23CA0150 Marriage of Luetters 07-25-2024
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 23CA0150
Jefferson County District Court No. 21DR30252
Honorable Lily W. Oeffler, Judge
In re the Marriage of
Byron Luetters,
Appellant,
and
Michele Luetters n/k/a Michele McGlasson,
Appellee.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED AND CASE
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division I
Opinion by JUDGE J. JONES
Welling and Schock, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced July 25, 2024
Law Office of Dailey & Pratt, LLC, Lisa M. Dailey, Joel M. Pratt, Colorado
Springs, Colorado, for Appellant
Fourth Street Law, LLC, Caroline C. Cooley, Christopher J. Linas, Castle Rock,
Colorado, for Appellee
1
¶ 1 In this dissolution of marriage proceeding involving Byron
Luetters (husband) and Michele Luetters, now known as Michele
McGlasson (wife), husband appeals those portions of the permanent
orders concerning property division and maintenance. We affirm
the judgment and remand the case to the district court to resolve
wife’s request for appellate attorney fees under section 14-10-119,
C.R.S. 2023.
I. Background
¶ 2 The parties married in 1995 and have three children.
¶ 3 After the parties separated in late 2018, wife stayed in the
marital home and husband provided her with financial support.
¶ 4 In 2021, husband petitioned to dissolve the marriage. Around
that time, he reported that he was the chief financial officer (CFO)
for Landmark Management Services, LLC (Landmark), earning
approximately $254,000 per year. Wife, for her part, reported that
she was a delivery driver and plasma donor, earning $1,320 per
year.
¶ 5 In January 2022, husband indicated that Landmark, through
no fault of his own, had demoted him and intended to reduce his
yearly income to $197,000. Then, a few months later, Landmark
2
decided to let him go, giving him a severance payout (based on his
former CFO base salary) plus a disbursement for his unused paid
time off (PTO).
1
¶ 6 Beginning on June 9, 2022, the district court held a four-day
evidentiary hearing. The court dissolved the marriage and entered
permanent orders. It divided the marital estate disproportionately
in wife’s favor as follows:
Marital Asset/Debt
Marital
Value
Wife’s
Portion
Husband’s
Portion
Equity in the Marital
Home
$333,628
$333,628
Investment/Retirement
Accounts
$117,052
$117,052
Bank Accounts
$62,774
$45,520
$17,254
Vehicles
$27,276
$18,156
$9,120
Personal Property
$1,900
$1,150
$750
Debts
($77,666)
($3,014)
($74,652)
TOTAL
$464,964
$395,440
$69,524
1
It appears that Landmark didn’t reduce husband’s salary but
rather continued to pay him his CFO salary until he left Landmark.
But the record isn’t entirely clear in this regard.
3
¶ 7 It then ordered husband to pay wife modifiable maintenance of
$3,900 per month for an indefinite term and to pay $10,000 of her
attorney fees under section 14-10-119. Because the parties’
youngest child was eighteen years old, the court didn’t enter any
parental responsibilities orders. On September 23, 2022, the court
entered a dissolution decree and a written judgment tracking its
oral ruling.
¶ 8 The district court subsequently denied husband’s C.R.C.P. 59
post-trial motion, which sought, among other things,
reconsideration of the unequal property division. In doing so, the
court further explained and clarified its reasoning behind the
property division.
II. Property Division
A. Standard of Review
¶ 9 A district court has great latitude to make an equitable
property division based on the facts and circumstances of each
case, and we won’t disturb its decision absent a showing of an
abuse of its discretion. In re Marriage of Collins, 2023 COA 116M,
¶ 19; see § 14-10-113(1), C.R.S. 2023. A court abuses its discretion
when its decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair,
4
or when it misconstrues or misapplies the law. In re Marriage of
Fabos, 2022 COA 66, ¶ 16.
B. Relevant Law
¶ 10 “The property division must be equitable, but not necessarily
equal.” In re Marriage of Wright, 2020 COA 11, ¶ 3; see In re
Marriage of Gallo, 752 P.2d 47, 55 (Colo. 1988) (“The key to an
equitable distribution is fairness, not mathematical precision.”). In
making an equitable division, the district court must consider all
relevant factors, including, among other things, each spouse’s
contribution to the acquisition of the marital property, including the
contribution of a spouse as homemaker, and each spouse’s
economic circumstances. § 14-10-113(1)(a), (c); In re Marriage of
Evans, 2021 COA 141, ¶ 50.
