of Alvis , 446 P.3d 963 ( 2019 )


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  •      The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
    constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
    the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
    cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
    Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
    should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
    SUMMARY
    June 27, 2019
    2019COA97
    No. 18CA0251, Marriage of Alvis — Family Law — Post-
    Dissolution — Child Support — Adjustments for Health Care
    Expenditures for Children — Extraordinary Medical Expenses
    In this post-dissolution of marriage case where the parties
    share parenting time equally, a division of the court of appeals
    concludes that the first $250 of uninsured medical expenses is part
    of the shared basic child support obligation and therefore neither
    party may request reimbursement from the other for that expense.
    The division rejects father’s argument that because he pays a larger
    share of the basic child support obligation, mother should pay the
    entire $250 expense. Rather, the division holds that, because the
    $250 expense is part of the shared basic child support obligation,
    each parent must pay uninsured medical expenses incurred during
    his or her parenting time, until the total for each child reaches
    $250, at which time the parents may seek reimbursement in
    proportion to their adjusted gross incomes. Accordingly, the
    division affirms the district court’s order.
    COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS                                       2019COA97
    Court of Appeals No. 18CA0251
    El Paso County District Court No. 11DR2085
    Honorable Deborah J. Grohs, Judge
    In re the Marriage of
    Michelle Lea Alvis,
    Appellee,
    and
    Norman Foster Darrell Alvis,
    Appellant.
    ORDER AFFIRMED AND CASE
    REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
    Division V
    Opinion by JUDGE HARRIS
    Richman and Tow, JJ., concur
    Announced June 27, 2019
    Weeks & Luchetta, LLP, Alexander M. Masterson, Colorado Springs, Colorado,
    for Appellee
    Law Office of Greg Quimby, P.C., Greg Quimby, Erica Vasconcellos, Cody
    Christian, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellant
    ¶1    In this post-dissolution of marriage proceeding involving
    Michelle Lea Alvis (mother) and Norman Foster Darrell Alvis (father),
    father appeals the district court’s order concluding that under
    section 14-10-115(10)(h)(I) and (II), C.R.S. 2018, neither parent can
    request reimbursement from the other parent for uninsured
    medical expenses for amounts less than $250 per child per year.
    ¶2    To resolve father’s appeal, we must address an issue that has
    not been decided in Colorado — who bears responsibility for the
    first $250 of uninsured medical expenses per child per year when
    the parents share parenting time equally. Because we decide that
    those expenses are accounted for in the parents’ shared basic child
    support obligation, we affirm. We also remand the case for
    determination of mother’s appellate attorney fees request under
    section 14-10-119, C.R.S. 2018.
    I. Background
    ¶3    The parties’ marriage was dissolved in March 2012. The court
    found that equal parenting time for the parties’ three children was
    in the children’s best interests and declined to designate a primary
    residential parent. Based on the child support schedule, the court
    ordered father to pay mother $453 per month in child support.
    1
    ¶4    In November 2017, father moved for an order requiring mother
    to pay the first $250 of uninsured medical expenses per child per
    year. In its order, the court “reminded [the parties] that [mother] is
    responsible for the first $250 of uninsured medical expenses per
    child per year.”
    ¶5    Mother then moved for relief under C.R.C.P. 59(a), contending
    that the district court had discretion to allocate to either parent the
    first $250 of uninsured medical expenses per child per year. She
    asked the court to allocate the expenses in proportion to the parties’
    incomes. Father reiterated his view that they were mother’s
    responsibility because she was receiving child support.
    ¶6    The court disagreed with both parties and interpreted section
    14-10-115(10)(h)(I) and (II) “to mean that neither party can request
    reimbursement of uninsured medical expenses from another party
    for amounts less than $250 per child per year.”
    II. Uninsured Medical Expenses
    ¶7    Father contends that the district court erred in ruling that
    neither parent can request reimbursement from the other parent for
    the first $250 of uninsured medical expenses per child per year. He
    2
    contends that mother, because she receives child support, should
    bear those expenses. We disagree.
