23CA0022 Peo v Pitre 07-18-2024
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 23CA0022
Mesa County District Court No. 17CR820
Honorable Valerie J. Robison, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Larry Detrell Pitre,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division I
Opinion by JUDGE J. JONES
Welling and Schock, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced July 18, 2024
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Josiah Beamish, Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Larry Detrell Pitre, Pro Se
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¶ 1 Defendant, Larry Detrell Pitre, appeals the postconviction
court’s order denying his Crim. P. 35(c) motion for postconviction
relief without a hearing. We affirm.
¶ 2 A jury found Pitre guilty of four counts of sexual assault on a
child by one in a position of trust committed as part of a pattern of
abuse, four counts of aggravated incest, patronizing a prostituted
child, attempted sexual assault on a child, attempted aggravated
incest, and attempted sexual assault. The trial court imposed an
aggregate prison sentence of seventy-eight years to life, plus a
consecutive one-year jail sentence. A division of this court affirmed
the judgment of conviction. See People v. Pitre, (Colo. App. No.
18CA0709, Aug. 5, 2021) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)).
¶ 3 Thereafter, Pitre filed a timely Crim. P. 35(c) motion, in which
he generally alleged constitutional violations, a violation of his
speedy trial rights, pretrial procedural errors, trial errors, ineffective
assistance of counsel, and lack of jurisdiction. The postconviction
court summarily denied the motion, finding that that some of Pitre’s
arguments had been raised on direct appeal or related to matters
other than defense counsel’s representation. With regard to
counsel’s representation, the court found that “there [we]re no
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factual assertions or specific details concerning counsel’s
performance,” that the record belied Pitre’s conclusory challenge to
counsel’s representation on the speedy trial issue, and that Pitre
“fail[ed] to explain, with any detail, what actions or statements . . .
should have been made or what actions could have been taken by
counsel or how counsel’s performance was deficient.”
¶ 4 First, we conclude that the postconviction court properly
denied the claims that were, or could have been, raised and
resolved in Pitre’s direct appeal. See Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(VI), (VII); see
also People v. Vondra, 240 P.3d 493, 494 (Colo. App. 2010)
(applying Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(VII) on appeal to preclude a successive
claim even though the postconviction court did not rely on that
provision). In particular, we note that the speedy trial issue was
raised and resolved in the prior appeal.
¶ 5 We acknowledge that Pitre’s jurisdictional challenge would be
an exception to the successiveness procedural bar. See Crim. P.
35(c)(3)(VII)(d); see also People v. Market, 2020 COA 90, ¶ 13
(“Issues of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised for
the first time on appeal.”). However, he doesn’t sufficiently develop
this argument. See People v. Houser, 2020 COA 128, ¶ 24 (we won’t
3
consider a bald legal proposition presented without argument or
development).
¶ 6 With regard to the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we
agree with the postconviction court that Pitre’s allegations are bare
and conclusory. See Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(VIII) (ineffective assistance
claims shall not be denied on the ground that the claims could have
been raised on direct appeal); see also People v. Delgado, 2019 COA
55, ¶ 8 (“[A] court may deny [a Crim. P. 35(c)] motion without a
hearing . . . if the claims are bare and conclusory in nature and
lack supporting factual allegations.”).
¶ 7 Lastly, we don’t address any claim or argument asserted on
appeal that Pitre didn’t raise in his Crim. P. 35(c) motion. See
People v. Goldman, 923 P.2d 374, 375 (Colo. App. 1996)
(“Allegations not raised in a Crim. P. 35(c) motion or during the
hearing on that motion and thus not ruled on by the trial court are
not properly before this court for review.”). This includes Pitre’s
additional arguments in support of his ineffective assistance of
counsel claim. See People v. Rodriguez, 914 P.2d 230, 251 (Colo.
1996) (rejecting the defendant’s “attempts to use his brief
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on . . . appeal to fortify a number of issues inadequately raised or
supported by his [postconviction] motion”).
¶ 8 The order is affirmed.
JUDGE WELLING and JUDGE SCHOCK concur.
