Duoc Van Nguyen v. Huyen T. Lai ( 2022 )

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
SUMMARY
December 8, 2022
2022COA141No. 21CA0418, Nguyen v. Lai — Family Law — Uniform
Dissolution of Marriage Act — Declaration of Invalidity —
Disposition of Property
In this domestic relations case, appellant wife appeals the
district court’s judgment declaring her marriage to appellee
husband invalid and concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to divide
the parties’ jointly owned property. A division of the court of
appeals holds that the district court’s conclusion that it lacked
jurisdiction over the division of the parties’ property was error and
reverses that portion of the district court’s judgement. Because the
court’s decree of invalidity doesn’t address property division at all,
the division dismisses without prejudice appellant wife’s appeal
concerning the decree of invalidity of marriage for lack of a final
order and remands the case to the district court for further
proceedings with the understanding that it has jurisdiction over the
division of the parties’ property.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2022COA141Court of Appeals No. 21CA0418
City and County of Denver District Court No. 20DR30226
Honorable Darryl F. Shockley, Judge
Duoc Van Nguyen,
Appellee,
v.
Huyen T. Lai,
Appellant.
JUDGMENT REVERSED IN PART, APPEAL DISMISSED IN PART,
AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division III
Opinion by JUDGE WELLING
J. Jones and Schutz, JJ., concur
Announced December 8, 2022
Woody Law Firm LLC, Danae D. Woody, James H. Delman, Denver, Colorado,
for Appellee
Campbell Killin Brittan & Ray, Michael Mirabella, Megan Cronin, Denver,
Colorado, for Appellant
¶1 Huyen T. Lai appeals the district court’s judgment declaring
that her marriage to Duoc Van Nguyen was invalid and concluding
that it lacked jurisdiction to divide the parties’ jointly owned
property. We disagree with the district court’s conclusion that it
lacked jurisdiction over the division of the parties’ property and
reverse that portion of the court’s judgement. Based on that
decision, we dismiss without prejudice Ms. Lai’s appeal concerning
the decree of invalidity of marriage for lack of a final order.
I. Relevant Facts
¶2 Mr. Nguyen and Ms. Lai were married in November 2017. In
March 2020, Mr. Nguyen filed a petition to declare the marriage
invalid. He alleged that, at the time of their marriage, Ms. Lai was
legally married to another person and that she fraudulently
represented to him that the prior marriage had ended.
¶3 After a hearing, the district court entered a decree invalidating
the marriage. The court found that the marriage was prohibited by
law because Ms. Lai was married to another person when she
married Mr. Nguyen and that Mr. Nguyen entered into the marriage
in reliance on Ms. Lai’s misrepresentations. The court also
determined that Ms. Lai wasn’t eligible for putative spouse status.
1
¶4 In its oral ruling (but not in the written decree), the court
indicated that it didn’t have jurisdiction over the parties’ property,
which includes real estate, vehicles, and bank accounts.
¶5 Ms. Lai appealed. After briefing was complete, this court
issued a show cause order questioning the finality of the judgment
because the district court hadn’t entered permanent orders
concerning the parties’ property. Nguyen v. Lai, (Colo. App. No.
21CA0418, Feb. 17, 2022) (unpublished order). And a motions
division of this court dismissed the appeal. Nguyen v. Lai, (Colo.
App. No. 21CA0418, Mar. 18, 2022) (unpublished order).
¶6 Ms. Lai then requested and obtained an amended decree from
the district court. In the amended decree, the court said that “due
to the [i]nvalidity of the [m]arriage, the [c]ourt does not have
jurisdiction over the division of the [p]arties’ jointly owned
property.”
¶7 In light of the amended decree, the motions division granted
Ms. Lai’s petition for rehearing on the order dismissing the appeal
and reinstated the appeal. Nguyen v. Lai, (Colo. App. No.
21CA0418, Apr. 12, 2022) (unpublished order). However, the
division clarified that its order didn’t preclude the merits division
2
from addressing the district court’s determination that it lacked
jurisdiction to divide the parties’ jointly owned property and,
depending on the resolution of that question, whether the balance
of the judgment is final and subject to appeal. Id.; see also Chavez
v. Chavez, 2020 COA 70, ¶ 12 (noting that the division of this court
that considers and decides the merits of an appeal is “colloquially”
referred to as the “merits division”).
II. Discussion
¶8 Because the resolution of the issue impacts our jurisdiction,
we must first consider the propriety of the district court’s
conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction to divide the parties’ property.
See Spiremedia Inc. v. Wozniak, 2020 COA 10, ¶ 11; see also People
v. S.X.G., 2012 CO 5, ¶ 9 (“Because we must always satisfy
ourselves that we have jurisdiction to hear an appeal, we may raise
jurisdictional defects [on our own], regardless of whether the parties
have raised the issue.”).
¶9 Without explanation, the district court concluded that the
invalidity of the parties’ marriage deprived it of jurisdiction over the
parties’ jointly owned property. However, our legislature has
granted the court this express authority. Section 14-10-111(6),
3
C.R.S. 2022, explicitly states that the provisions of the dissolution
of marriage statutes, which allow a court to divide the spouses’
marital property, are applicable to decrees of invalidity of marriage.
