v. Yakas ( 2019 )


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  •      The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
    constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
    the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
    cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
    Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
    should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
    SUMMARY
    August 1, 2019
    2019COA117
    No. 17CA0959, People v. Yakas — Criminal Law — Uniform
    Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act — Waiver
    A division of the court of appeals, interpreting section 16-14-
    104(2), C.R.S. 2018, of the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of
    Detainers Act (UMDDA), holds, as a matter of first impression, that
    UMDDA rights are not personal and may be waived by counsel. The
    division further holds that the statutory advisement may be waived
    by counsel. While the division disagrees with the trial court that
    the UMDDA issue is moot, it affirms the court’s decision on
    alternate grounds.
    COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS                                       2019COA117
    Court of Appeals No. 17CA0959
    Arapahoe County District Court No. 15CR3031
    Honorable Natalie T. Chase, Judge
    The People of the State of Colorado,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    Joshua Theodore Yakas,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ORDER AFFIRMED
    Division VI
    Opinion by JUDGE FREYRE
    Fox and Welling, JJ., concur
    Announced August 1, 2019
    Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Brock J. Swanson, Assistant Attorney
    General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
    Tara N. Jorfald, Alternate Defense Counsel, Lakewood, Colorado, for
    Defendant-Appellant
    ¶1    In this statutory interpretation case, we are asked to decide
    whether the right to a speedy disposition guaranteed by the
    Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act (UMDDA), §§ 16-
    14-101 to -108, C.R.S. 2018, can be waived by counsel or whether a
    defendant must personally waive this right. We hold that this
    statutory right may be waived by counsel and that counsel may also
    waive the required statutory advisement of rights. We further hold
    that when the defendant is present for counsel’s waiver and does
    not voice an objection to it, he cannot later complain that his
    UMDDA rights were violated.
    ¶2    Defendant, Joshua Theodore Yakas, appeals the trial court’s
    order denying his motion to dismiss his criminal case for violation
    of the UMDDA. We affirm.
    I.   Background
    ¶3    In October 2015, the police arrested Mr. Yakas for violating
    parole in an unrelated case. While incarcerated, the state charged
    him, on November 3, 2015, with three counts of enticement of a
    child, three counts of attempted inducement of child prostitution,
    three counts of attempted sexual assault on a child, three counts of
    indecent exposure – (third or subsequent offense), and habitual
    1
    criminality. Mr. Yakas appeared with court-appointed counsel at
    his first appearance on November 9, 2015. After waiving his right
    to a speedy preliminary hearing twice, Mr. Yakas proceeded to a
    preliminary hearing on January 13, 2016. The court found
    probable cause and bound the case over for arraignment on
    February 19, 2016. On February 19, the parties agreed to continue
    arraignment to April 29, 2016.
    ¶4    On February 29, 2016, Mr. Yakas filed a pro se “Petition for
    Speedy Disposition Under [the UMDDA].” As relevant here,
    paragraph four of the pro se petition states:
    4. The defendant, does not waive any rights of
    limits set forth under or in this act. If, at any
    time, the defendant chooses to waive any of
    these, it shall be himself, not through council
    [sic], by explicitly stating, in writing for the
    court or in open court, that he, knowingly,
    intentionally, and voluntarily waives his right
    under this act.
    ¶5    Upon receiving the petition, the court rescheduled
    arraignment for March 25, 2016. As well, on March 17, 2016,
    counsel for Mr. Yakas sent the following email to the court and the
    district attorney:
    I just wanted to let everyone know that Mr.
    Yakas is going to be withdrawing the detainer
    2
    and we will be asking that the April 29
    arraignment date remain. We’re fine with Mr.
    Yakas being brought in on 3/25 to do that on
    the record. Additionally, Mr. Yakas has been
    held at the Arapahoe County Jail, so unless he
    is going to be moved, we do not need a writ
    prepared.
    ¶6    When Mr. Yakas refused to appear on March 25, defense
    counsel explained that Mr. Yakas was “confused about the court
    date” and asked that the matter be reset for March 31, 2016,
    “because he’s going to withdraw that detainer [sic].”
    ¶7    Mr. Yakas appeared with counsel on March 31. The trial court
    asked whether “[defendant] was going to withdraw th[e] request [for
    speedy disposition] and . . . wanted to keep the arraignment date
    that we currently had set of April 29th.” Counsel responded, “That
    is correct.” The court then asked, “Do you wish any further
    advisement on the record with respect to Mr. Yakas’s withdrawal of
    request for speedy detainer?” Both defense counsel and the district
    attorney responded, “No.” Mr. Yakas remained silent. The trial
    court then found that the request for speedy disposition had been
    withdrawn and continued the matter to the April arraignment date.
