People v. William Robert Eason ( 2022 )

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
SUMMARY
May 19, 2022
2022COA54
No. 21CA0962, People v. Eason — Criminal Procedure — Trial
Jurors — Challenge to Pool — Mistrial on Ground Fair Jury Pool
Cannot be Assembled Due to Public Health Crisis; Colorado
Constitution — Article III — Separation of Powers
The Colorado Supreme Court adopted Crim. P. 24(c)(4) in 2020
during the COVID-19 pandemic. That rule allows a trial court to
declare a mistrial if the court determines that, due to a public
health crisis or limitations arising therefrom, a fair jury pool cannot
be safely assembled. A division of the court of appeals holds that
the rule does not run afoul of the separation of powers doctrine.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2022COA54
Court of Appeals No. 21CA0962
Boulder County District Court No. 20CR1109
Honorable Thomas F. Mulvahill, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
William Robert Eason,
Defendant-Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division III
Opinion by JUDGE J. JONES
Gomez, J., concurs
Lipinsky, J., specially concurs
Announced May 19, 2022
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Brian M. Lanni, Assistant Attorney General
II, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Gard Law Firm, L.L.C., Jeffrey S. Gard, Austin Q. Hiatt, Boulder, Colorado, for
Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant, William Robert Eason, appeals the district court’s
judgment of conviction entered on a jury’s verdict finding him guilty
of menacing. He challenges the constitutionality of Crim. P.
24(c)(4), which allows a court, on a party’s motion or on its own, to
declare a mistrial at any time before trial if a fair jury pool can’t
safely be assembled due to a public health crisis or limitations
resulting therefrom. He argues that by adopting this rule, the
Colorado Supreme Court violated the separation of powers doctrine
by intruding on the other government branches’ authority to adopt
or enact emergency laws relating to public health.
¶2 But we hold that the supreme court’s adoption of Rule 24(c)(4)
was a lawful exercise of its authority under Colorado Constitution
article VI, section 21, to promulgate procedural rules governing
criminal cases and that, in any event, the rule doesn’t conflict with
any executive branch order or legislative enactment and therefore
doesn’t violate the separation of powers doctrine. We also reject
Eason’s other challenges to his conviction and therefore affirm.
I. Background
¶3 This case stems from an altercation between Eason and two
teenage siblings, B.G. and P.G. (the victims) in Boulder. Eason
1
confronted B.G. and P.G. because he believed their trailer home was
on an easement on his property. Eason became irate and started
hitting the trailer with a three-foot wooden dowel. Several times he
said he was going to get a gun and kill the victims’ stepfather. B.G.
tried to stop Eason from hitting the trailer and stepped in front of
him, but Eason grabbed him by the neck with one hand and held
him up against the side of the trailer while raising the dowel above
his head. P.G. then intervened. When he pushed the two apart,
Eason fell to the ground. After the altercation, the victims’ mother
called the police to report what had happened. Deputy Kugel spoke
with the victims and their mother that day but wasn’t able to speak
with Eason.
¶4 Two days later, Deputy Williams contacted Eason and asked
him what had happened. Eason admitted to hitting the trailer with
the wooden dowel, but he said that he had to defend himself after
B.G. had confronted him. He denied ever touching B.G. Eason also
said he told the victims he was going to get his gun to protect
himself. Deputy Williams arrested Eason.
¶5 The People charged Eason with second degree assault, third
degree assault, and two counts of misdemeanor menacing. On
2
October 2, 2020, Eason pleaded not guilty and the district court
scheduled Eason’s jury trial for March 1, 2021.
¶6 Before trial, on December 4, 2020, Eason’s counsel filed a
motion to dismiss the case based on the prosecution’s failure to
properly preserve Deputy Kugel’s bodycam recording of his
discussions with the victims and their mother on the day of the
incident. The district court denied the motion and Eason’s
subsequent motion to reconsider.
¶7 The day Eason’s trial was set to begin, the district court, sua
sponte, declared a mistrial under Rule 24(c)(4) due to COVID-19
restrictions and reset the trial for June 7, 2021. Eason’s counsel
filed an objection to the court’s mistrial order and moved to dismiss
the case because Eason had been ready for trial on March 1.
Counsel argued that, by implementing Rule 24(c)(4), the Colorado
Supreme Court “usurped the power of the legislature and the
executive branches of government,” that Rule 24(c)(4) didn’t apply
in any event because a fair jury pool could have been assembled,
and that the court could not declare a mistrial because limiting the
3
number of courtrooms for trials was something within the court’s
control. The district court denied Eason’s objection and motion.1
¶8 On April 5, 2021, Eason’s counsel renewed his motion to
dismiss, arguing that the speedy trial deadline had passed on April
2. The district court denied that motion as well and later
rescheduled the trial for June 9, 2021.
¶9 On the second day of trial, after learning on the first day of
trial that the victims had given written statements to the police,
which the prosecution hadn’t provided to the defense, Eason’s
counsel renewed his motion to dismiss, claiming a Crim. P. 16
violation. The prosecutor agreed that there had been a Rule 16
violation. As a sanction, the district court dismissed the menacing
charge relating to P.G. But the court declined to dismiss the
menacing charge relating to B.G. or the assault charges as a
discovery sanction.
1 Eason’s counsel objected to the court’s prioritization of cases,
arguing that there was no need to limit trials to one per week in a
single courtroom. As discussed below, it was the combination of
the one trial in one courtroom per week limitation and the
prioritization of cases that resulted in Eason’s trial being reset.
4
¶ 10 A jury found Eason guilty of menacing but not guilty of
assault.
