Heartwood v. Harrington ( 2024 )

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<div>23CA1621 Heartwood v Harrington 10-17-2024 </div>
<div> </div>
<div>COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS </div>
<div> </div>
<div> </div>
<div>Court of Appeals No. 23CA1621 </div>
<div>El Paso<span> County District Court No. 21CV31903 </span>
</div>
<div>Honorable David Shakes, Judge </div>
<div> </div>
<div> </div>
<div>Heartwood Custom Cabinetry, LLLP, a Colorado limited liability limited </div>
<div>partnership, </div>
<div> </div>
<div>Plaintiff-Appellant, </div>
<div> </div>
<div>v. </div>
<div> </div>
<div>Charles Kent Harrington and Lynn Harrington f<span>/k/a Lynn Lemay</span>, </div>
<div> </div>
<div>Defendants-Appellees, </div>
<div> </div>
<div>v. </div>
<div> </div>
<div>Tracy Victor Martinez, </div>
<div> </div>
<div>Third-Party Defendant-Appellant. </div>
<div> </div>
<div> </div>
<div>JUDGMENT <span>AND ORDER AFFIRMED </span>
</div>
<div> </div>
<div>Division IV </div>
<div>Opinion by JUDGE YUN </div>
<div>Harris and <span>Kuhn</span>, JJ., concur </div>
<div> </div>
<div>NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) </div>
<div>Announced October 17, 2024 </div>
<div> </div>
<div> </div>
<div>Kane Law Firm, P.C., Mark H. Kane<span>, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Plaintiff-</span>
</div>
<div>Appellant and Third-Party Defendant-Appellant </div>
<div> </div>
<div>Sparks Willson, P.C., Matthew A. Niznik, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for </div>
<div>Defendants-Appellees </div>
<div> </div>
</div></div>
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<div>1 </div>
<div>¶ 1<span> </span><span>This case arises from a contract dispute that plaintiff, </span>
</div>
<div>Heartwood Custom Cabinetry, LLLP, and third-party defendant, </div>
<div>Tracy Victor Martinez (collectively, Heartwood), had with </div>
<div>defendants, Charles Kent Harrington and Lynn Harrington f/k/a </div>
<div>Lynn<span> Lemay (collectively, the Harringtons). </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 2<span> </span><span>After Heartwood <span>failed to respond to the Harringtons’ discov<span></span>ery </span></span>
</div>
<div>requests, the district court entered an order compelling discove<span></span>ry, </div>
<div>imposed attorney fees and costs, and ordered Martinez to appear in </div>
<div>person at a court hearing. When Heartwood still failed to respond </div>
<div>to the discovery and Martinez failed to appear in court, the district </div>
<div>court dismiss<span>ed</span> <span>Heartwood’s</span> claims and entered default judgment </div>
<div>on the Harringtons’ counterclaims against<span> Heartwood <span>as</span> discovery </span>
</div>
<div>sanctions under C.R.C.P. 37(c). </div>
<div>¶ 3<span> </span><span>Heartwood appeals these sanctions, arguing that they were </span>
</div>
<div>unduly harsh and that the court should have imposed less severe </div>
<div>penalties<span>. <span>Heartwood also appeals <span>the court’s</span> order den<span>ying</span> its </span></span>
</div>
<div>motion to reconsider <span>th</span><span>e </span>sanctions due to the negligence of its prior </div>
<div>attorney<span>. <span>Because we conclude that the district court did not abuse </span></span>
</div>
<div>its discretion by imposing the sanctions and because Heartwood did </div>
</div></div>
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<div>2 </div>
<div>not demonstrate gross negligence in its motion for reconsid<span></span>eration, </div>
<div>w<span>e <span>affirm the judgment and order. </span></span>
</div>
<div>I.<span> <span>Background </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 4<span> </span><span>In 2021, the Harringtons entered into a contract with </span>
</div>
<div>Heartwood Custom Cabinetry to build and install custom cabinetry </div>
<div>and a butcher block in their kitchen.<span> <span>But</span></span>, according to t<span></span>he </div>
<div>Harringtons, the company failed to comply with many of the </div>
<div>agreed-<span>up</span><span>on specifications for the installation.<span> </span>The Harringtons </span>
</div>
<div>eventually replaced the company <span>on</span> the project and refused to </div>
<div>make the final payment required by the contract upon completion </div>
<div>of the work. </div>
<div>¶ 5<span> </span><span>Thereafter, Martinez <span>—</span> a general partner of Heartwood </span>
</div>
<div>Custom Cabinetry <span>—</span> allegedly threatened to disseminate to the </div>
<div>Harringtons’ neighbors<span> news articles about a deferred prosecution </span>
</div>
<div>agreement that Charles Harrington entered into a decade earlier </div>
<div>unless the Harringtons made the final payment.<span> </span>When the </div>
<div>Harringtons did not capitulate, Heartwood filed a mechanic<span>’</span>s lien </div>
<div>against their home and commenced this lawsuit asserting claims f<span></span>or </div>
</div></div>
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<div>3 </div>