    ¶8    After several continued arraignments, made at the defense’s
    request, Mr. Yakas entered a not guilty plea on August 1, 2016.
    3
    But the parties eventually reached a disposition, and on December
    15, 2016, Mr. Yakas pleaded guilty to several counts in exchange
    for the dismissal of the remaining counts and a stipulated sentence
    of twenty years in the custody of the Department of Corrections
    (DOC). The court accepted Mr. Yakas’s guilty pleas and sentenced
    him accordingly.
    ¶9     Around the time he pleaded guilty, Mr. Yakas filed a pro se
    motion to dismiss his case for violation of the UMDDA. The motion
    asserted, in part, that counsel’s withdrawal of the UMDDA petition
    on March 31 was “against his request” and constituted an invalid
    waiver of his rights, thereby depriving the court of jurisdiction to
    accept his guilty pleas. Mr. Yakas did not mention this pro se
    motion at the providency hearing, and nothing in the record shows
    that the court or counsel knew of its existence when Mr. Yakas
    pleaded guilty.
    ¶ 10   Following the providency hearing on December 15, the trial
    court issued an order requesting clarification concerning whether
    the motion to dismiss should be ruled on in light of the guilty pleas.
    After receiving no response, the trial court denied the motion to
    dismiss as moot, on December 21, 2016.
    4
    II.    Counsel’s Withdrawal of the UMDDA Petition Constituted a
    Valid Waiver
    A.   Standard of Review and Law
    ¶ 11         The UMDDA, which governs the disposition of intrastate
    detainers, People v. Slusher, 
    43 P.3d 647
    , 649 (Colo. App. 2001),
    provides that “[a]ny person who is in the custody of the [DOC] . . .
    may request final disposition of any untried indictment,
    information, or criminal complaint pending against him in this
    state,” § 16-14-102(1), C.R.S. 2018. A parolee in county jail on a
    parole violation is in DOC custody for purposes of the UMDDA. See
    People v. Gess, 
    250 P.3d 734
    , 736 (Colo. App. 2010); 
    Slusher, 43 P.3d at 648-50
    . The UMDDA’s purpose is to provide a mechanism
    for prisoners to timely resolve untried charges that are the subject
    of a detainer so that they may proceed with or complete
    rehabilitative programs. People v. Higinbotham, 
    712 P.2d 993
    , 997
    (Colo. 1986).
    ¶ 12         Once a prisoner requests final disposition, the untried
    indictment, information, or criminal complaint must be brought to
    trial “[w]ithin one hundred eighty-two days after the receipt of the
    request by the court and the prosecuting official . . . .” § 16-14-
    5
    104(1), C.R.S. 2018. If the matter is not brought to trial within 182
    days, “no court of this state shall any longer have jurisdiction
    thereof, nor shall the untried indictment, information, or criminal
    complaint be of any further force or effect, and the court shall
    dismiss it with prejudice.” 
    Id. ¶ 13
      A defendant may waive the right to final disposition of an
    untried matter within the 182-day period if the waiver is express,
    on the record, and made after full advisement by the court. § 16-
    14-104(2).
    ¶ 14   Statutory interpretation of the UMDDA is a question of law
    that we review de novo. People v. Adolf, 
    2012 COA 60
    , ¶ 9.
    Whether a defendant has waived a right is also a question of law
    that we review de novo. Stackhouse v. People, 
    2015 CO 48
    , ¶ 4.
    ¶ 15   Finally, where the facts are undisputed, a trial court’s denial
    of a motion to dismiss for violation of the UMDDA is reviewed de
    novo. People v. Glasser, 
    293 P.3d 68
    , 76 (Colo. App. 2011). When
    the facts are disputed, we review the court’s decision for an abuse
    of discretion. 
    Id. 6 B.
      Analysis
    ¶ 16   Mr. Yakas challenges the court’s denial of his motion to
    dismiss on two grounds. First, he contends that the
    superintendent of the institution where he was confined failed to
    comply with the UMDDA’s statutory requirements and that this
    failure required the dismissal of the charges against him. Second,
    he contends that his purported waiver was invalid and, therefore,
    the court lacked jurisdiction on December 15, 2016, to accept his
    guilty pleas. We address and reject each of his contentions.
