Herrera v. Lerma , 440 P.3d 1194 ( 2018 )


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  •      The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
    constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
    the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
    cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
    Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
    should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
    SUMMARY
    September 20, 2018
    2018COA141
    No. 17CA0991 Herrera v. Lerma — Torts — Personal Injury;
    Evidence — Relevancy and Its Limits — Exclusion of Relevant
    Evidence on Grounds of Prejudice, Confusion, or Waste of Time
    A division of the court of appeals concludes that plaintiff’s
    evidence of her permanent whole person impairment rating
    percentage was relevant in a non-workers’ compensation personal
    injury case. Thus, the division reverses the trial court’s judgment
    and remands the case for a new trial.
    COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS                                       2018COA141
    Court of Appeals No. 17CA0991
    Mesa County District Court No. 15CV30729
    Honorable Lance P. Timbreza, Judge
    Maria Herrera,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    Leo Lerma,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE
    REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
    Division IV
    Opinion by JUDGE HAWTHORNE
    Berger and Miller*, JJ., concur
    Announced September 20, 2018
    Killian Davis Richter & Mayle, PC, J. Keith Killian, Damon J. Davis, Benjamin
    P. Meade, Grand Junction, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant
    Senter Goldfarb & Rice, LLC, Arthur J. Kutzer, Sarah M. Andrzejczak, Denver,
    Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee
    *Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
    VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2018.
    ¶1    Plaintiff, Maria Herrera, appeals the judgment entered on the
    jury’s verdict awarding her damages of $1980.81 on her negligence
    claim against defendant, Leo Lerma. We reverse and remand.
    I.   Facts and Procedural Background
    ¶2    In November 2012, defendant’s truck hit plaintiff’s car from
    behind as she slowed for traffic. A week later, plaintiff sought
    healthcare at a hospital where she complained of numbness in her
    legs and arms as well as neck pain. The doctor diagnosed her with
    neck strain.
    ¶3    In June 2013, plaintiff was involved in a second car accident.
    She had stopped at a traffic light and her sandal had become stuck
    beneath the brake pedal. As she tried to free it, she accidentally
    pushed the accelerator, causing her to hit the trailer hitch of the
    truck in front of her. Plaintiff testified that the second accident did
    not injure her.
    ¶4    A year later, starting in June 2014, plaintiff sought additional
    medical treatment for her neck and lower back. She then sued
    defendant for negligence, claiming total damages of $38,356.46.
    The jury awarded her $1980.81 in economic damages but $0 on her
    claims of physical impairment and noneconomic damages.
    1
    II.   Instructional Error
    ¶5    Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred by instructing the
    jury to consider whether the second accident in June 2013
    “increased, aggravated, or worsened any injuries, damages, or
    losses caused by the” first accident because defendant hadn’t
    presented any evidence supporting such an instruction. We agree.
    A.     Standard of Review
    ¶6    We review a trial court’s decision to give a particular jury
    instruction for an abuse of discretion. Day v. Johnson, 
    255 P.3d 1064
    , 1067 (Colo. 2011); Vititoe v. Rocky Mountain Pavement Maint.,
    Inc., 
    2015 COA 82
    , ¶ 67. A trial court abuses its discretion only
    when its ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or
    the instruction is unsupported by competent evidence in the record.
    Day, 255 P.3d at 1067; Vititoe, ¶ 67.
    ¶7    “We review a properly preserved objection to a jury instruction
    for harmless error.” Waneka v. Clyncke, 
    134 P.3d 492
    , 494 (Colo.
    App. 2005), aff’d on other grounds and remanded, 
    157 P.3d 1072
    (Colo. 2007). Such an error is harmless unless it affects the parties’
    substantial rights. C.R.C.P. 61. “The court must order a new trial
    when the result of the trial may have been different if the court had
    2
    given the proper instruction.” Clyncke, 157 P.3d. at 1079; Webb v.