    A. Standard of Review
    ¶8    Interpretation of the child support statutes is a question of law
    that we review de novo. In re Marriage of Paige, 
    2012 COA 83
    , ¶ 9.
    When we interpret a statute, we must ascertain and give effect to
    the legislature’s intent. In re Marriage of Joel, 
    2012 COA 128
    , ¶ 18.
    “We look first to the plain language of the statute, and if that
    language is clear and unambiguous on its face, we apply the statute
    as written.” Paige, ¶ 9 (quoting In re Marriage of Schmedeman, 
    190 P.3d 788
    , 790 (Colo. App. 2008)).
    ¶9    But if the plain language is ambiguous or if the statute is
    silent on an issue that would be expected to be within its scope, we
    enlist tools of statutory interpretation to discern the legislature’s
    intent. People v. Ray, 
    2018 COA 158
    , ¶ 16. Those tools include
    legislative history, prior law, the consequences of a particular
    construction, and the goal of the statutory scheme. In re Marriage
    of Ikeler, 
    161 P.3d 663
    , 668 (Colo. 2007). We must interpret the
    statute “to give consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all its
    parts.” 
    Id. at 667.
    3
    B. Legal Standards
    ¶ 10   Parents share an obligation to support their children to the
    best of their abilities. People v. Martinez, 
    70 P.3d 474
    , 477 (Colo.
    2003); In re Marriage of Bregar, 
    952 P.2d 783
    , 785 (Colo. App.
    1997).
    ¶ 11   Accordingly, the child support statute provides for a shared
    basic child support obligation, plus adjustments for “extraordinary”
    expenses.
    ¶ 12   The basic child support obligation is determined by applying
    the schedule in section 14-10-115(7)(b) to the parents’ combined
    gross incomes, which yields a presumptive amount necessary to
    cover the child’s basic needs. § 14-10-115(7)(a)(I); In re Marriage of
    Davis, 
    252 P.3d 530
    , 534 (Colo. App. 2011). The basic obligation is
    then divided between the parents in proportion to their incomes.
    § 14-10-115(7)(a)(I). This shared obligation is supposed to provide
    for the child’s basic needs — things like food, shelter, and clothing.
    See In re Marriage of White, 
    240 P.3d 534
    , 540 (Colo. App. 2010)
    (the noncustodial parent may be obligated to make child support
    payments to the custodial parent so that the custodial parent can
    provide the child with food, shelter, and other necessities),
    4
    superseded by statute on other grounds, Ch. 103, sec. 3, § 14-10-
    122(5), 2013 Colo. Sess. Laws 354, as recognized in In re Marriage
    of Garrett, 
    2018 COA 154
    , ¶ 31.
    ¶ 13   But children frequently have needs that fall outside the bare
    necessities covered by the basic child support obligation. Thus, the
    child support statute also contemplates “extraordinary” expenses.
    Extraordinary expenses can be predictable and recurring, like the
    cost of contact lenses or physical therapy for a long standing injury,
    or they can be unexpected, like the cost of repairing a broken tooth.
    Predictable and recurring extraordinary expenses are usually added
    to the basic child support obligation, allocated in proportion to the
    parties’ incomes, and become part of the monthly child support
    order. See, e.g., § 14-10-115(9)(a) (child care costs); § 14-10-
    115(10)(b) (health insurance premiums). Because the monthly
    support order already accounts for these extraordinary expenses,
    neither parent may separately seek reimbursement for them.
    ¶ 14   The unexpected extraordinary expenses, on the other hand,
    cannot be accounted for in the monthly support order. So when a
    child breaks her tooth on a trampoline or needs a few sessions of
    grief counseling after a grandparent dies, those expenses are paid
    5
    as they arise, and the parent who pays them may then seek
    reimbursement from the other parent for that parent’s proportional
    share.
