22CA2007 Peo v Barnett 07-18-2024
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 22CA2007
El Paso County District Court No. 16CR3315
Honorable Frances R. Johnson, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Matthew Manuel Barnett,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division I
Opinion by JUDGE WELLING
J. Jones and Schock, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced July 18, 2024
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Carmen Moraleda, Senior Assistant
Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Matthew Manuel Barnett, Pro Se
1
¶ 1 Defendant, Matthew Manuel Barnett, appeals the district
court’s order denying his Crim. P. 35(c) motion without a hearing.
We affirm.
I. Background
¶ 2 A jury convicted Barnett of menacing, child abuse,
harassment, and reckless endangerment. The trial court sentenced
him to three years in the custody of the Department of Corrections,
to be followed by two years of mandatory parole. Barnett directly
appealed, and a division of this court affirmed the judgment of
conviction. People v. Barnett, (Colo. App. No. 19CA1057, Mar. 11,
2021) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)).
¶ 3 Barnett then filed a timely pro se motion for postconviction
relief under Crim. P. 35(c). He asserted several claims related to his
trial counsel’s performance — namely, that counsel
(1) “knowingly and maliciously allowed violation of [his]
right to fair and speedy trial” and “lied” by saying “that
no violation occurred”;
(2) failed to investigate inconsistencies in witness
statements;
2
(3) failed to seek a mistrial when the prosecutor
referenced Barnett’s mental health issues;
(4) failed to investigate and “produce evidence for [a
mental health] defense or mitigation”;
(5) “restarted the [speedy trial] clock” by withdrawing his
not guilty plea and entering a not guilty by reason of
insanity plea;
(6) failed to seek a competency examination before
sentencing;
(7) failed to object to seating a juror who was friends with
the prosecutor’s parents; and
(8) “failed to present proof of evidence in the records at
trial” and other information that would have
demonstrated that “the victim was a compulsive liar.”
¶ 4 Barnett also claimed that the prosecutor committed
misconduct by (1) knowingly presenting perjured testimony from
two witnesses; (2) “threaten[ing] to elevate [the] charges to
attempted murder for not taking the Judge Shakes Veteran’s
Trauma court plea deal”; and (3) “taint[ing] the jury” by referencing
Barnett’s “mental health issues” and “trip to the VA.” He further
3
claimed that the trial court erred by denying a motion to dismiss,
denying his right to conflict-free counsel, and violating his “rights to
a fair and speedy trial because [his] attorney[’s] performance fell
below a reasonable level.” And, Barnett asserted, Judge Lowrey
(who presided over the trial) was biased due to his relationship with
Judge Shakes.
¶ 5 Last, Barnett alleged that he experienced a nine-month delay
in receiving a mental health evaluation. He questioned whether the
delay was attributable to his “attorney’s ineffectiveness or the
court’s lack of attention,” but stated that, “either way, this was very
prejudicial for my case.”
¶ 6 In a detailed written order, the district court denied the motion
without a hearing, concluding that Barnett had failed to state
adequate legal or factual grounds for relief.
II. The District Court Didn’t Err by Denying Crim. P. 35(c) Relief
¶ 7 We review de novo a district court’s decision to deny a Crim.
P. 35(c) motion without a hearing. People v. Cali, 2020 CO 20, ¶ 14.
We perceive no error in that decision here.
¶ 8 To warrant a hearing on a Crim. P. 35(c) motion, a defendant
must assert facts that, if true, would provide a basis for relief.
4
People v. Simpson, 69 P.3d 79, 81 (Colo. 2003). A postconviction
court may deny a Crim. P. 35(c) motion without a hearing when the
motion, the files, and the record clearly establish that the defendant
is not entitled to relief. Ardolino v. People, 69 P.3d 73, 77 (Colo.
2003). A court may also deny relief when the allegations are bare,
conclusory, vague, or lacking in detail. People v. Venzor, 121 P.3d
260, 262 (Colo. App. 2005). Although pro se pleadings must be
broadly construed, it is not a court’s role to rewrite those pleadings
or act as an advocate for a pro se litigant. Cali, ¶ 34.
A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
¶ 9 A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to the effective
assistance of counsel. U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV; Colo. Const.
art. II, § 16. To obtain relief on an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim, a defendant must show that (1) counsel’s performance was
deficient — in that it fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness; and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the
To establish prejudice, the defendant must allege a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s errors or omissions, the result of
the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 694.
5
¶ 10 If a court determines that a defendant has failed to prove
either prong of the Strickland test, it may deny the ineffective
assistance claim without addressing the other prong. Id. at 697.
¶ 11 Barnett’s allegations of deficient performance were nothing
more than a conclusory list of perceived errors and omissions,
without even the barest explanation of why, in his case, counsel’s
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. It’s
not enough for a defendant to merely assert bare accusations that
his counsel erred; he must allege with specificity why counsel’s
errors or omissions constituted deficient performance. See People v.
Zuniga, 80 P.3d 965, 973 (Colo. App. 2003) (Bare and “conclusory
allegations regarding counsel’s allegedly deficient performance are
insufficient to demonstrate that defendant may be entitled to
postconviction relief and that the record might contain specific facts
that would substantiate his claim.”). Moreover, even assuming, for
the sake of argument, that Barnett alleged sufficient facts to permit
a conclusion that counsel’s alleged errors and omissions
constituted deficient performance, he wholly failed to allege the
requisite prejudice. That is, he didn’t allege — let alone explain —
why, but for counsel’s alleged errors and omissions, the result of
6
his trial would have been different. Accordingly, we can’t conclude
that the district court erred by denying Barnett’s ineffective
assistance of counsel claims without a hearing.
B. Prosecutorial Misconduct and Trial Court Error
¶ 12 We likewise perceive no error in the district court’s resolution
of Barnett’s allegations of prosecutorial misconduct and trial court
error. To the extent these claims weren’t successive (because they
could have been raised in Barnett’s direct appeal, see Crim. P.
35(c)(3)(VII)), they were devoid of specific facts and therefore
appropriately denied as bare, conclusory, and lacking in sufficient
supporting detail. See Venzor, 121 P.3d at 262.
III. Appointment of Counsel
¶ 13 We also reject Barnett’s assertion that the district court erred
by failing to appoint counsel in conjunction with his postconviction
motion. Having concluded that the court properly denied the
motion without a hearing, we likewise conclude that the court didn’t
err by declining to appoint counsel. Id. at 264.
IV. New Assertions on Appeal
¶ 14 In his appellate brief, Barnett adds significant factual details
in support of his postconviction claims. However, a defendant may
7
not use his brief on appeal to fortify issues inadequately raised or
supported by his postconviction motion. People v. Rodriguez, 914
P.2d 230, 251 (Colo. 1996). Accordingly, we won’t consider these
details on appeal.
V. Disposition
¶ 15 The order is affirmed.
JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE SCHOCK concur.
