Peo v. Strepka ( 2022 )


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  • 16CA0348 Peo v Strepka 01-06-2022
    COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
    Court of Appeals No. 16CA0348
    City and County of Denver District Court No. 15CR328
    Honorable Ann B. Frick, Judge
    The People of the State of Colorado,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    Mark Strepka,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ORDER REVERSED AND CASE
    REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
    Division IV
    Opinion by JUDGE HARRIS
    Fox and Tow, JJ., concur
    Prior Opinion Announced April 2, 2020, Reversed in 20SC401
    NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
    Announced January 6, 2022
    Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Brock J. Swanson, Assistant Attorney
    General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
    Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Mark D. Evans, Deputy State
    Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
    1
    ¶ 1
    This case returns to us on remand after reversal by the
    supreme court. In People v. Strepka, (Colo. App. No. 16CA0348,
    Apr. 2, 2020) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)) (Strepka I), a
    division of this court vacated the trial court’s order denying the
    motion of defendant, Mark Strepka, for return of his property,
    reasoning that the trial court had lost jurisdiction to rule on the
    motion after the felony charges against Strepka were dismissed.
    The supreme court granted Strepka’s petition for certiorari review
    and reversed. See Strepka v. People, 2021 CO 58 (Strepka II). The
    court held that a trial court retains jurisdiction to resolve a motion
    for return of unlawfully obtained property after it dismisses a case
    as long as the motion is filed before the appeal period expires. Id. at
    ¶ 26. Under that standard, Strepka’s motion was timely. See id. at
    ¶¶ 5, 28. We therefore proceed with the appeal on the merits.
    ¶ 2
    The facts of the case are detailed in Strepka I and Strepka II so
    we provide only a brief summary. During a traffic stop, police
    officers searched Strepka’s car and seized methamphetamine and
    two firearms. At the time of the stop, Strepka had at least four
    prior felony convictions. The People charged him with possession of
    2
    a controlled substance and possession of a weapon by a previous
    offender.
    ¶ 3
    The trial court granted Strepka’s motion to suppress the drugs
    and firearms and then granted the prosecution’s motion to dismiss
    the charges. Strepka later filed a motion for the return of certain
    property seized during the traffic stop, including the firearms. He
    argued that the guns should be returned to him or a suitable third
    party. The trial court granted the motion in part but denied it with
    respect to the firearms based on Strepka’s status as a convicted
    felon.
    ¶ 4
    Though the prosecution objected to Strepka’s motion in the
    trial court, on appeal, the People stipulate that Strepka is entitled to
    have the firearms sold (with the proceeds paid to him) or transferred
    to a suitable third party. In changing course, the People rely on
    Henderson v. United States, 575 U.S. 622 (2015). In Henderson, the
    defendant lawfully possessed firearms but was required to
    surrender them after he was charged with a felony to which he
    ultimately pleaded guilty. Id. at 624. After serving his sentence,
    the defendant sought an order from the federal district court
    directing law enforcement to transfer the guns to a third party who
    3
    had agreed to buy them. The district court denied the request. Id.
    at 624-25. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that because federal
    law prohibits possession, but not ownership, of a firearm by a
    convicted felon, the defendant had a right to sell or transfer his
    firearms as long as the district court was persuaded that the
    defendant would not retain control over the firearms. Id. at 630-31.
    ¶ 5
    While we are not bound by the parties’ stipulations on
    questions of law or mixed questions of law and fact, see Bar 70
    Enters., Inc. v. Tosco Corp., 703 P.2d 1297, 1306 (Colo. 1985), we
    are mindful of the party presentation principle. That principle
    generally requires courts to rely on the parties to frame the issues
    to be decided, on the theory that “the parties know what is best for
    them, and are responsible for advancing the facts and arguments
    entitling them to relief.” Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237,
    244 (2008) (quoting Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 386
    (2003)).
    ¶ 6
    Accordingly, we need not decide here whether Henderson
    compels the result to which the People have stipulated on appeal.1
    1 In their answer brief, the People describe Henderson v. United
    States, 575 U.S. 622 (2015), as a case addressing “the appropriate
    4
    The People have not offered any argument in opposition to Strepka’s
    position, and we will not develop one on their behalf.
    ¶ 7
    The trial court’s order denying Strepka’s motion for return of
    the firearms is reversed. The case is remanded for further
    proceedings to allow the trial court to transfer the firearms in a
    manner that precludes Strepka from retaining control over them.
    JUDGE FOX and JUDGE TOW concur.
    disposition of firearms that were unlawfully seized.” The firearms in
    that case were not seized unlawfully, however. The case involved a
    defendant who lawfully possessed firearms but was required to
    “surrender all his firearms as a condition of his release on bail”
    after he was charged with the felony offense of distributing
    marijuana. Id. at 624.

Document Info

Docket Number: 16CA0348

Filed Date: 1/6/2022

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 7/29/2024