<div>breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and foreclosure of <span></span>a </div>
<div>mechanic<span>’</span><span>s lien.</span>
</div>
</div>
<div><div>1</div></div>
<div>
<div> </div>
<div>¶ 6<span> </span><span>The Harringtons asserted counterclaims <span>for</span> breach of contract<span>, </span></span>
</div>
<div>fraudulent misrepresentation, violation of the Colorad<span></span>o Consumer </div>
<div>Protection Act, and conversion against Heartwood Custom </div>
<div>Cabinetry, and they asserted claims for outrageous conduct and </div>
<div>violation of the Colorado Organized Crime Control Act against both </div>
<div>the company and Martinez.<span> </span>Martinez responded by asserting<span></span> a </div>
<div>claim for libel per se against the Harringtons based on t<span></span>heir </div>
<div>allegations against him. </div>
<div>¶ 7<span> </span><span>The Harringtons served discovery requests on Heartwood.<span> </span></span>
</div>
<div>After <span>granting the Harringtons’</span> anti-SLAPP</div>
</div>
<div><div>2</div></div>
<div>
<div> motion to dismiss </div>
<div>Martinez’s libel claim<span> that had automatically stayed discovery, <span></span>the </span>
</div>
<div>district court set a specific deadline for Heartwood to respond t<span></span>o the </div>
<div>Harringtons’<span> discovery requests.<span> </span>But Heartwood did not meet this </span>
</div>
<div>deadline.<span> <span>Instead, four days after the deadline had passed, </span></span>
</div>
<div> </div>
</div>
<div><div>1</div></div>
<div>
<div> Heartwood also asserted these claims against Aletha Ann </div>
<div>Harrington, but she was ultimately dismissed from the case an<span></span>d her </div>
<div>involvement is not relevant to this appeal.<span> </span> </div>
</div>
<div><div>2</div></div>
<div>
<div> <span>“SLAPP” is an acronym for “strategic lawsuits against pu<span></span>blic </span>
</div>
<div>participation.”<span> </span>
</div>
</div>
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<div>4 </div>
<div>Heartwood<span>’</span><span>s counsel reached out to <span>the Harringtons’ </span>attorney and </span>
</div>
<div>was given an additional four days to respond.<span> </span>Ten days later, the </div>
<div>Harringtons still had not received any discovery responses and filed </div>
<div>a motion to compel. </div>
<div>¶ 8<span> </span><span>Thirteen days after the motion to compel was filed (and </span>
</div>
<div>twenty-seven days after the original discovery deadline),<span></span> the district </div>
<div>court held a status conference on the discovery dispute.<span> </span>
</div>
<div>Heartwood<span>’</span><span>s counsel informed <span>the court that he “was having </span></span>
</div>
<div>difficulties with [Martinez]<span>”</span> concerning discovery.<span> </span>He did not object </div>
<div>to an order granting the motion to compel and told the court that </div>
<div>“what is provided to me by <span>[Martinez] </span>will be provided to” the </div>
<div>Harringtons.<span> <span>Accordingly, the court granted the motion, ordered </span></span>
</div>
<div>Heartwood to provide its discovery responses within seven <span></span>days, </div>
<div>and awarded the Harringtons their attorney fees and costs </div>
<div>associated with the discovery dispute.<span> </span>The district court also </div>
<div>determined that <span>“it would be important to have a status </span>
</div>
<div>conference . . . with Mr. Martinez present, so that I can go over </div>
<div>what my expectations are directly with him,<span>”</span> and it ordered </div>
<div>Martinez to appear <span>in</span> person at a conference <span>set</span> a month later. </div>
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<div>5 </div>
<div>¶ 9<span> </span><span>Heartwood again failed to deliver any discovery responses by </span>
</div>
<div>the deadline, and the Harringtons filed a motion for sanctions </div>
<div>requesting that the district court dismiss Heartwood<span>’</span>s claims an<span></span>d </div>
<div>enter default judgment on the Harringtons’<span> counterclaims.<span> </span>The </span>
</div>
<div>court did not rule on the motion before the scheduled status </div>
<div>conference. </div>
<div>¶ 10<span> </span><span>Martinez did not appear at the conference despite the court </span>
</div>
<div>order that he attend in person.<span> </span><span>Heartwood<span>’</span></span>s counsel informed the </div>
<div>court that he had spoken with Martinez a couple of weeks earlier </div>
<div>and that it was his “expectation that <span>[Martinez] </span>would be here.”<span> </span>
</div>
<div>Heartwood<span>’</span><span>s counsel also told the court that Martinez had </span>
</div>
<div>“informed [him that] <span>he was going to be pulling together the </span>
</div>
<div>information for the responses to discover<span>y” but </span>he <span>had “not received </span>
</div>
<div>those from him to date.”<span> </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 11<span> </span><span>The next day <span>—</span> sixty-one days after the original discovery </span>