¶ 11 The weighing of these factors is within the district court’s
sound discretion. In re Marriage of Powell, 220 P.3d 952, 959 (Colo.
App. 2009). The court doesn’t need to make specific findings as to
each factor so long as its findings allow us to determine that its
decision is supported by competent evidence. Collins, ¶ 19. And we
may look to the court’s oral ruling as supplementing its written
order. See In re Marriage of Thorburn, 2022 COA 80, ¶ 9 n.1.
5
C. Discussion
¶ 12 Husband contends that the disproportionate property division
cannot stand. To get there, he argues that the district court didn’t
consider the factors in section 14-10-113(1), make adequate
findings, or explain its reasoning. We aren’t persuaded by these
arguments.
¶ 13 In dividing the marital estate, the district court made the
following findings:
• This was a long-term marriage lasting twenty-six years.
See § 14-10-113(1) (property division requires
consideration of all relevant factors).
• Husband was the sole source of income for most, if not
all, of the marriage. See § 14-10-113(1)(a).
• During the marriage, wife provided little financially but
contributed as a full-time homemaker, taking care of the
children and maintaining the household. See id.
• Although currently unemployed, husband could a earn a
minimum of $220,000 per year. See § 14-10-113(1)(c).
• In fact, husband confidently represented that he could
find a position within the same field earning a salary
6
similar to that he had earned as CFO for Landmark. See
§ 14-10-113(1).
• In 2020, husband earned roughly $326,536, which
included a bonus. See id.
• Upon leaving Landmark, husband would receive eight
weeks of severance pay at his former CFO salary as well
as a disbursement for his unused PTO. See § 14-10-
113(1)(c).
• Wife hadn’t “worked outside the home in years and
therefore [had] not built up a resume and work history.”
See § 14-10-113(1).
• Wife received a high school diploma and was taking a few
college classes. See id.
• Wife was diagnosed with a vision impairment in 2021
and granted accommodations at her college. See id.
• Wife will begin work at a much lower salary than
husband given her limited employment history and
education, whereas husband “worked throughout the
marriage thereby building a significant career and is able
7
to earn a salary many times higher than wife.” See § 14-
10-113(1)(c).
• Wife had the potential to earn $40,726 per year. See id.
• The bulk of the debt should be allocated to husband
because he had “access more immediately to payments of
cash via severance and subsequent employment.” See id.
• There were minimal assets to divide possibly due to the
parties’ decision to spend $500,000 of husband’s
earnings on the children’s private school, which was no
longer an expense for him. See id.
¶ 14 The district court’s factual findings, which enjoy ample record
support, demonstrate that it considered all relevant factors. See
§ 14-10-113(1)(a), (c); see also Evans, ¶ 50. And those findings are
sufficient to provide us with a clear understanding of its reasons for
the property division. See Collins, ¶ 19. So, contrary to husband’s
argument, the court didn’t err in this regard.
¶ 15 Nor are we persuaded by husband’s related argument that the
district court erred because it improperly considered the vast
disparity in the parties’ future earning capabilities. Our supreme
court has declared it “obvious that a spouse’s earning capabilities
8
are properly part of the ‘economic circumstances’ the court must
consider in compliance with section 14-10-113(1).” See In re
Marriage of Faulkner, 652 P.2d 572, 574 (Colo. 1982) (“[I]t does not
follow that the court may not consider the earning capabilities of
one spouse when determining a fair property distribution.”); see
also In re Marriage of Morehouse, 121 P.3d 264, 265, 266-67 (Colo.
App. 2005) (in achieving an equitable division of property, the
district court may consider anticipated social security benefits as a
relevant economic circumstance); Wright, ¶ 10 (district court didn’t
abuse its discretion in dividing property where the husband’s
income was more than four times the wife’s because it could
reasonably have concluded that he had the financial means with
which to pay more of the marital debts).
¶ 16 And to the extent that husband asks us to reweigh the
evidence or the section 14-10-113(1) factors in his favor and
substitute our judgment for that of the district court, we decline the
invitation. See In re Marriage of Nelson, 2012 COA 205, ¶ 35 (When
reviewing for an abuse of discretion, even where “there is evidence
in the record that could have supported a different conclusion, we
will not substitute our judgment for that of the district court.”); see
9
also Thorburn, ¶ 49 (it is for the district court, not the reviewing
court, to determine witness credibility and the weight, probative
force, and sufficiency of the evidence, including the inferences and
¶ 17 Husband also argues that the property division should be
reversed given that the district court didn’t consider that the
retirement accounts allocated to him were illiquid. According to
him, “he received a bit of retirement and more debt and obligations
than he could meet.” But the court specifically addressed that
issue, finding that the parties had very few marital assets to divide
and that husband could manage the marital debts with his
severance payout, PTO disbursement, and subsequent employment.
