21CA0701 Peo in Interest of EDA 01-27-2022
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 21CA0701
Adams County District Court No. 20JV59
Honorable Patrick Harold Pugh, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Appellee,
In the Interest of E.D.A., a Child,
and Concerning J.N.S. and D.A.,
Appellants.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division VII
Opinion by JUDGE BROWN
Berger and Johnson, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced January 27, 2022
Heidi M. Miller, County Attorney, Julie Thomerson, Assistant County Attorney,
Westminster, Colorado, for Appellee
Anna N.H. Ulrich, Guardian Ad Litem
Pamela K. Streng, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Georgetown,
Colorado, for Appellant J.N.S.
Harald Van Gaasbeek, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Fort Collins,
Colorado, for Appellant D.A.
1
¶ 1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, J.N.S. (mother)
and D.A. (father) appeal the juvenile court’s judgment terminating
their parent-child legal relationships with E.D.A. (the child). We
affirm the judgment.
I. Background
¶ 2 The Adams County Human Services Department (the
Department) filed a petition in dependency and neglect, alleging
that the three-year-old child was with mother when she was
stopped by police while driving a stolen vehicle that contained
methamphetamine and foils. After she was arrested, mother asked
her partner to take the child to paternal aunt and uncle.
¶ 3 Father was in another state at the time of mother’s arrest, but
the petition alleged that, on the day the Department requested a
court hold to obtain custody of the child, father went to paternal
uncle’s house and absconded with the child. Father later returned
the child, and the Department placed him with a great aunt and
uncle, where he stayed for the remainder of the proceeding.
¶ 4 The juvenile court adjudicated the child dependent and neglect
by default. The court adopted treatment plans for mother and
father requiring, among other things, that they (1) complete
2
substance abuse and mental health evaluations and engage in any
recommended treatment; (2) submit to random sobriety testing; (3)
participate in child protection therapy; and (4) visit the child
regularly.
¶ 5 The Department later moved to terminate mother’s and
father’s parental rights. After a hearing, the juvenile court
terminated the parent-child legal relationships between mother,
father, and the child.
II. Continuance
¶ 6 Father contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion
by denying his counsel’s request for a continuance so that he could
be located to reappear and testify at the Webex hearing. We
disagree.
A. Relevant Law
¶ 7 A parent has a fundamental liberty interest in the care,
custody, and control of their child. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57,
66 (2000). To protect the parental liberty interest, due process
requires the court to provide fundamentally fair procedures to a
parent facing termination. A.M. v. A.C., 2013 CO 16, ¶ 28; see also
L.L. v. People in Interest of R.W., 10 P.3d 1271, 1276 (Colo. 2000).
3
Due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as
requires that a parent receive adequate notice of a termination
hearing and the opportunity to be heard and defend. People in
Interest of E.B., 2022 COA 8, ¶ 11. The right to be heard includes
affording the parent the right to cross-examine adverse parties and
¶ 8 The Children’s Code directs courts to “proceed with all
possible speed to a legal determination that will serve the best
interests of the child.” § 19-1-102(1)(c), C.R.S. 2021.
Consequently, when ruling on a motion to continue a termination
hearing, the juvenile court must balance the need for orderly and
expeditious administration of justice against the facts underlying
the motion and the child’s need for permanency. C.S. v. People in
Interest of I.S., 83 P.3d 627, 638 (Colo. 2004). The juvenile court
may grant a continuance “only upon a finding that a manifest
injustice would occur in the absence of a continuance.” Chief
Justice Directive 96-08, Directive Concerning the Processing of
Dependency and Neglect Cases, § 4 (Dec. 2, 1996).
4
¶ 9 Because the child was less than six years old when the
petition in dependency and neglect was filed, the expedited
permanency planning (EPP) provisions apply. See §§ 19-1-102(1.6),
19-1-123, C.R.S. 2021; E.B., ¶ 13. The EPP provisions require that
the child be placed in a permanent home as expeditiously as
possible and that the court hold the termination hearing within 120
days after the motion to terminate parental rights is filed. §§ 19-1-
102(1.6), 19-3-508(3)(a), 19-3-602(1), C.R.S. 2021. In EPP cases,
the juvenile court shall not delay or continue the termination
hearing “unless good cause is shown and unless the court finds
that the best interests of the child will be served by granting a delay
or continuance.” § 19-3-104, C.R.S. 2021; see also §§ 19-3-
508(3)(a), 19-3-602(1).
