22CA1895 Peo v Melton 07-03-2024
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 22CA1895
El Paso County District Court No. 21CR7100
Honorable Jessica L. Curtis, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Rodney Leonard Melton,
Defendant-Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division VII
Opinion by JUDGE KUHN
Tow and Taubman*, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced July 3, 2024
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Abigail M. Armstrong, Assistant Attorney
General Fellow, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Jeffrey C. Parsons, Alternate Defense Counsel, Broomfield, Colorado, for
Defendant-Appellant
* Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const.
art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2023.
1
¶ 1 Defendant, Rodney Leonard Melton, appeals the judgment of
conviction entered on a jury verdict finding him guilty of a single
count of third degree assault. We affirm.
I. Background
¶ 2 In December 2021, Melton and the victim got into a physical
altercation. According to the prosecution’s evidence at trial, Melton
approached a group of people that the victim was hanging out with
in front of a shelter for unhoused families. After the two exchanged
words, Melton kicked the victim in the face. The victim responded
by lunging at Melton, taking him to the ground, and placing him in
a chokehold. During the ensuing struggle, Melton pulled out a
knife and stabbed the victim ten times in the left arm, left flank,
and back.
¶ 3 Melton’s description of what happened after he was placed in
the chokehold mostly matched the prosecution’s evidence. But he
recounted a different version of the events that escalated the
encounter. Melton testified that after he approached the group of
people the victim was with, the victim made a racially charged
comment about him and spat on him. He reacted by “attempt[ing]
to kick at” the victim but testified that he wasn’t sure whether his
2
kick “connected” with the victim. He testified that the scuffle then
spiraled into an all-out fight between the two, ultimately resulting
in the victim sustaining serious injuries from the stabbing.
¶ 4 The prosecution charged Melton with one count each of first
degree assault and third degree assault. A jury found him guilty of
third degree assault but couldn’t reach a unanimous verdict as to
the other count. The trial court declared a mistrial, and a different
jury later acquitted him of first degree assault.
¶ 5 The trial court then sentenced Melton to two years in county
jail for third degree assault.
II. Analysis
¶ 6 Melton contends that the trial court erred by (1) entering a
conviction for third degree assault based on insufficient evidence
and (2) sentencing him to the maximum term of incarceration
allowed under the statute for that offense. We disagree with both
contentions.
3
A. Melton’s Conviction is Supported by
Sufficient Evidence in the Record
¶ 7 Melton contends that the prosecution failed to present
sufficient evidence in support of his conviction for third degree
assault. We disagree.
1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶ 8 “[W]e review the record de novo to determine whether the
evidence before the jury was sufficient both in quantity and quality
to sustain the convictions.” Dempsey v. People, 117 P.3d 800, 807
(Colo. 2005).
¶ 9 In doing so, we employ the substantial evidence test and ask
whether the evidence — viewed as a whole and in the light most
favorable to the prosecution — is substantial and sufficient to
support a conclusion by a reasonable mind that the defendant is
guilty of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. Gorostieta v.
People, 2022 CO 41, ¶ 16. We “must ‘give the prosecution the
benefit of every reasonable inference which might be fairly drawn
from the evidence.’ It does not matter that we might have reached a
different conclusion were we the triers of fact.” Id. at ¶ 17 (quoting
People v. Harrison, 2020 CO 57, ¶ 32).
4
¶ 10 As relevant here, a person commits third degree assault when
that person “knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another
person.” § 18-3-204(1)(a), C.R.S. 2023. Bodily injury means
“physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical or mental
condition.” § 18-1-901(3)(c), C.R.S. 2023. “Our supreme court has
interpreted this definition to mean that bodily injury is ‘at least
some physical pain, illness or physical or mental impairment,
however slight.’” People v. Black, 2020 COA 136, ¶ 35 (emphasis
470 (1977)). There is no requirement that the injury “be of a
crippling or otherwise incapacitating nature to be within the
statutory prohibition.” People v. Lobato, 187 Colo. 285, 288, 530
P.2d 493, 495 (1975).
2. Discussion
¶ 11 The prosecution argued during the first trial that Melton’s kick
to the victim’s face constituted third degree assault. In support, the
prosecution introduced a surveillance video showing the incident.
