Daniala Mohammadi v. Mark Kinslow ( 2022 )

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
SUMMARY
September 8, 2022
2022COA103No. 21CA0109 Mohammadi v. Kinslow — Courts and Court
Procedure — Limitation of Actions — Limitations for Persons
Under Disability — When a Statute Begins to Run
Under section 13-81-103(1)(c), C.R.S. 2021, a plaintiff who is a
“person under disability” when her cause of action accrues but
whose disability is later terminated may take action “within the
period fixed by the applicable statute of limitations or within two
years after the removal of the disability, whichever period expires
later.” As a matter of first impression in Colorado, a division of the
court of appeals is asked to determine the application of section
13-81-103(1)(c) to a situation in which the plaintiff’s disability is
terminated before the applicable statute of limitations expires. A
divided division concludes that it is bound by supreme court
precedent holding that the applicable statute of limitations is tolled
during the plaintiff’s period of disability and begins to run when the
disability is terminated. The division further concludes that the
supreme court has not recognized any exception to this rule when
the disability is terminated before the statute of limitations expires.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2022COA103Court of Appeals No. 21CA0109
Arapahoe County District Court No. 19CV32997
Honorable John L. Wheeler, Judge
Daniala Mohammadi,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Mark Kinslow,
Defendant-Appellee.
JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division V
Opinion by JUDGE YUN
Dunn, J., concurs
Welling, J., dissents
Announced September 8, 2022
The Viorst Law Offices, P.C., Anthony Viorst, David Chambers, Denver,
Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant
Jeremy R. Maline & Associates, Kevin R. Kennedy, Andrew M. LaFontaine,
Westminster, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee
¶1 In this car-bicycle accident case, the plaintiff, Daniala
Mohammadi, a minor at the time of the accident, appeals the
district court’s judgment dismissing her complaint against the
defendant, Mark Kinslow, as time barred.
¶2 Section 13-81-103(1)(c), C.R.S. 2021, provides that when “the
disability of any person is terminated” — e.g., when, as here, a
minor turns eighteen — “such person shall be allowed to take
action within the period fixed by the applicable statute of
limitations or within two years after the removal of the disability,
whichever period expires later.” No published Colorado opinion has
addressed the application of section 13-81-103(1)(c) to the situation
presented here, in which Mohammadi turned eighteen before the
applicable statute of limitations expired.
¶3 The district court ruled that the three-year statute of
limitations was not tolled1 because Mohammadi’s disability was
terminated — because she turned eighteen — before the limitations
1“A tolling statute suspends the running of a time period that
otherwise would expire.” Cintron v. City of Colorado Springs,
886 P.2d 291, 294 (Colo. App. 1994). Throughout this opinion, we
use the word “toll” to mean suspend. See Thurman v. Tafoya,
895 P.2d 1050, 1054 n.5 (Colo. 1995).
1
period expired. Thus, the court explained, Mohammadi had either
three years from the date of the accident or two years from the date
she turned eighteen, whichever was later, to bring her lawsuit.
Because Mohammadi did not meet the later deadline, the district
court granted Kinslow’s motion to dismiss.
¶4 We reverse and remand for the district court to reinstate
Mohammadi’s complaint. We conclude that we are bound by
supreme court precedent holding that the applicable statute of
limitations is tolled during a plaintiff’s period of disability and
“begins to run when the minor reaches the age of eighteen.”
Rudnicki v. Bianco, 2021 CO 80, ¶ 16 (quoting Elgin v. Bartlett,
994 P.2d 411, 414 (Colo. 1999), overruled on other grounds by
Rudnicki, 2021 CO 80)). We further conclude that the supreme
court has not recognized any exception to this rule when the
disability ends before the statute of limitations expires.
I. Background
¶5 On November 6, 2015, Mohammadi, then sixteen years old,
was injured when Kinslow hit her bicycle with his car. At the time
of the accident, Kinslow was making a right turn while Mohammadi
was crossing the intersection. Mohammadi turned eighteen on
2
January 1, 2017, and sued Kinslow almost three years later, on
December 30, 2019, alleging negligence and negligence per se.