¶ 10 Whether to grant a motion for a continuance is a decision
within the juvenile court’s discretion, and we will not disturb its
ruling on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. C.S., 83 P.3d
at 638. A court abuses its discretion when its ruling is manifestly
arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or when it misapplies the law.
E.B., ¶ 14.
5
B. Additional Background
¶ 11 The juvenile court held the termination hearing via Webex. In
opening statement, father’s attorney stated that father intended to
testify. Father appeared by video at the beginning of the hearing
but, during the caseworker’s testimony, he disconnected. The court
asked father’s attorney to reach out to him and ask him to
reconnect.
¶ 12 When the caseworker’s testimony concluded, father’s attorney
reported that she could not reach him. The juvenile court recessed
for lunch and asked father’s attorney to continue to try to contact
father. After the lunch break, father’s attorney again reported that
she had tried to text, phone, and email father, but was unable to
reach him. She requested a continuance so that father could be
located, arguing that a parent has a due process right to be present
and defend against the motion to terminate.
¶ 13 The court noted that the case had been pending for fourteen
months, that the hearing had been set for a couple of months, and
that each parent had appeared at only one prior hearing in the
case. It acknowledged that “parents should have the right to testify
if they so choose,” but it explained that a parent does not have a
6
constitutional right to be present during the hearing if represented
by competent counsel. It further noted that it had no indication
that father was physically unable to appear and testify. “[B]ased on
the totality of the circumstances” at the time, the court found that a
continuance would not be in the child’s best interests. It denied the
request but instructed father’s attorney to continue trying to locate
father, including by sending someone from her office to his
residence, while it proceeded to hear mother’s testimony.
¶ 14 After mother’s testimony, father’s attorney again requested a
continuance to have additional time to locate father. After
specifically considering “the due process implications” of its
decision, the juvenile court again denied the request for a
continuance. It found that father’s failure to log back on to the
virtual platform without explanation did not justify continuing the
hearing and that proceeding with the hearing did not violate father’s
due process rights. The court noted, however, that if father could
demonstrate that his failure to reappear at the Webex hearing was
“due to forces outside of his own control or his own decisions,” it
would entertain a motion under C.R.C.P. 59 or 60.
7
C. Analysis
¶ 15 Because this is an EPP case, the juvenile court should not
have continued the termination hearing unless father showed good
cause for the continuance and unless the court found that the best
interests of the child would be served by the continuance. § 19-3-
104. Even assuming that father’s unexplained absence from the
Webex hearing constituted good cause, the court found that a
continuance was not in the best interests of the child. Because the
record supports this finding, the court did not abuse its discretion
by denying the continuance.
¶ 16 Although this was an EPP case, the child had been out of the
home for fourteen months and more than 100 days had passed
since the Department filed its motion to terminate parental rights.
The court expressed its concerns about further delay when denying
the motion to continue. Even so, father’s attorney did not argue
that there was good cause to continue the hearing or that the
child’s best interests would be served by the requested continuance.
Instead, father’s attorney argued only that father would be denied
due process if the court did not continue the hearing to allow him to
appear.
8
¶ 17 When a parent has the opportunity to appear at a termination
hearing through counsel, their absence does not offend due
process. People in Interest of V.M.R., 768 P.2d 1268, 1270 (Colo.
App. 1989). Father received notice of, appeared at, and was
represented by counsel at the termination hearing. When it came
time for father’s testimony, father was no longer logged on to
Webex. The court gave father’s attorney a few hours to locate him,
but he did not respond to texts, phone calls, or emails.
¶ 18 On appeal, father does not explain why he disconnected from
the hearing, why his counsel could not reach him during the rest of
the full-day hearing, or why he was not able to reconnect to the
Webex platform. As a result, his case is dissimilar to E.B., in which
a division of this court concluded that the juvenile court abused its
discretion by declining to continue a termination hearing to allow
the father to reappear after he dropped from the Webex platform.