See In re Marriage of Farr, 228 P.3d 267, 268 (Colo. App. 2010); see
also § 14-10-113, C.R.S. 2022; In re Marriage of Joel, 2012 COA
128, ¶¶ 6, 21. Therefore, a court that declares a marriage invalid is
vested with the same authority to divide the parties’ property
acquired during the invalid marriage as if the court had dissolved a
valid marriage. See Farr, 228 P.3d at 268; In re Marriage of
Dickson, 983 P.2d 44, 47 (Colo. App. 1998) (recognizing that after a
“judgment of nullity,” the district court retained “jurisdiction to
enter orders as to property”); cf. Joel, ¶ 24 (“[A]s to property
acquired after the date of the voided marriage, or as to an increase
in the value of property acquired before the voided marriage, the
most the court may award to the party who engaged in fraud is the
proportion of property or increase in value attributable to the
financial contribution of that party.”) (citation omitted).
¶ 10 Still, at oral argument, Mr. Nguyen contended that the district
court didn’t err because section 14-10-111(6) merely allows the
court to divide the parties’ property; it does not require it. And he
4
argues that the court implicitly declined to exercise that authority.
Even if we assume, without deciding, that the court may, within its
discretion, decline to exercise jurisdiction as conferred by section
14-10-111(6), the district court didn’t indicate it had done so here.
To the contrary, it concluded that it did “not have jurisdiction” over
the parties’ property.
¶ 11 Nor are we persuaded that the district court was divested of
jurisdiction after it determined that Ms. Lai wasn’t a putative
spouse. While a putative spouse acquires the rights conferred on a
legal spouse when a marriage is declared invalid, see § 14-2-111,
C.R.S. 2022, nothing in the plain language of section 14-10-111(6)
conditions the court’s authority to address the spouses’ property on
a determination that one of them is a putative spouse, see
Przekurat v. Torres, 2018 CO 69, ¶ 8 (“If the language is ‘plain and
clear,’ then we apply the statute ‘as written.’” (quoting Clyncke v.
Waneka, 157 P.3d 1072, 1077 (Colo. 2007)).
¶ 12 The district court therefore erred by concluding that the decree
invalidating the marriage deprived it of jurisdiction to divide the
parties’ property. See § 14-10-111(6); Farr, 228 P.3d at 268;
5
Dickson, 983 P.2d at 47. Accordingly, we reverse this portion of the
court’s judgment.
¶ 13 Given our conclusion that the court erred by determining it
lacked jurisdiction to enter orders regarding division of the parties’
property, we are now left with a nonfinal order and must, therefore,
dismiss Ms. Lai’s appeal challenging the decree of invalidity. A final
judgment is “one that ends the particular action in which it is
entered, leaving nothing further for the court pronouncing it to do
in order to completely determine the rights of the parties involved in
the proceedings.” People in Interest of R.S. v. G.S., 2018 CO 31,
¶ 37 (quoting People v. Guatney, 214 P.3d 1049, 1051 (Colo. 2009));
accord Baldwin v. Bright Mortg. Co., 757 P.2d 1072, 1073 (Colo.
1988). Absent exceptions not applicable here, we have jurisdiction
only over a district court’s final judgment. § 13-4-102(1), C.R.S.
2022; C.A.R. 1(a)(1); Chavez, ¶ 24; Spiremedia, ¶ 12; see also Cyr v.
Dist. Ct., 685 P.2d 769, 770 (Colo. 1984) (stating the “general rule”
that “an entire case must be decided” to appeal a ruling). If a
judgment is not final, we must dismiss the appeal. See S.X.G.,
¶¶ 11, 20; see also Wilson v. Kennedy, 2020 COA 122, ¶ 6
(providing that our appellate jurisdiction is conferred by statute and
6
we have no authority to expand our jurisdiction beyond that
granted by the legislature).
¶ 14 Due to its erroneous jurisdictional finding, the district court
hasn’t issued a final judgment that fully resolves the dispute
between Ms. Lai and Mr. Nguyen; the division of their property
remains outstanding. See In re Marriage of Salby, 126 P.3d 291,
295 (Colo. App. 2005) (holding that an order not resolving all issues
between the parties can’t be appealed until all final orders are
entered). Without a final order, we lack jurisdiction to review Ms.
Lai’s appeal of the decree invalidating the marriage. See Chavez,
¶ 24; Spiremedia, ¶ 12.
¶ 15 While the parties undoubtedly desire a resolution on the
propriety of the decree of invalidity at this time, they cannot
consent to, or waive, our jurisdiction over the matter when
jurisdiction does not exist. See Arevalo v. Colo. Dep’t of Hum.
Servs., 72 P.3d 436, 437 (Colo. App. 2003); People v. Torkelson, 971
P.2d 660, 661 (Colo. App. 1998). Nor can we confer jurisdiction
upon ourselves. Torkelson, 971 P.2d at 661. We therefore must
dismiss without prejudice the balance of Ms. Lai’s appeal.
7
III. Attorney Fees on Appeal
¶ 16 Mr. Nguyen requests an award of appellate attorney fees under
section 13-17-102, C.R.S. 2022, arguing that Ms. Lai’s appeal was
frivolous. We decline to award such fees. See In re Estate of
Shimizu, 2016 COA 163, ¶ 34.
IV. Conclusion
¶ 17 We reverse in part, concluding that the district court erred by
determining that it lacked jurisdiction over the parties’ property,
and dismiss in part without prejudice as it relates to Ms. Lai’s
appeal of the decree invalidating the marriage because the decree,
by itself, is not a final judgment. Accordingly, we remand the case
to the district court for further proceedings with the understanding
that it has jurisdiction over the division of the parties’ property.
We, however, express no opinion as to whether the district court
should or must divide the parties’ property, as that issue isn’t
before us or ripe for our review. See, e.g., Tippett v. Johnson, 742
P.2d 314, 315 (Colo. 1987) (appellate courts are not empowered to
give advisory opinions).
JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE SCHUTZ concur.
8