Peo v. Hasadinratana ( 2021 )

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
SUMMARY
May 13, 2021
2021COA66
No. 19CA1114, Peo v Hasadinratana — Crimes — Possession of
Weapons by Previous Offenders; Criminal Law — Affirmative
Defenses — Choice of Evils
A division of the court of appeals holds that, in People v.
Carbajal, 2014 CO 60, 328 P.3d 104, our supreme court implicitly
overruled the holding in People v. DeWitt, 275 P.3d 728 (Colo. App.
2011). In this case, the division specifically holds that a defendant
charged with possession of a weapon by a previous offender cannot
assert the affirmative defense of choice of evils based solely on a
showing that he or she possessed a firearm while walking in what is
generally known as a high crime neighborhood. Because such a
showing, without more, does not establish the threat of imminent
harm, which Carbajal held is required to assert a choice of evils
defense, the division affirms the defendant’s judgment of conviction.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2021COA66
Court of Appeals No. 19CA1114
El Paso County District Court No. 18CR2188
Honorable Jann P. DuBois, Judge
Honorable Scott B. Epstein, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Payut Cody Hasadinratana,
Defendant-Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division VI
Opinion by JUDGE LIPINSKY
Pawar and Taubman*, JJ., concur
Announced May 13, 2021
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Daniel E. Rheiner, Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Sarah R. Rowlands, Deputy
State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2020.
¶1 In People v. Carbajal, 2014 CO 60, 328 P.3d 104, our supreme
court held that defendants charged with possession of a weapon by
a previous offender (POWPO) pursuant to section 18-12-108, C.R.S.
2020, are entitled to the affirmative defense of choice of evils only if
they possessed the weapon to defend themselves, their homes, or
their property from what they reasonably believed to be a threat of
imminent harm.
¶2 The Carbajal court did not address the effect of its decision on
People v. DeWitt, 275 P.3d 728 (Colo. App. 2011), which read the
choice of evils affirmative defense more expansively than did the
majority in Carbajal. Specifically, in DeWitt, a division of this court
held that a defendant was entitled to an affirmative defense
instruction to POWPO based on a “general fear for his personal
safety,” coupled with fear related to “specific trends of violence and
incidents in the areas where he regularly walked and in the stores
that he regularly visited.” 275 P.3d at 734.
¶3 We hold that the reasoning of DeWitt cannot be squared with
Carbajal. For that reason, we decide that Carbajal implicitly
overruled DeWitt to the extent DeWitt stands for the proposition that
defendants charged with POWPO are entitled to assert the
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affirmative defense of choice of evils based solely on a showing that
they possessed a firearm while walking in what is generally known
as a high-crime neighborhood.
¶4 Defendant, Payut Cody Hasadinratana, directly appeals his
conviction for POWPO. He contends that the district court erred by
declining to instruct the jury on the affirmative defense of choice of
evils. In light of our reading of Carbajal, we disagree and affirm his
judgment of conviction.
I. Background
¶5 According to the affidavit of probable cause in support of
Hasadinratana’s arrest, police were dispatched to an inn based on a
report of a physical disturbance involving two men with guns and
masks. The reporting party said the suspects could be found by a
nearby gas station. A police officer arrived and saw Hasadinratana,
who matched the description of one of the suspects, walking away
from the inn toward the gas station. When the officer stopped him,
Hasadinratana told the officer he had a gun in his possession. The
officer found the gun in the waistband of Hasadinratana’s pants.
¶6 Because Hasadinratana had a prior felony conviction, the
prosecution charged him with POWPO.
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¶7 Hasadinratana endorsed the affirmative defense of choice of
evils under section 18-1-702, C.R.S. 2020.
¶8 At a pretrial hearing, Hasadinratana testified that he lived in a
high-crime neighborhood plagued by gang and drug activity and
violent incidents. He said the police had an active presence in the
neighborhood. He also testified that, during the thirty years he
lived in the neighborhood, he witnessed incidents of violence and
had been a crime victim. He reported that property had been stolen
from his car and his yard, and that people had tried to break into
his home while he was away. However, Hasadinratana did not
testify to any facts showing that he had a reasonable belief that he
faced a threat of imminent harm at the time of his arrest.
¶9 Following that testimony and the parties’ arguments, the
district court denied Hasadinratana’s request to assert the
affirmative defense of choice of evils, explaining,
[To be able to assert that affirmative defense to
POWPO, there has to be a] specific, definite,
and imminent threat, and while I would
acknowledge that this defendant, because of
where he lived, may have had a generalized
perception that he was potentially in danger,
there was nothing on this occasion that
required him to arm himself since there was
nothing imminent that I’ve heard.