¶6 Kinslow moved to dismiss the lawsuit as untimely. He argued
that, because Mohammadi was a minor at the time of the accident,
section 13-81-103(1)(c) applied to her case. Under that section, he
argued, Mohammadi had to bring her action either within the
applicable three-year limitations period (that is, by November 6,
2018) or within two years after she turned eighteen (that is, by
January 1, 2019), whichever was later.
¶7 In response, Mohammadi agreed that section 13-81-103(1)(c)
applied but argued that, under that section, the three-year
limitations period was tolled and did not begin to run until her
eighteenth birthday. Accordingly, she argued, she did not need to
bring her action until three years after she turned eighteen (that is,
by January 1, 2020). Mohammadi further advised the district court
that a factually similar case was pending on appeal and asked the
court to stay this case “so that the dispositive issue [of the
interpretation of section 13-81-103(1)(c)] can be resolved by the
Colorado Court of Appeals.”
3
¶8 Later, in Roske v. Estate of Anderson, slip op. at ¶¶ 2, 20-21
(Colo. App. No. 19CA0484, Sept. 10, 2020) (not published pursuant
to C.A.R. 35(e)), a division of this court held that, because the
plaintiff was a minor at the time of her accident but turned eighteen
before the three-year limitations period expired, section
13-81-103(1)(c) required her to file suit “within three years from the
date of the collision, or two years from the date she turned eighteen,
whichever was later.”
¶9 While the district court noted that it could consider the
unpublished Roske decision for its “persuasive value,” see
Patterson v. James, 2018 COA 173, ¶ 40, the court undertook its
own textual analysis of section 13-81-103(1)(c). It ruled that,
because Mohammadi turned eighteen before the three-year statute
of limitations expired, she had either three years from the date of
her accident or two years from the date she turned eighteen,
whichever was later, to bring her lawsuit. Because she did not
meet the later deadline, the court concluded that her suit was time
barred.
4
II. Analysis
¶ 10 Mohammadi contends that the district court’s interpretation of
section 13-81-103(1)(c) is inconsistent with supreme court
precedent. We agree.
A. Standard of Review
¶ 11 The district court’s judgment granting Kinslow’s C.R.C.P.
12(b)(5) motion to dismiss turns on its interpretation of section
13-81-103(1)(c). We review the court’s interpretation of that statute
de novo. Roberts v. Bruce, 2018 CO 58, ¶ 8.
B. Statutory Interpretation
¶ 12 When interpreting a statute, our task is to give effect to the
intent of the General Assembly. Klinger v. Adams Cnty. Sch. Dist.
No. 50, 130 P.3d 1027, 1031 (Colo. 2006). In doing so, we look to
the plain language of the statute as a whole and give “consistent,
harmonious, and sensible effect to all its parts.” Roberts, ¶ 8.
¶ 13 In general, a person injured in a motor vehicle accident must
bring suit within three years of the date of the accident. See
§§ 13-80-101(1)(n)(I), -108(1), C.R.S. 2021. At the time of her
accident, however, Mohammadi was a minor and, therefore, a
“person under disability.” See § 13-81-101(3), C.R.S. 2021 (defining
5
a minor under eighteen as a “[p]erson under disability”).
Accordingly, she was entitled to take advantage of the provisions of
section 13-81-103.
¶ 14 Section 13-81-103 states, in pertinent part:
(1) When . . . a limitation is fixed upon the time
within which a right of action . . . may be
asserted . . . and the true owner of said right is
a person under disability at the time such
right accrues, then:
(a) If such person under disability is
represented by a legal representative at the
time the right accrues, or if a legal
representative is appointed for such person
under disability at any time after the right
accrues and prior to the termination of such
disability, the applicable statute of limitations
shall run against such person under disability
in the same manner, for the same period, and
with the same effect as it runs against persons
not under disability. Such legal
representative, or his successor in trust, in
any event shall be allowed not less than two
years after his appointment within which to
take action on behalf of such person under
disability, even though the two-year period
expires after the expiration of the period fixed
by the applicable statute of limitations.