We observe that husband was also awarded several bank accounts
containing more than $17,000. And he doesn’t point us to where
he presented evidence regarding the potential lost value incurred by
liquidating his retirement funds. In all, we can’t say that the court
abused its discretion on this point. See In re Marriage of Davis, 618
P.2d 692, 694 (Colo. App. 1980) (district court didn’t abuse its
discretion when it allocated to the wife all the parties’ cash and
10
liquid assets, leaving the husband with practically no marketable or
liquid assets while saddling him extensive debts).
¶ 18 We understand husband to maintain that the district court
conflated property division and maintenance when it “justified” its
unequal property division with wife’s “need for support.” The record
belies this claim. After considering the relevant factors under
section 14-10-113(1) and making express factual findings, the court
concluded that the property division was “equitable within the
context of the lengthy marriage, the disparity in education, job
history, and earning potential along with immediate income
disparities.” Thus, the court didn’t rely on wife’s need for support
or maintenance when it divided the parties’ property.
¶ 19 Because the district court’s decision to divide the marital
property equitably, albeit disproportionately in wife’s favor, was
within the court’s very broad discretion, we won’t disturb it. See
Collins, ¶ 19.
III. Maintenance
A. Standard of Review
¶ 20 The district court has broad discretion to award maintenance,
if any, that is fair and equitable to both spouses based on the
11
totality of the circumstances. § 14-10-114(3)(e), C.R.S. 2023; see
also In re Marriage of Vittetoe, 2016 COA 71, ¶ 14. We won’t disturb
the court’s award of maintenance absent a showing of an abuse of
that discretion. See In re Marriage of Medeiros, 2023 COA 42M,
¶ 58.
B. Relevant Law
¶ 21 Section 14-10-114(3) sets forth a specific process that a court
must follow when considering a maintenance request. Wright, ¶ 13.
¶ 22 The district court must first make findings regarding each
spouse’s income, the marital property apportioned to each spouse,
the spouses’ financial resources, the spouses’ reasonable financial
needs established during the marriage, and the taxability of the
maintenance awarded. § 14-10-114(3)(a)(I); Wright, ¶¶ 14, 19.
¶ 23 Next, the district court must determine an amount and a term
of maintenance that are fair and equitable to the parties. § 14-10-
114(3)(a)(II); Wright, ¶ 15.
¶ 24 Although the district court generally must also find and
consider the guideline amount and term of maintenance under
sections 14-10-114(3)(b)(I) and (3)(b)(II), those guidelines don’t apply
when, as here, the spouses’ combined annual adjusted gross
12
income exceeds $240,000. § 14-10-114(3.5); In re Marriage of
Herold, 2021 COA 16, ¶ 26. Still, the court isn’t precluded from
considering the guidelines. See § 14-10-114(3.5). In this context,
the court must determine the appropriate amount of maintenance
based on the statutory factors in section 14-10-114(3)(c). See § 14-
10-114(3.5). Those factors include the recipient spouse’s financial
resources and ability to meet her reasonable needs independently;
the payor spouse’s financial needs and ability to meet his
reasonable needs while paying maintenance; the lifestyle during the
marriage; the distribution of marital property; each spouse’s
income, employment, and employability, obtainable through
reasonable diligence and additional training or education; whether
a spouse has historically earned a higher or lower income; the
duration of the marriage; the payment of temporary maintenance;
each spouse’s age and health; significant economic or noneconomic
contribution to the marriage; and any other relevant factor. § 14-
10-114(3)(c)(I)-(X), (XIII).
¶ 25 The district court doesn’t have to make specific factual
findings on each factor so long as its decision gives us a clear
understanding of the basis of its order. See Wright, ¶ 20; see also
13
In re Marriage of Stradtmann, 2021 COA 145, ¶ 32; § 14-10-
114(3)(e) (“The court shall make specific written or oral findings in
support of the amount and term of maintenance awarded pursuant
to this section or an order denying maintenance.”).
¶ 26 And when a marriage exceeds twenty years, like this one, the
district court can award maintenance for an indefinite term. § 14-
10-114(3)(b)(II)(B).
