23CA0539 Peo v Hollingsworth 07-18-2024
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 23CA0539
El Paso County District Court No. 18CR2873
Honorable Monica J. Gomez, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Travis Glenn Hollingsworth,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL DISMISSED IN PART
AND ORDER AFFIRMED
Division III
Opinion by JUDGE DUNN
Yun and Moultrie, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced July 18, 2024
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Frank R. Lawson, Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Colorado Legal Defense Group, Mark T. Savoy, Denver, Colorado, for
Defendant-Appellant
1
¶ 1 Defendant, Travis Glenn Hollingsworth, appeals the district
court’s order revoking his probation and resentencing him in
violation of Crim. P. 11(b)(6). We dismiss the appeal in part and
otherwise affirm.
I. Background
¶ 2 The prosecution charged Hollingsworth with sexual assault,
second degree assault, and unlawful sexual contact based on
allegations that he physically and sexually assaulted his wife.
¶ 3 As part of a plea agreement, Hollingsworth pleaded guilty to
second degree assault and unlawful sexual contact. In exchange,
the prosecution dismissed the sexual assault count. The district
court sentenced Hollingsworth to five years of supervised probation.
One of the probation conditions required Hollingsworth to complete
sex offender treatment.
¶ 4 Less than one year later, probation filed a complaint to revoke
Hollingsworth’s probation (the 2020 complaint). The 2020
complaint alleged that Hollingsworth had been discharged from
Wisdom Works Counseling Services (WWCS) for failure to progress
in his sex offender treatment program. Specifically, WWCS
discharged Hollingsworth from treatment “due to his denial of his
2
sexual offense.” However, probation later withdrew the 2020
complaint when Hollingsworth began treatment with a new
provider, Bijou Treatment and Training Institute (BTTI).
¶ 5 About two years later, probation filed a second complaint to
revoke Hollingsworth’s probation (the 2022 complaint). The 2022
complaint alleged that BTTI discharged Hollingsworth for failure to
progress in his sex offender treatment program. In a letter to
Hollingsworth’s probation officer, BTTI explained that Hollingsworth
was resistant to participate in his treatment, he struggled to take
ownership of his offense, and his attendance was problematic.
¶ 6 After an evidentiary hearing, the district court concluded that
Hollingsworth violated the conditions of his probation (as to the
unlawful sexual contact count only) and revoked his probation on
that count for failure to comply with sex offender treatment. The
court resentenced him on that count to five years of probation along
with sixty days of jail and again ordered him to complete sex
offender treatment.
¶ 7 Hollingsworth appeals the order revoking his probation and
resentencing him in violation of Crim. P. 11(b)(6).
3
II. Discussion
¶ 8 Hollingsworth contends the district court erred by (1)
“sentencing” him with “little to no factual basis” in violation of Crim.
P. 11(b)(6), and (2) revoking his probation based on “behavior” that
was “outside of the scope of the plea agreement.” Because his first
contention is not properly before us, we dismiss that portion of the
appeal. We affirm the district court’s revocation of his probation.
A. Crim. P. 11(b)(6)
¶ 9 A district court shall not accept a guilty plea unless it
determines, among other things, that a factual basis for the plea
exists. Crim. P. 11(b)(6). However, a defendant may waive the
establishment of a factual basis for the charge to which he pleads
¶ 10 As we understand it, Hollingsworth asserts that the district
court failed to comply with Crim. P. 11(b)(6) when it originally
“sentenced” him and when it “resentenced” him following revocation
of his probation. But Crim. P. 11(b)(6) applies to a defendant’s plea.
See Crim. P. 11(b)(6) (“The court shall not accept a plea of guilty . . .
without first determining . . . [t]hat there is a factual basis for the
plea.”) (emphasis added); see also Medina v. People, 2023 CO 46,
4
¶ 19 (noting that Crim. P. 11 “govern[s] the procedures by which a
defendant may plead guilty” and “[c]ompliance with Crim. P. 11
‘normally will satisfy constitutional due process concerns’” (quoting
People v. Dist. Ct., 868 P.2d 400, 404 (Colo. 1994))). And Crim. P.
11(b) does not apply to revocation proceedings. See Finney v.
People, 2014 CO 38, ¶ 24 (concluding that “a probationer facing
revocation does not enter a ‘plea’ to a violation, but rather, is
required to ‘admit or deny’ the charges,” and therefore, Crim. P.
