Family Trust v. Bd. of Cty , 2018 COA 64 ( 2018 )

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
SUMMARY
May 3, 2018
2018COA64
No. 17CA0435, Bringle Family Trust v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs —
Taxation — Property Tax — Residential Land
A division of the court of appeals considers whether the
Colorado Board of Assessment Appeals erroneously declined to
reclassify a parcel of land as residential, rather than vacant, for tax
purposes. The division determines that land parcels are contiguous
— which is necessary to obtain property tax reclassification as
residential land under section 39-1-102(14.4)(a), C.R.S. 2017 —
only if they touch. Because a public right-of-way completely
separates the petitioner’s vacant and residential parcels, the
division concludes that the subject vacant parcel does not meet
section 39-1-102(14.4)(a)’s contiguity requirement.
Accordingly, the division affirms the order
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2018COA64
Court of Appeals No. 17CA0435
Colorado Board of Assessment Appeals Case No. 68817
Bringle Family Trust,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
Board of County Commissioners of Summit County, Colorado,
Respondent-Appellee,
and
Colorado Board of Assessment Appeals,
Appellee.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division VI
Opinion by JUDGE FOX
Furman and Ashby, JJ., concur
Announced May 3, 2018
Ryley Carlock & Applewhite, F. Brittin Clayton III, Denver, Colorado, for
Petitioner-Appellant
Jeffrey L. Huntley, County Attorney, Franklin Celico, Assistant County
Attorney, Breckenridge, Colorado, for Respondent-Appellee
Cynthia H. Coffman, Attorney General, Emmy A. Langley, Assistant Solicitor
General, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee
¶1 This property tax appeal concerns two land parcels — one
classified as residential and one as vacant — owned by the Bringle
Family Trust (the Trust). The Trust appeals the order of the
Colorado Board of Assessment Appeals (the Board) upholding one
parcel’s classification as vacant, rather than residential, land.
Because the Board correctly determined that the Trust failed to
show that the vacant parcel satisfied the contiguity requirement of
section 39-1-102(14.4)(a), C.R.S. 2017, which is necessary to obtain
property tax reclassification as residential land, we affirm.
I. Background
¶2 The Trust owns a parcel of land in Summit County, Colorado
(the residential parcel). The Trust also owns a parcel of land (the
subject parcel) located across a public road from the residential
parcel. The road between the Trust’s parcels is a public
right-of-way maintained by the Bills Ranch Subdivision Association.
The parcels, depicted below, are platted lots in the Bills Ranch
Subdivision.
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¶3 Charles Bringle is the owner representative of the Trust.
Bringle’s parents purchased separate, adjacent parcels of land —
that now constitute the subject parcel — during the 1950s.
Bringle’s parents built a home and an outhouse on the subject
parcel around 1951. About ten years later, Bringle’s parents
purchased separate, adjacent parcels that now comprise the
residential parcel. Around 1962, Bringle’s parents moved the house
— but not the outhouse — from the subject parcel to the residential
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parcel in order to make additions to the house. In 1995, the
subject and residential parcels — which were six distinct parcels
when purchased — were replatted into two parcels separated by a
public road.
¶4 In early 2016, the Trust petitioned the Board of County
Commissioners of Summit County (the County) for an abatement or
refund of taxes pursuant to section 39-10-114, C.R.S. 2017,
arguing that the subject parcel’s property tax assessment
classification should be changed from vacant to residential for tax
years 2013 to 2015. During those years, the subject parcel was
taxed at a rate about three times higher than the residential
parcel’s rate because of its vacant land classification. The County
denied the Trust’s petitions in March 2016.
¶5 In April 2016, the Trust appealed the County’s decision,
petitioning the Board to reclassify the subject parcel from vacant to
residential for 2013 to 2015. The Trust and the County disputed
whether the subject parcel was “contiguous” to the residential
parcel and was “used as a unit in conjunction with the residential
improvements located thereon” as contemplated by section
39-1-102(14.4)(a). After a hearing, the Board denied the Trust’s
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petition in a January 2017 order, finding against the Trust on both
issues.
II. The Board’s Order
¶6 The Trust contends that the Board erroneously denied its
petition by misconstruing section 39-1-102(14.4)(a) to conclude that
the subject parcel was not contiguous to the residential parcel or
“used as a unit in conjunction with the residential improvements
located thereon.” According to the Trust, two non-touching parcels
may satisfy section 39-1-102(14.4)(a)’s contiguity element if “they
are in close proximity and are separated only by a road, easement,
or other right of way that does not impede movement between the
parcels.”