    Dessert Seed Co., 
    718 P.2d 1057
    , 1066-67 (Colo. 1986) (requiring a
    new trial when the result would probably have been different if the
    court had given the proper instruction); Mendez v. Pavich, 
    159 Colo. 409
    , 411-12, 
    412 P.2d 223
    , 224 (1966) (requiring retrial when an
    instruction is so erroneous that it would probably lead the jury into
    error).
    B.    Analysis
    ¶8    Using an instruction consistent with CJI-Civ. 6:9 (2009), the
    trial court instructed the jury as follows:
    The plaintiff . . . claims damages from the
    defendant . . . for injuries, damages, or losses
    caused by an auto accident on November 13,
    2012. If you find that the defendant’s
    negligence or negligence per se, if any, was a
    cause of any such injuries, damages, or losses,
    then the plaintiff may recover all damages
    caused by that event. But if you find that
    plaintiff was later injured in an auto accident
    on June 6, 2013[,] which was not caused by
    any acts or omissions of the defendant, then
    the plaintiff may not recover any damages
    caused only by the second auto accident.
    If you find the auto accident on June 6, 2013,
    increased, aggravated, or worsened any
    injuries, damages, or losses caused by the
    auto accident on November 13, 2012, then you
    must separate, if possible, those damages
    3
    caused by the first auto accident from those
    caused by the second auto accident, and the
    plaintiff may recover all those separate
    damages caused by the first auto accident.
    If it is not possible to separate any damages
    caused by the auto accident on November 13,
    2012[,] from any caused by the auto accident
    on June 6, 2013, then the plaintiff may recover
    those damages only from the date of the first
    auto accident to the date of the second auto
    accident.
    Such an instruction is proper when sufficient evidence shows that a
    later event or incident either
    (1) causes a new, unrelated injury to the
    plaintiff or
    (2) aggravates the injury the plaintiff suffered
    as a result of the defendant’s tortious conduct.
    Lascano v. Vowell, 
    940 P.2d 977
    , 982 (Colo. App. 1996); see also
    Francis ex rel. Goodridge v. Dahl, 
    107 P.3d 1171
    , 1175 (Colo. App.
    2005) (“Because the evidence was sufficient to support the
    subsequent injury instruction and adequately formed a question of
    fact for the jury to decide, we perceive no error by the court in
    instructing the jury on subsequent injury.”); Guerreo v. Bailey, 
    658 P.2d 278
    , 279-80 (Colo. App. 1982) (“Since the defendant
    introduced evidence that [plaintiff’s layoff] aggravated the emotional
    injuries caused by the collision . . . the instruction was
    4
    warranted.”). Sufficient evidence must exist to justify giving this
    instruction because, without such evidence, “[i]t would be mere
    conjecture” to presume that the later event caused or aggravated an
    existing injury. Brooks v. Reiser, 
    483 P.2d 389
    , 391 (Colo. App.
    1971) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(f)).
    ¶9    Such conjecture occurred here. Neither party presented
    evidence that plaintiff suffered any injury or aggravation of an
    existing injury because of the second accident. Defendant failed to
    present his own medical expert and his counsel failed to question
    plaintiff’s medical expert about whether the second accident
    could’ve contributed to a later need for medical attention. Cf.
    Francis ex rel. Goodridge, 
    107 P.3d at 1175
     (“[T]he record reflects
    some evidence of a later injury suffered by plaintiff” where “experts
    testified for both parties and expressed conflicting opinions on
    whether plaintiff’s fall from the pommel horse increased her injuries
    caused by the accident with defendant.”). Thus, the evidence at
    trial was insufficient to justify instructing the jury about the second
    accident. So we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion
    in giving such an instruction.
