New Life Methodist Church v. Korean Methodist Church of the Americas, Jin Hi Cha , 2020 COA 20 ( 2020 )

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
SUMMARY
February 6, 2020
2020COA20
No. 18CA1149, Korean New Life Methodist Church v. Korean
Methodist Church of the Americas, Jin Hi Cha — Religious
Organizations — Property; Constitutional Law — First
Amendment — Freedom of Religion — Doctrine of Judicial
Abstention — Neutral Principles of Law Analysis
As a matter of first impression, a division of the court of
appeals considers whether a local church submitted to the
authority of the national denomination and whether the polity
approach or neutral principles of law should be used to answer this
question. Relying on Bishop & Dioceses of Colorado v. Mote, 716
P.2d 85 (Colo. 1986), the division holds that neutral principles of
law should be applied to answer the submission question.
Because the district court properly applied neutral principles to the
hearing facts to conclude there was no submission, the division
affirms the judgment. The division further denies the request for
attorney fees.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2020COA20
Court of Appeals No. 18CA1149
El Paso County District Court No. 18CV31065
Honorable David Prince, Judge
Korean New Life Methodist Church, a Colorado non-profit corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Korean Methodist Church of the Americas, a California non-profit corporation,
and Jin Hi Cha,
Defendants-Appellants.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division I
Opinion by JUDGE FREYRE
Taubman and Pawar, JJ., concur
Announced February 6, 2020
Mulliken Weiner Berg & Jolivet P.C., Murray I. Weiner, Hilary A. Roland,
Colorado Springs, Colorado; Weeks & Luchetta, LLP, Jeffrey L. Weeks,
Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Nussbaum Speir PLLC, Ian Speir, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Defendants-
Appellants
¶1 The First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution preclude civil courts from resolving religious disputes
involving religious law and decisions of ecclesiastical tribunals,
including disputes involving church governance (polity approach).
See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 708-
09 (1976). But when a dispute involves the ownership and control
of church property, our supreme court both permits and requires
civil courts to apply neutral principles of law in resolving them
(neutral principles approach). See Bishop & Diocese of Colo. v.
Mote, 716 P.2d 85, 96 (Colo. 1986). This approach includes
inquiring into whether the local church has submitted to the
authority of a national denomination. See id. at 100.
¶2 No Colorado court, however, has decided the questions
presented here — whether the local church actually surrendered its
control and submitted to the authority of the national
denomination, and whether the polity or neutral principles
approach should be used to answer this question. This dispute
between the local church, plaintiff, Korean New Life Methodist
Church, and the national denomination, defendants, Korean
Methodist Church of the Americas and Pastor Jin Hi Cha, arose
1
from the denomination’s attempt to retitle church property from the
local church’s to the denomination’s name, contrary to the local
church’s articles of incorporation, bylaws, and board resolutions.
¶3 We hold, consistent with Mote, that the submission to
authority question is one arising from the local church’s
organization and that neutral principles of general corporate law
must be applied to resolve it. Id. at 99. Therefore, we discern no
legal error in the district court’s decision to apply neutral principles.
As well, we discern no clear error in the district court’s application
of neutral principles to the evidence or in its finding that the local
church never ceded control or submitted to the denomination’s
authority. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
I. Background
A. Factual
¶4 In 1996, the local church began as a prayer group in the home
of founder Mr. Jong Kim. In February 1997, Mr. Kim incorporated
the prayer group as a nonprofit corporation named the Korean New
Life Church. The articles of incorporation named six people to serve
as the initial board of directors. As relevant here, Paragraph 4 of
the articles of incorporation, the dissolution paragraph, provided
2
that upon any dissolution, the board of directors should distribute
the church’s assets to nonprofit charitable corporations, municipal
corporations, or corporations for “the purposes of carrying on
nonprofit charitable purposes.”
¶5 Several months later, the board of directors passed a
resolution stating that the church “shall join the Korean Methodist
Church.” The resolution also changed the local church’s name from
Korean New Life Church to Korean New Life Methodist Church. The
church filed this name change with the Colorado Secretary of State.
¶6 The Korean Methodist Church (KMC) is a denomination based
in Seoul, South Korea. A geographic subdivision of the
denomination is the Korean Methodist Church of the Americas
(KMCA). The parties dispute whether the KMCA is part of the KMC.
