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<div><div><div><div id="pdf-container" style="width: 782px"> <div id="pf1" data-page-no="1"> <div> <div> <div> </div> <div> </div> <div>SUMMARY </div> <div>October 3, 2024 </div> <div> </div> <div>
2024COA106<span> </span> </div> <div> </div> <div>No. 22CA0237, <span>People v. d<span>â</span><span>Estree</span></span><span> </span><span>â</span> Constitutional Law <span>â</span> </div> <div>Fourth Amendment <span>â</span> Searches and Seizures <span>â</span> Exclusionary </div> <div>Rule <span>â</span> Independent Source Exception <span>â</span> Inevitable Discovery </div> <div>Exception<span> </span> </div> <div>A division of the court of appeals reverses the district court<span>â</span><span>s </span> </div> <div>decision declining to suppress evidence obtained from t<span></span>he second of </div> <div>two warrants issued to search the contents of a defendant<span>â</span>s cell </div> <div>phone. While the second warrant would have met the inde<span></span>pendent </div> <div>source doctrineâs requirements, <span>here police used an illegally </span> </div> <div>obtained cell phone PIN code to execute the otherwise lawful second </div> <div>warrant. Thus, the district court should have excluded evidence </div> <div>obtained from the phone at trial. The division further holds that </div> <div>when police seek to obtain a cell phone PIN code without a </div> <div>defendant<span>âs consent, in this case via a digital âbrute force at<span></span>tack,â </span> </div> <div>this constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment and </div> </div> <div> <div>The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions </div> <div>constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by </div> <div>the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be </div> <div>cited or relied upon as they are not the <span>official language of the division. </span> </div> <div>Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion </div> <div>should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion. </div> </div> </div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf2" data-page-no="2"> <div><div> <div> </div> <div>requires authorization via a warrant. Finally, the division holds </div> <div>that the use of the PIN code here does not meet the requi<span></span>rements of </div> <div>the inevitable discovery doctrine as police abandoned the lawful </div> <div>search to find the PIN code pursuant to the second warrant and </div> <div>expedited their access to the phone using the PIN code illegally </div> <div>obtained pursuant to the first warrant<span>. </span>The defendant<span>â</span>s convictions </div> <div>are reversed, and the case is remanded to the district court to hold </div> <div>a new trial<span>. </span> </div> <div> <span> </span>The special concurrence highlights t<span>wo</span> aspects of the </div> <div>inevitable discovery jurisprudence that may warrant </div> <div>reconsideration. </div> </div></div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf3" data-page-no="3"> <div> <img alt="" src="https://icbg.s3.amazonaws.com/media/MMq/p6V/MMqp6VuLCMHl7TCMfDWkGnolJvg0MLudk5YNy1msQMWA4%3D?AWSAccessKeyId=ASIA5PHC3MTPTCGXON2M&Expires=1728061407&Signature=5qK1UJjQhTtV79lqE4IPdVMOPdI%3D&x-amz-security-token=IQoJb3JpZ2luX2VjEJD%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2FwEaCXVzLWVhc3QtMSJGMEQCIGu1GFJEr5iCtVwEWS8%2FYmPE84Pm%2FFzYhGTa%2FGzTkZFfAiBYlQ81xdSGIng%2BcUDaidgy1WsHp67%2BHFXr7cayiQr96Cq7BQjZ%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F8BEAAaDDkyNjA0MTIwMzkzNSIMzvHNB8Hg%2FeYy74gxKo8Fw1BGlk0k2WAcVHzkDVLWXPPu7fXyai8%2FVmcJBP1B5%2FTcuoMPfiVAFsQXGJqr%2FQRvzqadIlgJbk3dYbNpShnr6eB2pCbH%2B4Hvv5E2ujgQ9UBciItlHCuWJlFY97UBrh6RPtR9yJaP2VPKmSF1TdBpSJzRU%2B9gh81G7dW1rAkUWZAOdu95nRvpZ0tYuIK0Mp6NzVSIBTyZE1edYT6%2BXT29YfEkafGlpVxfWtZMLX5DD%2F7d0450E%2Bw18%2Bo4rdUK9eBKUq7P3U54X1uLBq4tOOHz%2BTzN3pD%2BbkWgzjHRavawXN1JV2qncvKPq5tVoQbu%2BQwdSh%2BasKUPanR0wK7aI4eAWfjc9tm6Z94lArU4jTlxQCLAyDIYxyAJ9%2FokHkslhkIMonM612e95l%2FLFLlchEAlw5bSvnG4LW8buJtYxr4awsWEhvs5HHA9HHCQRI5ybJf%2FmeRGulWrsyvokEpMenBxE07Cy8RFjTgBvfZdfuyRq7mGbmVOdRueh7W3gznC7QW42speX%2B3ozW1ja1TDOn0lmTg%2B2hhethq2eJCnehZG5Pzsn42QfTDlMGu7UZKkZIROfvjxGjUGBFnoAKoYW8wrlZ6TbIKKAMRpiwIRDvYUNR9q4lIrzhBgdchRPLiz5b3LfpIHNYdRiqoppy%2F2%2FoPGVm8HEorgPTA2UG1SswU%2FTqwwMNSu%2FvbUSFGTx5PyDiGleLr%2B5bvGcuM%2BNP5pK1sw7ud6vZjmS%2Bo%2Fdg8mIJnA4g%2B8SxqVUN8J7gGZN3P7Ngqf4XuSu8SztIWSJrnFZ0oTF9%2FaIlPOkxPn5oDneJIBv0%2FW5efbsMvKTSzczqYLaQVAgqODa5AdE%2F%2BjpAkKSxZ6f9iAsOOj9awAHeJYxMO6VjDbnoC4BjqyAQJfem%2FyGQaRJDk1pn1lXABxVoqjZKcAUffRwrjy8yzqFYASw54B6ED%2FlPyyRZ5mz5zl%2BO4ad2UMibLl4n5RQVi5vjlO5SCd%2FhYZ9V%2Bj9fbbKOQFGLyZ48q9PCyOpuLdtM%2Bl2Cj1wT%2FuGQ7JB%2BdM4cGXUyPFmmXSiOZCwWgIz02zq3D%2Bo%2Fzzdh9foPH3VQRAXq%2F4iiXx7ge0dbFIqupgdip3EgfQKEViiGFEbNE7qXrwz80%3D"><div> <div> </div> <div>COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS <span>2024COA106</span> </div> <div> </div> <div> </div> <div>Court of Appeals No. 22CA0237 </div> <div>Jefferson County District Court No. 19CR4149<span> </span> </div> <div>Honorable Jeffrey R. Pilkington, Judge </div> <div> </div> <div> </div> <div>The People of the State of Colorado, </div> <div> </div> <div>Plaintiff-Appellee, </div> <div> </div> <div>v. </div> <div> </div> <div>Alec dâEstree,<span> </span> </div> <div> </div> <div>Defendant-Appellant. </div> <div> </div> <div> </div> <div>JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE<span> </span> </div> <div>REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS<span> </span> </div> <div> </div> <div>Division II </div> <div>Opinion by JUDGE FOX </div> <div>Sullivan, J., concurs </div> <div>Grove, J., specially concurs </div> <div> </div> <div>Announced October 3, 2024 </div> <div> </div> <div> </div> <div>Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Paul Koehler, Senior Counsel, Denver, </div> <div>Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee </div> <div> </div> <div>Gregory Lansky, Alternate Defense Counsel, Aurora, Colorado, for Defendant-</div> <div>Appellant</div> </div> </div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf4" data-page-no="4"> <div><div> <div>1 </div> <div>¶ 1<span> </span><span>Defendant, Alec d<span>â</span>Estree, appeals his convictions, challenging </span> </div> <div>the district court<span>â</span>s order declining to suppress evidence gathered </div> <div>from his cell phone using a PIN code obtained via an infirm </div> <div>warrant<span>. <span>We reverse his convictions and remand the case for a new </span></span> </div> <div>trial. </div> <div>I.<span> <span>Background </span></span> </div> <div>¶ 2<span> </span><span>On<span> October 15, 2019, Lakewood police officers responded to a </span></span> </div> <div>shooting outside an apartment complex around midnight<span>. </span>They </div> <div>found the victim <span>â</span> who had been shot in the chest <span>â</span> in the </div> <div>parking lot. First responders transported him to the hospital, </div> <div>where he later died<span>. </span>A neighbor testified that, shortly before police </div> <div>arrived, she heard arguing<span>, </span>a car horn<span>, </span>and then a gunshot, and </div> <div>saw<span> three individuals rush to a waiting car before driving away.