</div>
<div>response deadline <span>—</span> the district court granted the motion for </div>
<div>sanctions, awarded attorney fees and costs associated with the </div>
<div>motion, and dismissed Heartwood<span>’</span>s claims while entering default </div>
<div>judgment on the Harringtons’ <span>counterclaims against Heartwood.<span> </span></span>
</div>
<div>The court found that Heartwood completely <span>“fail</span>[ed] to comply with </div>
</div></div>
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<div>6 </div>
<div>the disclosure and discovery rules and orders<span>” </span>because Heartwo<span></span>od </div>
<div>“ha<span>[d] <span>disclosed nothing.”</span><span> </span>It also found that Heartwood</span><span>’</span><span>s repeated </span>
</div>
<div>failure to comply was prejudicial because <span>the Harringtons “cannot </span>
</div>
<div>adequately prepare their claims, defenses, or expert disclos<span></span>ures” </div>
<div>without the discovery responses.<span> </span>And the court noted that, whether </div>
<div>at the hearing or in its response to the motion for sanctions, </div>
<div>Heartwood <span>never explained “the absence of</span> . . . Martinez or . . .<span></span> the </div>
<div>failure to comply with the court<span>’</span>s discovery order<span>.”</span><span> </span>Because of </div>
<div>these failures<span>, t</span>he court determined that <span>Heartwood’s</span> conduct was </div>
<div>willful and deliberate. </div>
<div>¶ 12<span> </span><span>Several months later, Heartwood<span>’</span>s counsel filed a motion to </span>
</div>
<div>withdraw his representation of Heartwood Custom Cabinetry and </div>
<div>Martinez, and Heartwood retained a new attorney who entered his </div>
<div>appearance shortly thereafter.<span> </span>Heartwood then filed a C.R.C.P. </div>
<div>60(b) motion to reconsider the sanctions order, accompanied by </div>
<div>Martinez’s affidavit asserting that he “was unaware of any proble<span></span>ms </div>
<div>with discovery requests and/or responses<span>” and “was unaware of </span>
</div>
<div>any motions to compel or any potential sanctions taken against </div>
<div>Heartwood or [him] because of any failure to provide discovery </div>
<div>responses.<span>”</span><span> <span>The motion <span>“acknowledge[d] that discovery violation<span></span>s </span></span></span>
</div>
</div></div>
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<div>7 </div>
<div>occurred”<span> but argued that the sanctions the court imposed were </span>
</div>
<div>nonetheless too severe and that less drastic measures could ha<span></span>ve </div>
<div>been appropriate.<span> </span>And the motion asserted that <span>prior counsel “did </span>
</div>
<div>not share the significance of the sanctions potentially employed f<span></span>or </div>
<div>failure to comply with discovery requests.”<span> </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 13<span> </span><span>The district court denied the motion.<span> </span>It noted that, at the time </span>
</div>
<div>it granted the motion for sanctions, <span>“all prior efforts to encourage </span>
</div>
<div>[Heartwood] to comply with disclosure and discovery rules over the </div>
<div>preceding months had been futile and further efforts by the court t<span></span>o </div>
<div>encourage discovery compliance would be futile.<span>”</span><span> <span>It</span></span> thus concluded </div>
<div>that <span>“the sanction imposed in this case was and remains the </span>
</div>
<div>appropriate and necessary sanction.”<span> <span>And the court found that </span></span>
</div>
<div>“[b]ased on the evidence available in this case, the suggestion </div>
<div>[Heartwood w<span>as</span>] unaware of the seriousness of the discove<span></span>ry </div>
<div>violations is not plausible.<span>”</span> </div>
<div>¶ 14<span> </span><span>The court ultimately <span>held a hearing on the Harringtons’ </span></span>
</div>
<div>claimed damages where it allowed Heartwood to contest the amount </div>
<div>before entering <span>a monetary award in the Harringtons’ favor</span><span>.</span><span> </span>
</div>
<div>Heartwood <span>do<span>es</span></span> not challenge that award. </div>
</div></div>
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<div>8 </div>
<div>II.<span> <span>Analysis </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 15<span> </span><span>Heartwood appeals the district court<span>’</span>s imposition of sanctions </span>
</div>
<div>and its denial of <span>Heartwood’s</span> motion for reconsideration.<span> </span>We </div>
<div>address and reject each contention in turn. </div>
<div>A.<span> <span>Dismissal and Default Judgment </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 16<span> </span><span>Heartwood first contends that the district court abused its </span>
</div>
<div>discretion when it dismissed <span>Heartwood’s</span> claims and entered </div>
<div>default judgment against <span>it</span> <span>on the Harringtons’ </span><span>counterclaims.</span><span> </span>