The district court concluded that it need not resolve this dispute to
decide the submission question. For purposes of our analysis, we
presume that the KMCA is a geographic subdivision of the KMC,
and we refer to the entities collectively as “the denomination.”
¶7 The denomination is governed by rules provided in “The
Doctrines, Book of Discipline and Rules of the Korea [sic] Methodist
Church (2012)” (denomination rules). Among other things, the
3
denomination rules set forth the requirements for church
membership, church property registration with the denomination,
dues payments, mortgaging or selling local church property (which
requires denomination permission and approval), selecting a church
pastor, and general administrative control of the local church by the
pastor.
¶8 The denomination rules also define offenses, disciplinary
procedures, and church hierarchy. The rules group local churches
into districts, which are supervised and controlled by a district
superintendent. They also give the district superintendent the
authority to terminate a local church’s pastor.
¶9 As a nonprofit organization organized under Colorado law, the
local church board enacted bylaws to govern the church’s
administration and activities. 1 The bylaws provide for a “church
board” comprising the pastor, the assistant pastor, elders, and
selected deacons. The bylaws contain no reference to the
denomination or the denomination rules, but they provide the
district superintendent with “approval” authority over the board’s
1These bylaws are not dated but refer to the local church by its new
name.
4
selection of a pastor. The bylaws are silent about the
circumstances under which a pastor may be terminated.
¶ 10 The local church never amended its articles of incorporation to
reflect the local church’s new name, nor do the articles reference
the denomination or its rules.
¶ 11 After changing its name, the local church never “registered” its
property with the denomination. 2 Eventually, the local church sold
its original property and purchased new property without the
denomination’s permission or approval. As well, the deeds
conveying the property never mentioned the denomination, and the
property was titled in the name of the local church. The local
church later mortgaged the church property without receiving
permission or approval from the denomination, and two board
members signed as guarantors of the loan.
¶ 12 Additionally, the local church made nominal annual payments
to the denomination to support the overall church mission, and the
board passed resolutions placing the local church’s financial
decisions squarely under its control, contrary to the denomination
2Nothing in the record explains what “registration” means or the
procedure necessary to accomplish it.
5
rules. As well, in December 2015, the board authorized two board
members to sign on the church’s bank accounts, and indicated that
the “[p]astor will not be authorized to remove[] or add singers [sic].” 3
¶ 13 Pastor Cha began working at the local church in 2014. In
March 2018, a conflict with the board arose when he attempted to
register the local church’s property with the denomination and
when he attempted to take control of the church’s finances,
contrary to the board’s resolutions. The church board complained
to the district superintendent about Pastor Cha’s conduct, but the
district superintendent concluded that the accusations were not
supported by “admissible evidence.” 4 In response to the board’s
continued protests, the district superintendent, acting on behalf of
the denomination, fired the board members and authorized Pastor
3 The undisputed record reveals that the local church took this
action in response to problems with Pastor Cha’s predecessor and
that the board intended the pastor to focus on church
administration and not finances.
4 The record does not specify what the superintendent meant by
“admissible evidence.” We presume that the phrase refers to
admissible evidence as determined by the denomination rules and
not evidentiary rules of any jurisdiction.
6
Cha to install a new church board under the denomination’s
authority. 5
¶ 14 In response, the old board resisted and passed resolutions
terminating Pastor Cha and disassociating from the “Korean
Methodist Church in the United States.” It then filed this
declaratory judgment and injunctive relief action asking the district
court to declare that the old board was the lawful church board in
control of the local church, including church property and church
finances. The old board also requested injunctive relief to preserve
the status quo and to bar Pastor Cha from the church property.
¶ 15 The parties eventually stipulated to a temporary restraining
order to preserve the status quo, and the court entered the order in
April 2018. This order established a sharing arrangement between
the congregation members loyal to Pastor Cha, and the
denomination and congregation members loyal to the old church
board.
¶ 16 The district court conducted a preliminary injunction hearing
in May 2018 and received briefing on whether to follow the polity
5 The denomination characterized this action as the old board’s
resignation.
7
approach or the neutral principles approach. It heard conflicting
testimony about whether the local church had submitted to the
authority of the denomination. The founder and an original board
member, Mr. Kim, testified that the local church always intended to
manage its own affairs and had never submitted to the
denomination’s authority. He testified that he drafted the articles of
incorporation and filed them with the secretary of state, and that he
had never seen the denomination rules and was unfamiliar with
them. He explained that the intent of the resolution changing the
church’s name was to support the mission of the Korean Methodist
Church in South Korea, not to submit to its authority. And, he
described the church’s annual payment to the church in South
Korea as charitable support of the church’s mission, not a dues
payment to the denomination.
