to reoffend and pose a threat to public safety, as C.M.D. argues.
Rather, he was required to register as a sex offender based on his
adjudication for the current offense, coupled with having a prior
adjudication for a sex offense. In connection with his adjudication
for the current offense, C.M.D. was afforded his due process rights
to notice, counsel, and a hearing; and he does not allege that he
was deprived of any of those rights when he was adjudicated for the
prior offense.
¶ 39 We thus conclude that C.M.D. has not shown that the CSORA
violates due process or fundamental fairness when applied to
juveniles in the circumstances presented here.
3 Because public safety, not rehabilitation, is the purpose of the
registration requirement, C.M.D.’s cited studies and cases
concluding that juveniles are particularly amenable to rehabilitation
do not affect our resolution of the issue before us. Nevertheless, we
note that, even though juveniles may generally have a high
amenability to treatment, C.M.D. committed the current offense
after he had already been in sex offender treatment.
21
IV. Conclusion
¶ 40 We affirm the district court’s order requiring C.M.D. to register
as a sex offender.
JUDGE DAILEY and JUDGE LICHTENSTEIN concur.
22