    5
    ¶ 10   We also conclude that this error harmed plaintiff. Defendant’s
    main defense at trial was that plaintiff’s injuries were caused by the
    second accident. His counsel cross-examined plaintiff extensively
    about the second accident. He also focused on it during closing
    arguments. And most of all, the instruction gave the jury an
    unsubstantiated reason for denying plaintiff’s claim for her medical
    bills sustained after the second accident, which it arguably did by
    awarding plaintiff only $1980.81 — a far cry from her requested
    $38,356.46, mostly for medical bills accumulated, or expected to
    accumulate, after the second accident.
    ¶ 11   We therefore conclude that had it not been for the trial court’s
    improper instruction, the jury may have reached a different verdict.
    So we reverse the court’s judgment and remand this case to the
    trial court for a new trial.
    ¶ 12   Because the following two issues will likely arise on remand in
    the event of retrial, we address them now.
    III.   Impairment Rating
    ¶ 13   Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred by excluding her
    expert’s testimony about her 15% permanent whole body
    impairment rating. We agree.
    6
    A.    Standard of Review
    ¶ 14    Trial courts “have broad discretion to admit or to exclude
    expert testimony.” Sovde v. Scott, 
    2017 COA 90
    , ¶ 24. A “trial
    court abuses its discretion if its ruling is manifestly arbitrary,
    unreasonable, or unfair, or if it applies an incorrect legal standard.”
    
    Id.
    B.   Analysis
    ¶ 15    Using the American Medical Association Guides to the
    Evaluation of Impairment (AMA Guides), plaintiff’s expert evaluated
    plaintiff as having a permanent whole person impairment rating of
    15%. The AMA Guides is a publication used by physicians to
    calculate the nature and extent of a medical impairment. See
    Walker v. Jime Fuoco Motor Co., 
    942 P.2d 1390
    , 1392 (Colo. App.
    1997). The revised third edition is required by statute to be used in
    workers’ compensation cases to determine an employee’s medical
    impairment rating. See § 8-42-107(8)(b.5)(I)(A), (b.5)(II), C.R.S.
    2017. But, no Colorado statute or case law limits the use of the
    AMA Guides to workers’ compensation cases only.
    ¶ 16    Before trial, defendant asked the court to exclude testimony
    about plaintiff’s 15% permanent impairment rating as calculated by
    7
    her medical expert using the AMA Guides’ fifth edition. The court
    excluded the testimony because it determined that the impairment
    rating was irrelevant under CRE 401 and prejudicial under CRE
    403. But it allowed plaintiff’s medical expert to testify that plaintiff
    had suffered permanent impairment according to the AMA Guides,
    just not as to the actual percentage rating of that impairment.
    1.    Relevancy
    ¶ 17   In granting defendant’s motion in limine, the court determined
    that plaintiff’s permanent impairment was relevant to her case —
    but that the percentage rating of that impairment (15%) was not.
    But it provided no persuasive reason.
    ¶ 18   Defendant argues that the impairment rating was irrelevant
    because “this case was not a claim for workers’ compensation
    benefits.” It’s true that this isn’t a workers’ compensation case.
    But, that doesn’t mean the impairment rating determined by using
    the AMA Guides was irrelevant in this case. Simply because the
    workers’ compensation statute requires using the AMA Guides in
    determining a workers’ compensation claimant’s medical
    impairment rating doesn’t mean it necessarily excludes using an
    impairment rating in other types of personal injury claims. See
    8
    Music v. Hebb, 
    744 So. 2d 1169
    , 1171 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)
    (“Although impairment rating evidence is specifically permitted in
    workers’ compensation actions, its inclusion there does not
    preclude such evidence in this personal injury action. . . . Rather,
    we hold the admissibility of an impairment rating is governed by the
    general rules of evidence.”) (citations omitted); Estate of Carter v.
    Szymczak, 
    951 N.E.2d 1
    , 6 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (“Although it is
    clear that [impairment rating] evidence is specifically permitted in
    workers’ compensation claims, its inclusion within a worker’s
    compensation statutory scheme does not preclude such evidence in
    a personal injury action.” (citing Music, 744 So. 2d at 1171)).