<span></span> At </span> </div> <div>trial, Autumn Lucero <span>â</span> who had been present when the shooting </div> <div>occurred and accepted a plea deal from the prosecution before she </div> <div>testified <span>â</span> detailed her version of the events leading up to the </div> <div>killing<span>. <span> <span> <span> </span></span></span></span> </div> <div>¶ 3<span> </span><span>Lucero testified that, on October 14, 2019, she was traveling </span> </div> <div>with her ex-boyfriend Manuel Garcia and her cousin Dominic </div> </div></div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf5" data-page-no="5"> <div> <img alt="" src="https://icbg.s3.amazonaws.com/media/MMX/n%2Be/MMXn%2BekQ817y/lXyeovZwcgeMWibwHo7dUSO3Lu0a7r74%3D?AWSAccessKeyId=ASIA5PHC3MTPTCGXON2M&Expires=1728061407&Signature=i7I0KGk%2FQ0qr%2F4kN5kothv45lCA%3D&x-amz-security-token=IQoJb3JpZ2luX2VjEJD%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2FwEaCXVzLWVhc3QtMSJGMEQCIGu1GFJEr5iCtVwEWS8%2FYmPE84Pm%2FFzYhGTa%2FGzTkZFfAiBYlQ81xdSGIng%2BcUDaidgy1WsHp67%2BHFXr7cayiQr96Cq7BQjZ%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F8BEAAaDDkyNjA0MTIwMzkzNSIMzvHNB8Hg%2FeYy74gxKo8Fw1BGlk0k2WAcVHzkDVLWXPPu7fXyai8%2FVmcJBP1B5%2FTcuoMPfiVAFsQXGJqr%2FQRvzqadIlgJbk3dYbNpShnr6eB2pCbH%2B4Hvv5E2ujgQ9UBciItlHCuWJlFY97UBrh6RPtR9yJaP2VPKmSF1TdBpSJzRU%2B9gh81G7dW1rAkUWZAOdu95nRvpZ0tYuIK0Mp6NzVSIBTyZE1edYT6%2BXT29YfEkafGlpVxfWtZMLX5DD%2F7d0450E%2Bw18%2Bo4rdUK9eBKUq7P3U54X1uLBq4tOOHz%2BTzN3pD%2BbkWgzjHRavawXN1JV2qncvKPq5tVoQbu%2BQwdSh%2BasKUPanR0wK7aI4eAWfjc9tm6Z94lArU4jTlxQCLAyDIYxyAJ9%2FokHkslhkIMonM612e95l%2FLFLlchEAlw5bSvnG4LW8buJtYxr4awsWEhvs5HHA9HHCQRI5ybJf%2FmeRGulWrsyvokEpMenBxE07Cy8RFjTgBvfZdfuyRq7mGbmVOdRueh7W3gznC7QW42speX%2B3ozW1ja1TDOn0lmTg%2B2hhethq2eJCnehZG5Pzsn42QfTDlMGu7UZKkZIROfvjxGjUGBFnoAKoYW8wrlZ6TbIKKAMRpiwIRDvYUNR9q4lIrzhBgdchRPLiz5b3LfpIHNYdRiqoppy%2F2%2FoPGVm8HEorgPTA2UG1SswU%2FTqwwMNSu%2FvbUSFGTx5PyDiGleLr%2B5bvGcuM%2BNP5pK1sw7ud6vZjmS%2Bo%2Fdg8mIJnA4g%2B8SxqVUN8J7gGZN3P7Ngqf4XuSu8SztIWSJrnFZ0oTF9%2FaIlPOkxPn5oDneJIBv0%2FW5efbsMvKTSzczqYLaQVAgqODa5AdE%2F%2BjpAkKSxZ6f9iAsOOj9awAHeJYxMO6VjDbnoC4BjqyAQJfem%2FyGQaRJDk1pn1lXABxVoqjZKcAUffRwrjy8yzqFYASw54B6ED%2FlPyyRZ5mz5zl%2BO4ad2UMibLl4n5RQVi5vjlO5SCd%2FhYZ9V%2Bj9fbbKOQFGLyZ48q9PCyOpuLdtM%2Bl2Cj1wT%2FuGQ7JB%2BdM4cGXUyPFmmXSiOZCwWgIz02zq3D%2Bo%2Fzzdh9foPH3VQRAXq%2F4iiXx7ge0dbFIqupgdip3EgfQKEViiGFEbNE7qXrwz80%3D"><div> <div>2 </div> <div>Maestas.</div> </div> <div><div>1</div></div> <div> <div> Garcia and Maestas <span>st</span>ole several items from a </div> <div>convenience store and later robb<span>ed</span> some teenagers <span>in</span> <span>a </span>grocery </div> <div>store parking lot. D<span>â</span>Estree was at Lucero<span>â</span><span>s </span><span>apartment</span><span>, </span>to which <span></span>the </div> <div>group had returned after the robbery<span>. </span><span>DâEstree joined t</span><span>he</span> group<span>, </span> </div> <div>which then went to a friend<span>â</span>s house where Garcia re<span>tr</span>ieved a silver </div> <div>handgun. </div> <div>¶ 4<span> </span><span>The group next traveled to a private residence in Littleton </span> </div> <div>where, two weeks before, they had sold a stolen iPhone to an </div> <div>individual. According to Lucero, Garcia<span>â</span>s sister <span>â</span>had gotten beat up </div> <div>for the stolen iPhone,<span>â</span> so the group returned to the residence <span>â</span>to </div> <div>retaliate.<span>â</span><span> Garcia fired the silver handgun at the house <span>â</span>[s]ix or </span> </div> <div>seven times<span>â</span> in a drive-<span>by</span> shooting, <span>but</span> no one was harm<span></span>ed.</div> </div> <div><div>2</div></div> <div> <div> <span> </span> </div> <div>¶ 5<span> </span><span>Lucero testified that the group still wanted to <span>â</span>make some </span> </div> <div>money<span>â</span><span> by </span><span>â</span><span>robbing, stealing cars, et cetera.<span>â</span> While at <span>an<span></span><span> </span></span></span> </div> <div>apartment complex<span>, </span>Lucero saw d<span>â</span>Estree leave the car with the </div> <div> </div> </div> <div><div>1</div></div> <div> <div> Lucero, Garcia, and Maestas were originally set to be t<span></span>ried </div> <div>together as codefendants with d<span>â</span>Estree, but the district court later </div> <div>severed d<span>â</span><span>Estree<span>â</span></span>s trial.<span> </span><span> </span> </div> </div> <div><div>2</div></div> <div> <div> A prosecution expert later testified that her analysis of<span></span> shell </div> <div>casings and the bullets led her to conclude that the same gun <span></span>was </div> <div>used in the drive-by shooting and the homicide<span>. <span>A </span></span>matching shell </div> <div>was also found in Lucero<span>â</span>s apartment. <span> </span> </div> </div> <a href="#pf5" data-dest-detail='[5,"XYZ",69,187,null]'><div style="border-style:none;position:absolute;left:166.762778px;bottom:877.999444px;width:10.080000px;height:32.870000px;background-color:rgba(255,255,255,0.000001);"></div></a><a href="#pf5" data-dest-detail='[5,"XYZ",69,137,null]'><div style="border-style:none;position:absolute;left:618.610556px;bottom:416.031667px;width:10.080000px;height:32.870000px;background-color:rgba(255,255,255,0.000001);"></div></a> </div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf6" data-page-no="6"> <div><div> <div>3 </div> <div>silver handgun before hearing yelling, a car horn, and a gunsh<span></span>ot. </div> <div>D<span>â</span><span>Estree returned to the car and the group left the victim <span></span>in the </span> </div> <div>parking lot.<span> </span>After arriving home, Lucero photographed Garcia, </div> <div>Maestas, and d<span>â</span>Estree posing with the gun. According t<span></span>o Lucero, </div> <div>the next day d<span>â</span>Estree used his phone to search the internet for </div> <div>â<span>anything about what happened the night before.