¶7 We conclude that the Board correctly determined that the
Trust failed to show that the subject parcel satisfied section
39-1-102(14.4)(a)’s contiguity requirement, although for reasons
different from the Board’s.1 See Makeen v. Hailey, 2015 COA 181,
1 Our interpretation of section 39-1-102(14.4)(a), C.R.S. 2017, set
forth below, belies the Board’s determination that “physical
characteristics and integrated or conflicting uses may render two
parcels which do not ‘touch’ to be ‘sufficiently contiguous’ to
constitute a single parcel for residential classification purposes[.]”
See Marshall v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 2016 COA 156, ¶ 9 (stating that
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¶ 21 (noting that we may affirm on any grounds supported by the
record). In light of our determination, we will not address the
Trust’s contention that the subject parcel meets section
39-1-102(14.4)(a)’s “used as a unit” requirement.
A. Preservation and Standard of Review
¶8 The parties agree that these issues were preserved.
¶9 We will set aside the Board’s order only if the order constituted
an abuse of discretion or was arbitrary and capricious, based upon
findings of fact that were clearly erroneous, unsupported by
substantial evidence, or otherwise contrary to law. Boulder Cty. Bd.
of Comm’rs v. HealthSouth Corp., 246 P.3d 948, 951 (Colo. 2011);
see also § 24-4-106(7), C.R.S. 2017. “Substantial evidence is
probative evidence that would warrant a reasonable belief in the
existence of facts supporting a particular finding, without regard to
the existence of contradictory testimony.” Ward v. Dep’t of Nat.
Res., 216 P.3d 84, 94 (Colo. App. 2008). It is the Board’s role, not
ours, to weigh the evidence and resolve any conflicts. Home Depot
we “defer to the interpretation of a statute or a regulation by the
agency charged with its administration[ only if] the interpretation
has a reasonable basis in the law and is supported by the record”).
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USA, Inc. v. Pueblo Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 50 P.3d 916, 919 (Colo.
App. 2002).
¶ 10 While the “ultimate determination as to the appropriate
classification of property for property tax purposes involves mixed
issues of law and fact,” the taxpayer has the burden to establish the
basis for “any reclassification claims concerning the subject
property.” Id. at 920.
¶ 11 We consider an agency’s determination to the extent it accords
with statutory provisions, but the interpretation of statutes
presents a question of law that we review de novo. Id. In
construing legislation, we look first to the plain language of the
statute, reading it as a whole. Young v. Brighton Sch. Dist. 27J,
2014 CO 32, ¶ 11. Then, if the language is ambiguous, we
“construe the statute in light of the General Assembly’s objective,”
presuming “that the legislature intended a consistent, harmonious,
and sensible effect.” Anderson v. Vail Corp., 251 P.3d 1125,
1127-28 (Colo. App. 2010).
¶ 12 “[W]e presume that the General Assembly understands the
legal import of the words it uses and does not use language idly,
but rather intends that meaning should be given to each word.”
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Dep’t of Transp. v. Stapleton, 97 P.3d 938, 943 (Colo. 2004). “[I]n
determining the meaning of any one statutory section, we may look
to the legislative scheme as a whole in order to give effect to the
General Assembly’s intent.” Id. And, we “defer to the interpretation
of a statute or a regulation by the agency charged with its
administration, provided the interpretation has a reasonable basis
in the law and is supported by the record.” Marshall v. Civil Serv.
Comm’n, 2016 COA 156, ¶ 9.
B. Law
¶ 13 The Colorado General Assembly has defined “[r]esidential
land” as “a parcel or contiguous parcels of land under common
ownership upon which residential improvements are located and
that is used as a unit in conjunction with the residential
improvements located thereon.” § 39-1-102(14.4)(a) (emphasis
added); see also Colo. Const. art. X, § 3(1)(b) (“Residential real
property . . . include[s] all residential dwelling units and the land,
as defined by law, on which such units are located[.]”).