II. Discussion
¶ 11 Eason contends that the district court erred by (1) declaring a
mistrial and refusing to dismiss the case on speedy trial grounds
because (a) Rule 24(c)(4) violates the separation of powers doctrine
and is therefore unconstitutional and (b) the court didn’t make
sufficient findings justifying a mistrial and a mistrial wasn’t
justified under Rule 24(c)(4) because the trial could have been
conducted safely on March 1, 2021; and (2) denying his motions to
dismiss despite the prosecution’s multiple discovery violations.2 We
address and reject each of these contentions in turn.
A. Constitutionality of Rule 24(c)(4)
¶ 12 On April 7, 2020, the Colorado Supreme Court amended Rule
24 by adding subsection (c)(4). Rule Change 2020(07), Colorado
Rules of Criminal Procedure (Amended and Adopted by the Court
2Eason also argued in his opening brief that the Rule 24(c)(4)
continuance pushed the case beyond the speedy trial deadline of
section 18-1-405(6)(e), C.R.S. 2021. However, he withdrew this
argument based on the supreme court’s intervening decision in
People v. Sherwood, 2021 CO 61.
5
En Banc, Apr. 7, 2020), https://perma.cc/6DET-KNTH. With
amendments the court adopted on July 22, 2020, Rule 24(c)(4)
provides as follows:
At any time before trial, upon motion by a
party or on its own motion, the court may
declare a mistrial in a case on the ground that
a fair jury pool cannot be safely assembled in
that particular case due to a public health
crisis or limitations brought about by such
crisis. A declaration of a mistrial under this
paragraph must be supported by specific
findings.
Rule Change 2020(24), Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure
(Amended and Adopted by the Court En Banc, July 22, 2020),
https://perma.cc/CET7-Z88V.
¶ 13 Before turning to the merits of Eason’s contention that this
rule is unconstitutional, we must address the People’s argument
that we can’t opine on the constitutionality of Rule 24(c)(4) because
only the supreme court “can overrule [its] precedents concerning
matters of state law.” We reject the People’s argument because its
premise is incorrect: the rule isn’t a “precedent” as contemplated by
the cases on which the People rely. Those cases all deal with
supreme court case law. See People v. Novotny, 2014 CO 18, ¶ 26
(“we alone can overrule our prior precedents concerning matters of
6
state law”; discussing a line of Colorado Supreme Court case law);
People v. Denhartog, 2019 COA 23, ¶ 78 (“[I]f a precedent of the
supreme court ‘has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest
on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions,’ the court of
appeals should follow the case which directly controls . . . .”
(quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490
U.S. 477, 484 (1989))) (emphasis added).
¶ 14 Other divisions of this court have held that, based largely on
the expansive statutory grant of jurisdiction in section 13-4-102,
C.R.S. 2021, the court of appeals may determine the
constitutionality of a procedural rule adopted by the supreme court.
See People v. Montoya, 251 P.3d 35, 46 (Colo. App. 2010), overruled
on other grounds by People v. Walker, 2014 CO 6; People in Interest
of T.D., 140 P.3d 205, 210-12 (Colo. App. 2006), abrogated on other
grounds by People in Interest of A.J.L., 243 P.3d 244 (Colo. 2010);
see also Duff v. Lee, 439 P.3d 1199, 1205 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2019)
(noting that the Arizona Supreme Court’s adoption of a rule doesn’t
constitute a determination that it is valid and constitutional against
any challenge and affirming the Arizona Court of Appeals’ power to
determine the constitutionality of such a rule), aff’d in part, vacated
7
in part on other grounds, 476 P.3d 315 (Ariz. 2020). We agree with
those divisions.
¶ 15 Turning to the merits of Eason’s constitutional challenge to
Rule 24(c)(4), we conclude that the rule doesn’t violate the
separation of powers doctrine.
1. Standard of Review
¶ 16 Whether a rule adopted by the supreme court is constitutional
is a question of law that we review de novo. See People v.
Pennington, 2021 COA 9, ¶ 25 (we review a separation of powers
challenge de novo); People v. Reyes, 2016 COA 98, ¶ 23 (same).
2. Applicable Law and Analysis
¶ 17 Article III of the Colorado Constitution says that
[t]he powers of the government of this state are
divided into three distinct departments, — the
legislative, executive and judicial; and no
person or collection of persons charged with
the exercise of powers properly belonging to
one of these departments shall exercise any
power properly belonging to either of the
others, except as in this constitution expressly
directed or permitted.
Put a bit more simply, “the legislative, executive, and judicial
branches of government may exercise only their own powers and
8
may not usurp the powers of another co-equal branch of
government.” Vagneur v. City of Aspen, 2013 CO 13, ¶ 34.
¶ 18 The state’s legislative power is vested in the General Assembly,
subject to the people’s right to propose laws and amendments to the
constitution, to enact or reject laws and amendments by vote, and
to approve or reject “any act or item, section, or part of any act of
the general assembly” by vote. Colo. Const. art. V, § 1(1).
¶ 19 It is the executive department’s — or more specifically, the
governor’s — responsibility to “take care that the laws [are]
faithfully executed.” Colo. Const. art. IV, § 2.
¶ 20 The state’s judicial power is vested in the courts. Colo. Const.
art. VI, § 1. One such power is the supreme court’s power to make
rules:
The supreme court shall make and promulgate
rules governing the administration of all courts
and shall make and promulgate rules governing
practice and procedure in civil and criminal
cases, except that the general assembly shall
have the power to provide simplified
procedures in county courts for the trial of
misdemeanors.