</span>â<span> <span> </span></span> </div> <div>¶ 6<span> </span><span>The defense pointed out on cross-examination that Lucero<span>â</span><span>s </span></span> </div> <div>trial testimony substantially differed from her earlier statements to </div> <div>police. For example, in her first interview with police in Novembe<span></span>r </div> <div>2019, Lucero only told them about the drive-by shooting and not </div> <div>the homicide<span>. </span>During that interview Lucero claimed that only she, </div> <div>Garcia, and Maestas were in the car for the drive-<span>by</span> shooting; <span></span>at </div> <div>trial, she said that she had initially <span>â</span><span>forgotten<span>â</span></span> that d<span>â</span>Estree was </div> <div>there. Lucero further first told police that Garcia forced her, at </div> <div>gunpoint, to drive the car to the drive-by shooting location and that </div> <div>d<span>â</span><span>Estree later forced her, at gunpoint, to remain in the bac<span></span>kseat of </span> </div> <div>the car during the robbery that resulted in the victim<span>â</span>s death<span>. </span><span> </span> </div> <div>¶ 7<span> </span><span>Sergeant Jonathan Holloway testified that the homicide </span> </div> <div>investigation initially produced no suspects, nor did anything </div> <div>connect the drive-by shooting to the homicide, until the police </div> </div></div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf7" data-page-no="7"> <div><div> <div>4 </div> <div>learned that Garcia wanted to speak to them<span>. </span>Once aware of </div> <div>d<span>â</span><span>Estree<span>â</span><span>s potential involvement police arrested him, and lat<span></span>er </span></span> </div> <div>charged him on November 14, 2019. Police also seized his Apple </div> <div>iPhone, and searched and downloaded all of its cont<span></span>ents after </div> <div>acquiring a search warrant on November 20, 2019<span>. </span> </div> <div>¶ 8<span> </span><span>The district court, however, concluded the first search warrant </span> </div> <div>for the cell phone<span>â</span>s contents was invalid because it was overbroad<span>. </span> </div> <div>The prosecution later sought a second warrant to repeat the sea<span></span>rch<span>, </span> </div> <div>as <span>discussed in greater detail below. </span> </div> <div>¶ 9<span> </span><span>Pursuant to the second warrant, the court allowed police to </span> </div> <div>search the contents of d<span>â</span><span>Estree<span>â</span></span>s cell phone from October 1, <span></span>2019, </div> <div>to November 12, 2019, and the prosecution presented evidence </div> <div>collected from the phone <span>at dâEstreeâs </span>homicide trial. The </div> <div>prosecution admitted four pictures recovered from d<span>â<span>Estree</span><span>â</span></span>s phone </div> <div>taken inside Lucero<span>â</span>s home approximately one hour after the </div> <div>homicide<span>. <span> <span>One image showed Maestas and d<span>â</span>Estree standing, while </span></span></span> </div> <div>d<span>â</span><span>Estree pointed a silver handgun at the camera. One image </span> </div> <div>showed Garcia smiling for the camera, and another showed </div> <div>Maestas with two handguns, one black and the other silver, t<span></span>ucked </div> </div></div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf8" data-page-no="8"> <div><div> <div>5 </div> <div>into the strap of what appeared to be a bulletproof vest<span></span>. The last </div> <div>image showed Garcia pointing both handguns at the camera. <span></span> <span> </span> </div> <div>¶ 10<span> </span><span>The phone also contained several text messages d<span>â</span>Estree sent </span> </div> <div>in the weeks following the homicide<span>. </span> Most notably, d<span>â</span>Estree sent </div> <div>the following message on November 3, 2019: </div> <div>Ayee fam <span>. . .</span> just gotta check in with all my </div> <div>n[*****]s before I get locked up just wanted to </div> <div>let you know I appreciate you fam . . . [.] </div> <div>¶ 11<span> </span><span>The recipient of the message asked when d<span>â</span>Estree would go to </span> </div> <div>prison, and d<span>â</span>Estree responded: <span>â</span>Shit they ain<span>â</span>t kaught me y<span></span>et but </div> <div>they looking for somebody they just won<span>â</span>t release the name and shit </div> <div>link soon fam.<span>â</span><span> </span><span> </span> </div> <div>¶ 12<span> </span><span>Police also recovered d<span>â</span><span>Estree<span>â</span></span>s internet search history<span>. </span></span> </div> <div>Holloway testified that police found <span>â</span>[s]earch histories for looking </div> <div>for man shot, articles of man shot in West Denver and Lak<span></span>ewood<span>â</span> </div> <div>from October 15 and 16, 2019. <span> </span> </div> <div>¶ 13<span> </span><span>The jury found d<span>â</span>Estree guilty on all charges <span>â</span> first degree </span> </div> <div>felony murder, second degree murder, conspiracy to <span></span>commit </div> <div>aggravated robbery, three charges of criminal attempt to commit </div> </div></div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf9" data-page-no="9"> <div> <img alt="" src="https://icbg.s3.amazonaws.com/media/MMX/n%2Be/MMXn%2BekQ817y/lXyeovZwcgeMWibwHo7dUSO3Lu0a7r74%3D?AWSAccessKeyId=ASIA5PHC3MTPTCGXON2M&Expires=1728061407&Signature=i7I0KGk%2FQ0qr%2F4kN5kothv45lCA%3D&x-amz-security-token=IQoJb3JpZ2luX2VjEJD%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2FwEaCXVzLWVhc3QtMSJGMEQCIGu1GFJEr5iCtVwEWS8%2FYmPE84Pm%2FFzYhGTa%2FGzTkZFfAiBYlQ81xdSGIng%2BcUDaidgy1WsHp67%2BHFXr7cayiQr96Cq7BQjZ%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F8BEAAaDDkyNjA0MTIwMzkzNSIMzvHNB8Hg%2FeYy74gxKo8Fw1BGlk0k2WAcVHzkDVLWXPPu7fXyai8%2FVmcJBP1B5%2FTcuoMPfiVAFsQXGJqr%2FQRvzqadIlgJbk3dYbNpShnr6eB2pCbH%2B4Hvv5E2ujgQ9UBciItlHCuWJlFY97UBrh6RPtR9yJaP2VPKmSF1TdBpSJzRU%2B9gh81G7dW1rAkUWZAOdu95nRvpZ0tYuIK0Mp6NzVSIBTyZE1edYT6%2BXT29YfEkafGlpVxfWtZMLX5DD%2F7d0450E%2Bw18%2Bo4rdUK9eBKUq7P3U54X1uLBq4tOOHz%2BTzN3pD%2BbkWgzjHRavawXN1JV2qncvKPq5tVoQbu%2BQwdSh%2BasKUPanR0wK7aI4eAWfjc9tm6Z94lArU4jTlxQCLAyDIYxyAJ9%2FokHkslhkIMonM612e95l%2FLFLlchEAlw5bSvnG4LW8buJtYxr4awsWEhvs5HHA9HHCQRI5ybJf%2FmeRGulWrsyvokEpMenBxE07Cy8RFjTgBvfZdfuyRq7mGbmVOdRueh7W3gznC7QW42speX%2B3ozW1ja1TDOn0lmTg%2B2hhethq2eJCnehZG5Pzsn42QfTDlMGu7UZKkZIROfvjxGjUGBFnoAKoYW8wrlZ6TbIKKAMRpiwIRDvYUNR9q4lIrzhBgdchRPLiz5b3LfpIHNYdRiqoppy%2F2%2FoPGVm8HEorgPTA2UG1SswU%2FTqwwMNSu%2FvbUSFGTx5PyDiGleLr%2B5bvGcuM%2BNP5pK1sw7ud6vZjmS%2Bo%2Fdg8mIJnA4g%2B8SxqVUN8J7gGZN3P7Ngqf4XuSu8SztIWSJrnFZ0oTF9%2FaIlPOkxPn5oDneJIBv0%2FW5efbsMvKTSzczqYLaQVAgqODa5AdE%2F%2BjpAkKSxZ6f9iAsOOj9awAHeJYxMO6VjDbnoC4BjqyAQJfem%2FyGQaRJDk1pn1lXABxVoqjZKcAUffRwrjy8yzqFYASw54B6ED%2FlPyyRZ5mz5zl%2BO4ad2UMibLl4n5RQVi5vjlO5SCd%2FhYZ9V%2Bj9fbbKOQFGLyZ48q9PCyOpuLdtM%2Bl2Cj1wT%2FuGQ7JB%2BdM4cGXUyPFmmXSiOZCwWgIz02zq3D%2Bo%2Fzzdh9foPH3VQRAXq%2F4iiXx7ge0dbFIqupgdip3EgfQKEViiGFEbNE7qXrwz80%3D"><div> <div>6 </div> <div>aggravated robbery,</div> </div> <div><div>3</div></div> <div> <div> and two crime of violence sentence enhancers<span>. </span> </div> <div>The district court only sentenced d<span>â</span>Estree for his felony murde<span></span>r and </div> <div>conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery convictions because hi<span></span>s </div> <div>second degree murder and attempt to commit aggravated robbe<span></span>ry </div> <div>convictions merged into his felony murder conviction. The district </div> <div>court sentenced him to life without the possibility of parole for his </div> <div>felony murder conviction and sixteen years in the custody of the </div> <div>Department of Corrections for the conspiracy to commit<span></span> aggravated </div> <div>robbery conviction, served concurrently<span>. </span><span> </span> </div> <div>¶ 14<span> </span><span>This appeal followed<span>. D<span>â</span></span>Estree rais<span>es</span> four main issues<span>, </span></span> </div> <div>arguing that (1) the district court erred by declining to suppress </div> <div>evidence gathered from his phone after the second warrant was </div> <div>issued; (2) Lucero was coerced into waiving her Fifth Amendm<span></span>ent </div> <div>rights and testifying at trial, with the district court improperly </div> <div>advising the jury not to consider Lucero<span>â</span>s punishment; (3) the </div> <div>district court erred by failing to properly instruct the jury on </div> <div> </div> </div> <div><div>3</div></div> <div> <div> The prosecution charged d<span>â</span>Estree with three counts of att<span></span>empt to </div> <div>commit aggravated robbery under three different theories, but the </div> <div>district court did not require that the prosecution elect <span></span>a specific </div> <div>theory; rather, it exercised its discretion to simply impose </div> <div>concurrent sentences for each of the theories under which d<span>â</span>Estr<span></span>ee </div> <div>was found guilty. <span> </span> </div> </div> <a href="#pf9" data-dest-detail='[9,"XYZ",69,170,null]'><div style="border-style:none;position:absolute;left:262.289444px;bottom:877.999444px;width:10.080000px;height:32.870000px;background-color:rgba(255,255,255,0.000001);"></div></a> </div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pfa" data-page-no="a"> <div> <img alt="" src="https://icbg.s3.amazonaws.com/media/MM9/Zgu/MM9ZguMTW/pwsU7Hj38Z0aT83wGmUtrM/47S7PRRijEBs%3D?AWSAccessKeyId=ASIA5PHC3MTPTCGXON2M&Expires=1728061407&Signature=jYewIYtJVXKXrUNQW%2Fn%2FapTel%2Bg%3D&x-amz-security-token=IQoJb3JpZ2luX2VjEJD%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2FwEaCXVzLWVhc3QtMSJGMEQCIGu1GFJEr5iCtVwEWS8%2FYmPE84Pm%2FFzYhGTa%2FGzTkZFfAiBYlQ81xdSGIng%2BcUDaidgy1WsHp67%2BHFXr7cayiQr96Cq7BQjZ%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F8BEAAaDDkyNjA0MTIwMzkzNSIMzvHNB8Hg%2FeYy74gxKo8Fw1BGlk0k2WAcVHzkDVLWXPPu7fXyai8%2FVmcJBP1B5%2FTcuoMPfiVAFsQXGJqr%2FQRvzqadIlgJbk3dYbNpShnr6eB2pCbH%2B4Hvv5E2ujgQ9UBciItlHCuWJlFY97UBrh6RPtR9yJaP2VPKmSF1TdBpSJzRU%2B9gh81G7dW1rAkUWZAOdu95nRvpZ0tYuIK0Mp6NzVSIBTyZE1edYT6%2BXT29YfEkafGlpVxfWtZMLX5DD%2F7d0450E%2Bw18%2Bo4rdUK9eBKUq7P3U54X1uLBq4tOOHz%2BTzN3pD%2BbkWgzjHRavawXN1JV2qncvKPq5tVoQbu%2BQwdSh%2BasKUPanR0wK7aI4eAWfjc9tm6Z94lArU4jTlxQCLAyDIYxyAJ9%2FokHkslhkIMonM612e95l%2FLFLlchEAlw5bSvnG4LW8buJtYxr4awsWEhvs5HHA9HHCQRI5ybJf%2FmeRGulWrsyvokEpMenBxE07Cy8RFjTgBvfZdfuyRq7mGbmVOdRueh7W3gznC7QW42speX%2B3ozW1ja1TDOn0lmTg%2B2hhethq2eJCnehZG5Pzsn42QfTDlMGu7UZKkZIROfvjxGjUGBFnoAKoYW8wrlZ6TbIKKAMRpiwIRDvYUNR9q4lIrzhBgdchRPLiz5b3LfpIHNYdRiqoppy%2F2%2FoPGVm8HEorgPTA2UG1SswU%2FTqwwMNSu%2FvbUSFGTx5PyDiGleLr%2B5bvGcuM%2BNP5pK1sw7ud6vZjmS%2Bo%2Fdg8mIJnA4g%2B8SxqVUN8J7gGZN3P7Ngqf4XuSu8SztIWSJrnFZ0oTF9%2FaIlPOkxPn5oDneJIBv0%2FW5efbsMvKTSzczqYLaQVAgqODa5AdE%2F%2BjpAkKSxZ6f9iAsOOj9awAHeJYxMO6VjDbnoC4BjqyAQJfem%2FyGQaRJDk1pn1lXABxVoqjZKcAUffRwrjy8yzqFYASw54B6ED%2FlPyyRZ5mz5zl%2BO4ad2UMibLl4n5RQVi5vjlO5SCd%2FhYZ9V%2Bj9fbbKOQFGLyZ48q9PCyOpuLdtM%2Bl2Cj1wT%2FuGQ7JB%2BdM4cGXUyPFmmXSiOZCwWgIz02zq3D%2Bo%2Fzzdh9foPH3VQRAXq%2F4iiXx7ge0dbFIqupgdip3EgfQKEViiGFEbNE7qXrwz80%3D"><div> <div>7 </div> <div>criminal attempt; and (4) given his youth, his sentence to life </div> <div>without the possibility of parole for felony murder is </div> <div>unconstitutional. <span> </span> </div> <div>¶ 15<span> </span><span>We conclude that, in gathering evidence from d<span>â</span><span>Estree<span>â</span></span>s cell </span> </div> <div>phone, police violated the Fourth Amendment and that no </div> <div>exceptions to the warrant requirement apply, and that the error in </div> <div>allowing the evidence was not harmless beyond a reasonable <span></span>doubt<span>. </span> </div> <div>We thus reverse his convictions and remand the case for a new </div> <div>trial. We need not address d<span>â</span><span>Estree<span>â</span></span>s other contentions because </div> <div>they may not arise on retrial<span>. </span> <span>See People v. Cook</span><span>,</span><span> </span>197 P.3d 269, </div> <div>277 (Colo. App. 2008)<span>. </span><span> </span> </div> <div>II.<span> <span>Phone Search Conducted Pursuant to the Second Warrant </span></span> </div> <div>¶ 16<span> </span><span>As to the second warrant, d<span>â</span>Estree argues that (1) police<span>â</span>s use </span> </div> <div>of the PIN code</div> </div> <div><div>4</div></div> <div> <div> violated the independent source doctrine because </div> <div>the PIN code was discovered during the first suppressed sea<span></span>rch and </div> <div>was improperly used in preparing and executing the second </div> <div>warrant; (2) collecti<span>ng</span> the PIN code through a brute force attack </div> <div> </div> </div> <div><div>4</div></div> <div> <div> Where possible, we refer to the specific combination requir<span></span>ed to </div> <div>access d<span>â</span><span>Estree</span><span>âs phone as a â</span>PIN <span>code,â</span> though we also </div> <div>occasionally refer to âpasswordsâ in a broader <span>sense, and case law </span> </div> <div>and the record occasionally refer to <span>âpasswordâ or âpass code.â </span> </div> </div> <a href="#pfa" data-dest-detail='[10,"XYZ",69,137,null]'><div style="border-style:none;position:absolute;left:220.058889px;bottom:335.135556px;width:10.080000px;height:32.870000px;background-color:rgba(255,255,255,0.000001);"></div></a> </div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pfb" data-page-no="b"> <div><div> <div>8 </div> <div>constituted a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment; and (3) </div> <div>the inevitable discovery doctrine does not apply. <span> </span> </div> <div>¶ 17<span> </span><span>These contentions were preserved. <span>See People v. Tallent</span><span>, <span></span>2021 </span></span> </div> <div>CO 68, ¶ 12<span>; </span><span>People v. McFee</span>,2016 COA 97, ¶ 31. </div> <div>A.<span> <span>Additional Background </span></span> </div> <div>1.<span> <span>The First Warrant </span></span> </div> <div>¶ 18<span> </span><span>The challenged cell phone evidence result<span>ed</span> from two separate </span> </div> <div>search warrants, the first of which the court declared invalid<span>. </span>In </div> <div>the first warrant, police requested authorization to search d<span>â</span><span>Estre<span></span>e<span>â</span><span>s </span></span> </div> <div>cell phone <span>for</span> the following information: </div> <div>1. <span>Specialized Location Records:<span> </span></span>All call, text </div> <div>and data connection location information, </div> <div>related to all specialized carrier records <span>. . . <span>. </span></span> </div> <div>Historical GPS/Mobile Locate Information </div> <div>which shows GPS location (longitude and </div> <div>latitude) and Cell-Site and sector of the device </div> <div>in relationship to the network when connected </div> <div>to the network. . . . </div> <div>2. <span>Electronically Stored Records: </span>All records </div> <div>associated with the identified cell phone<span>[]</span>, to </div> <div>include all stored communication or files, </div> <div>including voice mail, text messages, including </div> <div>numbers text to and received from and all </div> <div>related content, e-mail, digital images (e.g. </div> <div>pictures), contact lists, video