¶ 27 The last step is for the district court to determine whether the
requesting spouse qualifies for maintenance, meaning that she
lacks sufficient property, including marital property awarded, to
provide for her reasonable needs and is unable to support herself
through appropriate employment. See § 14-10-114(3)(a)(II)(C),
(3)(d); Wright, ¶ 16.
C. Discussion
1. Factual Findings and Consideration of the Relevant Factors
¶ 28 Husband contends that the district court abused its discretion
by determining maintenance because it failed to make factual
findings concerning the parties’ financial resources under section
14-10-114(3)(a)(I)(C), wife’s reasonable needs under section 14-10-
14
114(3)(a)(I)(D), and their lifestyle during the marriage under section
14-10-114(3)(c)(III). We disagree.
¶ 29 The district court found that (1) husband and wife had the
potential to earn annual incomes of $220,000 and $40,726,
respectively; (2) from the limited marital estate, wife was allocated
the marital home and husband was allocated the
investment/retirement accounts; (3) wife would be responsible for
mortgage payments, taxes, and expenses on the marital home; (4)
the parties lived a “comfortable lifestyle”; (5) during most of the
marriage, husband was the sole income earner and wife worked as
a homemaker; (6) husband had an established career and would be
able to earn a salary many times higher than wife; (7) wife was
financially disadvantaged given her lack of education and work
experience; (8) wife was currently in college pursuing a bachelor’s
degree; (9) wife was diagnosed with a vision impairment; and (10)
the parties had a long-term marriage.
¶ 30 From those findings and after looking at the guidelines, the
district court ordered husband to pay wife modifiable maintenance
of $3,900 per month for an indefinite term, determining that wife
lacked sufficient income from marital property and employment to
15
meet her reasonable needs and that husband had the ability to pay
the amount of maintenance awarded and still meet his own
reasonable needs.
¶ 31 We conclude that the district court adequately set forth its
factual findings on the parties’ financial resources under 14-10-
114(3)(a)(I)(C). The court found that the marital estate was
essentially limited to the marital home and the parties’
investment/retirement accounts. The court also highlighted the
disparity in the parties’ potential incomes.
¶ 32 As to wife’s reasonable needs under section 14-10-
114(3)(a)(I)(D), the district court expressly found that she would be
solely responsible for all expenses associated with the marital
home, including the mortgage and taxes. And given that the court
said that it adopted the parties’ stipulated exhibits as identified in
their joint trial management certificate, we may presume that it
knew of and considered her other reasonable needs and expenses
as reflected in her sworn financial statement. See In re Marriage of
Udis, 780 P.2d 499, 504 (Colo. 1989); see also In re Marriage of
Salby, 126 P.3d 291, 296 (Colo. App. 2005) (the district court may
rely on parties’ financial affidavits to support its findings).
16
¶ 33 Contrary to husband’s insistence, the district court wasn’t
required to make specific factual findings on the parties’ lifestyle
during the marriage under section 14-10-114(3)(c)(III). See
Stradtmann, ¶ 32. The court nevertheless credited husband’s
testimony that they enjoyed a “comfortable” lifestyle. The court also
said that it “looked at [their] standard of living during the marriage.”
¶ 34 We reject husband’s argument that the district court
“disregarded” the fact that the parties had been separated for
several years before he petitioned for dissolution and that he had
provided wife with consistent financial support throughout the
dissolution proceeding. The court specifically found that he had
provided financial support to her since the parties separated in
2018.
2. Maintenance Amount
¶ 35 Next, husband argues that the district court didn’t sufficiently
explain how it arrived at a monthly maintenance amount of $3,900.
But the evidence shows that wife’s sworn financial statement
represented that she had roughly $6,500 in reasonable expenses
each month. And the court explained that the monthly
maintenance award of $3,900, when added to her potential income
17
of $3,393, would meet her monthly reasonable expenses. Because
we can understand the basis of the court’s decision, we don’t see
any reason to disturb it. See Wright, ¶ 20.
3. Maintenance Term
¶ 36 Husband claims that the district court’s decision to award wife
indefinite or lifetime maintenance isn’t supported by the record, as
wife testified that “she intended to become self-supporting” after
finishing her bachelor’s degree, earning her master’s degree, and
transitioning back into the work force as a therapist. Again, we
aren’t persuaded. As noted above, a court may consider a spouse’s
“employability, obtainable through reasonable diligence and
additional training or education.” See § 14-10-114(3)(c)(V). And a
vocational expert, who assessed wife’s employment prospects,
testified that her educational goals were “unrealistic,” saying that
she would be in her mid-fifties before she meets them, if she ever
does so.