    ¶ 19   To the contrary, the expert’s testimony as to plaintiff’s
    impairment rating was relevant here. Most importantly, it would’ve
    helped make the existence of plaintiff’s claim of permanent medical
    impairment more probable by showing that a physician using
    objective AMA guidelines had concluded not only that plaintiff was
    permanently impaired, but that the impairment could be quantified
    into a scientifically determined percentage. And such testimony
    would’ve also given the jury a concrete percentage on which it could
    base its verdict. See Estate of Carter, 
    951 N.E.2d at 6
     (“The
    9
    [impairment] rating evidence aided the jury in determining whether
    and to what extent [the plaintiff] was permanently injured. The
    challenged evidence is therefore relevant. Moreover, [the defendant]
    has not shown that its probative value is substantially outweighed
    by the danger of unfair prejudice.”); see also Tabieros v. Clark
    Equip. Co., 
    944 P.2d 1279
    , 1333 (Haw. 1997) (“The extent to which
    [the plaintiff] was permanently disabled or impaired by the accident
    was obviously relevant to his compensatory damage claim. . . . Our
    review of the record convinces us that the jury could not have been
    confused or [the defendant] unfairly prejudiced concerning the
    significance, with respect to [the plaintiff’s] ‘pain and suffering,’ of
    the impairment ratings following . . . cross-examination. We are
    likewise convinced that [the doctor’s] expert testimony was of the
    sort that ‘would probably aid the trier of fact in arriving at the
    truth.’”) (citation omitted).
    ¶ 20   Because we can’t discern any reason why plaintiff’s permanent
    impairment rating determined by her expert witness using the AMA
    Guides would be irrelevant — and we can perceive reasons why it
    would be relevant — we could conclude that the trial court abused
    10
    its discretion when it excluded the expert witness’s testimony from
    the trial. But first we take up the court’s CRE 403 concerns.
    2.    Rule 403
    ¶ 21   The trial court concluded that the impairment rating’s
    “minimum probative value” was “substantially outweighed by the
    danger of unfair prejudice and ha[d] the risk of being confusing or
    misleading to the jury” because it would require evidence
    (1) “concerning [the impairment rating’s] purpose”;
    (2) showing “how [the impairment rating] is determined”; and
    (3) determining “what [the impairment rating] means and
    which version of the Guides [is] appropriate given [that] the
    [workers’ compensation] statute requires one set . . . and
    [plaintiff’s medical expert] appeared to use another, not the
    most recent.”
    The court also reasoned that (4) the “impairment rating’s statutory
    application is [sic] to worker’s compensation cases for the purpose
    of arriving at a statutorily predetermined sum of money to
    compensate for disability in lieu of wages.”
    ¶ 22   We aren’t persuaded by the court’s reasoning. First of all,
    plaintiff’s medical expert testified at length about the
    11
     purpose of the AMA Guides,
     determination of the ratings, and
     version of the AMA Guides she used as compared to the
    version required by the workers’ compensation statute.
    ¶ 23   Second, for reasons already stated, the workers’ compensation
    statute’s use of the AMA Guides to determine a medical impairment
    rating in workers’ compensation claims has no bearing on its use in
    other personal injury claims.
    ¶ 24   And third, testimony laying the foundation for the scientific
    basis behind a medical expert’s opinion isn’t necessarily confusing
    or misleading to the jury. See Tabieros, 
    944 P.2d at 1333
    . If
    anything, it clarifies the context behind the 15% impairment rating.
    Yes, it could be argued that the “more meaningful testimony,” as
    the court reasoned, would be about the physical impairment itself
    because it “better places the jury in a position to determine the
    extent of any damages.” But that doesn’t mean the 15%
    impairment rating is irrelevant. If anything, it complements and
    corroborates plaintiff’s testimony. And it gives the jury another
    perspective to consider, which arguably places the jury in an even
    better position to determine plaintiff’s damages.