¶ 17 In contrast, Mr. Ryhu, another original board member,
testified that the intent of the resolution changing the church’s
name was to join the Korean Methodist Church in Seoul and that
the KMCA later became a subdivision of the KMC. He recognized
the authority of the denomination and said that the local church
paid annual dues to the denomination, let the district
8
superintendent approve the selection of a pastor, and sometimes
posted notices on the denomination’s stationery.
¶ 18 The court also received documentary evidence, including the
church’s articles of incorporation, bylaws, resolutions, board
minutes, real estate documents, and the denomination rules. It
then issued a comprehensive oral order granting injunctive relief to
the local church.
¶ 19 The district court first found that the operative question was
whether the local church had submitted to the denomination’s
authority, because if it had, then, under the polity approach, a civil
court could not interfere with the district superintendent’s decision
to oust the old board and to give Pastor Cha administrative and
financial control of the local church, consistent with the
denomination rules. 6 Relying on Mote, the court found that this
submission question was an issue of corporate law that should be
reviewed under neutral principles of law.
6 In its complaint, the local church asserted that it had never
submitted to the denomination’s authority. In its counterclaim, the
denomination asserted that the question of who should be the
rightful pastor was one of church governance not subject to civil
law.
9
¶ 20 Applying neutral principles, the court found insufficient
evidence to show that the local church had submitted to the
denomination’s authority. It was not persuaded that the name
change evidenced submission absent other changes or amendments
to the articles of incorporation to conform to the denomination
rules. It also noted that church property had never been registered
with the denomination; that the local church had never sought
permission or approval to buy, sell, or mortgage property; and that
the local church’s resolution vesting financial control in two church
board members and prohibiting the pastor from having authority
over financial accounts directly contradicted the denomination
rules.
¶ 21 The district court also distinguished the present case from
Mote by noting that the denomination could not point to any
provision in the denomination rules “that directly addressed control
over the local corporate entity.”
¶ 22 The court ruled:
[A]s a matter of corporate law, the old board,
the status quo ante board and the status quo
ante officers remain in place. The corporate
entity has not submitted to the authority of the
denomination based on the evidence I have
10
today. The Court finds that Plaintiff [the old
board] has a likelihood of success and
substantial likelihood of success on the merits.
B. Procedural Posture
¶ 23 Following the preliminary injunction hearing and to avoid the
expense of discovery and further litigation, the parties executed a
written stipulation making the preliminary injunction order a
permanent injunction order. They agreed that the evidence
presented at the preliminary injunction hearing sufficiently
supported the court’s order in favor of the local church, that those
findings should be deemed a final judgment, and that neither party
would challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal. They
further agreed that each party could appeal whether the district
court misapplied the law to the facts. Finally, the parties stipulated
that “neither party shall be awarded attorneys’ fees or costs by the
trial court.” The court accepted the stipulation and entered a final
judgment under C.R.C.P. 65(a). The denomination challenges the
district court’s decision to apply the neutral principles approach
rather than the polity approach to the submission question, and its
application of the neutral principles approach to the hearing facts
to find there was no submission. We perceive no error.
11
II. Neutral Principles Apply to the Submission Question
¶ 24 The denomination contends that because the local church
“joined” the KMC, everything that occurred thereafter, including
Pastor Cha’s attempts to take control of the church, install a new
board, and register church property with the denomination, relates
to church governance. It argues that because the First Amendment
and the polity approach shield church governance issues from civil
court review, the district court’s application of Mote’s neutral
principles “interfer[ed] with the internal church governance of the
Korean New Life Methodist Church.”
¶ 25 The local church responds that the district court correctly
applied Mote because this is a dispute over church property, to
which neutral principles apply, not church governance. We
conclude that the only question properly before us concerns the
meaning of “join” and whether the local church submitted to the
denomination’s authority. For the reasons described below, we
affirm the district court’s judgment.
A. Standard of Review and Preservation
¶ 26 Review of a permanent injunction order presents a mixed
question of law and fact. Dallman v. Ritter, 225 P.3d 610, 620-21
12
(Colo. 2010). We review the court’s factual findings for clear error
and defer to those findings when they are supported by the record.