calling, web </div> <div>activity (name of web site or application visited </div> <div>or accessed), domain accessed, data </div> <div>connections (to include Internet Service </div> </div></div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pfc" data-page-no="c"> <div><div> <div>9 </div> <div>Providers (ISPs), Internet protocol (IP) </div> <div>addresses, (IP) Session data, (IP) Destination </div> <div>Data, bookmarks, data sessions, name of web </div> <div>sites and/or applications accessed), date and </div> <div>time when all web sites, applications, and/or </div> <div>third party applications were accessed and the </div> <div>duration of each web site, application, and/or </div> <div>third party application was accessed, and any </div> <div>other files including all cell site and sector </div> <div>information associated with each connection </div> <div>and/or record associated with the cell. </div> <div>A judicial officer approved the first warrant on November 20, 201<span></span>9<span>, </span> </div> <div>even though the warrant had no subject-matter or date limits<span>. </span> </div> <div>¶ 19<span> </span><span>Dawn Fink, who was admitted as a police expert in <span>â</span>digital </span> </div> <div>forensic analysis<span>â</span> during a pretrial hearing, testified that, in </div> <div>analy<span>zing <span>a <span>cell phone, she typically extracts all electronic </span></span></span> </div> <div>information contained on the phone, unless the warrant has </div> <div>co<span>nstraints. Fink then provides all of the extracted data in a </span> </div> <div>readable format to detectives, who search through the data within<span></span> </div> <div>the scope of the warrant. The search tools available to her could </div> <div>not first limit the extraction by date<span>. </span><span> </span> </div> <div>¶ 20<span> </span><span>A return and inventory dated December 18, 2019, d<span></span>etailed </span> </div> <div>that no downloads of d<span>â</span><span>Estree<span>â</span></span>s phone could yet be completed </div> <div>pursuant to the first warrant because the phone was <span>â</span>password </div> <div>protected.<span>â</span><span> <span>To gain access to the phone, police had earlier reache<span></span>d </span></span> </div> </div></div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pfd" data-page-no="d"> <div> <img alt="" src="https://icbg.s3.amazonaws.com/media/MM9/Zgu/MM9ZguMTW/pwsU7Hj38Z0aT83wGmUtrM/47S7PRRijEBs%3D?AWSAccessKeyId=ASIA5PHC3MTPTCGXON2M&Expires=1728061407&Signature=jYewIYtJVXKXrUNQW%2Fn%2FapTel%2Bg%3D&x-amz-security-token=IQoJb3JpZ2luX2VjEJD%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2FwEaCXVzLWVhc3QtMSJGMEQCIGu1GFJEr5iCtVwEWS8%2FYmPE84Pm%2FFzYhGTa%2FGzTkZFfAiBYlQ81xdSGIng%2BcUDaidgy1WsHp67%2BHFXr7cayiQr96Cq7BQjZ%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F8BEAAaDDkyNjA0MTIwMzkzNSIMzvHNB8Hg%2FeYy74gxKo8Fw1BGlk0k2WAcVHzkDVLWXPPu7fXyai8%2FVmcJBP1B5%2FTcuoMPfiVAFsQXGJqr%2FQRvzqadIlgJbk3dYbNpShnr6eB2pCbH%2B4Hvv5E2ujgQ9UBciItlHCuWJlFY97UBrh6RPtR9yJaP2VPKmSF1TdBpSJzRU%2B9gh81G7dW1rAkUWZAOdu95nRvpZ0tYuIK0Mp6NzVSIBTyZE1edYT6%2BXT29YfEkafGlpVxfWtZMLX5DD%2F7d0450E%2Bw18%2Bo4rdUK9eBKUq7P3U54X1uLBq4tOOHz%2BTzN3pD%2BbkWgzjHRavawXN1JV2qncvKPq5tVoQbu%2BQwdSh%2BasKUPanR0wK7aI4eAWfjc9tm6Z94lArU4jTlxQCLAyDIYxyAJ9%2FokHkslhkIMonM612e95l%2FLFLlchEAlw5bSvnG4LW8buJtYxr4awsWEhvs5HHA9HHCQRI5ybJf%2FmeRGulWrsyvokEpMenBxE07Cy8RFjTgBvfZdfuyRq7mGbmVOdRueh7W3gznC7QW42speX%2B3ozW1ja1TDOn0lmTg%2B2hhethq2eJCnehZG5Pzsn42QfTDlMGu7UZKkZIROfvjxGjUGBFnoAKoYW8wrlZ6TbIKKAMRpiwIRDvYUNR9q4lIrzhBgdchRPLiz5b3LfpIHNYdRiqoppy%2F2%2FoPGVm8HEorgPTA2UG1SswU%2FTqwwMNSu%2FvbUSFGTx5PyDiGleLr%2B5bvGcuM%2BNP5pK1sw7ud6vZjmS%2Bo%2Fdg8mIJnA4g%2B8SxqVUN8J7gGZN3P7Ngqf4XuSu8SztIWSJrnFZ0oTF9%2FaIlPOkxPn5oDneJIBv0%2FW5efbsMvKTSzczqYLaQVAgqODa5AdE%2F%2BjpAkKSxZ6f9iAsOOj9awAHeJYxMO6VjDbnoC4BjqyAQJfem%2FyGQaRJDk1pn1lXABxVoqjZKcAUffRwrjy8yzqFYASw54B6ED%2FlPyyRZ5mz5zl%2BO4ad2UMibLl4n5RQVi5vjlO5SCd%2FhYZ9V%2Bj9fbbKOQFGLyZ48q9PCyOpuLdtM%2Bl2Cj1wT%2FuGQ7JB%2BdM4cGXUyPFmmXSiOZCwWgIz02zq3D%2Bo%2Fzzdh9foPH3VQRAXq%2F4iiXx7ge0dbFIqupgdip3EgfQKEViiGFEbNE7qXrwz80%3D"><div> <div>10 </div> <div>out to the United States Secret Service (USSS) in November 2019.</div> </div> <div><div>5</div></div> <div> <div> </div> <div>Police took d<span>â</span><span>Estree<span>â</span></span>s phone to the <span>USSS</span>, which installed </div> <div>â<span>Cellebrite,</span>â<span> its </span>â<span>advanced tool,</span>â<span> on the phone <span>to</span> initiate a </span>â<span>brute </span> </div> <div>force attack<span>.â</span><span> </span>A brute force attack<span> </span>uses a computer program <span>to</span> test </div> <div>every possible combination of a PIN code (here, a six-digit numeric </div> <div>code) until it finds the correct PIN code to access data in the device<span>. </span><span> </span> </div> <div>¶ 21<span> </span><span>After installing Cellebrite<span>, </span>the <span>USSS</span> returned the phone to </span> </div> <div>local police<span>. </span>Fink testified that police <span>â</span>waited three months or so till </div> <div>[Cellebrite] cracked th<span>e </span><span>code.<span>â</span></span><span> </span>Fink testified that the timeframe for </div> <div>a brute force attack to test every possible combination for a six-digit </div> <div>PIN code was anywhere from <span>â</span>a week to eleven years.<span>â</span><span> </span> </div> <div>¶ 22<span> </span><span>Once the Cellebrite software discovered the PIN code, Fink </span> </div> <div>returned to the <span>USSS</span> to re-connect the phone to Cellebrite to </div> <div>access the PIN code<span>â</span>s digits<span>. </span>With the PIN code in hand, Fink </div> <div>testified that she then extracted all of the information from </div> <div>d<span>â</span><span>Estree<span>â</span><span>s phone in February 2020, and she provided all t<span></span>he data to </span></span> </div> <div>detectives. <span> </span> </div> <div> </div> </div> <div><div>5</div></div> <div> <div> Fink could not specify exactly when in November 2019 police too<span></span>k </div> <div>the phone to the USSS. </div> </div> <a href="#pfd" data-dest-detail='[13,"XYZ",69,104,null]'><div style="border-style:none;position:absolute;left:663.677778px;bottom:877.999444px;width:10.090000px;height:32.870000px;background-color:rgba(255,255,255,0.000001);"></div></a> </div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pfe" data-page-no="e"> <div><div> <div>11 </div> <div>¶ 23<span> </span><span>D<span>â</span><span>Estree moved to suppress <span>th</span><span>e </span>results of the first search in </span></span> </div> <div>March 2021. D<span>â</span>Estree argued that (1) the search occurred without </div> <div>a warrant, as the first warrant did not authorize police to </div> <div>indefinitely hold the phone; (2) the warrant violated Crim. P. </div> <div>41(d)(5)(VI) and section 16-3-305(6), C.R.S. 2024<span>, </span>because it was </div> <div>executed more than fourteen days after the warrant was issued; </div> <div>and (3) the search was an unlawful general search. <span> </span> </div> <div>¶ 24<span> </span><span>The district court found, in May 2021, that while the warrant </span> </div> <div>was executed beyond the fourteen-day limit, thus violating Crim. P. </div> <div>41(d)(5)(VI) and section 16-3-305(6), the timing alone did not merit </div> <div>suppression. Relying on <span>People v. Coke</span>,2020 CO 28, ¶¶ <span>33</span>-38, </div> <div>however, the district court concluded that the warrant lacked </div> <div>sufficient particularly and was a prohibited general warrant. <span></span> The </div> <div>first warrant <span>â</span>permitted law enforcement to search and seize the </div> <div>entire contents of the <span>[i]</span>Phone; there were no limitations. Notably,<span></span> </div> <div>there were no subject matter or time limitations on t<span></span>he information </div> <div>to be seized. Such a broad authorization violates the particularity </div> <div>requirement demanded by the Fourth Amendment.