20CA0839 Peo v Vieyra 11-10-2021
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 20CA0839
Arapahoe County District Court No. 93CR1937
Honorable Eric B. White, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
David A. Vieyra, II,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division VI
Opinion by JUDGE WELLING
Fox and Johnson, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced November 10, 2021
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, John T. Lee, Senior Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
David A. Vieyra, II, Pro Se
1
¶ 1 Defendant, David A. Vieyra, II, appeals the district court’s
order declining to take action on an “Affidavit of Truth” that he filed
in this criminal case. We affirm the district court’s order.
I. Background
¶ 2 In 1994, a jury found Vieyra guilty of first degree murder, first
degree burglary, two counts of menacing, and carrying a concealed
weapon, after he fatally shot the victim in the victim’s home. He
was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole for
the murder count and consecutive prison terms totaling thirty-nine
years for the other counts. On direct appeal, a division of this court
affirmed the judgment of conviction and sentences. See People v.
Vieyra, (Colo. App. No. 95CA0429, Jan. 22, 1998) (not published
pursuant to C.A.R. 35(f)). The supreme court denied certiorari, and
this court issued its mandate in November 1998.
¶ 3 In 1999, Vieyra filed a habeas corpus petition in federal
district court. In 2002, a federal magistrate judge reviewed Vieyra’s
habeas petition and recommended that the petition be denied and
that the case be dismissed with prejudice. The federal district court
accepted the magistrate’s recommendation.
2
¶ 4 In 2003, Vieyra filed a pro se Crim. P. 35(c) motion (first
motion), alleging new constitutional claims that he had not alleged
in his direct appeal or in his federal habeas petition. After counsel
was appointed and afforded an opportunity to supplement the
motion, the postconviction court issued a written order summarily
denying Vieyra’s first motion in its entirety. The order denying the
first motion was affirmed by a division of this court. See People v.
Vieyra, 169 P.3d 205 (Colo. App. 2007).
¶ 5 In 2009, Vieyra filed a second pro se Crim. P. 35(c) motion
(second motion). The court summarily denied Vieyra’s second
motion without a hearing after finding that it was successive and
that the claims alleged therein failed on the merits. A division of
this court again affirmed. See People v. Vieyra, (Colo. App. No.
10CA1325, Aug. 11, 2011) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(f)).
¶ 6 On March 9, 2020, Vieyra filed an “Affidavit of Truth” in which
he asserted, among other things, that he had filed a contract with
the Colorado Secretary of State in 2016 making him a “foreign
sovereign,” which, in his view, meant he enjoyed “immunities”
provided by the Federal Sovereign Immunities Act. He concluded
that no court in the United States had jurisdiction over him as a
3
“foreign sovereign” and this case against him “must be dismissed.”
He also contended that Arapahoe County owed him “two million
dollars per day for unlawful confinement.”
¶ 7 The district court reviewed Vieyra’s Affidavit of Truth, noted
that it was taking no action, and entered the following order:
THE COURT, having reviewed the Defendant’s
Affidavit of Truth, and having reviewed the
Court’s own file, hereby observes that the
within action is criminal in nature wherein the
Defendant was convicted by jury. His
“Affidavit” fails to cite any valid authority upon
which the Court may or must act and has no
legal force or effect upon this Court.
Therefore, any ostensible request for relief
contained in the “Affidavit” is DENIED as
devoid of any legal merit whatsoever.
¶ 8 Vieyra appeals the district court’s order denying any relief in
connection with his Affidavit of Truth.
II. Analysis
¶ 9 The averments and contentions Vieyra sets forth in his
Affidavit of Truth are consistent with those asserted by adherents to
the “sovereign citizen” movement. See People v. Lavadie, 2021 CO
42, ¶ 7 n.1 (“The ‘sovereign citizen’ movement is an ideology that
‘rejects the legitimacy of United States jurisdiction over its
adherents.’” (quoting United States v. Pryor, 842 F.3d 441, 445 n.2
4
n.4 (“Those who affiliate with ‘Sovereign Citizenship’ believe in a
particular interpretation of the common law and believe they are
not subject to governmental statutes, proceedings, or jurisdictions.