    1.   Superintendent’s UMDDA Requirements
    ¶ 17   Section 16-14-103, C.R.S. 2018, provides that
    (1) Any request made pursuant to section 16-
    14-102 shall be delivered to the
    superintendent where the prisoner is confined
    who shall forthwith:
    (a) Certify the term of commitment under
    which the prisoner is being held, the time
    already served on the sentence, the time
    remaining to be served, the earned time
    earned, the time of parole eligibility of the
    prisoner, and any decisions of the state board
    of parole relating to the prisoner; and
    (b) Send, by registered mail, a copy of the
    request made by the prisoner and a copy of the
    information certified under paragraph (a) of
    this subsection (1) to both the court having
    jurisdiction of the untried offense and to the
    7
    prosecuting official charged with the duty of
    prosecuting the offense.
    ¶ 18   Mr. Yakas claims that, upon learning of his UMDDA rights, he
    immediately filed a petition invoking those rights “with the Court,
    Prosecuting Official, and Superintendent of Parole.” He argues that
    the superintendent failed to comply with the statutory requirements
    of section 16-14-103(1) that were triggered upon receipt of this
    petition and that this violation requires dismissal of the charges
    against him. 1
    ¶ 19   The record does not reflect whether Mr. Yakas sent his
    UMDDA petition to the correct person or, if so, whether that person
    complied with his or her statutory duties.
    ¶ 20   Even assuming, without deciding that Mr. Yakas correctly
    delivered his petition to the superintendent of the facility where he
    was confined and that the superintendent did not perform the
    statutory duties required by the UMDDA, we are not persuaded that
    dismissal of the charges is an appropriate remedy. See Martin v.
    1Mr. Yakas also asserted in his motion to dismiss that the
    superintendent violated the notice provision in section 16-14-
    102(2), C.R.S. 2018. However, he does not reassert this claim on
    appeal, so we do not address it. Cf. People v. Brooks, 
    250 P.3d 771
    ,
    772 (Colo. App. 2010).
    8
    People, 
    738 P.2d 789
    , 793 (Colo. 1987) (“Dismissal is not required
    unless the evidence fails to establish that the defendant was not
    prejudiced, in view of the purposes of the [UMDDA], by the
    superintendent’s failure to send ‘forthwith’ a copy of the defendant’s
    request for disposition to the trial court.”); 
    Higinbotham, 712 P.2d at 998-1001
    ; 
    Slusher, 43 P.3d at 650-51
    .
    ¶ 21   Our supreme court has determined that a prisoner may invoke
    his or her UMDDA rights through either strict or substantial
    compliance with the statute. See People v. McKimmy, 
    2014 CO 76
    ,
    ¶¶ 20, 23-24.
    ¶ 22   Strict compliance requires the prisoner to address his or her
    requests for speedy disposition to the prosecutor and the court, but
    also to send those requests to the superintendent of the facility
    where the prisoner is confined. 
    Id. at ¶
    23; see also §§ 16-14-
    102(1), 16-14-103(1). The superintendent must then comply with
    the requirements of section 16-14-103(1). McKimmy, ¶ 23.
    ¶ 23   Substantial compliance occurs when, notwithstanding the
    superintendent’s involvement, a prisoner substantially complies
    with the UMDDA’s requirements and the prosecution receives
    actual notice of the request for speedy disposition. 
    Id. at ¶
    24.
    9
    ¶ 24    Mr. Yakas admits, and the certificate of service reveals, that he
    sent his petition invoking his UMDDA rights to the court and the
    prosecutor. Further, the record contains an email from the
    prosecutor’s office acknowledging receipt of Mr. Yakas’s petition and
    asking the court to reschedule the arraignment date to align with
    the UMDDA’s time requirements.
    ¶ 25    Thus, even assuming that the superintendent failed to comply
    with section 16-14-103(1), we discern no prejudice from the
    violation since Mr. Yakas invoked his UMDDA rights by
    substantially complying with the statute. See 
    Martin, 738 P.2d at 793
    ; 
    Higinbotham, 712 P.2d at 998-1001
    ; 
    Slusher, 43 P.3d at 650
    -
    51.
    2.   Counsel’s Waiver of UMDDA Rights Was Valid
    ¶ 26    We begin by agreeing with Mr. Yakas that the court erred in
    finding his motion to dismiss was moot based on his guilty plea.
    The failure to bring a case to trial within the UMDDA’s required
    182-day timeframe automatically divests a trial court of jurisdiction
    over the matter, see § 16-14-104(1); therefore, such an issue is not
    mooted by the entry of a guilty plea, see 
    Gess, 250 P.3d at 736
    .
    Nevertheless, we may affirm the judgment on any ground supported
    10
    by the record. See People v. Garcia, 
    2012 COA 79
    , ¶ 62. So, we
    address his contention that counsel’s withdrawal of his UMDDA
    petition on March 31, 2016, was not a valid waiver of his rights.
