23CA0703 Peo v Garcia 07-03-2024
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 23CA0703
Moffat County District Court No. 21CR121
Honorable Sandra H. Gardner, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Christina Garcia,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division IV
Opinion by JUDGE RICHMAN*
Navarro and Pawar, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced July 3, 2024
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Jaycey DeHoyos, Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
K. Andrew Fitzgerald, Alternate Defense Counsel, Grand Junction, Colorado,
for Defendant-Appellant
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2023.
1
¶ 1 Defendant, Christina Garcia, appeals the trial court’s order
denying her Crim. P. 32(d) motion without a hearing. We affirm.
I. Background
¶ 2 The prosecution charged Garcia with possession with the
intent to manufacture or distribute a controlled substance,
unlawful possession of a controlled substance, tampering with
physical evidence, child abuse, and a special offender count. The
case proceeded to trial, but on the second day, Garcia entered into
a plea agreement. She pleaded guilty to an amended count of
possession with intent to distribute in exchange for (1) the
dismissal of the remaining charges and two other cases, and (2) a
stipulated sentence of four years in the custody of the Department
of Corrections.
¶ 3 Three days later, Garcia’s counsel moved to withdraw her
guilty plea under Crim. P. 32(d). The motion alleged that Garcia
had sent the following email to counsel the day after entering her
guilty plea:
Okay this is very concerning I wasn’t properly
informed about the consequences of this plea
deal and about these charges this is not good.
And the prosecutor relied [sic] to the judge and
to me he did not change his P agreement after
2
I got new charges he changed it after the judge
found no violations out of 17 in the discovery
violation motion hearing this is b*******.
It further alleged that Garcia “was, and still is, very confused about
the consequences of the guilty plea” and there were “fair and just
reasons” for allowing her to withdraw her guilty plea.
¶ 4 The trial court denied the motion without a hearing,
concluding, among other things, that the pleading “failed to make
even an initial showing . . . that there is a ‘fair and just reason’ for
the withdrawal of [the] plea” and was facially “insufficient to
support the relief requested.” The court sentenced Garcia pursuant
to the plea agreement.
II. Discussion
¶ 5 Garcia contends that the trial court abused its discretion by
denying her Crim. P. 32(d) motion without a hearing. We disagree.
¶ 6 Whether to grant a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is within
the discretion of the trial court and denial of such a motion will not
be overturned unless the court abused that discretion. People v.
Chippewa, 751 P.2d 607, 609 (Colo. 1988). To constitute an abuse
of discretion, the trial court’s ruling must be manifestly arbitrary,
3
(Colo. App. 2001).
¶ 7 Crim. P. 32(d) permits a defendant to file a motion to withdraw
a guilty plea before their sentence is imposed. Kazadi v. People,
2012 CO 73, ¶ 14. But a defendant does not have an absolute right
to withdraw a plea. Id. Rather, to warrant withdrawal, a defendant
has the burden of establishing a fair and just reason for it and must
make some showing that denial of the request will subvert justice.
Id. at ¶¶ 14-15; Maes v. People, 155 Colo. 570, 575, 396 P.2d 457,
459 (1964). There is no requirement that the trial court hold an
evidentiary hearing on a Crim. P. 32(d) motion. DiGuglielmo, 33
P.3d at 1250 (trial court properly denied relief without a hearing
where the defendant failed to assert facts demonstrating a fair and
App. 2000) (conclusory allegations were not sufficient to warrant a
hearing on a Crim. P. 32(d) claim).
¶ 8 Garcia’s self-described “bare-bones motion” provided the
following reasons for withdrawing her guilty plea: (1) she “wasn’t
properly informed about the consequences of her plea”; (2) she
“was, and still is, very confused about the consequences” of the
4
plea; and (3) there were “fair and just reasons” for allowing her to
withdraw her plea.
1
¶ 9 We perceive no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s
determination that these bare and conclusory allegations “failed to
make even an initial showing . . . that there [wa]s a ‘fair and just
reason’ for the withdrawal of [the] plea.” Garcia did not set forth
what consequences she was misinformed or confused about, and
did not state with any particularity that a reason — let alone a fair
and just one — existed for allowing her to withdraw her plea. Nor
did she make even the barest of allegations that justice would be
396 P.2d at 459 (There must be some showing that justice will be
subverted “[t]o warrant the exercise of discretion favorable to a
defendant concerning a change of plea.”); see also Kazadi, ¶ 14.
¶ 10 We are not persuaded otherwise by Garcia’s reliance on People
in Interest of J.D., 2017 COA 156, ¶ 18, aff’d on other grounds, 2020
1
The email quoted in the motion also appeared to complain about
the trial court’s ruling on a discovery issue and previous plea offers
extended by the prosecution. But the motion did not tether these
complaints to the request to withdraw Garcia’s guilty plea. Nor
does Garcia reference them on appeal.
5
CO 48, for the proposition that “the law contemplates evidentiary
hearings on Rule 32(d) motions,” except in the rarest of cases.
True, the cited portion of J.D. states that Rule 32(d) motions “often,
but not always, require[] an evidentiary hearing.” Id. at ¶ 18. But it
offers no opinion on the circumstances that permit a court to
summarily deny such a motion. As noted, other authorities do, and
they control our analysis here.
III. Disposition
¶ 11 The order is affirmed.
JUDGE NAVARRO and JUDGE PAWAR concur.