They believe the individual, a ‘flesh and blood’ man (denoted in
lowercase letters) is separate from a legally fictitious commercial
entity imposed upon them by issuance of a birth certificate and
other official documents (as governmental documents usually
denote names in all capital letters).”).
¶ 10 As noted above, the district court declined to take any action
on Vieyra’s Affidavit of Truth. The best way to understand what
Vieyra is asking for in this appeal is to simply look at what he says
in his opening brief. See Barnett v. Elite Props. of Am., Inc., 252
P.3d 14, 19 (Colo. App. 2010) (An appellant “must inform the court
both as to the specific errors asserted and the grounds, supporting
facts, and authorities to support their contentions.” (citing Westrac,
Inc. v. Walker Field, 812 P.2d 714, 718 (Colo. App. 1991))). In his
opening brief to this court, Vieyra’s argument, in its entirety, reads
as follows:
5
I believe that because the Legal Fiction, David
A Vieyra, II., is the entity that made a plea to
the charges, and the Legal Fiction was tried by
a jury, I, David A Vieyra, should be allowed to
file an AFFIDAVIT and have it recorded onto the
Public Record.
I, David A Vieyra, am a flesh and blood human
man born of God and act under the SUPREME
JURISDICTION of God. Under International
Maritime Law, I am allowed to file an
AFFIDAVIT into the municipal corporation,
ARAPAHOE COUNTY DISTRICT COURT. This
JUDGE must acknowledge the custom of
International Maritime Law, the Law Merchant
or what is now called Uniform Commercial Code
ex officio (by virtue of the authority implied by
office).
(Emphasis added.)
¶ 11 He then closes his brief with the following conclusion:
I pray that this HONORABLE JUDGE will
require the ARAPAHOE COUNTY JUDGE to
allow me to file AFFIDAVITS and have them
recorded by the COUNTY RECORDER onto the
PUBLIC RECORD. I pray that this
HONORABLE JUDGE will require the
ARAPAHOE COUNTY JUDGE to answer my
AFFIDAVIT OF TRUTH point-by-point as the
FEDERAL LAW dictates.
¶ 12 Based on the contents of his opening brief, it appears that
Vieyra is advancing two arguments on appeal: (1) he should be
allowed to file the Affidavit of Truth and “have it recorded onto the
6
[p]ublic [r]ecord”; and (2) this court should require the district court
to “answer” the Affidavit of Truth “point-by-point.” We aren’t
persuaded that he is entitled to any relief.
¶ 13 To the extent that he is seeking to be permitted to file the
Affidavit of Truth (and have it be part of the “public record”), such a
request is moot. This is because the record reflects that the
affidavit was accepted for filing by the district court and is part of
the court record. There is no further relief for this court to provide
in this regard.
¶ 14 To the extent that Vieyra is requesting that we order the
district court (or anyone else) to respond to the contents of his
Affidavit of Truth, we decline to do so. There is simply no legitimate
basis for requiring the district court to respond to Vieyra’s Affidavit
of Truth, and Vieyra cites none. Indeed, the district court acted
properly by summarily denying the relief Vieyra requested in his
Affidavit of Truth. See, e.g., United States v. Benabe, 654 F.3d 753,
767 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Regardless of an individual’s claimed status of
descent, be it as a ‘sovereign citizen,’ a ‘secured-party creditor,’ or a
‘flesh-and-blood human being,’ that person is not beyond the
7
jurisdiction of the courts. These theories should be rejected
summarily, however they are presented.”).
¶ 15 To the extent that Vieyra’s Affidavit of Truth can be construed
as a Crim. P. 35(c) postconviction motion, it is properly summarily
denied as successive. See Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(VII); People v. Taylor,
any additional claims below, we deem them abandoned for failure to
raise them in his briefing to this court. See People v. Delgado, 2019
COA 55, ¶ 9 n.3 (“We deem abandoned, and won’t address, the
seven claims that defendant raised in his Rule 35(c) motion but
didn’t discuss on appeal.”); People v. Ortega, 266 P.3d 424, 428
(Colo. App. 2011) (“We also deem abandoned any additional
contentions which [the defendant] raised in his postconviction
motion and which have not been pursued on appeal.”).
III. Conclusion
¶ 16 For the reasons set forth above, the district court’s order is
affirmed.
JUDGE FOX and JUDGE JOHNSON concur.