E.B., ¶ 17. Counsel for the father in E.B. represented to the court
during the hearing that the father had a “Wi-Fi phone,” meaning he
could only make calls when connected to Wi-Fi. Id. at ¶ 6. He told
the court that the paternal grandparents had informed him that the
father had been using Wi-Fi at a gas station to connect to the
9
virtual hearing but was asked to leave that location. Id. at ¶¶ 6-7.
The father was then unable to reconnect to the Webex platform. Id.
at ¶ 7.
¶ 19 Unlike the father in E.B., father here does not identify
anything in the record suggesting that his failure to return to the
Webex hearing was not by choice. Instead, he focuses on what he
would have testified to if present — the Department’s efforts to
support reunification, his efforts to contact the Department and
communicate about the treatment plan, and his efforts to see the
child. But he does not claim that this evidence was only available
through his testimony, and he was represented by competent
counsel at the hearing who was able to examine the remaining
witnesses about these topics. Accordingly, father was not denied
due process.
¶ 20 In addition, father makes no meaningful argument that a
continuance would serve the child’s best interests. He argues only
that it was in the child’s best interests “for his father to be afforded
his due process rights” and that a continuance would not have had
“any detrimental effect on the child” because the kinship placement
was meeting the child’s needs. We have already concluded that
10
father was not denied his due process rights. And detriment to the
child is not the standard by which the juvenile court was to
evaluate father’s request for a continuance.
¶ 21 Ultimately, the juvenile court found that further delay was not
in the child’s best interests and that finding is supported by the
record. We perceive no abuse of discretion.
III. Termination of Parental Rights
¶ 22 Father contends that the juvenile court erred by finding him
unfit to parent the child and unlikely to become fit in a reasonable
time. Mother contends that the court erred by finding that the
Department made reasonable efforts to reunify her with the child.
Finally, both parents contend that the court erred by finding no
available less drastic alternative to termination. We disagree with
each of these contentions and therefore affirm the juvenile court’s
termination judgment.
A. Statutory Criteria and Standard of Review
¶ 23 To terminate parental rights, the Department must establish
by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the child has been
adjudicated dependent or neglected; (2) the parent did not comply
with or was not successfully rehabilitated by an appropriate, court-
11
approved treatment plan; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the parent’s
conduct or condition is unlikely to change within a reasonable time.
§ 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2021; People in Interest of C.H., 166 P.3d
288, 289 (Colo. App. 2007).
¶ 24 Where resolution of an issue necessitates application of the
termination statute to evidentiary facts, it presents a mixed
question of fact and law. People in Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO
14, ¶ 15. We review the juvenile court’s factual findings for clear
error. C.R.C.P. 52. The credibility of witnesses; the sufficiency,
probative effect, and weight of the evidence; and the inferences and
conclusions to be drawn therefrom are all within the province of the
juvenile court. People in Interest of C.A.K., 652 P.2d 603, 613 (Colo.
1982). But a determination of the proper legal standard to be
applied and the application of that standard to the particular facts
of the case are questions of law that we review de novo. M.A.W. v.
People in Interest of A.L.W., 2020 CO 11, ¶ 31.
B. Fitness and Additional Time
¶ 25 Father contends that the juvenile court erred by finding him
unfit to parent the child. He argues that the Department presented
no evidence that father was unwilling to give the child reasonable
12
parental care because it “had no evidence or knowledge to assess
[father’s] ability to care for his son.” In the alternative, father
contends that the district court erred by finding that he was
unlikely to become fit in a reasonable time. We disagree.
1. Relevant Law
¶ 26 An unfit parent is one whose condition or conduct renders
them unable to give a child reasonable parental care. People in
Interest of D.P., 160 P.3d 351, 353 (Colo. App. 2007). Reasonable
parental care requires, at a minimum, that the parent provide
“nurturing and safe parenting sufficiently adequate to meet the
child’s physical, emotional, and mental health needs and
conditions.” § 19-3-604(2); see also People in Interest of A.J., 143
P.3d 1143, 1152 (Colo. App. 2006).
¶ 27 In determining unfitness, the court shall consider, among
other things, a parent’s excessive use of controlled substances and
whether reasonable efforts by child-caring agencies have been
unable to rehabilitate the parent. § 19-3-604(2)(e), (h). “Reasonable
efforts” means “the exercise of diligence and care” to reunify a
parent with their children, and it includes “[s]ervices provided by a
13
county or city and county in accordance with section 19–3–208.” §
19–1–103(114), C.R.S. 2021.
