20CA1487 & 20CA1488 Peo v Sikorsky 01-27-2022
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals Nos. 20CA1487 & 20CA1488
Summit County District Court Nos. 19CR189 & 20CR53
Honorable Mark D. Thompson, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Craig R. Sikorsky,
Defendant-Appellant.
SENTENCES AFFIRMED
Division VII
Opinion by JUDGE BERGER
Brown and Johnson, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced January 27, 2022
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Ellen Michaels, Senior Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Albani Law LLC, Peter B. Albani, Denver, Colorado; Richard L. Ott P.C.,
Richard L. Ott, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
1
¶ 1 In this consolidated sentencing appeal, defendant, Craig R.
Sikorsky, appeals his consecutive sentences of twelve and six years
in the custody of the Department of Corrections (DOC). We affirm
the sentences.
I. Background
¶ 2 Sikorsky was a neighbor to twelve-year-old C.B. C.B. reported
that Sikorsky had approached him and asked if he would like a job
walking Sikorsky’s dogs. C.B. agreed. Each of the approximately
seven times C.B. walked Sikorsky’s dogs, Sikorsky “smacked [his]
rear” as he left with the dogs. After the final walk, Sikorsky invited
C.B. into his home and put his mouth on C.B.’s penis for four or
five minutes. C.B. immediately told his father about the incident,
and a sexual assault examination revealed Sikorsky’s DNA on C.B.’s
penis.
¶ 3 The prosecution charged Sikorsky with one count of sexual
assault on a child by one in a position of trust, one count of sexual
assault on a child, one count of enticement of a child, and one
count of unlawful sexual contact. Sikorsky admitted to sexually
assaulting C.B., and he pleaded guilty to an added count of sexual
exploitation of a child, a class 4 felony punishable by one to twelve
2
years in the DOC, in exchange for dismissal of the original four
counts.
1
See § 18-6-403(3)(b), (5), C.R.S. 2021; see also § 18-1.3-
401(1)(a)(V)(A.1), (6), C.R.S. 2021. The district court ordered a
presentence investigation report (PSI), and it agreed to accept the
defense’s private sex offense specific evaluation (SOSE).
¶ 4 Before sentencing, two other victims surfaced after reading a
news article about the case. R.C. alleged that on multiple occasions
in 1995, his neighbor Sikorsky joined him and another boy, C.J., on
his trampoline and purposely grabbed and touched the boys’
genitals over their clothes when they were jumping. The boys were
about eleven years old at the time. C.J. confirmed this account,
and he added that the assaults had “had adverse effects on [his]
life.” According to C.J., Sikorsky moved away after R.C.’s father
confronted him about this conduct.
¶ 5 The prosecution charged Sikorsky with two counts of sexual
assault on a child as a pattern of abuse — one count each for R.C.
and C.J. Sikorsky admitted the crimes reported by R.C. and C.J.
1
This was the range available to the court with mitigating and
aggravating factors present. § 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(V)(A.1), (6), C.R.S.
2021. In the absence of such factors, the presumptive range was
two to six years. § 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(V)(A.1).
3
(although he claimed that the year was 1998), and he pleaded guilty
to one count of attempted sexual assault on a child, a class 5 felony
punishable by a term of imprisonment between six months and six
years, in exchange for dismissal of the pattern charges.
2
See
§ 18-3-405(1), C.R.S. 2021; § 18-2-101(4), C.R.S. 2021; see also
§ 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(V)(A.1), (6).
¶ 6 The district court ordered an updated PSI and SOSE. The
updated PSI, following the updated SOSE, assessed Sikorsky to be
a low risk for recidivism. Nevertheless, in light of the lasting
impacts on Sikorsky’s multiple victims, his repeated offenses, and
the danger he posed to the community, the PSI recommended
concurrent DOC sentences of six years for the crime against C.B.
and three years for the crime against R.C. and C.J. — the top of the
range for each offense in the absence of any aggravating factors.
¶ 7 At a joint sentencing hearing for the two cases, the district
court sentenced Sikorsky to consecutive, aggravated range prison
2
As with the charges stemming from the incident with C.B., this
was the range with mitigating and aggravating factors present.
§ 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(V)(A.1), (6). In the absence of such factors, the
presumptive range was one to three years.
§ 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(V)(A.1).
4
terms of twelve and six years — the maximum terms of
imprisonment for each crime. On appeal, Sikorsky contends that
(1) there was insufficient information in the record and inadequate
findings by the court to support his consecutive, aggravated range
sentences and (2) the district court abused its discretion by
“disregarding” the expert opinions in the updated PSI and SOSE.
We disagree.
II. Aggravated Sentencing Was Proper
A. Standard of Review and Relevant Law
¶ 8 A district court has broad discretion over sentencing decisions,
including whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences
when a defendant is convicted of multiple offenses; a sentence will
not be overturned absent a clear abuse of that discretion. Lopez v.
People, 113 P.3d 713, 720 (Colo. 2005); see Juhl v. People, 172 P.3d
896, 899 (Colo. 2007). A sentence must be manifestly arbitrary,
unreasonable, unfair, or contrary to law to constitute an abuse of
discretion. People v. Koehler, 30 P.3d 694, 697-98 (Colo. App.
2000).