....
(c) If the disability of any person is terminated
before the expiration of the period of limitation
in paragraph (a) of this subsection (1) and no
legal representative has been appointed for
6
him, such person shall be allowed to take
action within the period fixed by the applicable
statute of limitations or within two years after
the removal of the disability, whichever period
expires later.
¶ 15 In interpreting section 13-81-103(1)(c), the district court
concluded the following:
 the phrase “before the expiration of the period of
limitation in paragraph (a) of this subsection (1)” means
before the expiration of the applicable statute of
limitations;
 accordingly, section 13-81-103(1)(c) applies to someone
who is a “person under disability” when her cause of
action accrues but whose disability is “terminated” or
“remov[ed]” before the applicable statute of limitations
expires;
 because Mohammadi was a minor at the time of the
accident but turned eighteen before the expiration of the
three-year statute of limitations, section 13-81-103(1)(c)
applied to her case;
 section 13-81-103(1)(c) unambiguously requires the
calculation of two dates, and the later of the two
7
determines the last day on which a plaintiff’s claim may
be filed;
 the first date is “within the period fixed by the applicable
statute of limitations” — here, three years from the date
of the accident, or November 6, 2018;
 the second date is “within two years after the removal of
the disability” — here, two years from Mohammadi’s
eighteenth birthday, or January 1, 2019; and
 because Mohammadi did not bring her action on or
before January 1, 2019, the later of the two dates, it was
barred.
¶ 16 The federal district court’s reading of the statute in
McKinney v. Armco Recreational Products, Inc., 419 F. Supp. 464,
465 (D. Colo. 1976), supports these conclusions. The McKinney
court concluded that, when a plaintiff’s disability is terminated
before the applicable statute of limitations expires, “[p]ursuant to
§ 13-81-103(1)(c)[,] the applicable statute of limitations is not tolled,
but rather continues to run. However, even if the period in which
suit may be brought expires[,] a plaintiff still has two years [after
8
the removal of the disability] in which to initiate an action.” Id. The
court then illustrated its interpretation of the statute as follows:
For example, if a cause of action accruing to a
minor arises under a six-year statute of
limitations, but the action is not actually
brought until seven years later which is three
years after the minor has reached the age of
majority[,] the action would be barred under
§ 13-81-103(1)(c) since it would be more than
six years after accrual and more than two
years after reaching the age of majority.
Id.
¶ 17 We acknowledge that both the plain language of the statute
and McKinney support the district court’s interpretation of the
statute. But while we might agree with the district court’s
interpretation “were we writing on a blank slate, we are not writing
on such a slate.” Harner v. Chapman, 2012 COA 218, ¶ 20, rev’d,
2014 CO 78. Rather, as we will discuss below, we are bound by the
decisions of our supreme court. Id.C. Supreme Court Precedent
¶ 18 Since McKinney was decided in 1976, our supreme court has
made it clear that section 13-81-103(1)(c) operates as Mohammadi
says it does — that is, it tolls the applicable limitations period until
a minor plaintiff reaches the age of eighteen. Our supreme court,
9
not the federal district court, is the ultimate arbiter of the meaning
of a Colorado statute. See People ex rel. Salazar v. Davidson,
79 P.3d 1221, 1229 (Colo. 2003). And our supreme court has
interpreted section 13-81-103 multiple times over the years.
¶ 19 In In re Estate of Daigle, 634 P.2d 71, 75 (Colo. 1981), the
court said,
Section 13-81-103(1), C.R.S. 1973, . . . creates
what is the equivalent of a statutory toll to
applicable statutes of limitations for persons
under disability, such as minors, at the time a
right of action accrues. Upon termination of
the disability, section 13-81-103(1)(c) allows
“such person . . . to take action within the
period fixed by the applicable statute of
limitations, or within two years after the
removal of the disability, whichever period
expires later.”