</div>
<div>Specifically, <span>it</span> argues that the sanctions were unduly harsh and </div>
<div>that the court should have imposed other, less severe sanctions.<span> </span>
</div>
<div>We disagree. </div>
<div>1.<span> <span>Standard of Review and Applicable Law </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 17<span> <span>We review the district court’s imposition of sanctions under </span></span>
</div>
<div>C.R.C.P. 37 for an abuse of discretion. <span>Pinkstaff v. Black &amp; Decker </span>
</div>
<div>(U.S.) Inc.<span>, 211 <span>P.3d 698, 702 (Colo. 2009). The distr<span></span>ict court “has </span></span>
</div>
<div>considerable discretion to determine whether sanctions shoul<span></span>d be </div>
<div>imposed for discovery violations and what those sanctions shoul<span></span>d </div>
<div>be.” <span>Prefer v. PharmNetRx, LLC<span>, 18 P.3d 844, 849 (Colo. <span></span>App. 2000). </span></span>
</div>
<div>A district court abuses its discretion when its ruling is manif<span></span>estly </div>
<div>arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair or when it misinterprets or </div>
</div></div>
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<div>9 </div>
<div>misapplies the law. <span>Cath. Health Initiatives Colo. v. Earl Sw<span></span>ensson </span>
</div>
<div>Assocs., Inc.<span>, 2017 CO 94, ¶ 8; </span>see Churchill v. Univ. of Colo.<span>, 2012 </span>
</div>
<div>CO 54, ¶ <span>74 (“In assessing whether </span>[the district] <span>court’s decision <span></span>is </span>
</div>
<div>manifestly unreasonable, arbitrary, or unfair, we as<span></span>k not whether </div>
<div>we would have reached a different result but, rather, wheth<span></span>er the </div>
<div>[district] <span>court’s decision fell within a range of reasonable <span></span>options.” </span>
</div>
<div>(quoting <span>E-470 Pub. Highway Auth. v. Revenig</span>, 140 P.3d 227, </div>
<div>230-31 (Colo. App. 2006))). </div>
<div>¶ 18<span> </span><span>C.R.C.P. 37(b)(2) provides that a district court may sanction a </span>
</div>
<div>party that “fails to obey an order to provide or permit discove<span></span>ry.” </div>
<div>Sanctions can range from deeming certain facts as established, t<span></span>o </div>
<div>“dismissing the action or proceeding or any part thereof,” or </div>
<div>entering default judgment against the noncompliant party. <span> </span>
</div>
<div>C.R.C.P. 37(b)(2)(A)-(C). </div>
<div>Generally, sanctions under C.R.C.P. 37 </div>
<div>“should be applied in a manner that </div>
<div>effectuates proportionality between the </div>
<div>sanction imposed and the culpability of the </div>
<div>disobedient party.”<span> . . .<span> </span>When discovery </span>
</div>
<div>abuses are alleged, courts should carefully </div>
<div>examine whether there is any basis for the </div>
<div>allegation and, if sanctions are warranted, </div>
<div>impose the least severe sanction that will </div>
<div>ensure there is full compliance with a court’s </div>
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<div>10 </div>
<div>discovery orders and is commensurate with </div>
<div>the prejudice caused to the opposing party. </div>
<div>Pinkstaff<span>, 211 P.3d at 702 (quoting <span>Kwik Way Stores, I<span></span>nc. <span>v. </span></span></span>
</div>
<div>Caldwell<span>, 745 P.2d 672, 677 (Colo. 1987)). </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 19<span> <span>“Dismissal, the severest form of sanction, is generally </span></span>
</div>
<div>appropriate only for willful or deliberate disobedience of <span></span>discovery </div>
<div>rules, flagrant disregard of a party’s discovery obliga<span></span>tions, or a </div>
<div>substantial deviation from reasonable care in complying <span></span>with tho<span>se </span>
</div>
<div>obligations.” <span>Prefer</span><span>, 18 P.3d at 850. Thus, dismissal </span>“should be </div>
<div>imposed only in extreme circumstances.<span>” </span> <span>Nagy v. Dist. Ct<span></span>.<span>, </span></span>
</div>
<div>762 P.2d 158, 161 (Colo. 1988). </div>
<div>2.<span> <span>Discussion </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 20<span> </span><span>Heartwood <span>do<span>es</span></span> <span>not contest any of the district court’s findings</span> </span>
</div>
<div>in the sanctions order, including that Heartwood fail<span>ed</span> <span>“</span>to comply </div>
<div>with the disclosure and discovery rules and orders,<span>” </span>that <span>it<span></span><span> had </span></span>
</div>
<div>“disclosed nothing<span>,</span><span>”</span><span> and that the Harringtons </span>could not “<span>adequately </span>
</div>
<div>prepare their claims, defenses, or expert disclosures” without t<span></span>he </div>
<div>discovery responses.<span> </span>Nevertheless, Heartwood contends that the </div>
<div>district court abused its discretion by imposing dismissal an<span></span>d </div>
<div>default judgment in lieu of lesser sanctions. We are not persuaded. </div>
</div></div>
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</div>