Colo. Const. art. VI, § 21 (emphasis added). The General Assembly
itself has recognized the supreme court’s authority to adopt such
9
rules. See § 13-2-109(1), C.R.S. 2021 (“The supreme court has the
power to prescribe, from time to time, rules of pleading, practice,
and procedure with respect to all proceedings in all criminal cases in
all courts of the state of Colorado.”) (emphasis added); see also
Frasco v. People, 165 P.3d 701, 707 (Colo. 2007) (Martinez, J.,
specially concurring) (“We have the power to issue rules of criminal
procedure that can control what juries in criminal cases may take
into the deliberation room.” (citing section 13-2-109)).
¶ 21 So if Rule 24(c)(4) is a rule “governing practice and procedure”
— that is, a procedural rule — it doesn’t run afoul of separation of
powers. We conclude that Rule 24(c)(4) is a procedural rule.
Alternatively, even if there is some aspect of public policy
underlying the rule, it doesn’t conflict with any legislative (or
executive) expression of public policy and is therefore lawful.
¶ 22 “[R]ules adopted to permit the courts to function and function
efficiently are procedural whereas matters of public policy are
substantive and are therefore appropriate subjects for legislation.”
People v. Wiedemer, 852 P.2d 424, 436 (Colo. 1993) (holding that
section 16-5-402, C.R.S. 2021, which establishes time limits for
seeking postconviction relief under Crim. P. 35(c), is substantive
10
and therefore not a violation of separation of powers); accord Borer
v. Lewis, 91 P.3d 375, 380 (Colo. 2004) (section 13-25-127, C.R.S.
2021, which sets forth the burden of proof in civil cases, is
substantive and therefore not a violation of separation of powers);
People v. Bondurant, 2012 COA 50, ¶ 17. This distinction isn’t
always clear. “[B]ut ‘legislative policy and judicial rule making
powers may overlap to some extent so long as there is no
substantial conflict between statute and rule.’” Borer, 91 P.3d at
380 (quoting People v. McKenna, 196 Colo. 367, 373, 585 P.2d 275,
279 (1978)); accord Wiedemer, 852 P.2d at 436.
¶ 23 Rule 24(c)(4) clearly relates to docket management, jury pool
assembly, and trial practice — matters procedural in nature. It
doesn’t declare a public health crisis. Rather, the supreme court
adopted the rule in response to such declarations by the executive
branch.3 It did so to address effects of the public health crisis on
procedural aspects of the judicial process. Rule 24(c)(4) is intended
3 Other state courts implemented similar rules or orders in
response to the effects of COVID-19. E.g., Commonwealth v.
Lougee, 147 N.E.3d 464, 468-69 (Mass. 2020) (discussing such
emergency orders in Massachusetts).
11
to mitigate the effect of the public health crisis on criminal trials by,
for example, reducing the possibility that such trials will need to be
stopped as a result of a juror or jurors becoming ill.
¶ 24 In any event, even if we were to conclude that the rule touches
on aspects of public policy — for example, a desire to protect
prospective jurors, court personnel, parties, attorneys, and others
— this overlap wouldn’t establish a separation of powers violation.
This is so because Eason hasn’t shown that the rule conflicts with
any legislative enactment or executive branch public health order.
¶ 25 Contrary to Eason’s assertion, the mere fact the General
Assembly and the executive branch may adopt public health edicts
doesn’t establish the existence of a conflict. He attempts to show
an actual conflict only by asserting that the rule somehow “changes
. . . the speedy trial statutes or emergency public health orders”4
4On March 22, 2020, the executive branch issued Colorado
Executive Order No. D 2020 013, https://perma.cc/RV3P-HTN9,
pursuant to Colorado Constitution article IV, section 2, and the
Colorado Disaster Emergency Act, sections 24-33.5-701 to -717,
C.R.S. 2021, ordering
Colorado employers to reduce their in-person
work forces by fifty percent, and order[ing] the
Executive Director of the Colorado Department
12
and that the rule somehow intrudes on “the responsibilities placed
on the jury commissioners and the state court administrator” under
section 13-71-110, C.R.S. 2021. But he doesn’t describe any actual
conflict between the rule and any executive order or statute, and we
don’t see any.5
¶ 26 Thus, we conclude that Rule 24(c)(4) doesn’t run afoul of the
separation of powers doctrine.
of Public Health and Environment (CDPHE) to
issue a public health order defining critical
emergency personnel, infrastructure,
government functions, and other activities that
are exempt from the directives in this
Executive Order.
5 In his reply brief, Eason asserts a conflict with section 18-1-
301(2), C.R.S. 2021, which addresses “[t]ermination” of trials. But
that statute doesn’t purport to contain an exclusive list of reasons
for which a trial may properly be terminated. See Paul v. People,
105 P.3d 628, 633 (Colo. 2005); People v. Berreth, 13 P.3d 1214,
1217 (Colo. 2000) (reasons for a mistrial listed in section 18-1-
301(2)(b) aren’t exclusive). And section 18-1-405(6)(e) provides that
the period of delay resulting from a mistrial, not to exceed three
months, doesn’t count against the speedy trial deadline, and it
doesn’t indicate any limits on a court’s reasons for declaring a
mistrial.
13
B. Declaration of a Mistrial
¶ 27 Eason contends that the district court erred by declaring a
mistrial because it didn’t make specific findings as required under
Rule 24(c)(4) and because the court’s reasons for the mistrial were
matters within the court’s control. Again, we disagree.