The video showed Melton kicking the victim and the victim’s head
snapping back from the force of the kick. The prosecution also
presented the testimony of two eyewitnesses, who said that Melton
5
had kicked the victim before he was taken to the ground and placed
into the chokehold.
¶ 12 Melton contends that this evidence was nonetheless
insufficient to establish the bodily injury element of third degree
assault. He points out that the victim — who died from unrelated
causes before the trial — couldn’t testify about the injuries
sustained as a result of Melton’s conduct. Indeed, Melton
continues, “neither the lay witnesses to the incident nor the police
officer witnesses that responded to the scene and encountered the
alleged victim presented any testimony as to any effect any kick had
on [the victim], let alone any physical impairment.”
¶ 13 It’s true that the prosecution didn’t present testimony that the
victim had reported any pain or any physical or mental impairment
as a result of Melton’s kick. And while the People direct our
attention to a hospital photograph that appears to show an injury
on the victim’s face, no trial evidence was introduced linking the
injury to the incident, let alone the kick underlying Melton’s third
degree assault conviction.
¶ 14 Nevertheless, we conclude that the prosecution presented
sufficient evidence from which a reasonable mind could infer the
6
bodily injury element of the offense based on the nature of the
events. While the prosecution introduced no direct evidence about
the extent of the victim’s injuries from the kick, a reasonable juror
could infer that the victim suffered some level of bodily harm when
Melton kicked him in the head. See Gorostieta, ¶ 16 (stating that
the prosecution receives the benefit of all reasonable inferences that
may be drawn from the evidence); see also People v. Perez, 2016 CO
12, ¶ 31 (“The question is not whether it is possible to disagree with
the inferences, but rather, whether the inferences are reasonable
when the evidence is viewed as a whole in the light most favorable
to the prosecution.”). The jury wouldn’t have to rely on “guessing,
speculation, conjecture, or a mere modicum of relevant evidence,”
see People v. Donald, 2020 CO 24, ¶ 19 (quoting Perez, ¶ 25), to
reach that conclusion in this case. Rather, the jury heard
eyewitness testimony and viewed a video of the events. That
evidence provided a sufficient foundation upon which the jury could
conclude that Melton kicking the victim in the head caused the
victim to experience some amount of physical pain or impairment,
however slight. See id. No more was required to establish the
bodily injury element of third degree assault. See Black, ¶ 35.
7
Melton’s sufficiency challenge, then, must fail.
1
B. The Trial Court Didn’t Err by Sentencing
Melton to Two Years in County Jail
¶ 15 Melton next argues that the trial court abused its discretion
when it sentenced him to the maximum term of incarceration for
third degree assault. We again disagree.
1. Additional Background
¶ 16 The prosecutor requested a two-year jail sentence at the
sentencing hearing, arguing that the sentence was appropriate
given that third degree assault was still an extraordinary risk crime
when Melton committed it; the victim ultimately sustained serious
injuries as a result of the altercation; Melton had three prior second
degree assault convictions; and throughout the trial proceedings, he
manifested “a lack of willingness to accept accountability and a
continual attempt to frustrate the process.”
1
Melton also asserts, without providing supporting authority or
developing an argument, that the prosecution “presented no
testimony of any kind as to [his] mens rea, further demonstrating
the lack of sufficiency of the evidence.” Because we don’t “consider
a bald legal proposition presented without argument or
development,” we don’t address this issue further. People v. Rios,
2020 COA 2, ¶ 7 n.1.
8
¶ 17 Melton’s trial counsel, on the other hand, pointed out that
while Melton was convicted of third degree assault for kicking the
victim, the court presided over the second trial in which a different
jury acquitted him of first degree assault based on the theory that
he stabbed the victim in self-defense. Considering this mixed
outcome, and the fact that Melton had already been incarcerated for
almost a year at the time of sentencing, counsel asked the court “to
grant him credit for time served with no further penalty.”
¶ 18 The trial court granted the prosecution’s request, sentencing
Melton to two years in county jail.
2. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶ 19 A trial court has extremely broad discretion when, as here, it
imposes a sentence within the statutory range. People v. Rice, 2015
COA 168, ¶ 8. We review such decisions for an abuse of discretion
because “the trial court’s ‘familiarity with the facts of the case’
places it ‘in the best position to fix a sentence that reflects a
balance of the relevant considerations.’” People v. Torrez, 2013 COA
37, ¶ 71 (quoting People v. Vigil, 718 P.2d 496, 507 (Colo. 1986)).
We will not disturb this kind of sentencing decision on appeal
absent a showing that the court abused its discretion by imposing a
9
sentence that is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or is
based on an erroneous construction of the law. People v. Herrera,
2014 COA 20, ¶ 16.
¶ 20 But “a trial court’s sentence must not be devoid of reason or
principle and should reflect a rational selection of the sentencing
alternatives consistent with the aims of the sentencing process.”
Torrez, ¶ 72. Thus, in exercising its discretion, the court should
consider, among other things, the nature of the defendant’s crime,
the defendant’s criminal history, the events surrounding the
criminal conduct, and the nature and extent of the victim’s injuries.
Id. at ¶ 73; People v. Koehler, 30 P.3d 694, 698 (Colo. App. 2000).
When weighing various factors, however, the court need not
expressly refer to each factor it considers and need only provide a
reasonable explanation for its sentence. See Torrez, ¶ 74 (citing
People v. Martinez, 179 P.3d 23, 26 (Colo. App. 2007)).
3. Discussion
¶ 21 The two-year jail sentence was the maximum term the trial
court could impose for Melton’s class 1 misdemeanor offense.
§ 18-3-204(3) (“Assault in the third degree is a class 1
misdemeanor.”); § 18-1.3-501(1)(a), (3)(a), (b)(I), C.R.S. 2023
10
(classifying third degree assaults committed before March 1, 2022,
as extraordinary risk crimes that are subject to an additional
six-month term beyond the eighteen-month maximum term
applicable to most other class 1 misdemeanors).
2
But even though
the court sentenced Melton within the statutory range, he contends
that the court abused its discretion by “failing to sufficiently justify
the maximum allowable sentence” for his conviction.
¶ 22 The trial court provided the following reasoning for imposing
the two-year jail sentence:
The first jury that acted as fact finder, with
respect to the original charges brought against
Mr. Melton, found that the Prosecution had
[disproved] his claim of self-defense as to third
degree assault beyond a reasonable doubt.
The second jury found -- or evidently found
that the Prosecution failed to disprove Mr.
Melton’s claim of self-defense as to the
stabbing of [the victim].
2
Melton relies on section 18-1.3-401(10), C.R.S. 2023, to assert
that “the Colorado statute defining ‘extraordinary risk’ crimes
pertain only to felonies and do not list third degree assault among
those crimes.” But as we note above, Melton’s third degree assault
is a class 1 misdemeanor that is deemed an extraordinary risk
crime under the statute governing sentencing for misdemeanors.
Section 18-1.3-401, which applies only to felonies, is therefore
irrelevant here.
11
The reasonable conclusion the Court is left
with is that the first jury felt that Mr. Melton’s
kick of [the victim] was not an act of self-
defense but that perhaps the Prosecution did
not meet [its] burden in disproving that the
stabbing was not in self-defense. The
reasonable conclusion being that Mr. Melton’s
kick of [the victim] set off a chain of events in
which [the victim] was stabbed and could have
died.
(Emphasis added.)
¶ 23 Thus, while the court also noted that defense counsel’s and
the prosecutor’s “recitation of the posture of this case [wa]s
accurate,” it grounded its sentencing decision on Melton’s kick
triggering the subsequent events that ultimately left the victim with
serious stab wounds. Implicit in this analysis is consideration of
the nature of Melton’s conduct, the events surrounding that
conduct, and the nature and extent of the victim’s injuries. Each of
these considerations is a proper sentencing factor. See Koehler, 30
P.3d at 698. The trial court didn’t need to discuss each one to
justify its sentencing decision. Torrez, ¶ 74.