(Citations omitted.)
¶ 20 Similarly, in Southard v. Miles, 714 P.2d 891, 897 (Colo. 1986),
the court concluded that “there can be no question that [section
13-81-103] is intended to toll the applicable statute of limitations
during the period of disability.” Specifically, “[t]he provisions of
section 13-81-103 . . . operate to suspend the running of the
applicable statute of limitations until either the disability is
10
removed or, as expressly provided in subsection (1)(a), a ‘legal
representative’ is appointed for the ‘person under disability.’” Id.¶ 21 In Elgin, 994 P.2d at 414, the court recognized that
[a] person under disability, for whom the court
has not appointed a legal representative, is
protected by the statute of limitations’ tolling
provisions. See § 13-81-103(1)(c), 5 C.R.S.
(1999). The statute of limitations begins to
run when the minor reaches the age of
eighteen or when, if it does, a court appoints a
legal representative for the minor.
¶ 22 Most recently, in Rudnicki, the court reaffirmed that “we have
construed section 13-81-103(1)(c)” to mean that, unless a legal
representative is appointed, “the statute of limitations . . . ‘begins to
run when the minor reaches the age of eighteen.’” Rudnicki, ¶ 16
(quoting Elgin, 994 P.2d at 414). Although Rudnicki overruled Elgin
on other grounds, it explicitly adopted Elgin’s reading of section
13-81-103(1)(c).
¶ 23 The dissent says that these supreme court cases are not
binding because they do not address “what happens when a
disability terminates, if at all, after the expiration of the otherwise
applicable limitations period.” Infra ¶ 40. But that is precisely
what section 13-81-103(1)(c) addresses — when “the disability of
11
any person is terminated before the expiration of the period of
limitation in paragraph (a) of this subsection (1).” And the supreme
court, interpreting the same provision as the dissent, broadly
concluded that section 13-81-103(1)(c) tolls the statute of
limitations and, most recently, explained that “the statute of
limitations . . . ‘begins to run when the minor reaches the age of
eighteen.’” Rudnicki, ¶ 16 (quoting Elgin, 994 P.2d at 414).
Because the supreme court has not excepted from its broad
interpretation situations in which the minor turns eighteen before
the statute of limitations expires, neither may we.
¶ 24 We therefore conclude that the district court erred by finding
that Mohammadi’s lawsuit was time barred. Mohammadi was
sixteen when the accident occurred on November 6, 2015. Under
the supreme court’s interpretation of section 13-81-103(1)(c),
because no legal representative was appointed, the applicable
three-year limitations period was tolled and did not begin to run
until she turned eighteen on January 1, 2017. Consequently, as
she argued, Mohammadi had until January 1, 2020 — three years
from her eighteenth birthday — to file her action.
12
¶ 25 We are not persuaded otherwise by Kinslow’s argument that
section 13-81-106, C.R.S. 2021, confirms the district court’s
interpretation of section 13-81-103(1)(c). Section 13-81-106 is
titled “Removal of disability — effect,” and provides as follows:
If before the expiration of the period fixed by
the applicable statute of limitations the
disability of any person under disability is
removed, the fact of such removal shall not in
any way affect or stop the running of the
applicable statute of limitations, except as
provided in section 13-81-103(1)(c).
¶ 26 Kinslow argues that, “[u]nder this provision, once the
disability is removed, the concept of tolling is wholly inapplicable.”
But the operation of this provision is limited by the phrase, “except
as provided in section 13-81-103(1)(c).” And the supreme court has
interpreted section 13-81-103(1)(c) to mean that the statute of
limitations is tolled until the minor turns eighteen. We are not at
liberty to disregard a rule announced in prior supreme court
decisions absent “some clear indication” that the supreme court has
overruled its earlier decisions. Harner, ¶ 20 (quoting Silver v. Colo.