11(b) does not apply).
¶ 11 Hollingsworth’s contention therefore actually targets the
validity of his guilty plea — his original conviction. But
Hollingsworth didn’t file a Crim. P. 35(c) to challenge his guilty plea.
See People v. Rockwell, 125 P.3d 410, 414 (Colo. 2005) (“[M]otions
that challenge the validity of a defendant’s plea or the manner in
which it was taken are properly brought under Crim. P. 35(c).”).
Because the only issue before us is the order revoking and
resentencing Hollingsworth to probation, and because Crim. P.
11(b) doesn’t apply to revocation proceedings, we dismiss the appeal
as to Hollingsworth’s contention that the district court failed to
comply with Crim. P. 11(b)(6).
5
B. Probation Revocation
¶ 12 Whether a defendant violated any condition of probation is a
question of fact that the prosecution must establish by a
preponderance of the evidence. People v. Gravina, 2013 COA 22,
¶ 15. We review questions of fact for clear error, meaning “factual
findings are ‘binding unless so clearly erroneous as not to find
support in the record.’” People v. Turner, 2022 CO 50, ¶ 19 (quoting
Melssenn v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 2012 COA 102, ¶ 16). Once it is
determined that the defendant has violated a condition of
probation, the district court has discretion whether to revoke his
the court’s decision to revoke probation unless that determination
is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Gravina, ¶ 15.
¶ 13 Hollingsworth asserts that the record doesn’t support the
district court’s finding that he violated probation because the
treatment providers (WWCS and BTTI) discharged him from
treatment for “denying acts outside of the underlying offense to
which he pleaded guilty” — namely, for refusing to admit that he
sexually assaulted his wife. In support, he points to the letters
from WWCS and BTTI, which he asserts convey that his rejection
6
from treatment was based on the failure to admit to the dismissed
count of sexual assault.
¶ 14 As an initial matter, Hollingsworth’s discharge from sex
offender treatment by WWCS was the basis for the 2020 complaint
— a complaint that was ultimately withdrawn — not the 2022
complaint, which was based on his discharge from BTTI. Thus,
Hollingsworth’s discharge from treatment by WWCS was not before
the district court in the 2022 probation revocation proceedings.
And based on our review of the record provided, we see nothing to
suggest that the court considered the 2020 WWCS discharge to
revoke Hollingsworth’s probation in 2022.
1
¶ 15 We likewise reject Hollingsworth’s assertion that the district
court impermissibly revoked his probation based on BTTI’s
discharge that, he maintains, required him to admit conduct that
was “outside of the scope of the plea agreement.”
1
The record doesn’t include all of the transcripts from the 2022
revocation proceedings. See C.A.R. 10(d)(3) (“The appellant must
include in the record transcripts of all proceedings necessary for
considering and deciding the issues on appeal.”). We therefore
presume that omitted portions of the record support the court’s
order. See People v. Duran, 2015 COA 141, ¶ 12.
7
¶ 16 Nothing in BTTI’s discharge letter states that Hollingsworth
was forced to admit to conduct that formed the basis for the
dismissed sexual assault charge as opposed to the unlawful sexual
contact charge. Rather, the letter asserts that Hollingsworth was
discharged from treatment due to his “non-compliance” for having
“made minimal progress” and being “resistant” overall to participate
in treatment. The letter details that Hollingsworth struggled with
owning the offense “as he wrote about it” and has “regressed” to
“denial of his offense and victim blaming.” Moreover, the letter
outlines eleven absences from various group and individual
treatment sessions and five “warning/zero tolerance letters,” and
concludes that Hollingsworth is a community safety risk due to his
lack of progress in treatment.
¶ 17 Based on this record, we perceive no abuse of discretion in the
district court’s decision to revoke Hollingsworth’s probation. The
court found that Hollingsworth violated the condition requiring him
to successfully complete sex offender treatment, and this finding
has substantial record support. See People v. Ickler, 877 P.2d 863,
867 (Colo. 1994) (a court may revoke probation for failure to comply
with a sex offender treatment program); People v. Lientz, 2012 COA
8
118, ¶ 44 (a court may revoke probation if a probationer violates
any condition of probation).
III. Disposition
¶ 18 The appeal is dismissed in part and the order revoking
probation is affirmed.
JUDGE YUN and JUDGE MOULTRIE concur.