1. Additional Background
¶ 28 On March 1, 2021, the first day of trial, Eason and his
attorney appeared in court ready for trial. But the district court
didn’t start Eason’s trial that morning; instead, it declared a
mistrial under Rule 24(c)(4). The court explained that “because of
the circumstances created by the pandemic and the health
restrictions, particularly with respect to social distancing, this
district is only able to select one jury at a time.” It also noted that
another case, which was ready for trial, had priority on the docket.
The court later issued a written order supplementing its findings as
follows:
 The Governor had declared a disaster emergency because
of the COVID-19 pandemic and the executive branch had
issued health orders encouraging the public to stay at
14
home to reduce the spread of the highly contagious and
potentially deadly virus.
 COVID-19 spreads less easily when interactions between
people are limited and distance between people is
increased. (The court described various social distancing
measures that were then in place.)
 Even though Colorado courts had, to some extent, re-
opened and resumed trials in person, courthouse
capacity was limited so as to comply with the physical
distancing requirements of public health orders.
 Boulder County’s public safety mandate required six feet
of spacing between people in the courthouse.
 These requirements “severely” limited the courthouse’s
overall occupant capacity. And the juror rooms and
other spaces designated for juror use weren’t “large
enough to safely accommodate a socially distanced jury
during trial breaks and deliberations.”
 The other trials that were proceeding involved more
serious offenses and highly sensitive evidence,
15
necessitating more prospective and selected jurors and
resulting in longer trials.
 Because the potential jury pool included many older
adults and persons with underlying health risks, the
court considered “any disproportionate risk of serious
infection[s]” that would likely increase the need for a
potential juror to “postpone jury service, be excused for
hardship, and/or fail to appear for jury duty.” Those
risks directly impacted the jury pool and the ability to
assemble a fair representation of the community.
2. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶ 29 We review a district court’s decision to declare a mistrial for an
abuse of discretion. People v. Jackson, 2018 COA 79, ¶ 19, aff’d,
2020 CO 75. A court abuses its discretion if its decision is
manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or based on a
misunderstanding or misapplication of the law. People v. Knapp,
2020 COA 107, ¶ 31.
¶ 30 A district court is justified in declaring a mistrial when present
circumstances amount to “manifest necessity” or when “the ends of
public justice would not be served by a continuation of the
16
proceedings.” People v. Segovia, 196 P.3d 1126, 1133 (Colo. 2008)
(quoting United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 485 (1971)); Jackson,
¶ 21.
¶ 31 As noted, Rule 24(c)(4) permits a trial court, by a party’s
motion or on its own, to declare a mistrial at any time before trial
“on the ground that a fair jury pool cannot be safely assembled in
that particular case due to a public health crisis or limitations
brought about by such crisis.” “[D]eclar[ing] . . . a mistrial under
this [rule] must be supported by specific findings.” Crim. P.
24(c)(4).
3. Analysis
¶ 32 Eason argues first that the district court erred by failing to
make specific findings of fact supporting its decision to declare the
mistrial under Rule 24(c)(4). We aren’t persuaded.
¶ 33 The court made numerous specific findings in declaring the
mistrial, as summarized above. Eason’s contention that these
findings didn’t concern his particular case is simply wrong. They
concerned his case and others. He doesn’t explain why the
limitations imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic and the various
public safety orders wouldn’t apply to his case, and we can’t see
17
any reason why they wouldn’t. Cf. People v. Sherwood, 2021 CO
61, ¶¶ 33-34 (the district court properly continued trial after it
declared a mistrial because it couldn’t safely assemble a fair jury
pool due to COVID-19 in the first place).
¶ 34 Eason also contends that the district court’s decision to limit
the courthouse to one jury trial per week shows that the
circumstances giving rise to the mistrial weren’t outside the court’s
control. He is mistaken. The mistrial wasn’t declared because of
“docket congestion,” as Eason argues, but because of the pandemic
and related public health orders, which imposed limitations on the
use of the courthouse — matters obviously beyond the court’s
control. See People v. Lucy, 2020 CO 68, ¶ 1 (“COVID-19, the
highly contagious and potentially deadly illness,” has caused trial
courts to struggle “with effectuating a defendant’s statutory right to
speedy trial amid this unparalleled public health crisis.”).6
6 Eason’s counsel asserts that the Boulder courts had been
conducting multiple trials at the same time shortly before the
mistrial order in this case. There is no actual record evidence that
this was so. But, in any event, the court’s order reflects a
thoughtful consideration of the then-current health orders and the
Boulder courts’ practical ability to comply with those orders under
present circumstances. To the extent there was some reevaluation
18
¶ 35 In sum, we see no abuse of discretion.
C. Discovery Violations
¶ 36 Lastly, Eason contends that the district court erred by denying
his motions to dismiss based on the prosecution’s discovery
violations — the destruction of Deputy Kugel’s bodycam recording
and the late disclosure of two written witness statements. He
argues that the discovery violations denied him his right to due
process and that the only appropriate remedy was dismissal. We
conclude, however, that the district court didn’t abuse its discretion
by refusing to dismiss the entire case.
1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶ 37 To establish a due process violation based on the state’s
failure to preserve potentially exculpatory evidence, the defendant
“must prove that the evidence was suppressed or destroyed by state
action and that the evidence was material.” People v. Braunthal, 31
P.3d 167, 172 (Colo. 2001); accord People v. Greathouse, 742 P.2d
of the appropriateness of conducting multiple trials at the same
time, it isn’t for us to say that such revaluation was improper. We
take notice that the pandemic presented a need to constantly
reexamine the measures necessary to respond to it.
19
334, 337-38 (Colo. 1987). More specifically, the defendant
ordinarily must show that (1) the state suppressed or destroyed the
evidence; (2) the evidence had an exculpatory value that was
apparent before it was destroyed; and (3) he was unable to obtain
comparable evidence by other reasonably available means.