<span>â</span><span> </span>Thus, the </div> <div>court suppressed the evidence gathered from the full extra<span></span>ction of </div> <div>d<span>â</span><span>Estree<span>â</span><span>s phone. <span> </span></span></span> </div> </div></div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pff" data-page-no="f"> <div><div> <div>12 </div> <div>¶ 25<span> </span><span>The prosecution next requested that the district court </span> </div> <div>reconsider its ruling, arguing that <span>â</span> even though the warrant </div> <div>lacked a search timeframe <span>â</span> when the warrant was read with t<span></span>he </div> <div>accompanying affidavit, it was sufficiently particular and police </div> <div>acted in good faith<span>. </span>Suppression of this <span>â</span><span>critical<span>â</span></span> evidence was </div> <div>therefore unwarranted, the prosecution argued. The district court </div> <div>rejected these arguments. <span> </span> </div> <div>2.<span> <span>The Second Warrant </span></span> </div> <div>¶ 26<span> </span><span>With the evidence from the first search suppressed, police </span> </div> <div>sought a second warrant to extract information from d<span>â</span><span>Estree<span>â</span></span>s cell </div> <div>phone. This time, the warrant specified that it sought inf<span></span>ormation </div> <div>from <span>â</span>October 1, 2019 - November 12, 2019<span>â</span> relating to the </div> <div>homicide<span>. <span>The warrant requested the following information: </span></span> </div> <div>â¢<span> <span>Data which tends to show possession, </span></span> </div> <div>dominion and control over said equipment, </div> <div>including device and system ownership </div> <div>information (telephone number, ESN </div> <div>number, serial number, IMEI, IMSI, CCID); </div> <div>â¢<span> <span>Passwords, encryption keys, codes, and/or </span></span> </div> <div>other devices or information that may be </div> <div>necessary to access the device and its </div> <div>contents; </div> <div>â¢<span> <span>Date/time, language, and other settings </span></span> </div> <div>preferences to include wireless local area </div> </div></div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf10" data-page-no="10"> <div><div> <div>13 </div> <div>network setting(s), Bluetooth settings to </div> <div>include device name(s), hotspot SSID </div> <div>(name), and MAC address and connection </div> <div>dates and times to the device; </div> <div>â¢<span> <span>System and device usage files, logs, and </span></span> </div> <div>databases utilized to record device activities </div> <div>such as lock/unlock activities, powering </div> <div>on/off cycles, installation and deletions </div> <div>records; </div> <div>â¢<span> <span>Telephone contact lists, phone books and </span></span> </div> <div>telephone logs; </div> <div>â¢<span> <span>Data contained in notes, reminders, </span></span> </div> <div>documents, calendars and/or other similar </div> <div>applications that relates to the planning and </div> <div>commission of the attempt[ed] Homicide/ </div> <div>Homicide that occurred between October 1, </div> <div>2019 - November 12, 2019; </div> <div>â¢<span> <span>Communications made, stored, sent, </span></span> </div> <div>received or deleted that relate to the </div> <div>planning and commission of the attempt[ed] </div> <div>Homicide/Homicide that occurred between </div> <div>October 1, 2019 <span>â</span> November 12, 2019; </div> <div>â¢<span> <span>Photos and videos created, stored, sent, </span></span> </div> <div>received or deleted, or documents </div> <div>containing such photographs or videos that </div> <div>relate to the planning and commission of </div> <div>the attempt[ed] Homicide/Homicide that </div> <div>occurred between October 1, 2019 - </div> <div>November 12, 2019; </div> <div>â¢<span> <span>All electronic files, data, videos, and </span></span> </div> <div>communications, including related </div> <div>metadata and location data, stored, sent, </div> <div>received or deleted from social media and </div> </div></div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf11" data-page-no="11"> <div><div> <div>14 </div> <div>third-party applications located on the </div> <div>device that relate to the planning and </div> <div>commission of the attempt[ed] Homicide/ </div> <div>Homicide that occurred between October 1, </div> <div>2019 - November 12, 2019; </div> <div>â¢<span> <span>Communications through the </span></span> </div> <div>SIRI/(GOOGLE ASSISTANT system<span>[)]</span><span>, </span> </div> <div>including all communications entered </div> <div>and/or recorded into the system as well as </div> <div>communicated from the system to the user </div> <div>that relate to the attempt[ed] Homicide/ </div> <div>Homicide that occurred between October 1, </div> <div>2019 <span>â</span> November 12, 2019; </div> <div>â¢<span> <span>Global position system (GPS) data and any </span></span> </div> <div>other geolocation data that relates to the </div> <div>planning and commission of the attempt[ed] </div> <div>Homicide/Homicide that occurred between </div> <div>October 1, 2019 <span>â</span> November 12, 2019; </div> <div>â¢<span> <span>Records of internet activity that relates to </span></span> </div> <div>the planning and commission of the </div> <div>attempt[ed] Homicide/Homicide that </div> <div>occurred between October 1, 2019- </div> <div>November 12, 2019, including internet </div> <div>protocol (IP) addresses and Port IDs, firewall </div> <div>logs, transactions with internet hosting </div> <div>providers, co-located computer systems, </div> <div>cloud computing services, caches, browser </div> <div>history and cookies, <span>â</span><span>bookmarked<span>â</span></span> <span>or </span> </div> <div>â<span>favorite</span>â<span> web pages, search terms that the </span> </div> <div>user entered into any internet search </div> <div>engine, and records of user-typed we<span>b </span> </div> <div>addresses pertaining to violations of the law </div> <div>or that show who used, owned, possessed, </div> <div>or controlled the device(s). </div> </div></div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf12" data-page-no="12"> <div><div> <div>15 </div> <div>The district court approved the second warrant on October 11, </div> <div>2021. <span>After dâEstreeâs</span> arrest, the phone had remained in police </div> <div>custody (except for the brief times the USSS handled <span></span>it).