23CA1777 Peo in Interest of LTF 07-18-2024
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 23CA1777
El Paso County District Court No. 23JV30167
Honorable Jessica L. Curtis, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Appellee,
In the Interest of L.T.F. and E.T-F., Children,
and Concerning D.J.T.,
Appellant,
and
W.F.,
Appellee.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division III
Opinion by JUDGE DUNN
Yun and Moultrie, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced July 18, 2024
Kenneth R. Hodges, County Attorney, Shannon Boydstun, Assistant County
Attorney, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellee the People
Josi McCauley, Guardian Ad Litem
Lindsey Parlin, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for
Appellant D.J.T.
Ainsley Bochniak, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for
Appellee W.F.
1
¶ 1 D.J.T. (mother) appeals the judgment allocating parental
responsibilities for L.T.F. and E.T-F. (children) to W.F. (father). We
affirm.
I. Background
¶ 2 The El Paso County Department of Human Services filed a
petition in dependency and neglect, alleging concerns about
mother’s substance abuse and physical abuse of the children.
1
The
juvenile court adjudicated the children dependent and neglected as
to mother.
¶ 3 Shortly after, father moved for an allocation of parental
responsibilities (APR). After an evidentiary hearing, the juvenile
court awarded father sole decision-making responsibility for and
physical custody of the children. The court also awarded mother
supervised parenting time and ordered a step-up parenting plan to
allow mother to progress to unsupervised parenting time. The step-
up plan was conditioned on mother engaging in substance abuse
treatment and providing a limited release of information to father.
The APR order recognized that the “parties may modify the
1
The Department named two additional children in the petition,
but they are not subject to the order allocating parental rights.
2
parenting time.” The court certified the APR order into a domestic
relations case and closed the dependency and neglect case.
II. Analysis
¶ 4 The Children’s Code applies to determinations of allocations of
parental responsibilities in dependency and neglect proceedings.
See People in Interest of J.G., 2021 COA 47, ¶¶ 18-19. Once an APR
order is entered, a certified copy of the juvenile court’s order is filed
into the district court, and jurisdiction transfers to the district
court. See § 19-1-104(6)(b), C.R.S. 2023.
¶ 5 An APR is within the juvenile court’s discretion, and we will
not disturb its determination when that ruling is supported by the
record. See People in Interest of A.M.K., 68 P.3d 563, 565 (Colo.
App. 2003). A court abuses its discretion when its ruling is
“manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or when it
misapplies the law.” People in Interest of M.H-K., 2018 COA 178,
¶ 60.
¶ 6 Mother doesn’t challenge the juvenile court’s APR order as it
relates to decision-making authority or custody. Instead, she
contends that the juvenile court erred by ordering that she “could
3
not petition the domestic relations court to step down and adjust
her [parenting time] until certain conditions were met.”
¶ 7 But we see nothing in the APR order that places any
restrictions or preconditions on mother’s ability to seek
modification. Indeed, the APR order plainly recognizes that the
parties may modify parenting time. And while the APR order
outlines conditions to allow mother to step up to unsupervised
parenting time, the order neither tethers the parenting time
provisions to mother’s ability to move to modify parenting time in
the district court nor restricts mother’s right to seek modification in
the district court. See § 14-10-129(1)(a)(I), C.R.S. 2023 (allowing a
district court to modify parenting time “whenever such order or
modification would serve the best interests of the child”).
2
¶ 8 Because nothing in the APR order prevents mother from
moving to modify parenting time in the district court, we disagree
that the juvenile court abused its discretion by entering the APR.
2
It doesn’t appear that mother has asked the district court to
modify parenting time. Thus, we have no basis to consider mother’s
theory that such a motion would be denied because she hasn’t met
certain conditions.
4
III. Disposition
¶ 9 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE YUN and JUDGE MOULTRIE concur.