<div id="pfc" data-page-no="c">
<div><div>
<div>11 </div>
<div>¶ 21<span> </span><span>The district court took steps <span>of</span> escalating severity in an effort </span>
</div>
<div>to make Heartwood comply with its discovery obligations.<span></span> The court </div>
<div>initially set a specific deadline for Heartwood to respond; when <span></span>that </div>
<div>failed, it entered an order compelling Heartwood to respond and </div>
<div>awarded the Harringtons attorney fees and costs.<span> </span>And as a final </div>
<div>measure, it ordered Martinez to appear in person at the <span></span>next status </div>
<div>conference so it could impress upon him the importance of </div>
<div>complying with his discovery obligations. </div>
<div>¶ 22<span> </span><span>Despite the<span>se </span>efforts, Martinez did not appear at the </span>
</div>
<div>subsequent hearing and, sixty-one days after the initial response </div>
<div>deadline and well over a year after filing the lawsuit, Heartwo<span></span>od had </div>
<div>not produced any discovery.<span> </span><span>Heartwood<span>’</span></span>s repeated failure to </div>
<div>participate in discovery warranted severe sanctions because, as the </div>
<div>district court found, Heartwood w<span>as</span> <span>“withholding necessary and </span>
</div>
<div>important evidence to every claim in the matter<span>”</span> and <span>“[w]ithout </span>
</div>
<div>Heartwood’s and Martinez’s discovery response<span>s, [the Harringtons] </span>
</div>
<div>[could not] adequately prepare their claims, defenses, <span>or </span>expert </div>
<div>disclosures.<span>”</span><span> <span>Cf. Cornelius <span>v. River Ridge Ranch Landowners Ass’n</span></span>, </span>
</div>
<div>202 <span>P.3d 564, 571 (Colo. 2009) (Because “the nondisclos<span></span>ure in this </span>
</div>
</div></div>
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</div>
<div id="pfd" data-page-no="d">
<div><div>
<div>12 </div>
<div>case was so extensive that the parties and the water court ha<span></span>d </div>
<div>virtually no specific information,” it merited dismissal of <span></span>the case.)<span>. </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 23<span> </span><span>In total, Heartwood disregarded three separate court orders. <span></span> </span>
</div>
<div>And, as the district court noted, Heartwood did not <span>ma<span>ke</span></span> any effort </div>
<div>to <span>“explain the failures to comply with disclosure rules and </span>
</div>
<div>discovery orders”<span> or why Martinez did not appear as ordered.<span> </span>Thus, </span>
</div>
<div>the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing </div>
<div>Heartwood<span>’</span><span>s claims and entering default judgment against it on <span></span>the </span>
</div>
<div>Harringtons’ <span>counterclaims because Heartwood willfully <span>or</span> </span>
</div>
<div>flagrant<span>ly</span><span> disregarded its discovery obligations<span>. </span><span>See Caldwell</span><span>, </span></span>
</div>
<div>745 P.2d <span>at</span> 677 <span>(“Where a party</span> . . . engages in a course of conduct </div>
<div>that manifests a flagrant disregard of discovery obligations . . .<span></span> , a </div>
<div>court may properly impose the sanction of default.”)<span>; </span><span>Newell <span>v. </span></span>
</div>
<div>Engel<span>, 899 P.2d 273, 277 (Colo. App. 1994) <span>(“[A] sufficient level of </span></span>
</div>
<div>culpability for default will generally be present in cases in <span></span>which an </div>
<div>order compelling discovery was entered and the party f<span></span>ailed to </div>
<div>comply.”).<span> <span>And because Heartwood <span>ignored the court’s previous </span></span></span>
</div>
<div>attempts to enforce discovery compliance, including a lesser </div>
<div>sanction awarding attorney fees and costs and an order requiring </div>
<div>Martinez to appear in court to discuss the importance of complying </div>
</div></div>
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</div>
<div id="pfe" data-page-no="e">
<div><div>
<div>13 </div>
<div>with his discovery obligations, it was reasonable for the district </div>
<div>court to conclude that no less severe sanctions were appropriate.<span> </span>
</div>
<div>C<span>f.</span><span> <span>Sheid v. Hewlett Packard</span>, 826 P.2d 396, 39<span></span>9 (Colo. App. 1991) </span>
</div>
<div>(dismissal appropriate where the plaintiff refused to comply <span></span>with </div>
<div>three orders directing the plaintiff to sign medical releases de<span></span>spite </div>
<div>the tribunal’s <span>efforts to stay the proceedings pending compliance). </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 24<span> </span><span>In sum, while dismissal is only appropriate in rare cases for </span>
</div>
<div>“willful or deliberate disobedience of discovery rules,<span></span> flagrant </div>
<div>disregard of a party’s discovery obligations, or a substantial </div>
<div>deviation from reasonable care in complying with those <span></span>obligations,” </div>