M.D.C./Wood, Inc. v. Mortimer, 866 P.2d 1380, 1383–84 (Colo.
1994); Rome v. Mandel, 2016 COA 192M, ¶ 60. We review
questions of law de novo. Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1274
(Colo. 1993).
¶ 27 A party seeking a permanent injunction must show (1) actual
success on the merits; 7 (2) irreparable harm if the injunction is not
entered; (3) the threatened injury outweighs the harm that the
injunction may cause to the opposing party; and (4) an adverse
public interest if the injunction is denied. See Dallman, 225 P.3d at
62; Langlois v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 78 P.3d 1154, 1157 (Colo. App.
2003). Because the parties only dispute the first factor — success
on the merits — we do not address the remaining factors.
¶ 28 Initially, we must decide whether the church governance issue
was preserved for our review. During its oral ruling, the district
court stated, “I have not decided and have not had to decide today
who is the pastor. I don’t have to decide whether — today whether
7A preliminary injunction requires a showing of a likelihood of
success on the merits, which the court found.
13
the board has the authority to fire the pastor . . . .” Nothing in the
record shows that the denomination sought the district court’s
ruling on this issue. Nor did the denomination choose to appeal the
preliminary injunction ruling. Further, we discern no record
evidence that the denomination sought a ruling on the local
church’s authority to fire the pastor and install a new board before
the court entered a final judgment pursuant to the parties’
stipulation. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the
church governance issue was not preserved, and we address only
the court’s ruling on the submission question. See Rinker v. Colina-
Lee, 2019 COA 45, ¶ 25 (“As a general rule, a party must make a
timely and specific objection or request for relief in the district court
to preserve an issue for appeal.”).
B. Relevant Law
¶ 29 The First Amendment to the United States Constitution
prohibits any “law respecting an establishment of religion or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” U.S. Const. amend. I; see also
Moses v. Diocese of Colo., 863 P.2d 310, 319 (Colo. 1993). It
includes an absolute freedom to believe and a qualified freedom to
act. Moses, 863 P.2d at 319. To protect a religious group’s freedom
14
to preserve its beliefs or practices, courts apply two approaches
when resolving church disputes.
¶ 30 First, courts generally recognize a “doctrine of judicial
abstention in matters involving court interpretation of ecclesiastical
law.” Id. (citing Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1871)). This polity
approach stems from the legal principle that all persons have “the
full and free right to entertain any religious belief, to practice any
religious principle, and to teach any religious doctrine which does
not violate the laws of morality and property, and which does not
infringe personal rights.” Watson, 80 U.S. at 728. When a church
submits to a religious association or body, it impliedly consents to
the ecclesiastical government of the association and is bound by its
authority. Id. at 729. Any decisions of these ecclesiastical bodies
and their tribunals are subject only to appeals that the “organism
itself provides for.” Id. Thus, civil courts must defer to such bodies’
rulings on ecclesiastical matters and may not inquire into whether
the church judicial body properly followed its own rules of
procedure. Serbian, 426 U.S. at 720, 724.
¶ 31 Under the second approach — neutral principles — civil courts
may provide a forum for determining the ownership of church
15
property so long as they refrain from resolving such disputes “on
the basis of religious doctrine and practice.” Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S.
595, 602 (1979). Indeed, a state is free to adopt a procedure for
resolving church property disputes “so long as it involves no
consideration of doctrinal matters” such as “the ritual and liturgy of
worship or the tenets of faith.” Id. (quoting Md. & Va. Eldership of
Churches of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 U.S. 367,
368 (1970)).
¶ 32 When resolving disputes over the ownership and control of
church property, our supreme court has adopted the neutral
principles approach. Mote, 716 P.2d at 96. Under this approach,
the court first determines whether instruments of conveyance,
church documents, and “other relevant evidence establish that the
general church has rights of ownership or control over the disputed
church property by reason of a trust, a reverter clause, or some
other basis.” Id. at 99. If, after applying these neutral principles,
the court determines that ownership or control belongs to the
general church, then “there will be no need to assess how property
of the local church is controlled.” Id. However, if the court
determines that ownership or control of the disputed property
16
belongs to the local church, “it then may be necessary to determine
how control over that property is to be exercised.” Id.