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¶ 10 Hasadinratana filed a motion to reconsider, arguing, among
other things, that “[t]he accused need not present evidence of
imminent threat, just that the weapon was possessed for a
constitutionally protected purpose, i.e. defense of person or
property.” He repeated that argument on the morning of the first
day of trial.
¶ 11 The district court denied the motion to reconsider and
reaffirmed its ruling that, because Hasadinratana had not
presented evidence of a threat of imminent harm, he would not be
allowed to assert the affirmative defense of choice of evils at trial.
However, over the prosecutor’s objection, the court granted
Hasadinratana’s request for the following theory of defense
instruction:
It is the defense theory of the case that Mr.
Hasadinratana carried a weapon for what he
believed was a constitutionally protected
purpose, namely, to protect person and
property. Notwithstanding a prior felony
conviction, Mr. Hasadinratana believed he was
justified in carrying a weapon under a belief of
threat of harm to person or property.
¶ 12 The jury found Hasadinratana guilty of POWPO and the court
sentenced him to three years of probation.
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II. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶ 13 To be entitled to assert an affirmative defense, a defendant
must present “some credible evidence” supporting the defense.
§ 18-1-407(1), C.R.S. 2020; People v. DeGreat, 2018 CO 83, ¶ 16,
428 P.3d 541, 544. This burden is “relatively lenient.” DeGreat,
¶ 22, 428 P.3d at 545. In determining whether a defendant met the
burden, we view the proffered evidence in the light most favorable to
him. Cassels v. People, 92 P.3d 951, 955 (Colo. 2004) (citing
Mata-Medina v. People, 71 P.3d 973, 979 (Colo. 2003)). Also,
because the jury decides the credibility of evidence, the burden can
be met even if the only supporting evidence is “highly improbable”
testimony from the defendant. DeGreat, ¶ 22, 428 P.3d at 545
(quoting Lybarger v. People, 807 P.2d 570, 579 (Colo. 1991)).
¶ 14 However, as a matter of law, a trial court need not give an
affirmative defense instruction if the record contains no evidence to
support it because, in the absence of supporting evidence, there is
no issue of fact for the jury to resolve. O’Shaughnessy v. People,
2012 CO 9, ¶ 13, 269 P.3d 1233, 1236.
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¶ 15 Whether a defendant has met his burden of showing
entitlement to an affirmative defense presents a question of law that
we review de novo. DeGreat, ¶ 16, 428 P.3d at 544.
III. Analysis
¶ 16 Hasadinratana relies primarily on DeWitt to support his
argument that he presented sufficient evidence to entitle him to
assert a choice of evils affirmative defense. Before we address
DeWitt, we discuss the relevant supreme court precedent and model
jury instructions.
¶ 17 In 1975, in People v. Blue, the supreme court held that the
POWPO statute was a legitimate exercise of the state’s police power
and did not facially violate article II, section 13, of the Colorado
Constitution, which protects a person’s right to bear arms. 190
Colo. 95, 102-04, 544 P.2d 385, 390-91 (1975). The court
explained that a defendant charged with POWPO can assert the
affirmative defense of choice of evils, which allows the possession of
a weapon “to avoid an imminent public or private injury.” Id. at
103, 544 P.2d at 391 (quoting § 18-1-702).
¶ 18 Two years later, the supreme court noted that Blue left open
the question of whether the POWPO statute could be
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unconstitutional as applied in a particular case. See People v. Ford,
193 Colo. 459, 461, 568 P.2d 26, 28 (1977). To reconcile the
POWPO statute with the constitutional right to bear arms, the
supreme court held in Ford that a defendant charged with POWPO
“who presents competent evidence showing that his purpose in
possessing weapons was the defense of his home, person, and
property thereby raises an affirmative defense.” Id. at 462, 568
P.2d at 28.
¶ 19 Based on Ford, a model criminal jury instruction for an
affirmative defense to POWPO was subsequently adopted that read,
“[i]t is an affirmative defense to the crime of [POWPO] that the
defendant possessed the weapon for the purpose of defending his
[home] [person] [property].” CJI-Crim. 7:63 (1983). The same
model instruction appeared in the 2008 update to the model
instructions. See COLJI-Crim. H:51 (2008).
¶ 20 In Carbajal, the supreme court considered whether a trial
court erred by adding the following italicized clause to the model
instruction: “It is an affirmative defense to the charge of possession
of a weapon by a previous offender that the defendant possessed a
firearm for the purpose of defending himself, home, or property from
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what he reasonably believed to be a threat of imminent harm.”