<div>Prefer<span>, 18 P.3d at 850, this is that rare case where dismissal and </span>
</div>
<div>the entry of default judgment was a reasonable exercise of the </div>
<div>district court’s discretion<span> because Heartwood willfully <span>or</span> flagrant<span></span>ly </span>
</div>
<div>disobeyed its discovery obligations and multiple court orders. </div>
<div>¶ 25<span> </span><span>We are not persuaded otherwise by Heartwood<span>’</span>s contention </span>
</div>
<div>that the sanctions were too severe given <span>“evidence of attorney </span>
</div>
<div>misconduct”<span> </span>—<span> failing to respond to requests for admission and t<span></span>o </span>
</div>
<div>explain Martinez’s absence at the status conference<span> </span><span>—</span><span> by </span>
</div>
<div>Heartwood’s<span> prior counsel.<span> </span>Heartwood did not raise this argument </span>
</div>
<div>with the district court, so we will not consider it.<span> </span><span>See</span> <span>Gestner <span>v. </span></span>
</div>
</div></div>
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</div>
<div id="pff" data-page-no="f">
<div><div>
<div>14 </div>
<div>Gestner<span>, 2024 COA 55, ¶ <span>18 (“In civil cases, issues not raised in <span></span>or </span></span>
</div>
<div>decided by the district court generally will not be addressed for the </div>
<div>first time on appeal.”).<span> </span>
</div>
<div>B.<span> <span>Motion for Reconsideration </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 26<span> </span><span>Heartwood next contends that the district court abused its </span>
</div>
<div>discretion by denying <span>Heartwood’s</span> C.R.C.P. 60(b) motion <span></span>for </div>
<div>reconsideration premised on the “gross negligence” o<span></span>f <span>its prior </span>
</div>
<div>attorney.<span> <span>We again disagree. </span></span>
</div>
<div>1.<span> <span>Standard of Review and Applicable Law </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 27<span> <span>We review a district court’s denial of a C.R.C.P. 60(b) mot<span></span>ion </span></span>
</div>
<div>for an abuse of discretion. <span>Gold Hill Dev. Co., L.P. v. TSG Ski &amp; Golf, </span>
</div>
<div>LLC<span>, 2015 COA 177, ¶ <span>65. “To constitute an abuse of disc<span></span>retion, </span></span>
</div>
<div>the [district] <span>court’s ruling must be manifestly arbitrary, </span>
</div>
<div>unreasonable, or unfair, or be based on a misunderst<span></span>anding of the </div>
<div>law.” <span>Id<span>.</span></span><span> </span>The district court’s findings of fact and credibility </div>
<div>determinations may not be disturbed on appeal unless they <span></span>are </div>
<div>clearly erroneous and lack support in the record, and <span></span>we may not </div>
<div>substitute our own findings of fact for those of the district <span></span>court. </div>
<div>See<span> <span>M.D.C./Wood, Inc. v. Mortimer</span>, 866 P.2d 1380, 1383-84 (Colo. </span>
</div>
<div>1994). </div>
</div></div>
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</div>
<div id="pf10" data-page-no="10">
<div><div>
<div>15 </div>
<div>¶ 28<span> </span><span>As relevant in this case, a judgment or order may be set aside </span>
</div>
<div>for <span>“[m]istake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” </span>
</div>
<div>C.R.C.P. 60(b)(1)<span>. </span><span>“A party’s conduct constitutes excusable neglect </span>
</div>
<div>when the surrounding circumstances would cause a reasonably </div>
<div>careful person similarly to neglect a duty. Common carelessness </div>
<div>and negligence do not amount to excusable neglect.” <span> </span><span>I<span></span>n re </span>
</div>
<div>Weisbard<span>, 25 P.3d 24, 26 (Colo. 2001) (citation omitt<span></span>ed).<span> </span><span>“When </span></span>
</div>
<div>determining whether a [litigant]<span>’s failure to act is excusable un<span></span>der </span>
</div>
<div>C.R.C.P. 60(b), courts ‘should not impute the gross negligence <span></span>of an </div>
<div>attorney to the client.’” <span>Plaza del Lago Townhomes Ass’<span>n <span>v. </span></span></span>
</div>
<div>Highwood Builders, LLC<span>, 148 P.3d 367, 374 (Colo. App. 20<span></span>06) </span>
</div>
<div>(quoting <span>Buckmiller v. Safeway Stores, Inc.</span>, 727 P.2d 1112, 111<span></span>6 </div>
<div>(Colo. 1986)). </div>
<div>¶ 29<span> </span><span>The movant bears the burden of establishing grounds for r<span></span>elief </span>
</div>
<div>by clear and convincing evidence. <span>Goodman Assocs., LLC v. WP </span>
</div>
<div>Mountain Props., LLC<span>, 222 P.3d 310, 315 (Colo. 2010); </span>see Borer <span>v. </span>
</div>
<div>Lewis<span>, 91 P.3d 375, 379 (Colo. 2004). </span>
</div>
<div>2.<span> <span>Discussion </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 30<span> </span><span>As a threshold matter, Heartwood did not preserve t<span>he</span> </span>
</div>
<div>argument that its prior counsel was grossly negligent for our review. </div>
</div></div>
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<div id="pf11" data-page-no="11">