¶ 33 The polity and neutral principles approaches are not mutually
exclusive. Applying neutral principles is always subject to the
broad caveat that civil courts have no subject matter jurisdiction to
resolve a dispute that is “strictly and purely ecclesiastical in its
character . . . [such as] a matter which concerns theological
controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the
conformity of the members of the church to the standard of morals
required of them.” Watson, 80 U.S. at 733; see, e.g., Moses, 863
P.2d at 319-20 (citing cases).
C. Application
¶ 34 Both parties agree that the local church was formed
independently of the denomination. But they dispute whether the
local church later submitted to the denomination’s authority and
how that question should be analyzed. Mote answers these
questions.
¶ 35 The dispute in Mote arose from a doctrinal change that caused
the majority of the local church’s members to secede from the
denomination. Mote, 716 P.2d at 89. The minority members, loyal
17
to the denomination, brought an action to determine who had legal
rights to the church property. Id. at 87.
¶ 36 The trial evidence established that the local church was
incorporated under Colorado law and that legal title to the church’s
real and personal property was held by the corporate entity. Id. at
88. The founders’ affidavit said the original members had
unanimously decided to organize under the Colorado diocese, a
geographical unit of the national denomination. Id. In later
resolutions, the local church acceded to the constitutions of the
national denomination, recognized the authority of the national
denomination, and promised obedience to the canons of the
national denomination. Id. Consistent with denomination rules,
the local church then amended its articles of incorporation to say
that the local church could not incur indebtedness that might
encumber church property without the written consent of the
denomination. Id. The amendments reaffirmed the local church’s
accession to the denomination’s rules and authority. Id. The
doctrinal change provoking the secession occurred more than two
decades later, after which the denomination’s executive council
18
issued a resolution refusing to recognize the validity of the
secession. Id. at 89.
¶ 37 Relying on this last resolution, the trial court applied the polity
approach to find that it could not interfere with this religious
decision and that the property belonged to the denomination. Id. A
division of this court reversed and concluded that the proper
procedure for deciding this issue was the neutral principles
approach. Id. at 90. As part of that approach, the division adopted
a “presumptive rule of majority representation” for church property
disputes. It then examined the record only to determine whether
the majority members of the local church had created an express
trust over the property in favor of the denomination. Id. Finding no
such express trust, the division concluded the property belonged to
the majority members of the local church. Id.
¶ 38 The supreme court rejected the majority representation rule,
but it agreed with the division’s decision to apply neutral principles
of law. The court traced this approach through United States
Supreme Court precedent, noting that states are free to adopt
neutral principles of law to resolve church property disputes so long
as the analysis involves no consideration of doctrine. Id. at 94. It
19
recognized the Supreme Court’s “clear preference for the neutral
principles approach” because this approach is completely secular,
is flexible enough to accommodate all forms of religious
organization, and relies on objective, well-established and widely-
known trust and property laws. Id. at 94-95 (citing Wolf, 443 U.S.
at 603-04). Moreover, it noted that churches may determine and
document the disposition of church property in advance of any
dispute according to church members’ intent — a minimal burden.
Id. at 95.
¶ 39 Finally, relying on its previous holding in Horst v. Traudt, 43
Colo. 445, 448, 96 P. 259 (1908), that religious corporations “are
subject to the principles of the common law and the practice and
procedure applicable to corporations under the general
incorporation laws,” the supreme court was persuaded that it
“should analyze legal issues that arise out of church organizations
in the same manner as [it] would analyze those issues if they arose
out of any other corporation or voluntary association.” Mote, 716
P.2d at 99.
¶ 40 As well, another division of this court has held that neutral
principles may be “applied to disputes touching upon religious
20
conflicts that do not involve the disposition of church property.”
Wolf v. Rose Hill Cemetery Ass’n, 914 P.2d 468, 471 (Colo. App.
1995).
¶ 41 With these principles in mind, we conclude that the question
of submission does not involve a “religious dispute” covering
ecclesiastical matters or involving church doctrine. See St. John
Chrysostom Greek Catholic Church of Pittsburgh v. Elko, 259 A.2d
419, 424-25 (Pa. 1969) (concluding that a court’s resolution of
whether a local church was part of the denomination or
independent of any church hierarchy is a factual matter that does
not require it to consider the significance and relevance of church
doctrine). Rather, it involves an inquiry into the local church’s
organizational intent as evidenced by church documents,
testimony, and conduct. Id. at 421-24. And, just as we discern
corporate intent from the corporation’s organizing documents and
board actions, we may discern a local church’s intent by
considering “instruments of conveyance, church documents and
other relevant evidence” bearing on the local church’s intent. Mote,
716 P.2d at 99; see McCoy v. Pastorius, 125 Colo. 574, 581, 246
P.2d 611, 615 (1952) (concluding that a board’s resolution gave a
21
corporation’s president “complete authority” to enter into an
agreement).
