22CA2050 Peo v Esparza 07-11-2024
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 22CA2050
Arapahoe County District Court No. 04CR1256
Honorable Joseph Whitfield, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Gabriel Esparza,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER REVERSED AND CASE
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division V
Opinion by JUDGE GRAHAM*
Harris and Lum, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced July 11, 2024
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Alejandro Sorg, Assistant Attorney General,
Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Gabriel Esparza, Pro Se
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2023.
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¶ 1 Defendant, Gabriel Esparza, appeals the district court’s order
denying his motion for return of seized property. We reverse the
order and remand for further proceedings.
I. Background
¶ 2 In 2005, a jury convicted Esparza of murder in the first
degree, aggravated motor vehicle theft in the first degree, and
violation of a protection order. The district court sentenced him to
life without parole in the custody of the Department of Corrections
(DOC) consecutive to twelve-year and one-year DOC sentences.
Esparza appealed his judgment of conviction and a division of this
court affirmed. See People v. Esparza, (Colo. App. No. 05CA1952,
Apr. 30, 2009) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(f)).
¶ 3 In 2014, Esparza filed a motion for return of certain property
seized. This ultimately culminated in an appeal to a division of this
court, which reversed and remanded with directions for the district
court to determine if there was any pending litigation and if not, to
make detailed factual findings concerning whether the prosecution
had a continuing need to retain each of the seized items. See
People v. Esparza, (Colo. App. No. 16CA1985, Oct. 26, 2017) (not
published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)).
2
¶ 4 On remand, Esparza filed a motion requesting the return of
the following seized property: (1) $9,300.00 in cash; (2) Baptismal
Catholic records and certificates; (3) Catechism Catholic records
and certificates; and (4) assorted family photos. The prosecution
did not respond to Esparza’s motion, and the district court issued
an order concluding that the prosecution’s silence indicated it no
longer needed the requested property and ordered that the items be
returned to Esparza’s representative. It appears that at least some
of that property was returned to Esparza.
¶ 5 However, as part of his effort to retrieve the listed items,
Esparza learned that the police department had seized and kept
other property. Esparza then filed a motion requesting an itemized
list of the property that was seized. After receiving the list, Esparza
filed a new motion requesting return of the following property:
• $160.15 in cash;
• the victim’s diary;
• a beige filing cabinet and its contents;
• records from an upstairs office/den;
• a Gateway computer;
• computer discs and papers from an upstairs office/den;
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• a brown leather day planner;
• a large book, a checkbook, and receipts from an upstairs
office/den;
• a checkbook, cards, and print-outs from a cardboard box in
the office;
• a two-drawer metal file cabinet and its contents;
• computer discs;
• two rolls of film;
• all family photos;
• the contents of a gray safe;
• resume references and business cards from a master
bedroom;
• car rental paperwork; and
• all financial, marital, and legal paperwork.
¶ 6 The prosecution objected to releasing the property, primarily
on the ground that there is no time limit to challenge a conviction
for a class 1 felony under section 16-5-402(1), C.R.S. 2023. In
reply, Esparza acknowledged the lack of a time limit but argued
that any appeal would be successive and subject to laches unless
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there was new evidence of his innocence. Esparza also argued that
the prosecution’s failure to respond to his previous motion for
return of property should bar its objection to this new motion.
Esparza further argued that the property at issue was not used as
evidence in his trial and that the prosecution previously agreed to
release the victim’s diary to him.
¶ 7 The district court denied Esparza’s motion for return of the
seized property based on “the posture of this case, the potential for
further litigation, and the lack of a waiver . . . by [Esparza] to said
further litigation.” This appeal followed.
II. Analysis
¶ 8 Esparza contends that the district court erred by denying his
motion for return of the seized property. We agree that Esparza is
entitled to the return of his cash, but we must remand the case to
the district court for detailed findings with respect to the remaining
items.
A. Standard of Review
¶ 9 We review a district court’s interpretation of legal questions
regarding return of seized property de novo and defer to its factual
determinations of ownership unless clearly erroneous. See United
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States v. Dean, 100 F.3d 19, 20 (5th Cir. 1996); see also People v.
Fordyce, 705 P.2d 8, 9 (Colo. App. 1985) (credibility determinations
are within the purview of the trial court and are binding on
reviewing courts).
¶ 10 We liberally construe pro se pleadings so that litigants are not
denied review of important issues based on their inability to
articulate arguments like a lawyer. Jones v. Williams, 2019 CO 61,
¶ 5.
B. The Record Does Not Support a Need to Retain All of the
Seized Property
¶ 11 Esparza contends that the district court erred by denying the
return of the seized property because (1) the seized property was
not evidence at his trial; (2) a requirement that, to obtain the
property, he waive his right to seek further postconviction review
violates his due process rights; and (3) the prosecution could retain
the property only if it initiated forfeiture proceedings.