Braunthal, 31 P.3d at 173; People v. Enriquez, 763 P.2d 1033, 1036
(Colo. 1988); see California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 489 (1984).
¶ 38 If, however, the evidence in question wasn’t apparently
exculpatory, but only potentially useful, a defendant alternatively
establishes a due process violation if he shows that the state
suppressed or destroyed the evidence in bad faith. See Arizona v.
Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 57-58 (1988); People v. Wyman, 788 P.2d
1278, 1279 (Colo. 1990); People v. Young, 2014 COA 169, ¶ 74.
¶ 39 If we determine that a due process violation occurred, then we
must decide whether the district court “fashioned an appropriate
remedy, [while] recognizing that the trial court has broad discretion
in this regard.” Enriquez, 763 P.2d at 1036. In determining the
appropriate remedy for the state’s destruction of evidence
amounting to a due process violation, a court should consider the
state’s degree of culpability, the need to preserve the integrity of the
20
truth-finding process, and the need for deterrence of the conduct at
issue. See People v. Collins, 730 P.2d 293, 298 (Colo. 1986). In
determining the appropriate remedy for the state’s delay in
producing evidence, a court should consider (1) the reason for the
delay in providing the requisite discovery; (2) any prejudice a party
has suffered as a result of the delay; and (3) the feasibility of curing
such prejudice by way of a continuance or recess in situations
where the jury has been sworn and the trial has begun. People v.
Lee, 18 P.3d 192, 196 (Colo. 2001). As a general matter, in the
event of a discovery violation by the People, dismissal is
inappropriate if any prejudice can be cured by a lesser sanction. Id.
at 197.
¶ 40 We review de novo to determine whether the state violated a
defendant’s due process rights. People v. Burlingame, 2019 COA
17, ¶ 11. But we review whether the district court fashioned an
appropriate remedy for an abuse of discretion. See People v.
Holloway, 649 P.2d 318, 320 (Colo. 1982) (a district court has
broad discretion in fashioning a proper remedy to protect the
defendant’s rights based on the loss or destruction of evidence).
21
2. Destruction of Bodycam Video
¶ 41 Eason argues that the State violated his right to due process
by destroying potentially exculpatory evidence — Deputy Kugel’s
bodycam recording of his discussions with the victims and their
mother — which denied him his only means to meaningfully
impeach the credibility of key witnesses. We aren’t persuaded.
a. Additional Background
¶ 42 Before trial, Eason’s attorney filed a motion for further
discovery, requesting that the court order the prosecution to
disclose “all written statements and all audio or video recordings
made of [Eason], any witness, or police officer in connection with
this case.” The district court granted Eason’s discovery motion and
ordered the prosecution to comply with his request.
¶ 43 The prosecution produced several bodycam recordings but
said that its lead investigator hadn’t received Deputy Kugel’s
bodycam recording from the Boulder County Sheriff’s Department.
Eason’s attorney then followed up with the Sheriff’s Department to
get a copy. The prosecution then told Eason’s attorney that the
Sheriff’s Department couldn’t produce the bodycam recording
22
because it had been inadvertently and automatically deleted from
the department’s digital files.
¶ 44 Eason’s attorney filed a motion to dismiss the case, arguing
that the State’s failure to preserve the deputy’s bodycam recording
violated Eason’s due process rights. Eason’s counsel also argued
that the Sheriff’s Department had prematurely deleted the deputy’s
bodycam recording in bad faith by failing to preserve evidence for
three years in violation of its own document retention policy.
¶ 45 The prosecution responded that Eason hadn’t met the
requirement of showing the apparent exculpatory value of the
deputy’s bodycam recording before its destruction. The prosecution
challenged Eason’s attorney’s argument that the video was
necessary to impeach the credibility of key witnesses as speculative
and said that it had provided counsel with other evidence sufficient
to question the witnesses’ credibility. As for Eason’s counsel’s bad
faith argument, the prosecution countered that it had produced
numerous other bodycam recordings of the investigation and other
witness statements, and that the Sheriff’s Department had only
negligently failed to preserve the one recording.
23
¶ 46 The district court denied Eason’s motion to dismiss for the
reasons given in the prosecution’s response to the motion.
b. Analysis
¶ 47 There is no dispute that the State inadvertently destroyed the
deputy’s bodycam recording, thus establishing the first element of a
due process violation. Eason contends that the recording had
apparent exculpatory value and that it was his only reasonably
available means of testing the victims’ credibility. If we conclude,
however, that the recording didn’t have apparent exculpatory value
when it was destroyed, he contends in the alternative that his right
to due process was violated because the State destroyed it in bad
faith.7
¶ 48 We first conclude that Eason failed to establish that the
bodycam recording had apparent exculpatory value before the
7 Courts in other jurisdictions have concluded that, unless a
defendant establishes that a recording of an interview with a victim
had apparent exculpatory value when it was destroyed, there is no
due process violation unless the defendant establishes that the
recording was potentially useful and that the recording was
destroyed in bad faith. E.g., State v. Cote, 2015 ME 78, ¶¶ 6-20,
118 A.3d 805, 808-11; Garcia v. State, 592 S.W.3d 590, 600-01
(Tex. App. 2019). Eason appears to accept this view.
24
Sheriff’s Department destroyed it. “[E]xculpatory evidence includes
evidence which bears on the credibility of a witness the prosecution
intends to call at a trial.” Braunthal, 31 P.3d at 174-75; see also
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985) (“Impeachment
evidence, . . . as well as exculpatory evidence, falls within the Brady
rule.”). Eason’s assertion that the recording had apparent
exculpatory value consistent with this definition is conclusory and
speculative. See People v. Daley, 97 P.3d 295, 299 (Colo. App.