¶ 42 Similar cases from other jurisdictions support our conclusion.
See Belin v. West, 864 S.W.2d 838, 841 (Ark. 1993) (explaining that
“if a dispute involving a church can be resolved without addressing
ecclesiastical questions, the First Amendment does not prohibit
consideration by the civil courts”); Diocese of San Joaquin v.
Gunner, 202 Cal. Rptr. 3d 51, 62 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016) (noting that
civil courts may consider deeds, a local church’s articles of
incorporation, the general church’s constitutions, canons, and rules
and relevant statutes including those concerning religious property
to resolve a property dispute “that does not turn on questions of
church doctrine”); Draskovich v. Pasalich, 280 N.E.2d 69, 72 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1972) (explaining that courts may look at ecclesiastical
documents and related evidence concerning religious doctrine “for
the limited purpose of determining the nature of the church
organization”); Nolynn Ass’n of Separate Baptists in Christ v. Oak
Grove Separate Baptist Church, 457 S.W.2d 633, 634 (Ky. 1970)
(accepting jurisdiction to decide whether a local church had
withdrawn from the denomination); St. John Chrysostom Greek
22
Catholic Church, 259 A.2d at 255-56 (affirming lower court’s
conclusion that the local church submitted to the denomination’s
authority based on sufficient record support); Malanchuk v. St.
Mary’s Greek Catholic Church of McKees Rocks, 9 A.2d 350, 399-
400 (Pa. 1939) (affirming lower court’s conclusion that the local
church intended to remain independent of the denomination based
on sufficient record support); Diocese of Galveston-Houston v. Stone,
892 S.W.2d 169, 176-77 (Tex. App. 1994) (“So long as there is no
involvement in resolving underlying controversies over religious
doctrine, civil courts may resolve church disputes over property.”).
¶ 43 Accordingly, we discern no error in the district court’s decision
to apply neutral principles of law to the submission question.
III. No Submission Occurred
¶ 44 Having concluded that neutral principles of law should be
applied to decide the submission question, we next consider the
denomination’s assertion that the court erroneously applied that
law to the evidence.
A. Standard of Review
¶ 45 We review the trial court’s application of neutral principles on
the submission question for clear error. We set aside such
23
decisions by the trial court only when the record lacks any
competent evidence to support such decisions. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs
v. Conder, 927 P.2d 1339, 1343 (Colo. 1996).
B. Analysis
¶ 46 The denomination relies heavily on Mr. Ryhu’s status as an
original board member and his testimony that the local church
intended to submit to the denomination when it changed its name.
But recall, the local church’s founder and original board member
Mr. Kim contradicted Mr. Ryhu’s testimony. In the end, the district
court placed little weight on Mr. Ryhu’s testimony, and we may not
second-guess or alter that decision. See Mariani v. Rocky Mountain
Hosp. & Med. Serv., 902 P.2d 429, 436 (Colo. App. 1994) (resolution
of witness credibility and the weight given to a witness’s testimony
are “the sole responsibility of the trial court,” and we will not
reverse the trial court’s findings on appeal if there is record support
for those findings), aff’d, 916 P.2d 519 (Colo. 1996).
¶ 47 Instead, the court relied on the local church’s articles of
incorporation, bylaws, resolutions, board meeting minutes, property
conveyance actions, and the denomination rules, all of which
support its conclusion that the local church did not submit to the
24
denomination’s authority. See St. Michael & Archangel Russian
Orthodox Greek Catholic Church v. Uhniat, 259 A.2d 862, 864 (Pa.
1969) (Reviewing the corporate charter revealed that the local
church was founded as a constituent part of the Russian Orthodox
Church because the local church “acknowledges itself to be a
member and to belong to the Russian Orthodox Greek Catholic
Church in the No[r]th America Diocese and as such, it accedes to,
recognizes, and accepts the Constitution, Canons, Doctrines,
Discipline and Worship of the Russian Orthodox Greek Catholic
Church in the Diocese of North America and acknowledges their
authority accordingly”); see also Protestant Episcopal Church v.