¶ 9 Section 18-1.3-401(6) authorizes a district court to impose
sentences within the aggravated range if it concludes that
5
extraordinary aggravating circumstances are present, are based on
evidence in the record of the sentencing hearing and the PSI, and
support a different sentence. Before sentencing outside the
presumptive range, “the court shall make specific findings on the
record of the case, detailing the specific extraordinary
circumstances which constitute the reasons for varying from the
presumptive sentence.” § 18-1.3-401(7); see Lopez, 113 P.3d at
725.
¶ 10 As relevant here, an aggravated range sentence may be based
on facts admitted by the defendant. Lopez, 113 P.3d at 719; see
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). Only one legitimate
factor is required to justify a sentence in the aggravated range.
Lopez, 113 P.3d at 731.
3
B. Sentencing Hearing
¶ 11 At sentencing, C.B.’s parents testified that C.B. had difficulty
sleeping and continued to have fears of adult males that negatively
3
Sikorsky does not contend on appeal that the aggravated sentence
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
6
impacted many aspects of his life. R.C. and C.J. also testified; R.C.
requested the maximum sentence.
¶ 12 The prosecution argued that the updated SOSE was unreliable
and asked for the maximum allowable sentences of twelve and six
years — a cumulative term of eighteen years in the DOC. Defense
counsel asked the court to sentence Sikorsky to concurrent DOC
terms of three years and eighteen months.
¶ 13 In sentencing Sikorsky to the maximum term of
imprisonment, the district court considered the entire record,
including the parties’ arguments, the victims’ statements, both
PSIs, and Sikorsky’s allocution. It found the following
extraordinarily aggravating circumstances:
• Sikorsky’s conduct had a “lifelong adverse impact” on his
victims.
• The conduct underlying the original charges was
substantially more serious than the offenses to which
Sikorsky pleaded guilty.
• The conduct was not an isolated incident. Rather, it was
part of a pattern of behavior with three prepubescent
male victims.
7
• Sikorsky’s conduct preyed upon his neighbors and was a
troubling violation of the public trust.
¶ 14 The court emphasized that sentencing in the aggravated range
was appropriate based on the extraordinary seriousness of the
admitted behavior underlying the charges — behavior which could
have supported indeterminate sentencing. For these reasons, and
“to ensure community safety,” the court sentenced Sikorsky to
consecutive terms.
C. Discussion
¶ 15 Sikorsky fails to explain why the district court’s findings are
insufficient to support consecutive, aggravated range sentences.
We conclude that these findings are sufficient.
¶ 16 First, consecutive sentencing was well within the district
court’s discretion because Sikorsky was convicted of separate
offenses, with separate victims, decades apart. See Juhl, 172 P.3d
at 899.
¶ 17 Second, the district court properly considered multiple
aggravating factors, including Sikorsky’s admission to conduct that
supported more serious charges and demonstrated a pattern of
sexual misconduct. And because Sikorsky perpetrated this
8
misconduct on his neighbors’ children, the court viewed him as a
threat to the community. We conclude that these factors justify
aggravated sentences. See § 18-1.3-401(8)(c) (allowing the court to
consider discretionary aggravating factors for sentencing); People v.
Torrez, 2013 COA 37, ¶ 74 (“[T]he circumstances of the crime alone
might justify the imposition of a particularly harsh sentence.”); see
also Lopez, 113 P.3d at 719, 731.
¶ 18 We find no merit in Sikorsky’s contention that the district
court abused its discretion by “disregarding” the expert opinions in
the PSI and SOSE. The record demonstrates that the court
considered the updated PSI and SOSE but disagreed, at least in
part, with them. The updated SOSE, which is cited in the updated
PSI, asserted that the original assessments of a low risk of
recidivism had not changed with the inclusion of two additional
victims. The reports characterized the three victims as one “cluster”
of criminal activity because the 1995 crimes had not been
prosecuted before the 2019 crime occurred. At sentencing, the
court explained that it disagreed that conduct separated by decades
of time should be characterized as a cluster, simply because
Sikorsky had not been previously charged.
9
¶ 19 To the extent Sikorsky claims the district court must follow
the recommendations of the PSI and SOSE, he is wrong. Sikorsky
cites no authority, and we are not aware of any, that requires a
court to agree with the PSI or to follow the recommendations of
these reports. Similarly, Sikorsky cites no authority, and we are
unaware of any, that elevates the SOSE above the PSI. To the
contrary, “[t]he sentencing judge must make an independent
decision regarding an appropriate sentence and is not bound by a
presentence recommendation of the probation department.” People
v. Tijerina, 632 P.2d 570, 571 (Colo. 1981).
¶ 20 Moreover, our review of the updated SOSE reveals troubling
omissions. In updating the SOSE, the evaluators relied only on
case reports and two phone interviews with Sikorsky, noting “we
need to review more collateral and other interview.” The evaluators
did not collect a statement from Sikorsky regarding his impact on
the two additional victims. And most importantly, the Sexual
Evaluation section was not properly updated. The first SOSE
reported that “except for the contact with the victim [Sikorsky]
maintained that he has not had any other same sex contact as an
adult . . . [and] denied additional sexual behaviors indicative of . . .
10
pedophilia.” The updated SOSE did not acknowledge that Sikorsky
had given false statements in connection with the first SOSE but
instead merely adjusted the number of victims.
¶ 21 For these reasons, we discern no abuse of discretion and
affirm the sentences.
III. Disposition
¶ 22 The sentences are affirmed.
JUDGE BROWN and JUDGE JOHNSON concur.