    12
    ¶ 25   For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court abused its
    discretion when it excluded plaintiff’s expert’s testimony about
    plaintiff’s 15% impairment rating.
    IV.   Insurance Question During Voir Dire
    ¶ 26   Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred by preventing her
    counsel from asking prospective jurors during voir dire whether
    they had an interest in defendant’s insurance carrier. We agree. As
    mentioned earlier, we address this issue because it is likely to arise
    on remand in the event of retrial. But we don’t address defendant’s
    preservation arguments because we doubt that this issue will arise
    in the same manner as it did in the original proceedings.
    A.   Standard of Review
    ¶ 27   We review a trial court’s decision to limit voir dire for an abuse
    of discretion. People v. Collins, 
    730 P.2d 293
    , 300 (Colo. 1986)
    (“The propriety of questions to potential jurors on voir dire is within
    the discretion of the trial court, and its ruling thereon will not be
    disturbed on appeal unless an abuse of that discretion is shown.”).
    B.   Analysis
    ¶ 28   Before trial, plaintiff sought permission from the court to ask
    prospective jurors during voir dire, “[A]re any of you now or have
    13
    any of you been an agent, stockholder, or employee of Young
    America Insurance Company in this case or an underwriting
    company of Young America or do any of you have any other interest
    in a subsidiary company of Young America?” (the insurance
    question). Defendant objected because “this case is fraught with
    danger to provide some kind of indication to the [j]ury that liability
    insurance is available.” The court ruled that plaintiff could ask the
    broad insurance question as plaintiff had phrased it, but without
    mentioning defendant’s specific insurance carrier, because “then
    we’re finding out information that may lead to, arguably, reasons to
    not have a [j]uror be part of the panel.” It also said that, “if the
    [j]uror answers in the affirmative, we can address what may be
    appropriate from there.”
    ¶ 29   This issue presents essentially the same circumstances
    reviewed by our supreme court in Smith v. District Court, 
    907 P.2d 611
     (Colo. 1995). There, the court framed the insurance question
    as “whether prospective jurors are officers, directors, or
    policyholders of the defendant’s insurance carrier.” Id. at 612. The
    court also noted that “[i]t is well established in Colorado that the
    insurance question . . . may be asked by counsel during voir dire of
    14
    prospective jurors.” Id. And the court then held that, “[a]ccording
    to our precedent, counsel may ask the insurance question during
    voir dire in order to determine the prejudices and biases of
    prospective jurors. We therefore hold that the trial court
    erroneously prohibited plaintiff’s counsel from asking whether
    prospective jurors are officers, directors, or policyholders of
    [defendant’s insurance carrier] during voir dire.” Id. at 613.
    ¶ 30   Still, defendant argues that in a “modern personal injury
    lawsuit, jurors know, or at least can presume, that insurance is
    somehow involved . . . [and] [t]here is no purpose for plaintiffs to
    present the insurance question to the jury, as it only indicates that
    insurance is an issue in the case.” He also asserts that the trial
    court’s ruling that plaintiff could ask the broad insurance question
    was a reasonable option for the trial court to follow. But we are
    “bound to follow supreme court precedent.” In re Estate of
    Ramstetter, 
    2016 COA 81
    , ¶ 40 (quoting People v. Gladney, 
    250 P.3d 762
    , 768 n.3 (Colo. App. 2010)). And here, we are bound by
    the supreme court’s explicit holding that counsel is entitled to ask
    the insurance question during voir dire to determine the biases and
    prejudices of prospective jurors.
    15
    ¶ 31   So, the trial court abused its discretion by not allowing
    plaintiff to ask the insurance question during voir dire.
    V.     Conclusion
    ¶ 32   We reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the case to
    the trial court for a new trial.
    JUDGE BERGER and JUDGE MILLER concur.
    16