¶ 28 The Department is responsible for providing services to
support the objectives of the parent’s treatment plan, which in turn
must be reasonably calculated to render the parent fit to provide
adequate parenting to the child within a reasonable time. § 19-1-
103(12). Thus, the objectives of the parent’s treatment plan, the
services provided to meet the objectives, and the parent’s
compliance with the objectives are inextricably linked with the
court’s determination of fitness. See People in Interest of S.N-V., 300
P.3d 911, 915 (Colo. App. 2011); People in Interest of K.B., 2016
COA 21, ¶ 16.
¶ 29 When determining whether a parent’s conduct or condition is
likely to change within a reasonable time, a juvenile court may
consider whether any change has occurred during the pendency of
the dependency and neglect proceeding, the parent’s social history,
and the chronic or long-term nature of the parent’s conduct or
condition. E.S.V. v. People in Interest of C.E.M., 2016 CO 40, ¶ 22.
A reasonable time is not an indefinite time, and it must be
14
determined by considering the physical, mental, and emotional
conditions and needs of the child. A.J., 143 P.3d at 1152.
2. Analysis
¶ 30 On appeal, father does not contend that his treatment plan
was inappropriate or that the Department failed to make reasonable
efforts to reunify him with the child. Thus, his fitness depends in
significant part on his compliance with and the success of his
treatment plan. In EPP cases, however, no parent shall be found to
be in reasonable compliance with or have been successful at a
court-approved treatment plan when the parent has not attended
visits with the child as set forth in the treatment plan, unless good
cause can be shown for failing to visit, or when a parent exhibits
the same problems addressed in the treatment plan without
adequate improvement. § 19-3-604(1)(c)(I)(A)-(B).
¶ 31 The juvenile court found that father was not fit based on
ongoing concerns about his mental health, substance abuse, and
ability to care for and protect the child. The court noted that father
did not meaningfully participate in his treatment plan and, most
importantly, did not regularly visit the child and had not seen the
child in ten months. The court found that father made little
15
progress in the fourteen months the case was open and did not
show that he was willing or able to dedicate himself to treatment
and become fit in a reasonable time. The record supports the
juvenile court’s findings.
¶ 32 Father’s treatment plan required that he maintain and
enhance his bond with the child by, among other things, visiting
regularly with the child. The caseworker testified that father had
only one in-person, supervised visit with the child early in the case.
During that visit the child screamed, ran away from the parents,
and tried to hide. The child pressed himself against the wall and
was not receptive to father’s attempts to play or give affection.
Although the child later settled down during that visit and allowed
mother to hold and comfort him, he never warmed to father.
¶ 33 Following that first visit, father participated in a few virtual
visits. The Department arranged an in-person visit for the child’s
birthday in June of 2020. Great aunt and uncle transported the
child from their home in Colorado Springs to Denver for the visit,
but father did not show up, leaving the child distraught. Father did
not see the child again and stopped communicating with the
caseworker.
16
¶ 34 Father’s treatment plan also required that he stabilize his
mental health and address issues of substance abuse by, among
other things, completing a dual-diagnosis evaluation, consistently
engaging in treatment, and complying with requests for random
drug testing. The caseworker testified that she referred father for
urinalysis tests (UAs) and for a dual-diagnosis mental health and
substance abuse assessment, but he did not participate in those
services. The caseworker told the court that she had the same
concerns about father’s mental health and substance abuse
problems as she did when the proceeding began.
¶ 35 In addition, father’s treatment plan required that he work with
the Department to address and minimize child protection concerns
by, among other things, cooperating with the Department, notifying
the caseworker of any changes of address, and resolving all criminal
matters. And the treatment plan required that father provide the
child with a safe and stable home where the child’s basic needs
were sufficiently met. The caseworker testified that father did not
maintain contact with the Department and that she did not know
where father lived or worked. She also testified that father had
17
been incarcerated at various times throughout the case, including
during February and March preceding the April 2021 hearing.
