23CA1832 Peo in Interest of PG-E 07-03-2024
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 23CA1832
Adams County District Court No. 21JV277
Honorable Caryn A. Datz, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Appellee,
In the Interest of P.G-E., a Child,
and Concerning C.T.,
Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division V
Opinion by JUDGE LUM
Harris and Brown, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced July 3, 2024
Heidi Miller, County Attorney, Conor Hagerty, Assistant County Attorney,
Westminster, Colorado, for Appellee
Alison A. Bettenberg, Guardian Ad Litem
Michael Kovaka, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Littleton, Colorado, for
Appellant
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¶ 1 C.T. (mother) appeals the juvenile court’s judgment
terminating her parent-child relationship with P.G-E. (the child).
Mother’s sole contention on appeal is that the court erred by
concluding that she could not become fit within a reasonable time.
We perceive no error and therefore affirm.
I. Background
¶ 2 The Adams County Department of Human Services filed a
petition in dependency and neglect after the child was born to
mother, who had a history of methamphetamine use and was
behaving erratically at the hospital in the hours after the child’s
birth — hiding under the hospital bed and not allowing the hospital
staff to touch the child. Mother had five older children who were
not in her care.
¶ 3 The court adjudicated the child dependent and neglected and
adopted a treatment plan. Mother’s treatment plan required her to
(1) communicate with case professionals; (2) demonstrate an ability
to provide for the child’s needs and engage with life skills services;
(3) obtain appropriate housing; (4) complete a dual diagnosis
evaluation and comply with any recommendations and urinalysis
testing; and (5) attend family time with the child.
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¶ 4 The Department moved to terminate mother’s parental rights,
asserting that she had not complied with her treatment plan. After
a hearing, the juvenile court granted the Department’s motion. By
that time, almost two years after the case opened, mother had given
birth to another child (daughter) who was then four months old.
II. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶ 5 The juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by
clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child has been
adjudicated dependent or neglected; (2) the parent didn’t comply
with or wasn’t successfully rehabilitated by an appropriate, court-
approved treatment plan; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the parent’s
conduct or condition is unlikely to change within a reasonable time.
§ 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2023; People in Interest of E.S., 2021 COA
79, ¶ 10.
¶ 6 When evaluating whether a parent can become fit within a
reasonable time, the juvenile court may consider whether any
changes occurred during the dependency and neglect proceeding,
the parent’s social history, and the chronic or long-term nature of
the parent’s conduct or condition. People in Interest of S.K., 2019
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COA 36, ¶ 75. A reasonable time is not indefinite and must be
determined by considering the child’s condition and needs. Id.
¶ 7 Because the child was under the age of six when the petition
was filed, the expedited permanency planning (EPP) provisions
applied. § 19-1-123(1)(a), C.R.S. 2023. Those provisions require
the court to place the child “in a permanent home as expeditiously
as possible.” § 19-3-702(5)(c), C.R.S. 2023.
¶ 8 Where resolution of an issue necessitates application of the
termination statute to evidentiary facts, it presents a mixed
question of fact and law. People in Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO
14, ¶ 15. We review the juvenile court’s factual findings for clear
error. C.R.C.P. 52. The credibility of witnesses, the sufficiency,
probative effect, and weight of the evidence, and the inferences and
conclusions to be drawn therefrom are all within the juvenile court’s
province. People in Interest of C.A.K., 652 P.2d 603, 613 (Colo.
1982). But a determination of the proper legal standard to be
applied in a case and the application of that standard to the
particular facts of the case are questions of law that we review de
novo. M.A.W. v. People in Interest of A.L.W., 2020 CO 11, ¶ 31.
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III. Analysis
¶ 9 The juvenile court found that, despite a change in mother’s
circumstances — her recent and commendable sobriety and
progress in treatment — mother’s conduct or condition was unlikely
to change within a reasonable time because of her history of
substance abuse and lack of engagement in treatment. In reaching
this conclusion, the court considered mother’s “sustained lack of
compliance with [her] treatment plan,” her admission that she
wasn’t ready to parent the child, the lack of a relationship between
mother and the child, and the EPP requirements.
¶ 10 The juvenile court’s findings are supported by the record.
Both mother and the caseworker testified that, after daughter was
born, mother began engaging in voluntary treatment and has
reported sobriety. Since daughter’s birth, mother has been in
frequent contact with the caseworker. Mother’s testimony reflected
self-awareness about her addiction and how it has negatively
impacted her ability to parent.
¶ 11 Despite her impressive progress with treatment in the four
months before the termination hearing, the record supports the
court’s conclusion that mother did not substantially comply with
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her treatment plan. The caseworker testified that mother had
attended only three court hearings in the two years the case was
open and had a history of very inconsistent contact with case
professionals. Mother’s life skills worker had difficulty keeping in
contact with her. Until a few months before the termination
hearing, the Department did not know where mother was living and
suspected she was homeless. Mother never provided a urinalysis
test to the Department. She never provided the results of a dual
diagnosis evaluation to the Department and never participated in
treatment the Department arranged for her. Finally, although the
Department made family time available to mother, she never
participated in a visit with the child. The caseworker, whom the
court qualified as an expert in social work with an emphasis in
child protection, opined that mother was not successful with her
treatment plan and remained unfit.
¶ 12 During the termination hearing, mother testified that she was
“mentally . . . unsure of when [she] would feel healthy enough for
[the child to] fully come home.” Mother admitted that she was not
yet ready to parent the child because she needed to continue to
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work on her substance use and mental health as well as “other
areas in [her] life.”
¶ 13 The caseworker repeatedly opined that mother and the child
had no relationship. According to the caseworker’s expert
testimony, there was no reasonable amount of time in which
mother could become fit for the child. She opined that the child,
who had already waited two years, should not have to wait longer
for a permanent home, and that it was in his best interests for
mother’s parental rights to be terminated.
¶ 14 Although we, like the juvenile court, recognize that mother
made progress in the last four months before the termination
hearing, based on this record, we cannot conclude that the juvenile
court erred when it determined that mother was unfit and that her
condition was unlikely to improve within a reasonable period of
time for the child.
IV. Disposition
¶ 15 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE HARRIS and JUDGE BROWN concur.