Cas. Ins. Co., 219 P.3d 324, 330 (Colo. App. 2009)). Thus, any
tension between section 13-81-106 and the supreme court’s
13
interpretation of section 13-81-103(1)(c) must be resolved by that
court or by the legislature.
¶ 27 Nor are we persuaded by Kinslow’s alternative argument that,
because Mohammadi asked the district court to stay this case “so
that the dispositive issue [of the interpretation of section
13-81-103(1)(c)] can be resolved” in Roske, she is bound by the
unpublished decision of the Roske division. As the district court
correctly noted, unpublished decisions of the court of appeals are
not binding. See Patterson, ¶ 40 (“[O]ur supreme court has made
it . . . clear that unpublished opinions ‘have no value as precedent.’”
(quoting Welby Gardens v. Adams Cnty. Bd. of Equalization, 71 P.3d
992, 999 (Colo. 2003))). And in any event, we are not obligated to
follow another division’s decision. People v. Johnson, 2020 COA
124, ¶ 12, aff’d, 2021 CO 79.
¶ 28 Further, we are unpersuaded by Kinslow’s argument that the
doctrine of judicial estoppel precludes Mohammadi from taking a
position contrary to Roske. “Judicial estoppel is a narrow doctrine
that precludes a party from taking a position in a proceeding that is
totally inconsistent with a position the party took earlier in the
same or related proceeding in an intentional effort to mislead the
14
court.” Tuscany Custom Homes, LLC v. Westover, 2020 COA 178,
¶ 35. For three reasons, judicial estoppel does not apply here.
First, this doctrine “normally applies to inconsistent factual
positions rather than legal positions,” Arko v. People, 183 P.3d 555,
560 (Colo. 2008), and this case involves the latter. Second,
Mohammadi did not mislead, much less intentionally mislead, the
district court when she stated that the court of appeals in Roske
was considering the dispositive issue in this case. And third,
Mohammadi’s position on appeal is not “totally inconsistent” with
her position in the district court because she never agreed to be
bound by an unpublished decision.
¶ 29 For all these reasons, Mohammadi’s filing of the action on
December 30, 2019, fell within the time allowed by law, and the
district court therefore erred by dismissing her case against
Kinslow.
III. Request for Attorney Fees
¶ 30 Kinslow requests attorney fees under section 13-17-201,
C.R.S. 2021. That statute provides that an award of attorney fees is
mandatory when a district court dismisses a tort action under
C.R.C.P. 12(b). Crandall v. City of Denver, 238 P.3d 659, 663 (Colo.
15
2010). Further, “[a] party who successfully defends a dismissal
order is entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees incurred on
appeal.” Wilson v. Meyer, 126 P.3d 276, 284 (Colo. App. 2005).
However, because we reverse the district court’s dismissal order, we
deny Kinslow’s request for attorney fees.
IV. Conclusion
¶ 31 The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the
district court with directions to reinstate Mohammadi’s complaint.
Kinslow’s request for attorney fees is denied.
JUDGE DUNN concurs.
JUDGE WELLING dissents.
16
JUDGE WELLING, dissenting.
¶ 32 In my view, the clear and unambiguous language of section
13-81-103(1)(c), C.R.S. 2021, dictates the outcome in this case. It
is undisputed that Daniala Mohammadi turned eighteen years
old — and her age-related disability terminated — before the
expiration of the three-year limitations period that would have
otherwise governed her claim. Under such circumstances, section
13-81-103(1)(c) required Mohammadi to file suit within three years
from the date of her injury, or two years from the date she turned
eighteen, whichever was later. Because she didn’t file her
complaint before this deadline, the district court properly dismissed
her case.
¶ 33 Where I depart from the majority is in its interpretation and
application of Rudnicki v. Bianco, 2021 CO 80, and Elgin v. Bartlett,
994 P.2d 411 (Colo. 1999), overruled on other grounds by Rudnicki,
2021 CO 80. The majority concludes that Rudnicki and Elgin are
controlling in the circumstances presented here. Because I
disagree, I respectfully dissent.