1. The Prosecution Has Not Met its Burden to Show a Right to
Retain All of the Seized Property
¶ 12 Esparza contends that the district court erred by denying his
motion and adopting the prosecution’s argument that it had a
continuing need for the seized property. This error is clear with
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respect to the $160.15 in cash. No reason was advanced for the
court to refuse to return this cash.
¶ 13 “It is fundamental to the integrity of the criminal justice
system that seized property against which the government has no
claim must be returned to its lawful owner.” People v. Buggs, 631
P.2d 1200, 1201 (Colo. App. 1981). A defendant must make a
prima facie showing that (1) he owned or otherwise is entitled to
possess the requested property and (2) law enforcement seized the
requested property as part of their case. Woo v. El Paso Cnty.
Sheriff’s Off., 2022 CO 56, ¶ 45. A prima facie showing may be
established through “[a] verified motion asserting that law
enforcement took the requested property from the defendant at the
time of his arrest,” “proof that law enforcement seized the requested
property from the defendant,” or “the mandatory receipt
documenting the property taken.” Id. If a defendant makes the
prima facie showing, then the prosecution has the burden to
demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) the
defendant is not the owner of the requested property or entitled to
possess it; (2) the prosecution may need the requested property
later, including during postconviction proceedings; or (3) based on
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any relevant factors, including the type of case and nature of the
requested property, it would be inappropriate to grant the motion.
Id. at ¶ 46; see also Fordyce, 705 P.2d at 9.
¶ 14 Here, it appears undisputed that the police collected the seized
property at issue in connection with search warrants for Esparza’s
case. Thus, a prima facie showing has been established that the
property seized belonged to the defendant. See Woo, ¶ 45.
However, we conclude the prosecution has not met its burden to
show by a preponderance of the evidence that Esparza does not
own the property, the seized property could be required for further
postconviction proceedings, or there is some other reason the court
should not return the property. See id. at ¶ 46.
¶ 15 Under section 16-5-402(1), any person convicted of a class 1
felony may collaterally attack their conviction at any time, which
includes motions under Crim. P. 35. See People v. Robinson, 833
P.2d 832, 837 (Colo. App. 1992). We acknowledge that Esparza
previously filed a direct appeal and a Crim. P. 35(c) motion, the
denials of which were affirmed by divisions of this court. See
Esparza, No. 05CA1952; People v. Esparza, (Colo. App. 10CA0540,
Jan. 19, 2012) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(f)). However,
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Esparza could still file a Crim. P. 35 motion based on an exception
to the rule’s procedural bars or raise a Crim. P. 35(a) challenge.
1
¶ 16 On appeal, the People argue that handwritten letters found in
the safe and the victim’s emails to her coworkers might have
evidentiary value at a second trial. They also contend that there
“was a real dispute as to who owned” some of the seized items, and
that it would be improper “to release the victim’s diary to her
murderer.” But they say nothing about the remaining property.
Regardless, the district court did not make any specific findings,
even with respect to the letters, the emails, and the diary.
¶ 17 As a result, we cannot determine whether the prosecution is
entitled to retain the property, except with respect to the cash
recovered from Esparza at the time of his arrest. There does not
appear to be any dispute that the cash belongs to Esparza, has no
evidentiary value, and should not otherwise be retained by the
government.
1
Esparza argued below that any postconviction challenge would be
barred by the doctrine of laches, but he does not cite any case law,
and we are not aware of any law, that laches could apply to bar a
Crim. P. 35(a) claim. Cf. Robbins v. People, 107 P.3d 384, 390
(Colo. 2005) (concluding that laches bars Crim. P. 35(c) motions).
9
¶ 18 But as for the remaining property at issue, the district court
must hold further proceedings, if necessary, and make detailed
factual findings concerning whether the prosecution has met its
burden to show its right to retain those items. We therefore
conclude that the district court erred by denying Esparza’s motion
without further inquiry into the prosecution’s reasons for retaining
these items.
2. Esparza’s Remaining Arguments
¶ 19 Esparza contends that requiring him to waive further
postconviction proceedings in return for release of the seized
property violates his due process rights and that the prosecution
could not retain the property unless it initiated forfeiture
proceedings. In light of our disposition, we need not address these
arguments.
III. Disposition
¶ 20 We reverse the district court’s order and direct the district
court to order the return of Esparza’s $160.15 in cash. We
otherwise remand the case for further proceedings to consider what
additional property, if any, should be returned to Esparza.
JUDGE HARRIS and JUDGE LUM concur.