Barker, 171 Cal. Rptr. 541, 554 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (recognizing
that the resolution of church property disputes turns on the unique
facts of each church’s organizational structure); Borgman v.
Bultema, 182 N.W. 91, 95 (Mich. 1921) (examining a local church’s
incorporation act and concluding that the act required “conformity
to the faith and constitution or form of government as adopted by
the” denomination).
¶ 48 First, in contrast to Mote, the church’s bylaws and articles of
incorporation do not reference the denomination or its rules. Nor
25
does either document expressly provide that the local church will
abide by the denomination rules. And neither document has been
amended to recognize the denomination or its authority over local
churches since the local church was formed.
¶ 49 Next, the bylaws and resolutions placed the church’s financial
control in two designated board members, contrary to the
denomination rules vesting “administrative” authority in the pastor
and making the pastor responsible for “church administration in
general.” Importantly, the record shows that Pastor Cha was a
board member in 2015 when the board made this decision, yet he
never voiced an objection to it or raised the denomination rules as a
bar to it, either then or at any time before March 2018. See Oak
Grove, 457 S.W.2d at 634 (concluding that evidence showed the
local church “attended to its own affairs, handled its own finances
and selected its own church officials”).
¶ 50 As well, we are not persuaded that the bylaws’ inclusion of
“district superintendent” approval of a pastor evidences submission
to the denomination’s authority, because Paragraph 3(b) of the
bylaws vests the power to nominate a pastor in the church board,
after consultation and approval by the district superintendent. In
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our view, this supports the district court’s finding that the district
superintendent did not possess the independent authority to
nominate or install a pastor without the church board’s
participation, but merely gave the district superintendent “veto
authority” over the board’s selection, a “narrow act of obeisance” as
opposed to a “general act of obeisance to the denomination.”
¶ 51 We are similarly unconvinced by the denomination’s assertion
of “numerous acts where the members and leaders of the [local
church] acted in full connection with the [denomination].” The
denomination asks us to weigh these facts more heavily than the
district court did to find in its favor, an action not within our
province as an appellate court. See Van Cise, Phillips & Goldberg v.
Jelen, 197 Colo. 428, 430, 593 P.2d 973, 974 (1979) (“[A]n appellate
court will neither weigh the evidence nor appraise the credibility of
witnesses, this determination will not be disturbed on review.”).
¶ 52 We also conclude that the record supports the district court’s
finding that the local church managed its property independently of
and contrary to the denomination’s rules. See Indep. Methodist
Episcopal Church v. Davis, 74 A.2d 203, 208-09 (Conn. 1950)
(deferring to a trial court’s finding that the local church did not
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surrender its autonomy to the general church because it reserved
the right to control its own property, even though it “followed the
spiritual guidance and leadership” of the general church).
¶ 53 The record reveals that the local church bought and sold at
least two properties before purchasing the existing property, but
that it had never notified or sought approval from the denomination
for any of these transactions. Moreover, the record shows that the
local church mortgaged its existing property, again without
notification to or approval from the denomination. And, the local
church never registered the property with the denomination,
contrary to the denomination rules.
¶ 54 Finally, the dissolution paragraph in the articles of
incorporation, which vests the church board (not the denomination)
with the authority to charitably distribute church property upon
dissolution, supports the court’s finding that the local church did
not submit to the denomination. Compare Guardian Angel Polish
Nat’l Catholic Church of Los Angeles, Inc. v. Grotnik, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d
552, 561 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (applying presumption of a trust
because the articles of incorporation did not include an express
provision governing the distribution of assets in the event of a
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dissolution), with Barker, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 554 (concluding no
express trust was created by the articles of incorporation because
the articles “say nothing about disposition of church property on
dissolution of the corporation”).
¶ 55 For these reasons, we discern no clear error in the district
court’s application of the neutral principles approach to the
evidence and affirm the judgment. See Rome, ¶ 60.
IV. Attorney Fees
¶ 56 The local church requests appellate attorney fees and costs
based on its assertion that the denomination’s argument is “directly
contrary the Colorado Supreme Court’s decision in Mote” and is
therefore substantially frivolous, groundless, or vexatious under
section 13-17-102, C.R.S. 2019. We disagree because as explained
above, the question here is one of first impression. As well, the
parties stipulated that neither party shall be awarded attorney fees.
Therefore, we deny the request.
V. Conclusion
¶ 57 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE TAUBMAN and JUDGE PAWAR concur.
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