17
I. The Unambiguous Language of the Statute Bars Mohammadi’s
Claim
¶ 34 “If the statutory language is unambiguous, we apply it as
written and go no further.” Ford Motor Co. v. Forrest Walker, 2022
CO 32, ¶ 19 (citing Nieto v. Clark’s Mkt., Inc., 2021 CO 48, ¶ 12).
Only if the statutory language is ambiguous — “meaning that it is
susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation” — may we
turn to other interpretive aids to discern the legislature’s intent. Id.(citing Nieto, ¶ 13). And in no event do the tools at our disposal
“include adding our own words or deleting any the legislature has
chosen.” Id. (citing Nieto, ¶ 12); see also Dep’t of Revenue v. Agilent
Techs., Inc., 2019 CO 41, ¶ 16 (“[W]e must respect the legislature’s
choice of language, and we will not add words to a statute or
subtract words from it.”).
A. Applying the Statute as Written
¶ 35 Article 81 of title 13 treats a minor — someone “under
eighteen years of age” — as a “person under disability” for the
purpose of the running of a statute of limitations. See
§ 13-81-101(3), C.R.S. 2021. And section 13-81-103 governs when
and how a statute of limitations runs against certain persons who
18
are or were under disability. Specifically, section 13-81-103(1) is
divided into three subsections, each governing a different scenario:
(a) when a “legal representative” represents or is appointed to
represent a person under disability; (b) when a person dies while
still under disability; and (c) when the disability “terminate[s]”
before the expiration of the limitations period. Here, we are faced
with the third of the three circumstances contemplated by section
103(1). The pertinent paragraph provides as follows:
If the disability of any person is terminated
before the expiration of the period of limitation
in paragraph (a) of this subsection (1) and no
legal representative has been appointed for
him, such person shall be allowed to take
action within the period fixed by the applicable
statute of limitations or within two years after
the removal of the disability, whichever period
expires later.
§ 13-81-103(1)(c) (emphasis added).
¶ 36 The statutory language couldn’t be clearer: if (1) the disability
“terminate[s]” before the expiration of the limitations period and
(2) no legal representative has been appointed for the person, then
the person must bring suit before the expiration of the longer of
(A) what remains in the limitations period or (B) two years after the
“removal of the disability.” Id.
19
¶ 37 The application of this rule to the facts of this case is equally
straightforward. Mohammadi was just under two months shy of
her seventeenth birthday when she was hit by a car driven by Mark
Kinslow and her cause of action against him accrued. A three-year
statute of limitations applies to Mohammadi’s claim against
Kinslow. See § 13-80-101(1)(n)(I), C.R.S. 2021. Because she was
under eighteen when she was injured, at the time her claim accrued
she was “a person under disability” for the purpose of the running
of the statute of limitations. The three-year limitations period had
not yet expired when Mohammadi reached her eighteenth birthday
and her “disability” was removed; there were approximately
twenty-two months remaining in the limitations period at that time.
Because less than two years remained on the statute of limitations
when Mohammadi turned eighteen (and the disability was
removed), she had two years from her eighteenth birthday (i.e., until
her twentieth birthday) to file her complaint. § 13-81-103(1)(c).
The complaint wasn’t filed until two days before her twenty-first
birthday, so it was untimely. § 13-81-103(2).
20
B. Supreme Court Cases
¶ 38 Up to this point I don’t think there is much daylight between
my view and that adopted by the majority.
¶ 39 Where I part ways with the majority is the effect to accord a
line of supreme court cases addressing how courts are to treat legal
disability under circumstances not explicitly covered by section
13-81-103(1). (Indeed, section 13-81-103 is silent as to what
happens when a limitations period expires while a plaintiff is still
under a disability.)