¶ 36 The caseworker further testified that, in her opinion, father
was not able to meet the child’s physical, emotional, or mental
health needs. She concluded that it would not be in the child’s best
interests to allow father more time to address the issues that
brought the family to the attention of the Department because the
child had not seen him in ten months, the child protection concerns
identified by the Department “would not be able to be resolved in a
reasonable amount of time,” and, even if such issues were
addressed, rebuilding a relationship with the child “would take a
long, long time.”
¶ 37 Despite this record, father argues that the Department did not
present evidence that he was unwilling or unable to give the child
reasonable parental care because the caseworker admitted she had
no evidence or knowledge of father’s ability to care for the child. By
relying on the caseworker’s testimony to find him unfit, he
contends, the juvenile court erroneously placed the burden on him
to prove that he could provide reasonable parental care instead of
requiring the Department to prove by clear and convincing evidence
18
that he could not. For this same reason, he argues that the court
erred by finding that his conduct or condition was unlikely to
change within a reasonable time; he does not otherwise
demonstrate how that finding was clearly erroneous.
¶ 38 True, the caseworker testified that, because father had not
kept in touch with the Department or engaged in visits or
treatment, she was not able to fully assess his ability to parent.
But it is a parent’s responsibility to comply with the treatment plan.
People in Interest of A.H., 736 P.2d 425, 428 (Colo. App. 1987). And
the evidence establishes that father did not comply with even the
basic requirements of communicating with the Department or
visiting the child so that the Department could make the
assessment he now claims is lacking.
¶ 39 The Department put in place services to render father fit by
meeting the objectives of his treatment plan, but father did not take
advantage of the services and remained unfit. See People in Interest
of K.T., 129 P.3d 1080, 1082 (Colo. App. 2005) (concluding that
mother’s failure to comply with certain treatment plan objectives
demonstrated that she was not committed to meeting the child’s
needs and was unfit to parent). On this record, we cannot conclude
19
that the juvenile court erred when it found father unfit and unlikely
to become fit in a reasonable time.
C. Reasonable Efforts
¶ 40 Mother contends that the juvenile court erred by finding that
the Department made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate her and
reunify her with the child because the caseworker did not
communicate with her while she was incarcerated to learn about
how her homelessness or lack of a phone prevented her from
participating in services. We are not persuaded.
1. Relevant Law
¶ 41 The state must make reasonable efforts to reunify the family
when an abused or neglected child is placed out of the home. § 19-
3-100.5, C.R.S. 2021. “‘Reasonable efforts’ . . . means the exercise
of diligence and care . . . for children . . . who are in . . . out-of-
home placement . . . .” § 19-1-103(114). When a court decides
whether a parent is unfit or whether her conduct or condition will
change, it must evaluate whether the Department’s reasonable
efforts have been unable to rehabilitate her. § 19-3-604(2)(h); S.N-
V., 300 P.3d at 915.
20
¶ 42 The Department satisfies the reasonable efforts standard if it
provides services in accordance with section 19-3-208, C.R.S. 2021.
See People in Interest of J.A.S., 160 P.3d 257, 262 (Colo. App. 2007).
Such services include screening, assessments, home-based family
and crisis counseling, information and referral services to available
public and private assistance resources, visitation services for
parents with children in out-of-home placement, and placement
services including foster care and emergency shelter. § 19-3-
208(2)(b). Additional services should be made available if they are
determined to be necessary and appropriate by the case plan and if
adequate funding exists. § 19-3-208(2)(d). Examples of additional
services include providing transportation to required services when
other transportation is not available, mental health services, and
drug and alcohol treatment services. Id.
¶ 43 Once services are provided, however, the parent becomes
responsible for utilizing those services to obtain the assistance that
she needs to comply with her treatment plan’s requirements.
People in Interest of J.C.R., 259 P.3d 1279, 1285 (Colo. App. 2011).
21
2. Analysis
¶ 44 The juvenile court found that the Department made
reasonable efforts to rehabilitate mother. It found that the
Department made referrals for a dual-diagnosis evaluation, sobriety
monitoring, and visitation services. The court acknowledged
mother’s testimony that she could not participate in most services
because she did not have access to a phone. But it found that
mother did not notify the caseworker of this barrier and that the
Department “cannot put forward reasonable efforts to overcome an
obstacle of which it is not aware.” In sum, it found that mother was
able to have some communication with the caseworker and a few
video visits with the child, but it was mother’s responsibility to tell
the caseworker why she could not have more consistent
engagement. Evidence in the record supports the court’s findings.