    ¶ 15   This appeal involves the statutory provision that addresses
    extraordinary medical expenses. Section 14-10-115(10)(h) provides
    in relevant part as follows:
    (h)(I) Any extraordinary medical expenses
    incurred on behalf of the children shall be
    added to the basic child support obligation and
    shall be divided between the parents in
    proportion to their adjusted gross incomes.
    (II) Extraordinary medical expenses are
    uninsured expenses, including copayments
    and deductible amounts, in excess of two
    hundred fifty dollars per child per calendar
    year. Extraordinary medical expenses include,
    but need not be limited to, such reasonable
    costs as are reasonably necessary for
    orthodontia, dental treatment, asthma
    treatments, physical therapy, vision care, and
    any uninsured chronic health problem.
    C. The District Court’s Order
    ¶ 16   As a threshold matter, we disagree with the parties’
    interpretation of the district court’s order. The district court
    interpreted section 14-10-115(10)(h)(I) and (II) “to mean that neither
    6
    party can request reimbursement of uninsured medical expenses
    from another party for amounts less than $250 per child per year.”
    ¶ 17   Both parties interpreted the order to mean that each parent
    must pay $250 per child per year, for a total of $500 per child per
    year, before seeking reimbursement from the other parent. The
    district court, however, did not say that each parent is separately
    responsible for $250 of uninsured medical expenses per child per
    year. Rather, the court ruled that the parents cannot seek
    reimbursement for uninsured medical expenses until a total of
    $250 is spent on a child in a single year.
    D. First $250 of Uninsured Medical Expenses Per Child Per Year
    ¶ 18   With that threshold issue resolved, we turn to the merits of
    father’s contention that mother is responsible for the first $250 of
    uninsured medical expenses per child per year because she receives
    child support from him. We are not persuaded.
    ¶ 19   By its plain language, section 14-10-115(10)(h)(II) specifically
    excludes from the definition of extraordinary medical expenses the
    first $250 of uninsured medical expenses per child per year. In
    light of the statutory scheme, if the $250 is not an extraordinary
    expense, it must be part of the basic child support obligation. See
    7
    BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Patterson, 
    185 P.3d 811
    , 813 (Colo. 2008) (“[A]
    provision existing as part of a comprehensive statutory scheme
    must be understood, when possible, to harmonize the whole.”).
    ¶ 20   The legislative history supports our reading. When the
    legislature last modified the definition of extraordinary medical
    expenses, the bill’s sponsor indicated that the basic child support
    schedule assumes that each child will incur $250 per year in
    uninsured medical expenses. Hearings on S.B. 02-21 before the S.
    Judiciary Comm., 63rd Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Feb. 5, 2002)
    (statement of Sen. Peggy Reeves).
    ¶ 21   Thus, we conclude that the first $250 of uninsured medical
    expenses per child per year is included in the shared basic child
    support obligation.
    ¶ 22   Father agrees that uninsured medical expenses of less than
    $250 constitute a “basic need” covered by the basic child support
    obligation. But he says that, because the expense is part of the
    basic child support obligation, the parent who receives child
    support is obligated to pay it.
    ¶ 23   That argument is inconsistent with the fundamental premise
    of a shared basic child support obligation. Under the statutory
    8
    scheme, both parents contribute, according to their abilities, an
    amount necessary to cover the children’s ordinary living expenses.
    When the parents share physical care of the children, as they do in
    this case, each parent’s share of the support obligation is
    calculated, and “[t]he parent owing the greater amount of child
    support shall owe the difference between the two amounts . . . .” §
    14-10-115(8)(b). Then, during his or her parenting time, each
    parent is expected to cover the children’s expenses accounted for in
    the monthly support order. See 
    id. (recognizing that
    when parents
    have shared physical care of the children, certain basic expenses
    will be duplicated).
    ¶ 24   In this case, the parties’ combined monthly income of
    approximately $10,000 yielded a presumptive amount of basic child
    support of $3000 for the three children, of which father was
    responsible for roughly seventy percent ($2023) and mother for
    thirty percent ($987). Mother and father share parenting time just
    about equally, so each parent owes about fifty percent of his or her
    share to the other parent: mother owes father $492 and father owes
    mother $1014. After an adjustment for paying health insurance for
    the children, father’s share owed to mother is reduced to $945.