¶ 40 The cases that Mohammadi and the majority rely on address a
scenario not covered by section 13-81-103: what happens when a
disability terminates, if at all, after the expiration of the otherwise
applicable limitations period. See Rudnicki, ¶ 16; Elgin, 994 P.2d at
414; cf. Southard v. Miles, 714 P.2d 891, 897 (Colo. 1986); In re
Estate of Daigle, 634 P.2d 71, 75 (Colo. 1981).
¶ 41 Rudnicki and Elgin are medical malpractice cases involving
children who were injured at birth and at nine years old,
respectively, and the applicable two-year statute of limitations,
therefore, expired long before they turned eighteen. Rudnicki, ¶ 1;
Elgin, 994 P.2d at 413.
21
¶ 42 Southard and Estate of Daigle aren’t any more on point.
Southard involved a plaintiff who contended that he was under an
ongoing disability when he attempted to amend his complaint to
include a claim against an additional defendant after the underlying
statute of limitations would have expired but for the alleged
disability. 714 P.2d at 895. And Estate of Daigle involved wrongful
death claims brought by three children who were still under the age
of majority at the time the claims were filed on their behalf.
634 P.2d at 73.
¶ 43 Simply put, none of the cases relied on by the majority involve
the application of any provision of section 13-81-103. Instead,
those cases involve the supreme court filling a gap not explicitly
addressed by section 13-81-103 (or any other statutory
provision) — namely, how is a limitations period affected when it
expires while a plaintiff is still under a disability.
¶ 44 To be sure, the cases cited by the majority speak broadly of
the statute of limitations being “tolled” while a plaintiff is under
eighteen. See, e.g., Rudnicki, ¶¶ 16-17; Elgin, 994 P.2d at 413-14.
The majority concludes that because the supreme court has not
excepted situations in which the minor turns eighteen before the
22
statute of limitations expires from its broad interpretation, neither
may we. Supra ¶ 23. I disagree. Instead, because the supreme
court hasn’t addressed what happens when a plaintiff’s disability is
terminated before the applicable statute of limitations expires, we
must look to the plain language of the statute and not extend a
supreme court ruling to where the supreme court itself hasn’t said
it applies.
¶ 45 And I am not persuaded that the supreme court’s use of
sweeping language to address circumstances outside the reach of
the statute at issue circumscribes the operation of the statute
under circumstances actually covered by the statute. More to the
point, the cases cited by the majority don’t alter the plain meaning
of section 13-81-103(1)(c); in my view, that slate remains blank.
II. Application
¶ 46 The timeline below illustrates section 13-81-103(1)(c)’s
application to the facts of this case. The red line represents the
period that Mohammadi was under a disability due to her age; the
green line represents the three-year period after the claim accrued.
As shown by the red and green lines together, Mohammedi’s
disability terminated (she reached the age of majority) before the
23
three-year limitations period expired. The solid orange line
represents the two-year period following the termination of the
disability (the period between her eighteenth and twentieth
birthdays). That period expired on January 1, 2019 (Mohammedi’s
twentieth birthday); the complaint wasn’t filed until December 30,
2019 (the vertical blue line). Accordingly, I would conclude that
Mohammadi’s complaint is time barred.
¶ 47 The limitations period urged by Mohammadi and adopted by
the majority is the one shown by the dashed orange line, which is
the three-year period following the termination of disability. Only
this interpretation saves Mohammadi’s complaint. Because this
interpretation is inconsistent with section 13-81-103(1)(c) and

Although Mohammadi’s birthday falls on a legal holiday, see
C.R.C.P. 6(a)(2), her deadline to file her negligence complaint would
still have been the second anniversary of the termination of her
disability, see Morin v. ISS Facility Servs., Inc., 2021 COA 55, ¶¶ 14,
19; Williams v. Crop Prod. Servs., Inc., 2015 COA 64, ¶ 2.
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because, in my view, it isn’t required by any binding authority, I
reject it and, therefore, respectfully dissent.
25