¶ 37 Husband also argues that the district court failed to consider
the parties’ ages. The evidence presented to the court included the
parties’ ages, and we may presume that the court considered this
circumstance. See Udis, 780 P.2d at 504.
18
4. Husband’s Imputed Income
¶ 38 Husband contends that the district court erred first by not
expressly finding him voluntarily unemployed and then also by
imputing to him yearly income of $220,000. We disagree.
¶ 39 In calculating maintenance, income means a party’s actual
gross income if the spouse is fully employed. § 14-10-114(8)(a)(II).
If, however, a spouse is voluntarily unemployed, maintenance is
calculated based on that spouse’s potential income. § 14-10-
114(8)(c)(IV). “‘[P]otential income’ is described as the amount a
party could earn from a full-time job commensurate with the party’s
demonstrated earning ability.” In re Marriage of Tooker, 2019 COA
83, ¶ 26.
¶ 40 The district court has broad discretion in determining income
for maintenance purposes, and whether to impute income to a
spouse is typically a question of fact, the determination of which we
won’t disturb if it has record support. See People v. Martinez, 70
P.3d 474, 480 (Colo. 2003); see also Tooker, ¶ 27.
¶ 41 At the initial permanent orders hearing on May 23, 2022,
husband told the district court that Landmark had recently ended
19
his employment. After the court expressed its frustration about the
last-minute disclosure, husband’s attorney said the following:
[Husband] is not here asking the [c]ourt not to
impute income to him. He understands that
he’s capable of making a certain amount.
What that amount is . . . is in dispute.
However, he’s not here to say I lost my job, so I
shouldn’t have to pay maintenance.
. . . .
[Husband] is not requesting that the [c]ourt
forego [sic] imputing income.
The court eventually continued the hearing to June 9, 2022.
¶ 42 At the June 9 hearing, husband testified that the next day
would be his last day with Landmark. He asserted that he should
be imputed yearly income of $197,000, his “actual salary” in
January 2022. Yet when he was asked what the “minimum
amount” he could earn was, he replied that a yearly salary ranging
between $175,000 and $225,000 was “achievable.” A vocational
expert later testified that husband was “highly employable,” would
not have any difficulty landing a job in his field, and could earn as
much as $275,000 per year. The expert added that husband was
not performing a “valid job search.”
20
¶ 43 While the district court credited the vocational expert’s
opinion, the court determined that it was more appropriate to
impute to husband a yearly income of $220,000. In support, the
court found that husband had “marketable skills” and could find
work in his field given the wide availability of jobs. The court also
emphasized that husband had “expressed directly . . . that he could
find a position with a similar salary.”
¶ 44 Those findings, combined with the evidence in the record,
imply a finding that husband was voluntarily unemployed by
choosing not to earn the full-time income he was capable of
earning. See Nelson, ¶ 41 (implied findings are sufficient); see also
Martinez, 70 P.3d at 480 (“A court may interpret a parent’s lack of
initiative in finding or keeping work as a voluntary refusal to fulfill a
support obligation.”).
¶ 45 And because the record, including husband’s admissions,
supports the amount of income that was imputed to him, we won’t
disturb the court’s ruling. See Martinez, 70 P.3d at 480; see also
Tooker, ¶ 27.
21
IV. Attorney Fees in the District Court
¶ 46 Husband requests that if we reverse the property division, we
instruct the district court on remand to reconsider its 14-10-119
attorney fee award. See In re Marriage of de Koning, 2016 CO 2,
¶ 26 (when a district court is required to revisit property division, it
must also re-evaluate its determination on attorney fees in light of
the updated property division). Given our disposition, we decline to
do so.
V. Appellate Attorney Fees and Costs
¶ 47 Wife asks us to order husband to pay her appellate attorney
fees under section 14-10-119, asserting that the parties’ financial
resources are disparate. We remand her request to the district
14-10-119; C.A.R. 39.1.
¶ 48 Wife is also entitled to an award of her appellate costs. See
C.A.R. 39(a)(2) (costs are taxed against the appellant if a judgment
is affirmed).
22
VI. Disposition
¶ 49 The judgment is affirmed, and the case is remanded to the
district court to resolve wife’s section 14-10-119 appellate attorney
fees request.
JUDGE WELLING and JUDGE SCHOCK concur.