<div><div>
<div>16 </div>
<div>In its motion for reconsideration, Heartwood <span>argued that “[p]revious </span>
</div>
<div>counsel . . . did not share the significance of the sanctions </div>
<div>potentially employed for failure to comply with discovery <span></span>requests” </div>
<div>and that “Heartwood and Martinez were not aware of<span></span> the discovery </div>
<div>disputes or the pending sanctions.”<span> <span>Even if we assume that these </span></span>
</div>
<div>assertions preserved the argument that Heartwood<span>’</span>s counsel was </div>
<div>negligent<span>, <span>they did not preserve the argument that the attorney was </span></span>
</div>
<div>grossly<span> negligent. <span>See Gebert v. Sears, Roebuck &amp; <span>Co.</span></span>, 2023 COA </span>
</div>
<div>107, ¶ <span>25</span> <span>(“</span>To properly preserve an argument for a<span></span>ppeal, the party </div>
<div>asserting the argument must present <span>‘</span>the sum and substance of the </div>
<div>argument<span>’</span><span> to the district court.<span>” (quoting <span>Madalena v. Zurich Am. </span></span></span>
</div>
<div>Ins. Co.<span>, 2023 COA 32, ¶ <span>50</span>)). <span>Gross negligence requires “con<span></span>duct </span></span>
</div>
<div>[that] is so aggravated as to be all but intentional. . . .<span> </span>[It] </div>
<div>describe[s] a form of aggravated negligence that differs in qualit<span></span>y </div>
<div>rather than degree from ordinary lack of care.” <span>White v. Hansen<span>, </span></span>
</div>
<div>837 P.2d 1229, 1233 (Colo. 1992); <span>see Pfantz v. Kmart Co<span></span>rp.<span>, </span></span>
</div>
<div>85<span> P.3d 564, 568 (Colo. App. 2003).<span> </span><span>Heartwood<span>’</span></span>s contention that </span>
</div>
<div>its prior attorney <span>“did not share the significance of the sanctions </span>
</div>
<div>potentially employed for failure to comply with discovery <span></span>requests” </div>
<div>does not allege conduct rising to this level<span>. </span><span>See In re Weisbard</span><span>, </span>
</div>
</div></div>
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</div>
<div id="pf12" data-page-no="12">
<div><div>
<div>17 </div>
<div>25<span> P.3d at </span>26<span>. <span>And Martinez’s affidavit <span>does not contain a single </span></span></span>
</div>
<div>reference to his prior attorney <span>or the attorney’s conduct</span>. Instead, it<span></span> </div>
<div>simply states that Martinez was <span>“unaware of any problems with </span>
</div>
<div>discovery requests and/or responses” and “unaware <span></span>of any motions </div>
<div>to compel or any potential sanctions . . . because of any failure to </div>
<div>provide discovery responses” <span>without any further explanation.<span> </span><span>See </span></span>
</div>
<div>Goodman Assocs., LLC<span>, 222 P.3d at 315. Accordingly, we conclude </span>
</div>
<div>that Heartwood<span>’</span>s motion for reconsideration did not preserv<span></span>e its </div>
<div>argument of gross negligence. </div>
<div>¶ 31<span> </span><span>But even if Heartwood<span>’</span>s gross negligence argument were </span>
</div>
<div>preserved, the district court considered and rejected the <span></span>evidence </div>
<div>underpinning the argument <span>when it found that “the suggestion t<span></span>hat </span>
</div>
<div>[Heartwood w<span>as</span>] unaware of the seriousness of the discovery </div>
<div>violations is not plausible.”<span> <span>This finding enjoys record support </span></span>
</div>
<div>through the statements of Heartwood<span>’</span>s prior counsel demonstrating </div>
<div>that he was communicating with his clients about discovery.<span> </span>Most </div>
<div>notably, at the status conference that Martinez was ordered to </div>
<div>attend, <span>Martinez’s </span>counsel told the court that he had spoken with </div>
<div>Martinez about the conference and expected him to appear in </div>
<div>person and that, during the<span>ir</span> conversation, Martinez <span>“informed me </span>
</div>
</div></div>
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</div>
<div id="pf13" data-page-no="13">
<div><div>
<div>18 </div>
<div>he was going to be pulling together the information for the </div>
<div>Responses to the discovery.”<span> <span>Heartwood <span>do<span>es</span></span> not dispute that this </span></span>
</div>
<div>conversation took place.<span> </span><span>Instead</span><span>, <span>it</span></span> contends <span>that “one call </span>
</div>
<div>made . . . two-and-a-<span>half weeks before the hearing was inadeq<span></span>uate,” </span>
</div>
<div>and <span>it</span> stress<span>es</span> that the record reflects other supposedly negligent </div>
<div>conduct by its prior counsel that undercuts the credibility of the </div>
<div>attorney’s statements<span>.<span> <span>But even if true</span>, <span>it <span>is</span> the role of the district </span></span></span>
</div>
<div>court to weigh conflicting evidence; <span>the court’</span>s finding is supp<span></span>orted </div>