    ¶ 27   We requested supplemental briefing related to this issue.2 The
    parties agree that waiver and withdrawal are synonymous, and that
    counsel’s actions at the March 31 hearing should be treated as an
    express or attempted waiver of Mr. Yakas’s UMDDA rights.
    Because the March 31 hearing transcript shows that counsel
    expressly waived Mr. Yakas’s UMDDA rights on the record, we must
    decide (1) whether UMDDA rights can be waived by counsel or must
    be personally waived by the defendant; and (2) whether counsel can
    waive section 16-14-104(2)’s advisement requirement.
    ¶ 28   We first conclude that a defendant’s UMDDA rights can be
    waived either by the defendant or by counsel. See People v. Bryant,
    
    2013 COA 28
    , ¶ 12 (recognizing that either the defendant or
    counsel may waive UMDDA rights); see also People v. Newton, 764
    2 We asked three questions: (1) whether there is a difference
    between withdrawing a UMDDA petition and waiving UMDDA
    rights; (2) if there is a difference, whether counsel withdrew the
    petition or waived Mr. Yakas’s rights on March 31; and (3) what
    effect, if any, Mr. Yakas’s presence and silence had on counsel’s
    withdrawal or waiver.
    
    11 P.2d 1182
    , 1187-88 (Colo. 1988) (recognizing, under the Interstate
    Agreement on Detainers Act (IAD), that either the defendant or his
    attorney may waive a defendant’s right to speedy trial); Sweaney v.
    Dist. Court, 
    713 P.2d 914
    , 918 (Colo. 1986) (noting that the policies
    underlying the UMDDA and the IAD are the same). Therefore, we
    reject Mr. Yakas’s assertion that UMDDA rights can only be waived
    by a defendant personally.
    ¶ 29   A criminal defendant is guaranteed certain constitutional
    rights that “are so inherently personal and basic that fundamental
    fairness of a criminal trial is called into question if they are
    surrendered by anyone other than the accused.” People v. Curtis,
    
    681 P.2d 504
    , 511 (Colo. 1984); see also New York v. Hill, 
    528 U.S. 110
    , 114 (2000) (“For certain fundamental rights, the defendant
    must personally make an informed waiver.”); United States v. Olano,
    
    507 U.S. 725
    , 733 (1993) (“Whether a particular right is waivable;
    whether the defendant must participate personally in the waiver;
    whether certain procedures are required for waiver; and whether
    the defendant’s choice must be particularly informed or voluntary,
    all depend on the right at stake.”). “For other rights, however,
    waiver may be effected by action of counsel.” 
    Hill, 528 U.S. at 114
    .
    12
    ¶ 30   While the intent of the UMDDA is to render the constitutional
    guarantee of a speedy trial more effective, the rights afforded under
    the UMDDA are not fundamental constitutional rights requiring
    personal waiver by a defendant. See People v. Anderson, 
    649 P.2d 720
    , 722-23 (Colo. App. 1982) (An extension of the UMDDA’s
    deadline did not require the defendant’s personal consent because
    “[t]his case does not involve the question of whether defense
    counsel may waive his client’s constitutional right to a speedy trial
    without his client’s consent.”); State v. Hinojosa, 
    798 N.W.2d 634
    ,
    637 (N.D. 2011) (“The [UMDDA] creates ‘a conditional procedural
    statutory right’ and ‘is not the equivalent of a fundamental
    constitutional right requiring the personal waiver or consent of the
    defendant to be effective.’” (quoting State v. Carlson, 
    258 N.W.2d 253
    , 258 (N.D. 1977))).
    ¶ 31   Instead, “waiver of rights under the [UMDDA] is to be governed
    by the words of the statute.” 
    Anderson, 649 P.2d at 723
    . Section
    16-14-104(2) contains no language requiring a defendant to
    personally waive his or her rights. And we may not add such
    language. See Turbyne v. People, 
    151 P.3d 563
    , 567 (Colo. 2007).
    13
    ¶ 32   Furthermore, because “[t]he UMDDA’s counterpart governing
    interstate detainers, the Interstate Agreement on Detainers [IAD],
    embodies similar policies to those in the UMDDA,” “the principles
    applicable to the IAD may be applied to the UMDDA.” 
    Slusher, 43 P.3d at 649
    . As relevant here, courts have held that counsel can
    waive a defendant’s rights under the IAD. See 
    Hill, 528 U.S. at 114
    -
    15; 
    Newton, 764 P.2d at 1187-88
    .