Carbajal, ¶ 7, 328 P.3d at 106 (emphasis added).
¶ 21 The supreme court held that the trial court did not err by
adding the requirements of reasonableness and imminence to the
model instruction. See id. at ¶¶ 10-21, 328 P.3d at 106-09. After
analyzing Blue and Ford, the supreme court concluded that “the
POWPO affirmative defense is the statutory defense of choice of
evils.” Id. at ¶ 21, 328 P.3d at 109. The court reasoned that “the
choice of evils defense was the legislature’s way of preserving [the
constitutional right to bear arms] in connection with POWPO.” Id.
at ¶ 17, 328 P.3d at 108. Notably, in approving the trial court’s
modified instruction, id. at ¶ 21, 328 P.3d at 109, the court
disapproved of the then-existing model instruction for the
affirmative defense to POWPO, see id. at ¶ 20, 328 P.3d at 108-09.
¶ 22 Consistent with Carbajal, the model jury instruction was
amended again to state that the affirmative defense to POWPO
applies only if the defendant “possessed the weapon for the purpose
of defending his [her] home, person or property from what he [she]
reasonably believed to be a threat of imminent harm which was
about to occur because of a situation occasioned or developed
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through no conduct of the defendant.” COLJI-Crim. H:64 (2014)
(emphasis added). (The language, “which was about to occur
because of a situation occasioned or developed through no conduct
of the defendant,” mirrors language in the choice of evils statute,
section 18-1-702(1). See id. at cmt. 2 (citing Carbajal, ¶ 21 n.5, 328
P.3d at 109 n.5).)
¶ 23 Hasadinratana repeatedly argued in the district court that the
affirmative defense to POWPO has no imminence requirement
(although his tendered instruction included the imminence
requirement and tracked COLJI-Crim. H:64 (2014)).
¶ 24 In his opening brief on appeal, Hasadinratana describes
Carbajal in a single paragraph, and neither applies it nor discusses
how the imminence requirement applies to the facts in his case.
Instead, he primarily relies on DeWitt, in which a division of this
court held that the trial court erred by rejecting the defendant’s
tendered affirmative defense instruction to POWPO because “[the]
defendant not only testified to a general fear for his personal safety,
but also tied his fear to specific trends of violence and incidents in
the areas where he regularly walked and in the stores that he
regularly visited.” 275 P.3d at 734.
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¶ 25 In DeWitt, the defendant’s tendered affirmative defense
instruction said, “[i]t is an affirmative defense to the crime of
[POWPO] that the defendant’s purpose in possessing weapons was
the defense of his home, person, and property.” Id. at 733.
Notably, that language reflected the pre-Carbajal model instruction.
That instruction made no reference to a reasonableness or
imminence requirement. See COLJI-Crim. H:51 (2008); CJI-Crim.
7:63 (1983). Also, DeWitt does not mention the concept of
imminence or the affirmative defense of choice of evils. (The same
is true of the supreme court’s 1977 Ford opinion.)
¶ 26 Although Carbajal did not explicitly overrule DeWitt, as noted
above, we hold that Carbajal implicitly overruled DeWitt. In light of
Carbajal, we cannot follow the suggestion in DeWitt that a
defendant charged with POWPO is entitled to assert the affirmative
defense of choice of evils where the defendant showed only that he
possessed a firearm while walking in what is generally known as a
high-crime neighborhood. That scenario, without more, does not
show a threat of imminent harm. “‘Imminent’ means ‘likely to
happen without delay; impending; threatening.’” Moczygemba v.
Colorado Dep’t of Health Care Pol’y & Fin., 51 P.3d 1083, 1087
10
(Colo. App. 2002) (quoting Webster’s New World Dictionary 702
(1972)); see People v. Brandyberry, 812 P.2d 674, 678 (“‘Imminent’
means ‘near at hand, impending or on the point of happening.’”
(quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 676 (rev. 5th ed. 1979)).
¶ 27 Similarly, Hasadinratana showed only that he was walking in
what is generally known as a high-crime neighborhood at
12:45 a.m. It does not matter that police were dispatched to the
inn based on a report of a physical disturbance involving two men
with guns and masks because Hasadinratana concedes that he was
not aware of that disturbance when the officer stopped him. These
facts fall short, as a matter of law, to show that Hasadinratana
possessed the firearm to protect himself “from what he reasonably
believed to be a threat of imminent harm.” Carbajal, ¶ 21, 328 P.3d
at 109 (emphasis added); see O’Shaughnessy, ¶ 13, 269 P.3d at
1236.
IV. Conclusion
¶ 28 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE PAWAR and JUDGE TAUBMAN concur.
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