23CA1445 Peo v Williams 07-11-2024
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 23CA1445
City and County of Denver District Court No. 97CR3503
Honorable Darryl F. Shockley, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Jimmy Williams,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER REVERSED AND CASE
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division VII
Opinion by JUDGE RICHMAN*
Gomez and Kuhn, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced July 11, 2024
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Megan C. Rasband, Senior Assistant
Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Jimmy Williams, Pro Se
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2023.
1
¶ 1 Defendant, Jimmy Williams, is serving consecutive sentences
totaling 112.5 years, having been convicted in 1997 of first degree
sexual assault and attempted first degree murder. Williams has
filed numerous postconviction motions and has appealed to this
court on at least five prior occasions. But only one of those appeals
is relevant to the current case.
¶ 2 In People v. Williams, (Colo. App. No. 21CA0121, Mar. 31,
2022) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)) (Williams V), a
division of our court decided that Williams had timely filed a motion
under Crim. P. 35(a) claiming that he was sentenced in an illegal
manner to a consecutive term of imprisonment for the attempted
first degree murder. The motion suggested that the district court
may have thought consecutive sentencing was mandatory when in
fact it was discretionary. Id. at ¶ 15. The division noted the
statement of the sentencing court in 2005:
Someone who beats a small child into
insensibility with a baseball bat . . . [,] who
participated in a dual rape of a young teenager
in various fashions and then . . . picks her up
and drops her on her head so hard it fractures
her skull, is not inclined to get a lot of mercy
from me.
Id. (alterations in original).
2
¶ 3 However, as the division reasoned, this statement was “not
enough to resolve the issue” even if the district court knew it had
discretion to sentence Williams to consecutive terms. Id. The
division remanded the case to the postconviction court for “further
consideration” and stated the court “may, in its discretion, hold an
evidentiary hearing.” Id. at ¶¶ 16, 31.
¶ 4 While the case was on remand, Williams filed two pro se
motions. The first, filed February 16, 2023, and captioned “motion
for evidentiary hearing,” requested a hearing to (1) allow Williams to
“submit evidence regarding brain development in young adults”;
(2) allow him to testify regarding responsibility, remorse, and
rehabilitation; and (3) inform the court regarding missing
transcripts. The second motion, filed May 19, 2023, requested the
status of the pending action on remand.
¶ 5 On July 11, 2023, the postconviction court entered an order
captioned “Order re: Defendant’s Motion for Evidentiary Hearing,”
which concluded that no hearing was necessary because a request
for transcripts was not justified based on the circumstances,
Williams had not established an entitlement to postconviction relief,
3
and his postconviction requests were outside the time limitation
imposed by the legislature, citing to section 16-5-402, C.R.S. 2023.
¶ 6 On appeal, Williams argues the postconviction court abused
its discretion in denying his motions, and he requests as a sanction
the vacatur of his sentence. The People acknowledge that the
district court did not address the remand order of Williams V and
suggest the appeal should be dismissed for lack of a final
appealable order or remanded again. The People also contend there
is no basis for the sanction requested by Williams.
¶ 7 We agree with the People that the postconviction court did not
comply with the scope of the remand ordered in Williams V because
it did not address whether the district court entered the consecutive
sentences with an awareness that consecutive sentencing was not
mandatory, and whether, having such discretion, it would
nonetheless have imposed consecutive sentences. Thus, we reverse
the order and again remand this case to the postconviction court to
address those two questions and consider whether a hearing is
required to address those two questions. We deny Williams’s
request for a sanction vacating his sentence, as he offers no legal
basis for such relief.
4
JUDGE GOMEZ and JUDGE KUHN concur.