¶ 24 It’s true that the trial court could have made more extensive
findings in support of its decision. The court, for example, made no
mention of Melton’s prior criminal convictions or his demeanor
12
during the trial proceedings, even though the prosecutor brought
these matters to the court’s attention. But the fact that the court
didn’t address those additional factors doesn’t mean that its
sentence is “devoid of reason or principle,” id. at ¶ 72, or that the
court — in Melton’s words — “failed to rely on ‘sound reasons’” in
imposing it. To the contrary, by focusing on the bodily harm
resulting from Melton’s conduct, the trial court articulated a clear
basis for selecting a sentence at the top end of the statutory range.
¶ 25 Melton nevertheless argues that the court’s rationale for
imposing the maximum sentence is improper because it’s grounded
upon his stabbing of the victim, the conduct for which a different
jury acquitted him. By acquitting him of first degree assault,
Melton continues, “the jury necessarily found that the stabbing was
a lawful act, having occurred in self-defense.” Consequently, he
argues, there was “no reasonable basis for the Court to determine
that any alleged kick had resulted in the stab[b]ing and near death
of [the victim].”
¶ 26 Even if this argument has some intuitive force, it still doesn’t
carry the day. As we have already noted, sentencing courts have
extremely broad discretion when choosing a sentence within the
13
statutory range. Rice, ¶ 8. That discretion allows the court to
consider not only the previously identified factors, but also, “in
some circumstances, conduct for which [the defendant] was
charged and subsequently acquitted.” People v. Newman, 91 P.3d
369, 372 (Colo. 2004) (first citing United States v. Juarez-Ortega,
Atkins, 480 F.2d 1223, 1224 (9th Cir. 1973)).
¶ 27 In Newman, a defendant was convicted of storing and
disposing hazardous waste in violation of the relevant statute. Id.
at 370. On appeal, his storage conviction was upheld but his
disposal conviction was reversed because the applicable statute of
limitations for that offense had run. Id. In sentencing the
defendant on remand, the court nonetheless relied on the facts
giving rise to the reversed conviction. Id. In a subsequent appeal
from that ruling, the supreme court affirmed the court’s sentence.
Id. at 374. It determined that the court didn’t abuse its discretion
by considering the facts underlying the reversed conviction because
the two incidents, while separate, were sufficiently connected to one
another and the defendant played a significant role in both. Id. at
373-74.
14
¶ 28 Similarly, in Juarez-Ortega, a defendant challenged his
sentence for two counts of distributing cocaine on grounds that the
sentencing court improperly considered the fact that he possessed a
handgun during the drug offense because the jury had “acquitted
him of a substantive count of carrying a firearm during a drug
trafficking offense.” 866 F.2d at 748. The Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals rejected this argument. It reasoned that even though the
jury determined that the prosecution hadn’t proved all of the
elements of the weapons offense, such a determination didn’t
preclude the court from considering facts underlying that charge for
purposes of sentencing, given that those facts were neither in
dispute nor unreliable. Id. at 748-49.
¶ 29 The circumstances in this case are akin to those present in
Newman and Juarez-Ortega. Specifically, the facts underlying the
charge for which Melton was acquitted are not in dispute. The
prosecution presented overwhelming evidence at trial that Melton
stabbed the victim, and he didn’t assert otherwise. And while the
stabbing occurred immediately after the victim placed Melton in the
chokehold, it was still just seconds removed from Melton kicking
the victim in the face. This shows that not only were the two acts
15
sufficiently connected, but that they were part and parcel of the
same altercation. See Newman, 91 P.3d at 374. Thus, while
Melton was acquitted of criminal liability for the stabbing in
connection with his first degree assault charge, we perceive no
abuse of discretion in the court’s consideration of that act in
imposing his sentence for the third degree assault that triggered the
later events.
¶ 30 “‘Only in truly exceptional situations’ will we substitute our
judgment for that of the sentencing court and overturn a sentence.”
People v. Tresco, 2019 COA 61, ¶ 31 (quoting People v. Beatty, 80
P.3d 847, 855 (Colo. App. 2003)). For the reasons articulated
above, we conclude that this isn’t such a case.
III. Disposition
¶ 31 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE TOW and JUDGE TAUBMAN concur.