    ¶ 33   Therefore, we conclude that a defendant’s UMDDA rights are
    not among the fundamental rights that require personal waiver by
    the defendant and that counsel here possessed the authority to
    waive Mr. Yakas’s UMDDA rights at the March 31 hearing. See 
    Hill, 528 U.S. at 114
    ; People v. Baird, 
    66 P.3d 183
    , 190 (Colo. App. 2002)
    (“A statutory right may be waived by counsel’s statements.”).
    ¶ 34   Having concluded that counsel may waive a defendant’s
    UMDDA rights, we must next decide whether counsel can also
    waive the advisement requirement of section 16-14-104(2).
    Consistent with our supreme court’s holding in Finney v. People,
    
    2014 CO 38
    , ¶¶ 15-17, we conclude that counsel’s waiver of the
    required advisement, in Mr. Yakas’s presence, was permissible and
    14
    effected a valid waiver of his UMDDA rights. See also 
    Hill, 528 U.S. at 114
    ; 
    Baird, 66 P.3d at 190
    .
    ¶ 35   A defendant who invokes his rights to a speedy disposition of
    untried charges is entitled to the procedural safeguards conferred
    by the statute. Cf. Finney, ¶ 15. As relevant here, section 16-14-
    104(2) provides as follows:
    (2) Any prisoner who requests disposition
    pursuant to section 16-14-102 may waive the
    right to disposition within the time specified
    [182 days] in subsection (1) of this section by
    express waiver on the record after full
    advisement by the court. . . .
    (Emphasis added.) And as recognized by a division of this court in
    People v. Carr, 
    205 P.3d 471
    , 473-74 (Colo. App. 2008), these
    safeguards preclude an implied waiver of UMDDA rights — any
    waiver must be express and on the record. Nevertheless, counsel
    may waive a defendant’s statutory rights and such a waiver must
    only be voluntary, not knowing or intelligent. Finney, ¶ 16 (listing
    cases finding counsel’s conduct waived a defendant’s statutory
    rights).
    ¶ 36   In Finney, the defendant’s challenge to the revocation of his
    deferred judgment was premised on the court’s failure to advise him
    15
    of the penalties associated with revocation under section 16-11-
    206, C.R.S. 2018. 
    Id. at ¶
    15. Similar to the UMDDA, section 16-
    11-206(2) contains language stating that “the court shall advise the
    probationer of the charges against him and the possible penalties
    therefor.” The court held that plea counsel’s waiver of the
    advisement, in Finney’s presence, constituted an express and
    voluntary waiver of this penalty advisement. Finney, ¶ 17.
    ¶ 37   Here, the record reflects that counsel advised the court and
    the district attorney by email that Mr. Yakas intended to withdraw
    his UMDDA petition. At the hearing, the court asked whether this
    remained Mr. Yakas’s intent, and counsel responded that it did. At
    no time did Mr. Yakas express any disagreement with counsel’s
    representation, nor did he voice an objection to the petition’s
    withdrawal. See People v. Rodriguez, 
    209 P.3d 1151
    , 1160 (Colo.
    App. 2008) (“[I]t was incumbent upon [the] defendant to press for a
    definitive ruling before being able to claim on appeal that the court
    somehow erred.”), aff’d, 
    238 P.3d 1283
    (Colo. 2010); People v.
    Anderson, 
    70 P.3d 485
    , 487 (Colo. App. 2002) (where defense
    counsel asked the court to take action that was contrary to the
    defendant’s wishes, any objection thereto may be abandoned by the
    16
    defendant’s failure to press for a ruling); see also People v.
    DiGuglielmo, 
    33 P.3d 1248
    , 1251 (Colo. App. 2001) (stating that at a
    providency hearing, the defendant had the affirmative obligation to
    ask for clarification if he did not understand the plea agreement).
    ¶ 38   We are not persuaded that paragraph 4 of the petition,
    precluding a waiver by counsel, requires a different result. Mr.
    Yakas cites no authority to support that it does, and, as noted, he
    had ample opportunity to bring his intention expressed in the
    paragraph to the court’s attention at the hearing. Therefore, as in
    Finney, we hold that counsel validly waived section 16-14-104(2)’s
    advisement requirement. 3 As well, because Mr. Yakas waived his
    UMDDA rights, the trial court had jurisdiction to accept his guilty
    pleas.
    III.   Conclusion
    ¶ 39   The order is affirmed.
    JUDGE FOX and JUDGE WELLING concur.
    3 We do not address Mr. Yakas’s argument, raised for the first time
    in his reply brief, that any waiver, if valid, was not voluntary. See
    People v. Grant, 
    174 P.3d 798
    , 803 (Colo. App. 2007).
    17