2004) (destruction of clothing didn’t warrant sanctions tantamount
to dismissal; even though the trial court found that if the clothing
had been available, it might have exonerated the defendant, “the
mere possibility that testing might lead to exculpatory evidence
does not support dismissal of the charges”); People in Interest of
J.M.N., 39 P.3d 1261, 1264-65 (Colo. App. 2001) (the defendant
failed to establish that a sample taken from a horse’s back had
apparent exculpatory value when it was destroyed); People v.
Erickson, 883 P.2d 511, 515 (Colo. App. 1994) (officer’s notes of
conversation with the defendant, which were apparently destroyed
after the officer prepared his written report, didn’t have apparent
exculpatory value when they were destroyed); People v. Silva, 782
25
P.2d 846, 848 (Colo. App. 1989) (the defendant’s assertion that the
destroyed evidence had exculpatory impeachment value was
speculative).
¶ 49 And, Eason’s argument that the deputy’s bodycam recording
was the only evidence available to effectively cross-examine key
witnesses is belied by the record. The prosecution produced the
deputy’s written statement documenting his investigation, other
witnesses’ statements, and nine additional bodycam recordings.
¶ 50 Eason’s reliance on Holloway, 649 P.2d 318, is misplaced. In
that case, police officers inadvertently erased dispatch recordings of
an officer’s radio broadcast providing the description of a burglar
who the prosecution alleged was the defendant. Id. at 319. The
tapes were crucial to the defendant’s claim of misidentification
given the discrepancies between the officers’ recollection of the
burglar’s description at trial and the citizen complaint to police
allegedly describing the burglar as a Caucasian male. Id. at 320.
The defendant established that the dispatch recordings had
exculpatory value before their destruction because of “the
reasonable possibility that the evidence could have been of
assistance to the defense.” Id. (quoting People v. Morgan, 199 Colo.
26237, 241, 606 P.2d 1296, 1299 (1980)). But the record in this case
is devoid of any comparable facts.
¶ 51 We also reject Eason’s alternative contention that the district
court erred by finding that the Sheriff’s Department didn’t act in
bad faith when it destroyed the bodycam recording. The
prosecution provided the court with communications showing that
the recording had been destroyed due to negligence: it had been
mislabeled (and therefore automatically destroyed) or there had
been “a download/upload” error. The prosecution noted that this
recording was the only one of ten bodycam recordings relating to
the case that had been destroyed, and that it had produced the
other nine to defense counsel. The district court accepted this
explanation.
¶ 52 Eason hasn’t persuaded us that the district court abused its
discretion by doing so. He doesn’t contest the prosecution’s stated
reasons why the recording was destroyed. He claims only that the
destruction of the video resulted from the Sheriff’s Department’s
failure to follow its retention policy. But evidence supports the
court’s conclusion that this failure was inadvertent, not willful.
27
¶ 53 Pointing to two other instances of destruction of bodycam
recordings, Eason also argues that the State’s “chronic failure” to
preserve such evidence shows bad faith. But those two other cases
were traffic cases for which the Sheriff’s Department’s policy
required retention for 180 days after creation of the recording and
automatic destruction thereafter. According to the evidence Eason
submitted with his motion to dismiss, the Sheriff’s Department
complied with that policy in both cases: the prosecution failed to
timely request the recordings or inform the department of any
discovery request for the recordings before the retention period
expired.8
¶ 54 In this case, in contrast, the Sheriff’s Department didn’t
comply with its policy to retain the recording for three years (the
period applicable to criminal cases such as this one). Thus, the
three failures at issue involve two qualitatively different failures by
two different entities. We don’t mean to suggest that these
incidents are — singularly or collectively — trivial. They aren’t. But
8Eason’s counsel relied on this explanation below and doesn’t
contest it on appeal.
28
Eason hasn’t shown that the district court erroneously concluded
that those incidents don’t show bad faith.9
3. Victims’ Written Statements
¶ 55 We also aren’t persuaded by Eason’s contention that dismissal
of the entire case was the only appropriate remedy for the
prosecution’s late disclosure of the victims’ written statements.
a. Additional Background
¶ 56 On the first day of trial, P.G. testified that he had given Deputy
Kugel a written statement about his confrontation with Eason. The
district court ordered the prosecutor to confirm whether witnesses’
written statements existed and, if so, to make them available to
Eason’s attorney and the court. On the second day of trial, the
prosecutor (1) said Deputy Kugel told him both victims had
provided written statements; (2) obtained those statements; and (3)
gave the statements to Eason’s attorney and the court. The
prosecutor conceded a Rule 16 violation.
9We also observe that while the district court could have imposed
some lesser sanction for the destruction of the video, Eason’s
counsel didn’t ask for one.
29
¶ 57 Eason’s counsel moved to dismiss the case based on this and
the prosecution’s previous discovery violation (the destruction of the
deputy’s bodycam recording). As to the written statements, Eason’s
counsel argued that they were potentially exculpatory as to the
menacing charges against Eason — whether he actually threatened
to get his gun and return to shoot the victims. The prosecutor
countered that the written statements were inculpatory because
they corroborated the victims’ testimony about Eason’s threat to get
his gun.