    9
    Thus, after offsetting mother’s share, father pays mother $453. In
    this way, each parent can cover the monthly expenses of the
    children when he or she has physical care of them.
    ¶ 25   According to father, the first $250 of uninsured medical
    expenses should be paid from the amount he sends to mother. But
    why would that particular expense, which is accounted for (like all
    basic necessities) in the monthly child support order, fall entirely to
    mother? If, during his parenting time, father takes the children out
    to eat or to the mall to buy shoes, is mother obligated to pay those
    expenses, too, out of the $453 child support payment? Under
    father’s reasoning, mother should be responsible for all of the
    children’s ordinary living expenses merely because she receives an
    offsetting child support payment from him. We reject that
    interpretation of the statutory scheme as absurd. See State v.
    Nieto, 
    993 P.2d 493
    , 501 (Colo. 2000) (in construing a statute, court
    must seek to avoid an interpretation that leads to an absurd result).
    ¶ 26   Imagine if, instead of offsetting mother’s share of the child
    support obligation, each parent sent the other his or her share. The
    net result would be the same, but mother’s contribution would be
    more obvious. And the flaw in father’s logic would be as well.
    10
    Father is no more entitled to a reimbursement for his expenditures
    for the children’s basic needs than mother is for hers.
    ¶ 27   Expenses covered by the basic support obligation have already
    been accounted for and divided between the parents in proportion
    to their incomes and therefore are not reimbursable. Thus, each
    parent must pay uninsured medical expenses incurred during his
    or her parenting time, until the total for each child reaches $250, at
    which time the parents may seek reimbursement in proportion to
    their adjusted gross incomes. See § 14-10-115(10)(h)(I)-(II).
    ¶ 28   We are not persuaded otherwise by In re Marriage of Marson,
    
    929 P.2d 51
    , 52-53 (Colo. App. 1996) (construing prior version of
    statute which defined extraordinary medical expenses as those in
    excess of $100 for a single illness or condition), and In re Marriage
    of Finer, 
    920 P.2d 325
    , 330 (Colo. App. 1996) (same). In those
    cases, divisions of this court assumed that the “custodial” parent
    was obliged to pay the excluded amount of uninsured medical
    expenses. But the question of how to characterize and allocate this
    expense was not squarely before either division. In any event, we
    do not view those cases as necessarily inconsistent with our
    conclusion. It makes sense for a “custodial” parent (in modern-day
    11
    parlance, the parent who has exclusive or near-exclusive physical
    care of the child) to be responsible for paying the child’s ordinary
    living expenses (with the financial assistance of the other parent).
    Here, though, neither mother nor father qualifies as the “custodial”
    parent, and thus the reasoning of Marson and Finer does not apply.
    ¶ 29   We therefore affirm the district court’s order that neither
    parent can seek reimbursement for uninsured medical expenses of
    less than $250 per child per year.1
    III. Mother’s Request for Appellate Attorney Fees
    ¶ 30   Mother requests her appellate attorney fees under section 14-
    10-119, based on the parties’ unequal financial circumstances.
    Because the district court is better equipped to resolve the factual
    issues regarding the parties’ current financial circumstances, we
    remand mother’s request to the district court. See In re Marriage of
    Kann, 
    2017 COA 94
    , ¶ 84.
    IV. Conclusion
    1 We recognize that the basic child support calculation assumes
    that each parent will incur some portion of the $250 of uninsured
    medical expenses for each child. If the district court finds that one
    parent is more likely to incur all of those expenses, we do not mean
    to preclude the court from deviating from the basic support
    obligation to reflect and remedy that inequity. See § 14-10-
    115(8)(e), C.R.S. 2018.
    12
    ¶ 31   The district court’s order is affirmed, and the case is remanded
    for determination of mother’s appellate attorney fees request under
    section 14-10-119.
    JUDGE RICHMAN and JUDGE TOW concur.
    13