¶ 45 The caseworker testified that, following the first in-person visit
with the child, mother was referred for virtual visits but did not
respond to the provider’s efforts to reach her. Even so, mother was
able to have one or two video visits each month facilitated by great
aunt and uncle.
22
¶ 46 The caseworker referred mother for UAs but she never
provided a sample.
¶ 47 The caseworker referred mother for a dual-diagnosis
evaluation, which she eventually completed. The evaluation
recommended that mother attend dual-diagnosis treatment, but she
did not attend the intake for treatment.
¶ 48 At the hearing, mother testified that a caseworker visited her
while she was incarcerated. She also testified that she did not
engage in any services because she was homeless and because she
did not have a phone or means to access virtual services. But she
admitted that she did not tell the caseworker about her living
situation or lack of a phone. The caseworker testified that the
Department could have provided assistance for mother to access
virtual services, but that she did not know mother needed this help.
¶ 49 Based on this record, we cannot conclude that the juvenile
court erred when it found that the Department made reasonable
efforts.
D. Less Drastic Alternatives
¶ 50 Mother and father both contend that the juvenile court erred
by finding no less drastic alternative to termination. Specifically,
23
they argue that the juvenile court should have ordered an allocation
of parental responsibilities (APR) to great aunt and uncle. We are
not persuaded.
1. Relevant Law
¶ 51 The juvenile court must consider and eliminate less drastic
alternatives before it terminates the parent-child legal relationship.
T.M., ¶ 19. When considering less drastic alternatives, the court
bases its decision on the best interests of the child, giving primary
consideration to the child’s physical, mental, and emotional
conditions and needs. § 19-3-604(3). “[I]f a proposed alternative to
termination is to be deemed viable, it must not only be adequate, it
must be in the child’s best interests.” T.M., ¶ 27.
¶ 52 When determining whether placement with a relative or other
person is a viable alternative to termination, the juvenile court may
consider various factors, including whether an ongoing relationship
with the parent would be beneficial or detrimental to the child.
People in Interest of A.R., 2012 COA 195M, ¶ 38. This
determination will be influenced by a parent’s fitness to care for the
child’s needs. See § 19-3-604(2); A.R., ¶ 38. Long-term placement
with a relative is not a viable less drastic alternative to termination if
24
the child needs a stable, permanent home that can only be assured
by adoption. People in Interest of M.B., 70 P.3d 618, 627 (Colo. App.
2003).
2. Analysis
¶ 53 The juvenile court found no available less drastic alternative to
termination. It found that the parents had not maintained a bond
with the child, did not have stable living environments, and had
pending criminal matters. The court noted that the benefit of
stability and permanency outweighed an ongoing relationship with
the parents and that adoption was in the child’s best interest.
Evidence supports the juvenile court’s findings.
¶ 54 The caseworker testified that father had not seen the child for
ten months at the time of the termination hearing. Mother had only
sporadic video visits and occasionally saw the child at family
functions. Both parents had periods of incarceration throughout
the proceeding and the court took judicial notice of several pending
criminal matters.
¶ 55 The caseworker testified that the child had been with great
aunt and uncle for over a year and that adoption by them was in
his best interests. She explained that the child displayed
25
aggression, needed socialization and a regular schedule, and
required play therapy. She testified that the child was thriving in
great aunt and uncle’s care.
¶ 56 The parents argue that no evidence suggested that great aunt
and uncle were opposed to an APR and only wanted to adopt. But
that evidence would be relevant only if the juvenile court found that
an APR would be in the child’s best interests. See T.M., ¶ 32 (“[I]f a
trial court considers a less drastic alternative in connection with its
overall consideration of the statutory criteria for termination and
finds that termination is in the child’s best interests, it must reject
the alternative and order termination.”). Here, the court found,
with record support, that a less drastic alternative to termination
was not in the child’s best interests.
¶ 57 Based on this record, we cannot conclude that the juvenile
court erred when it found that an APR to great aunt and uncle was
not an available less drastic alternative to termination.
IV. Conclusion
¶ 58 We affirm the judgment.
JUDGE BERGER and JUDGE JOHNSON concur.