<span> </span> </div> <div>¶ 27<span> </span><span>Fink conducted the second extraction seeking to collect all </span> </div> <div>information from the phone, without limitation, to ensure no </div> <div>relevant information was missed<span>, </span>but this time she provided the </div> <div>detectives only data within the dates specified <span>in</span> the warrant. Fink </div> <div>also explained that a new tool available after the first warrant<span>, </span> </div> <div>â<span>GrayKey,</span>â<span> was used to conduct the extraction, which allowed p<span></span>olice </span> </div> <div>to conduct three types of extractions:<span> </span><span>a <span>â</span></span>partial BFU<span>â</span> (before first </div> <div>unlock), an <span>â</span>instant AFU<span>â</span> (after first unlock), or a <span>â</span>full-file system<span>â</span> </div> <div>AFU extraction. Fink testified that a partial BFU extracti<span></span>on </div> <div>â<span>provides generally just system data,</span>â<span> and occasionally some </span> </div> <div>photos, and is used <span>â</span>to see if there<span>â</span>s any information to potentially </div> <div>find [PIN] codes for the device<span>.â</span> This type of extraction is the only </div> <div>extraction available without a PIN code. Having a PIN code enables </div> <div>conducting an AFU extraction, with the <span>â</span>full-file system<span>â</span> AFU </div> <div>providing all information on a device, but it could take years t<span></span>o </div> <div>crack the PIN code<span>. </span><span> </span> </div> </div></div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf13" data-page-no="13"> <div> <img alt="" src="https://icbg.s3.amazonaws.com/media/MMX/n%2Be/MMXn%2BekQ817y/lXyeovZwcgeMWibwHo7dUSO3Lu0a7r74%3D?AWSAccessKeyId=ASIA5PHC3MTPTCGXON2M&Expires=1728061407&Signature=i7I0KGk%2FQ0qr%2F4kN5kothv45lCA%3D&x-amz-security-token=IQoJb3JpZ2luX2VjEJD%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2FwEaCXVzLWVhc3QtMSJGMEQCIGu1GFJEr5iCtVwEWS8%2FYmPE84Pm%2FFzYhGTa%2FGzTkZFfAiBYlQ81xdSGIng%2BcUDaidgy1WsHp67%2BHFXr7cayiQr96Cq7BQjZ%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F8BEAAaDDkyNjA0MTIwMzkzNSIMzvHNB8Hg%2FeYy74gxKo8Fw1BGlk0k2WAcVHzkDVLWXPPu7fXyai8%2FVmcJBP1B5%2FTcuoMPfiVAFsQXGJqr%2FQRvzqadIlgJbk3dYbNpShnr6eB2pCbH%2B4Hvv5E2ujgQ9UBciItlHCuWJlFY97UBrh6RPtR9yJaP2VPKmSF1TdBpSJzRU%2B9gh81G7dW1rAkUWZAOdu95nRvpZ0tYuIK0Mp6NzVSIBTyZE1edYT6%2BXT29YfEkafGlpVxfWtZMLX5DD%2F7d0450E%2Bw18%2Bo4rdUK9eBKUq7P3U54X1uLBq4tOOHz%2BTzN3pD%2BbkWgzjHRavawXN1JV2qncvKPq5tVoQbu%2BQwdSh%2BasKUPanR0wK7aI4eAWfjc9tm6Z94lArU4jTlxQCLAyDIYxyAJ9%2FokHkslhkIMonM612e95l%2FLFLlchEAlw5bSvnG4LW8buJtYxr4awsWEhvs5HHA9HHCQRI5ybJf%2FmeRGulWrsyvokEpMenBxE07Cy8RFjTgBvfZdfuyRq7mGbmVOdRueh7W3gznC7QW42speX%2B3ozW1ja1TDOn0lmTg%2B2hhethq2eJCnehZG5Pzsn42QfTDlMGu7UZKkZIROfvjxGjUGBFnoAKoYW8wrlZ6TbIKKAMRpiwIRDvYUNR9q4lIrzhBgdchRPLiz5b3LfpIHNYdRiqoppy%2F2%2FoPGVm8HEorgPTA2UG1SswU%2FTqwwMNSu%2FvbUSFGTx5PyDiGleLr%2B5bvGcuM%2BNP5pK1sw7ud6vZjmS%2Bo%2Fdg8mIJnA4g%2B8SxqVUN8J7gGZN3P7Ngqf4XuSu8SztIWSJrnFZ0oTF9%2FaIlPOkxPn5oDneJIBv0%2FW5efbsMvKTSzczqYLaQVAgqODa5AdE%2F%2BjpAkKSxZ6f9iAsOOj9awAHeJYxMO6VjDbnoC4BjqyAQJfem%2FyGQaRJDk1pn1lXABxVoqjZKcAUffRwrjy8yzqFYASw54B6ED%2FlPyyRZ5mz5zl%2BO4ad2UMibLl4n5RQVi5vjlO5SCd%2FhYZ9V%2Bj9fbbKOQFGLyZ48q9PCyOpuLdtM%2Bl2Cj1wT%2FuGQ7JB%2BdM4cGXUyPFmmXSiOZCwWgIz02zq3D%2Bo%2Fzzdh9foPH3VQRAXq%2F4iiXx7ge0dbFIqupgdip3EgfQKEViiGFEbNE7qXrwz80%3D"><div> <div>16 </div> <div>¶ 28<span> </span><span>Fink conducted a BFU extraction on October 12, 2021, and </span> </div> <div>then initiated a brute force attack. Fink allow<span>ed</span> the prog<span></span>ram to run </div> <div>for seven days without success; then she abandoned the brute force </div> <div>attack in favor of expediting the process by using a six-digit code </div> <div>she found on the back of the phone <span>â</span> d<span>â</span><span>Estree<span>â</span></span><span>s </span>PIN code <span>â</span> to </div> <div>unlock the phone and conduct the AFU.</div> </div> <div><div>6</div></div> <div> <div> <span>It is unclear exactly how </span> </div> <div>the PIN code came to be adhered to the phone after the first <span></span>search </div> <div>â<span> there is no evidence indicating that the PIN code was originally </span> </div> <div>there <span>â</span> and Fink conceded that the <span>USSS</span> <span>â</span>could have<span>â</span> placed the </div> <div>code there. <span> </span> </div> <div>¶ 29<span> </span><span>Once the PIN code unlocked the phone on October 18, Fink </span> </div> <div>conducted a full-file system AFU extraction with GrayKey, </div> <div>downloaded the phone<span>â</span>s contents, and then used Cellebrite t<span></span>o </div> <div>â<span>decode</span>â<span> the raw data. Once decoded, Fink used Cellebrite to sel<span></span>ect </span> </div> <div>only data from October 1 <span>to</span> November 12, 2019 (the range specified </div> <div> </div> </div> <div><div>6</div></div> <div> <div> Fink testified that she tried birthdates and the PIN code on the </div> <div>phone as these numbers were âsuggestedâ to her after the <span></span>first </div> <div>seven days of the brute force attack proved unsuccessful.<span></span> There is </div> <div>no evidence in the record that the PIN code changed between the </div> <div>first and second search<span>es</span>, so we assume that the PIN code Fink </div> <div>used is the same one that police used to first access the phone. </div> </div> <a href="#pf13" data-dest-detail='[19,"XYZ",69,170,null]'><div style="border-style:none;position:absolute;left:440.117778px;bottom:668.022222px;width:10.080000px;height:32.860000px;background-color:rgba(255,255,255,0.000001);"></div></a> </div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf14" data-page-no="14"> <div><div> <div>17 </div> <div>in<span> the warrant), and provided this information to police in <span></span>a <span>â</span><span>user-</span></span> </div> <div>friendly<span>â</span><span> report.<span> </span><span> </span></span> </div> <div>¶ 30<span> </span><span>Holloway testified that, when drafting the second warrant </span> </div> <div>application and affidavit, he relied on information <span>â</span>[f]rom the first </div> <div>warrant<span>â</span><span> but did not place any information learned from the </span> </div> <div>suppressed search into the second warrant application.<span> </span>Beyond </div> <div>limiting the scope to specific dates<span>, </span>the <span>â</span>only thing that was added </div> <div>[w<span>as<span>] . . . some explanations of cell phone capabilities.