<div>by the record, and we cannot substitute <span>it</span> with our own<span>. </span><span>See</span> </div>
<div>Mortimer<span>, 866 P.2d at 1383-84. </span>
</div>
<div>¶ 32<span> </span><span>The district court also rejected Heartwood<span>’</span>s argument that <span></span>it </span>
</div>
<div>was entitled to C.R.C.P. 60(b) relief because it was inadequately </div>
<div>advised when prior counsel <span>“did not share the significance of the </span>
</div>
<div>sanctions potentially employed for failure to comply with <span></span>discovery </div>
<div>requests.<span>”</span><span> The court ruled that <span>“</span><span>[i]</span>f the excuse offered by </span>
</div>
<div>[Heartwood] is that its attorney failed to properly advise and </div>
<div>represent <span>it</span>, then that issue is more appropriately addresse<span></span>d in a </div>
<div>forum in which that attorney can be heard and respond.”<span> <span>We </span></span>
</div>
<div>discern no abuse of discretion in this ruling because, as we </div>
<div>previously mentioned, the alleged misconduct of prior counsel does </div>
</div></div>
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</div>
<div id="pf14" data-page-no="14">
<div>
<img alt="" src="https://icbg.s3.amazonaws.com/media/MM9/Zgu/MM9ZguMTW/pwsU7Hj38Z0aT83wGmUtrM/47S7PRRijEBs%3D?AWSAccessKeyId=ASIA5PHC3MTPQUWNOXOP&amp;Expires=1729526609&amp;Signature=5lHbX9%2FTeFSEx%2BftvsHSbPwkzqg%3D&amp;x-amz-security-token=IQoJb3JpZ2luX2VjECcaCXVzLWVhc3QtMSJGMEQCIBjh2%2BW42YVDMVJShOM5N1NP2aLLnsrx%2BzD61bbsw2PXAiBPxnFftUre8prQhCt3wzyXdQhtnLNqFfumN9wT5ZQP0iq6BQiQ%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F8BEAAaDDkyNjA0MTIwMzkzNSIM%2BI7sFg9e8D2rC31YKo4FH8NBjcrp8f13wbXqJlcQqlJPRlZvWu2nLsP9gYCO8PRCKog2iUiJdwUhqLMj7IkhQhAHNK7Q31NAMfbVDbE%2BbZNJ99Hl7JyvC5Xsa%2Bsrs3I8jr2%2FXBX7v8DicL8a%2B6uXAWmHHmHeTTY4%2F5l1fEhMXUqpFdfX%2BneR8csjKuocYdLuNS%2F0tDUvUpRTlRPgqj84GMvGxGWXG4YoAus0MisJIgtgpY5FQRd96yzvRNzmco0gV8jccinTD2gK2l%2B4yJgAvBghSvhHKhnxqHqH47Dzt9sD63mEnssTk3INKmbcIA5qx%2Fv%2BEcYOd9wqMRLtzgmvOZcXzY6E3c%2BM4KcC6gxKQJgXdtaO%2FYkaZPr3aLxUE78QPDoOaEtvvLi4uI5Q4%2F%2BPUXMSuyEl%2BWgC1pZJFOIDe5KpwpuUnCKTD%2BkVbcY9xRIr5Vaut%2FEqhWWePlWAr63YCTJSNYL49CNw3APQ7OiYHyDNPbTzRG0XVpt3jhpqtCuaKOR0vEpTfo7jDVxnk8hdlXtk%2FeMavWNj37nAhblFQFFuyTAamwe1OInQC%2B2Yc%2BkFyaZJn2WMq6GciNkOJDF1r2wxJjwQ6SYFoqn9mixcyw8%2FFitClhJF6kKEkeOK57uvGbyBWyuadm0IjVoXxNwGEyVHtTWeM86dqYuTojj6dUVyfi6P6ecx%2FM7Mj%2FcioLKTnv2AbchY8DxFQysLxa5dx3k1uMiB57k4ybk7LXY5049B5EbvVpR3kF0RDSm9Zm6PDsMzFZHCLj1D9gAnHkXIudH8PtrXBF7MOexHBIkti8ZHOuvF5bB9hgIZF5Rhne2vWKNcdjtrW6UZgRc53RC%2B9J1%2FdCQ8t5ock%2F%2F%2F4%2BVTgb0yoHArNUYfha1%2B0%2BL8MKXP2bgGOrIBr4fS0QsQSeC%2B0c3Y4czxv7Y1ywDy3MPu%2BOvj3B1vCBYUgqQIyar6TUkrqCfbo%2B0e6X%2BluCQ4kBv2GD2ZwZ9tkQH%2FgbToljyHdEOsq3LDVweYnkkqE4z%2FzZPrEP9GHYg5bDd22qgjYXVW9lvKlvPM3xx7uTfB239atiDxi1dKtIyjWEbkXVo81y8AQ%2FgL8YAINRaVR124Vy6JqNiOHKSfu9YHC7G8wKxRWXEU%2FENf5jr14Q%3D%3D"><div>
<div>19 </div>
<div>not rise to the level of gross negligence warranting relief under </div>
<div>C.R.C.P. 60(b)(1).<span> </span><span>See In re Weisbard</span>, 25 P.3d at <span>26</span>. </div>
<div>¶ 33<span> </span><span>Accordingly, we perceive no abuse of discretion in the district </span>
</div>
<div>court’s denial of <span>Heartwood</span><span>’</span><span>s motion for reconsideration. </span>
</div>
<div>C.<span> <span>Attorney Fees </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 34<span> </span><span>The Harringtons request an award of their appellate attorney </span>
</div>
<div>fees pursuant to “Rule 37”</div>
</div>
<div><div>3</div></div>
<div>
<div> <span>and under the district court’s order </span>
</div>
<div>entering a monetary award. Because the Harringtons do not </div>
<div>explain how the rule <span>or</span> the order entitles them to appellate attorney </div>
<div>fees, we deny their request. <span>See</span> C.A.R. 39.1 (requiring <span></span>that the </div>
<div>party requesting attorney fees explain the legal and factual b<span></span>asis to </div>
<div>support the request)<span>; </span><span>Sos v. Roaring Fork Transp. Auth.</span>, 2017 COA </div>
<div>142, ¶ <span>59 (declining to consider an “undeveloped request” f<span></span>or </span>
</div>
<div>attorney fees where the requesting party failed to state an<span></span>y legal or </div>
<div>factual basis for an award). </div>
<div> </div>
</div>
<div><div>3</div></div>
<div>
<div> We assume that the Harringtons are referring to C.R.C.<span></span>P. 37 </div>
<div>(<span>“</span><span>Failure to Make Disclosure or Cooperate in Discove<span></span>ry: Sanctions<span>”</span><span>) </span></span>
</div>
<div>and not C.A.R. 37 (<span>“</span>Interest on Judgments<span>”</span><span>).</span> </div>
</div>
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<div>20 </div>
<div>III.<span> <span>Disposition </span></span>
</div>
<div>¶ 35<span> </span><span>The judgment and order are affirmed. </span>
</div>
<div>JUDGE HARRIS and JUDGE KUHN concur. </div>
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