¶ 58 After considering the evidence and the circumstances
surrounding the delayed disclosure, the district court dismissed the
menacing charge relating to P.G. as a sanction because that charge
alleged the threatened use of a gun. But the court declined to
dismiss the menacing count relating to B.G. because that count
charged a threat by use of the dowel, not a gun. As for the assault
charges, the court found that the minor inconsistencies between
the written statements and the victims’ testimony didn’t
significantly impact Eason’s ability to defend against those
30
charges.10 The court offered to instruct the jury that the Sheriff’s
Department and the prosecution had violated their duty to timely
disclose the witness statements, the witness statements wouldn’t be
admitted into evidence, and the jury could not infer that those
statements would be helpful to the prosecution. (The limited
portion of the trial transcript that is part of the record on appeal
doesn’t show whether defense counsel took the court up on its
offer.)
b. Analysis
¶ 59 While we agree with Eason that, as a general proposition,
evidence bearing on a witness’s credibility qualifies as potentially
exculpatory evidence, we can’t determine whether the victims’
written statements were potentially exculpatory, nor can we
meaningfully evaluate the district court’s ruling, because Eason
hasn’t provided us with transcripts of any of the trial testimony. In
these circumstances, we must presume that the district court’s
choice of sanction was appropriate. See People v. Sosa, 2019 COA
182, ¶ 40; People v. Duran, 2015 COA 141, ¶ 12 (“If an appellant
10 As noted above, the jury acquitted Eason of assault.
31
intends to urge on appeal that a finding or conclusion is
unsupported by or contrary to the evidence, the appellant must
include in the record a transcript of all evidence relevant to such
finding or conclusion.”).
¶ 60 Therefore, we conclude that the district court didn’t abuse its
discretion.
III. Conclusion
¶ 61 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE GOMEZ concurs.
JUDGE LIPINSKY specially concurs.
32
JUDGE LIPINSKY, specially concurring.
¶ 62 While I agree with the majority’s analysis, I write separately to
make clear that today’s decision does not mean a law enforcement
agency’s repeated, systematic destruction of evidence can never
violate a defendant’s due process rights.
¶ 63 A law enforcement officer’s destruction of the recorded
statements of a defendant’s accusers can directly affect the outcome
of the defendant’s trial, particularly where, as here, the
prosecution’s case rests on those witnesses’ credibility. But a
defendant’s due process rights are not violated every time a law
enforcement officer destroys evidence — a defendant’s conviction or
acquittal can hinge on whether the evidence was lost because the
officer destroyed it in bad faith or through inadvertence.
¶ 64 The majority accurately recites the test for determining when a
law enforcement agency’s failure to preserve exculpatory evidence
results in a due process violation: “the defendant must establish
that (1) the evidence was destroyed by state action; (2) the evidence
possessed an exculpatory value that was apparent before it was
destroyed; and (3) the defendant was unable to obtain comparable
evidence by other reasonably available means.” People v. Braunthal,
33
31 P.3d 167, 173 (Colo. 2001). “[E]xculpatory evidence includes
evidence which bears on the credibility of a witness the prosecution
intends to call at trial.” Id. at 174.
¶ 65 A due process violation occurs if the agency destroyed the
evidence in bad faith; in contrast, the “‘[n]egligent destruction’ of
evidence cannot constitute a due process violation.” People v.
Young, 2014 COA 169, ¶ 69, 412 P.3d 676, 685 (citation omitted).
And due process is not violated if the agency inadvertently
destroyed the evidence and the defendant can only establish that
the evidence was potentially exculpatory. See People v. Abdu, 215
P.3d 1265, 1270 (Colo. App. 2009) (“Because defendant claims only
that the videotape was potentially useful, and cannot show it had
apparent exculpatory value when it was destroyed, he must show
bad faith in order to establish a federal or state due process
violation.”).
¶ 66 “[A] claim that the evidence was only ‘potentially useful’ cannot
prove that the evidence had ‘apparent exculpatory value’ when it
was destroyed” and, thus, that the destruction violated the
defendant’s due process rights. Young, 412 P.3d at 685 (citation
omitted); cf. People v. Holloway, 649 P.2d 318, 320 (Colo. 1982)
34
(holding that the defendant’s due process rights were violated when
the prosecution destroyed police dispatch tapes that were “not
merely incidental” to the defense theory of misidentification (quoting
People v. Morgan, 199 Colo. 237, 241, 606 P.2d 1296, 1299 (1980))).
In contrast, “[i]t is a violation of the defendant’s due process rights
when the state fails in bad faith to preserve evidence that might
have exonerated him or her.” People v. Scarlett, 985 P.2d 36, 39
(Colo. App. 1998).
¶ 67 These principles echo the United States Supreme Court’s
pronouncement in Arizona v. Youngblood that, “unless a criminal
defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to
preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of
due process of law.” 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988). The Supreme Court
suggested that an agency’s destruction of evidence does not
constitute bad faith in the absence of “official animus towards
respondents or of a conscious effort to suppress exculpatory
evidence.” California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 488 (1984).
¶ 68 The Colorado Supreme Court, “while once having adopted a
broader test, has since ‘expressly declined to find a broader
protection in the state constitution’ than that provided federally by
35
Youngblood.” Abdu, 215 P.3d at 1270 (quoting People v.
Wartena, 156 P.3d 469, 475 (Colo. 2007)). We are bound by our
supreme court’s decisions, People v. Tarr, 2022 COA 23, ¶ 33, ___
P.3d ___, ___, and, thus, must follow Youngblood.
¶ 69 The Colorado cases, however, have not considered whether a
law enforcement agency’s repeated inadvertent destruction of
evidence, in violation of its own retention policy, can rise to the level
of bad faith. Notably, here, the People do not challenge Eason’s
assertion that the Department deleted recordings of body camera
videos in two other cases close in time to the destruction of the
body camera recording at issue here.