¶ 14 The parties did not identify — and we have not found — a
Colorado appellate case interpreting the meaning of section
39-1-102(14.4)(a)’s contiguity requirement. And, divisions of this
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court are divided as to whether a parcel — used as a unit in
conjunction with a residential dwelling on a contiguous parcel —
must contain residential improvements to be properly classified as
residential property for tax purposes. Compare Sullivan v. Bd. of
Equalization, 971 P.2d 675, 676 (Colo. App. 1998) (“[A] particular
parcel of land may qualify for residential classification” by (1) “itself
containing a residential dwelling unit that is used as such” or (2)
“having residential improvements other than a dwelling unit and
being used as a unit in conjunction with a residential dwelling unit
located on a contiguous parcel that is under common ownership.”),
with Fifield v. Pitkin Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 2012 COA 197, ¶¶ 9, 13
(declining to follow Sullivan, 971 P.2d at 676, as dicta and
determining that the taxpayers’ residential land consisted of “those
portions of Lot One and Lot Two that were used as a unit in
conjunction with the home on Lot One (assuming that there were
no additional residential improvements on either lot)”).
¶ 15 The Property Tax Administrator (PTA) is charged with
enforcing the pertinent statute. Golden Gate Dev. Co. v. Gilpin Cty.
Bd. of Equalization, 856 P.2d 72, 74 (Colo. App. 1993). The PTA has
interpreted subsection 102(14.4)(a)’s definition of “residential land”
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in the Assessors’ Reference Library (ARL), which is binding for
county assessors. See § 39-2-109(1)(e), C.R.S. 2017; see also
Huddleston v. Grand Cty. Bd. of Equalization, 913 P.2d 15, 17 (Colo.
1996). According to the operative version of the ARL, a “residential
land” classification requires “[p]arcels of land, under common
ownership, that are contiguous to land used for a residence and
used as an integral part of a residence.” 2 Div. of Prop. Taxation,
Dep’t of Local Affairs, Assessors’ Reference Library § 6, at 6.10-6.11
(rev. July 2012). The ARL states that a “physical inspection will
provide information critical” to determining a parcel’s classification.
Id. It also provides a non-exhaustive list of relevant criteria for
county assessors to consider, including, “Are the parcels considered
and actually used as a common unit with the residence?” and,
“Would the parcel(s) in question be conveyed with the residence as
a unit?” Id.
C. Analysis
¶ 16 The Trust’s challenge to the Board’s standing (or ability to file
a brief in the subject appeal) is misplaced. See § 24-4-106(11)(d)
(mandating that an agency shall be designated as an appellee when
judicial review of the agency’s action is directed to this court and
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that the “docketing of the appeal and all procedures thereafter shall
be as set forth in the Colorado appellate rules”); see also C.A.R.
28(b), (h) (discussing an appellee’s ability to file a brief and detailing
related requirements); Capital Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Arapahoe Cty. Bd.
of Comm’rs, 802 P.2d 1180, 1181 (Colo. App. 1990) (“[W]e hold that
when judicial review of a decision of the [Board] is sought, that
board must be joined as a party to such proceedings.”); cf. B.C., Ltd.
v. Krinhop, 815 P.2d 1016, 1018 (Colo. App. 1991) (“Because a
court’s judgment in de novo proceedings may affect the action of a
board of equalization in the exercise of its constitutional duties, the
board must be joined in order to protect its constitutionally
conferred interests, to afford complete relief among all affected or
interested persons or entities, and to assure the adequacy of the
court’s judgment.”).
¶ 17 Pursuant to subsection 102(14.4)(a) and the ARL, the subject
parcel must be “contiguous” to the residential lot in order to be
properly classified as residential property for tax purposes.
According to the term’s generally accepted meaning, two things
must actually touch to be “contiguous.” See Black’s Law Dictionary
386 (10th ed. 2014) (defining “contiguous” as “[t]ouching at a point
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or along a boundary”); Merriam-Webster Dictionary,
https://perma.cc/B4C9-H4RS (defining “contiguous” as “being in
actual contact,” “touching along a boundary or at a point,” or
“touching or connected throughout in an unbroken sequence”);
Oxford English Dictionary, https://perma.cc/H7UX-YEAH (defining
“contiguous” as “[s]haring a common border; touching” and noting
that the term originates from the Latin word “contiguus ‘touching’,
from the verb contingere ‘be in contact, befall’”). The statutory
scheme and the ARL do not define “contiguous,” nor do they qualify
the use of the term, in the context of residential property
classifications. Thus, we conclude that subsection 102(14.4)(a)’s
language unambiguously means that two parcels must actually
touch to be contiguous and, thereby, to constitute residential
property. Young, ¶ 11.
¶ 18 Our reading of subsection 102(14.4)(a) accords with the plain
language’s generally accepted meaning and the PTA’s interpretation
of the statute provided in the ARL. See Fifield, ¶ 10 (noting that we
owe deference to the PTA’s interpretation of the statute it is charged
with administering). Subsection 102(14.4)(a) and pertinent ARL
sections address parcels that are “contiguous,” not “sufficiently
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contiguous.” See HealthSouth Corp., 246 P.3d at 951 (“We do not
add words to a statute.”); see also supra note 1.
¶ 19 Given our interpretation of subsection 102(14.4)(a),
“contiguity” in the residential property tax classification context is
distinguishable from the meaning of “contiguity” in other contexts.
¶ 20 In statutes concerning subdivision exemption plats and
municipal annexations, for example, the General Assembly qualified
its use of “contiguous,” specifying that contiguity is not affected by
intervening obstacles, such as a right-of-way. See § 30-28-302(5),
C.R.S. 2017 (“‘Parcel’ means a contiguous area of land, except for
intervening easements and rights-of-way[.]”); § 31-12-104(1)(a),
C.R.S. 2017 (“Contiguity shall not be affected by the existence of a
platted street or alley, a public or private right-of-way, a public or
private transportation right-of-way or area, public lands, . . . or
other natural or artificial waterway between the annexing
municipality and the land proposed to be annexed.”); see also Town
of Erie v. Town of Frederick, 251 P.3d 500, 504 (Colo. App. 2010)
(“Contiguity is not affected by the existence of a public or private
right-of-way between the annexing municipality and the land
proposed to be annexed.”). By contrast, neither subsection
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102(14.4)(a) nor the ARL qualifies its use of the term “contiguous”
to negate the effect of an intervening public right-of-way.
¶ 21 Further, the Colorado Supreme Court’s discussion of
contiguity in Douglas County Board of Equalization v. Clarke, 921
P.2d 717, 722 (Colo. 1996), is inapplicable here. At issue in Clarke
was, in the context of property tax classifications of ranches as
agricultural land, whether an area of land
is a segregated parcel that should be treated as
a single unit; or whether it is part of an
integrated larger parcel[ — a factual
determination] controlled by whether the land
is sufficiently contiguous to and connected by
use with other land to qualify it as part of a
larger unit or whether it is a parcel segregated
by geography or type of use from the balance
of the unit.
Id.
¶ 22 The Clarke court interpreted section 39-1-102(1.6)(a)’s
definition of “agricultural land” and the word “parcel” as used in
section 39-1-102(13.5), which says “‘[r]anch’ means a parcel of land
which is used for grazing livestock for the primary purpose of
obtaining a monetary profit.” See Clarke, 921 P.2d at 722. The
court concluded that the taxpayer must “prove that the land was
actually grazed unless (1) the reason the land was not grazed
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related to a conservation practice; or (2) the land is part of a larger
functional agricultural unit on which grazing or conservation
practices have been occurring.” Id. at 718 (emphasis added).
¶ 23 The word “contiguous” does not appear in sections 39-1-
102(1.6)(a) or 39-1-102(13.5), but the General Assembly used the
term in section 39-1-102(14.4)(a). See Stapleton, 97 P.3d at 943
(“[T]he General Assembly understands the legal import of the words
it uses and does not use language idly, but rather intends that
meaning should be given to each word.”). Moreover, the Clarke
court addressed agricultural classifications and conservation
practices regarding grazing; the court did not interpret or discuss
subsection 102(14.4)(a) or residential classifications. Accordingly,
our interpretation of subsection 102(14.4)(a)’s contiguity
requirement does not conflict with the Clarke court’s understanding
of contiguity with regard to an agricultural “parcel” as contemplated
by subsections 102(1.6)(a) or 102(13.5).
¶ 24 Although the Trust’s subject and residential parcels were
initially acquired as six separate parcels, they were replatted as two
distinct parcels separated by a public road that the Trust does not
own. The subject parcel and the residential parcel do not touch at
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any point.2 We therefore conclude that the Trust failed to show that
the subject parcel meets subsection 102(14.4)(a)’s contiguity
requirement and, thus, the Board correctly declined to reclassify
the subject parcel as residential property. See HealthSouth Corp.,
246 P.3d at 951; Makeen, ¶ 21.
III. Conclusion
¶ 25 The Board’s order is affirmed.
JUDGE FURMAN and JUDGE ASHBY concur.
2This opinion addresses whether a public right-of-way completely
dividing two distinctly platted parcels defeats contiguity pursuant to
section 39-1-102(14.4)(a). Any question of whether another
obstacle, such as a private easement, would defeat subsection
102(14.4)(a)’s contiguity requirement is not before us.
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