¶ 70 Multiple violations of a preservation policy within a brief period
suggest a culture in which officers face no consequences for
noncompliance with the policy. This type of pattern and practice
can be indicative of a law enforcement agency that condones the
destruction of evidence it has a duty to preserve. Courts in other
jurisdictions have held that the willful failure to comply with a law
enforcement policy can rise to the level of bad faith. See, e.g., White
v. McKinley, No. 05-0203-CV-W-NKL, 2009 WL 813001, at *10
(W.D. Mo. Mar. 26, 2009) (unpublished opinion) (holding that a
36
police detective who consistently violated accepted practices and
policy acted in bad faith), aff’d, 605 F.3d 525 (8th Cir. 2010).
¶ 71 Even if a law enforcement agency’s tolerance of multiple
violations of its document retention policy does not constitute bad
faith, however, I would hold that the repeated destruction of
potentially exculpatory evidence as a consequence of this type of
careless approach to document retention violates a defendant’s due
process rights. Defendants have no control over the preservation of
evidence in the hands of governmental agents. Thus, it should not
matter whether evidence was lost because an officer purposefully
destroyed it, or whether the evidence was lost because the law
enforcement agency conveyed the message to its personnel that
they could take a cavalier approach to retention of evidence. In
these scenarios, either willful action or willful inaction resulted in
the loss of the evidence. This approach would be consistent with
the Supreme Court’s holding that a “conscious effort to suppress
exculpatory evidence” can be deemed bad faith. See Trombetta, 467
U.S. at 488. A culture in which officers routinely disregard their
agency’s retention policy may reflect a “conscious effort to suppress
exculpatory evidence.”
37
¶ 72 A law enforcement agency’s repeated violation of its document
retention policy can have significant consequences for a defendant’s
due process rights. This is particularly true when the lost evidence
was as potentially critical to the defense as the only recordings of
witness statements obtained immediately following the alleged
offense. Treating lax enforcement of document retention policies as
the equivalent of the bad faith destruction of evidence, if not bad
faith itself, would create a more level playing field when defendants
contend that the loss of potentially critical evidence violated their
due process rights.
¶ 73 First, it is not an easy task to prove bad faith. Law
enforcement officers have a disincentive to admit to their intentional
destruction of evidence, particularly because the intentional
destruction of evidence is sanctionable. And, even if evidence is
destroyed intentionally, the destruction of evidence is rarely
documented on a video recording. The task of proving the bad faith
destruction of evidence is so difficult that I am unaware of any
Colorado appellate decision holding that a law enforcement officer
destroyed evidence in bad faith. While the vast majority of officers
38
in Colorado would never think about engaging in such behavior, it
would be naive to assume it has never occurred.
¶ 74 Second, absent proof of bad faith, a defendant attempting to
prove a due process violation premised on a law enforcement
officer’s destruction of evidence faces an impossible task: proving
that the evidence he or she never saw was exculpatory.
¶ 75 Of course, Eason did not establish that the deleted body
camera recording was exculpatory. How could he? The
Department deleted the video before he and his counsel could see it.
The defense didn’t know, the trial court didn’t know, and we don’t
know what the victims and witnesses said on the destroyed video.
¶ 76 Nor could Eason assess whether the allegedly comparable
evidence, most notably the deputy’s one-page summary of the
hour-long video, was comparable to the information on the video
recording. Eason had nothing to compare to the allegedly
comparable evidence.
¶ 77 The Ohio Court of Appeals aptly described this conundrum:
The state contends that even if its refusal to
provide the videotape was noncompliant with
[Ohio] Crim. R. 16, [the defendant] has still
failed to show that he was prejudiced by the
refusal — as he offers only speculation and
39
cannot demonstrate that the tape would have
proven his innocence. After our initial
bewilderment, we question whether the state is
facetious in advancing this Alice-in-
Wonderland argument. The tautology is too
obvious: [T]he defendant has not justified his
right to a copy of the videotape upon which he
might experiment in search of exculpatory
evidence because he has not already proven
that the experiment would produce
exculpatory evidence. . . . The repetitive and
circular invective is dizzying.
Thus, we are reminded of Alice’s tumble down
the rabbit hole, and the point at which she
observed the Knave of Hearts standing trial for
theft of the Queen’s tarts. . . . Accordingly, if
[the defendant] cannot prove that he was not
the driver of the car, then he has no right
to demand evidence with which he might prove
that he was not the driver. This is patently
absurd.
State v. South, 2005-Ohio-2152, ¶¶ 13-14, 832 N.E.2d 1222,
1226-27.
¶ 78 But this is not the right case for deciding whether the
destruction of potentially exculpatory evidence as a consequence of
a law enforcement agency’s conscious disregard of its document
retention policy violates a defendant’s right to due process. The
record in this case does not reveal the circumstances of the
destruction of the body camera videos in the two other cases.
40
Without such information, it is impossible for us to determine
whether the employees of the Department consistently turn a blind
eye to the Department’s document retention policy. Accordingly,
based on the record of the proceedings in the trial court, I agree
with the majority that the Department did not destroy the body
camera video recording in bad faith. Following our precedents, I
also agree with the majority that the destruction of the recording
did not violate Eason’s due process rights.
¶ 79 But my agreement with my colleagues’ conclusion does not
mean that the majority opinion should be construed as condoning
law enforcement officers’ lackadaisical adherence to retention
requirements. The courts will not tolerate a law enforcement
agency’s systemic failure to comply with its document retention
policy or any other retention requirement imposed by law.
41