<span>â</span><span> </span><span> </span></span></span> </div> <div>¶ 31<span> </span><span>D<span>â</span><span>Estree challenged the second warrant, arguing that <span>it</span> (1) </span></span> </div> <div>was not independent of the first warrant<span>â</span>s illegality; (2) relied on </div> <div>suppressed evidence, including the PIN code; and (3) did not cabin </div> <div>the police<span>â</span>s search, which also exceeded the warrant<span>â</span>s legitimat<span></span>e </div> <div>scope. Allowing this evidence would also be unfair, d<span>â</span>Estree arg<span></span>ued. </div> <div>¶ 32<span> </span><span>The district court declined to suppress the cell phone evidence </span> </div> <div>gathered pursuant to the second warrant.<span> </span><span> </span> </div> <div>¶ 33<span> </span><span>The district court found that police sought the second warrant </span> </div> <div>for reasons independent of information learned from t<span></span>he first, thus </div> <div>me<span>eting the <span>â</span>independent source doctrine<span>â</span> criteria. <span> </span>It noted that <span> </span></span> </div> <div>[t]he Second Affidavit was essentially the same </div> <div>as the First Affidavit with three exceptions: (1) </div> <div>a reference to the court<span>â</span>s prior suppression </div> </div></div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf15" data-page-no="15"> <div><div> <div>18 </div> <div>orders; (2) an expanded explanation of </div> <div>cellphone capabilities; and (3) inclusion of the </div> <div>Second Date Range. Of significance here, </div> <div>nothing in the Second Affidavit referenced the </div> <div>information seized in the February Search. </div> <div>It also found that Holloway<span>â</span>s testimony <span>â</span> that he did not rely on </div> <div>information from the first suppressed search <span>â</span> was credible an<span></span>d </div> <div>noted that there was no contrary evidence<span>. </span> </div> <div>¶ 34<span> </span><span>Regarding use of the PIN code (found on the back of the </span> </div> <div>phone), the district court said that suppression was unwarranted </div> <div>for two reasons. First, the district court concluded that the </div> <div>retrieval of the PIN code through a brute force attack during </div> <div>execution of the first warrant did not constitute a Fourth </div> <div>Amendment search. Recognizing that there were no Colorado ca<span></span>ses </div> <div>on the issue, it analogized to how police officers execute se<span></span>arch </div> <div>warrants against a locked house. Police may break into a home t<span></span>o </div> <div>execute a search warrant and the actual breach of t<span></span>he home <span>â</span> via </div> <div>a door or through a window <span>â</span> is not a search; rather, it is <span></span>a </div> <div>âmeansâ to conduct a search. <span> </span> </div> <div>¶ 35<span> </span><span>The court also found that the discovery of the PIN code fell </span> </div> <div>within the <span>â</span>inevitable discovery<span>â</span> exception to the exclusionary <span></span>rule, </div> <div>noting that, <span>â</span>[e]ven though it was listed on the back of the </div> </div></div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf16" data-page-no="16"> <div><div> <div>19 </div> <div>cellphone[,] <span>. . . </span>if it had not been available, law enforcement would </div> <div>have obtained it through the [<span>USSS</span>] or its own software.<span>â</span><span> </span>It also </div> <div>noted that case law <span>â</span>has not distinguished between evidence that </div> <div>would have been discovered quickly and evidence that would <span></span>have </div> <div>taken much longer to discover.<span>â</span><span> </span>Thus, because the PIN code would </div> <div>have been revealed once all possible combinations were tested, </div> <div>there was a <span>â</span>reasonable probability<span>â</span> <span>â</span> indeed, the court found, </div> <div>because there was a finite number of possible combi<span></span>nations, there </div> <div>was <span>a â100% probabilityâ â</span> that the PIN would have been </div> <div>discovered eventually<span>. </span>The district court rejected the defense<span>â</span><span>s </span> </div> <div>fairness argument as unsupported by case law. </div> <div>B.<span> <span>Standard of Review and Applicable Law </span></span> </div> <div>¶ 36<span> <span>âWhether evidence should be suppressed is a mixed question </span></span> </div> <div>of law and fact. As a result, we defer to the trial court<span>â</span>s factual </div> <div>findings if they are supported by competent evidence, but we <span></span>review </div> <div>the legal effect of those findings de novo.<span>â</span> <span>People v. Seymour</span>, 202<span></span>3 </div> <div>CO 53, ¶ 19 (citation omitted). <span> </span> </div> <div>¶ 37<span> <span>â<span>The United States and Colorado Constitutions protect </span></span></span> </div> <div>individuals against <span>â</span>unreasonable searches and seizures.<span>ââ</span> <span>I<span></span>d. <span>at </span></span> </div> <div>¶ <span>20</span> (quoting U.S. Const. amend. IV<span>; </span>Colo. Const. art. II, § 7). <span></span><span>A </span> </div> </div></div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf17" data-page-no="17"> <div> <img alt="" src="https://icbg.s3.amazonaws.com/media/MM9/Zgu/MM9ZguMTW/pwsU7Hj38Z0aT83wGmUtrM/47S7PRRijEBs%3D?AWSAccessKeyId=ASIA5PHC3MTPTCGXON2M&Expires=1728061407&Signature=jYewIYtJVXKXrUNQW%2Fn%2FapTel%2Bg%3D&x-amz-security-token=IQoJb3JpZ2luX2VjEJD%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2FwEaCXVzLWVhc3QtMSJGMEQCIGu1GFJEr5iCtVwEWS8%2FYmPE84Pm%2FFzYhGTa%2FGzTkZFfAiBYlQ81xdSGIng%2BcUDaidgy1WsHp67%2BHFXr7cayiQr96Cq7BQjZ%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F8BEAAaDDkyNjA0MTIwMzkzNSIMzvHNB8Hg%2FeYy74gxKo8Fw1BGlk0k2WAcVHzkDVLWXPPu7fXyai8%2FVmcJBP1B5%2FTcuoMPfiVAFsQXGJqr%2FQRvzqadIlgJbk3dYbNpShnr6eB2pCbH%2B4Hvv5E2ujgQ9UBciItlHCuWJlFY97UBrh6RPtR9yJaP2VPKmSF1TdBpSJzRU%2B9gh81G7dW1rAkUWZAOdu95nRvpZ0tYuIK0Mp6NzVSIBTyZE1edYT6%2BXT29YfEkafGlpVxfWtZMLX5DD%2F7d0450E%2Bw18%2Bo4rdUK9eBKUq7P3U54X1uLBq4tOOHz%2BTzN3pD%2BbkWgzjHRavawXN1JV2qncvKPq5tVoQbu%2BQwdSh%2BasKUPanR0wK7aI4eAWfjc9tm6Z94lArU4jTlxQCLAyDIYxyAJ9%2FokHkslhkIMonM612e95l%2FLFLlchEAlw5bSvnG4LW8buJtYxr4awsWEhvs5HHA9HHCQRI5ybJf%2FmeRGulWrsyvokEpMenBxE07Cy8RFjTgBvfZdfuyRq7mGbmVOdRueh7W3gznC7QW42speX%2B3ozW1ja1TDOn0lmTg%2B2hhethq2eJCnehZG5Pzsn42QfTDlMGu7UZKkZIROfvjxGjUGBFnoAKoYW8wrlZ6TbIKKAMRpiwIRDvYUNR9q4lIrzhBgdchRPLiz5b3LfpIHNYdRiqoppy%2F2%2FoPGVm8HEorgPTA2UG1SswU%2FTqwwMNSu%2FvbUSFGTx5PyDiGleLr%2B5bvGcuM%2BNP5pK1sw7ud6vZjmS%2Bo%2Fdg8mIJnA4g%2B8SxqVUN8J7gGZN3P7Ngqf4XuSu8SztIWSJrnFZ0oTF9%2FaIlPOkxPn5oDneJIBv0%2FW5efbsMvKTSzczqYLaQVAgqODa5AdE%2F%2BjpAkKSxZ6f9iAsOOj9awAHeJYxMO6VjDbnoC4BjqyAQJfem%2FyGQaRJDk1pn1lXABxVoqjZKcAUffRwrjy8yzqFYASw54B6ED%2FlPyyRZ5mz5zl%2BO4ad2UMibLl4n5RQVi5vjlO5SCd%2FhYZ9V%2Bj9fbbKOQFGLyZ48q9PCyOpuLdtM%2Bl2Cj1wT%2FuGQ7JB%2BdM4cGXUyPFmmXSiOZCwWgIz02zq3D%2Bo%2Fzzdh9foPH3VQRAXq%2F4iiXx7ge0dbFIqupgdip3EgfQKEViiGFEbNE7qXrwz80%3D"><div> <div>20 </div> <div>â<span>search</span>â<span> within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment </span>â<span>occurs </span> </div> <div>when the government infringes on an individual<span>â</span>s reasonable </div> <div>expectation of privacy.<span>â</span> <span>Id. </span>(citing <span>Katz v. United Stat<span></span>es<span>, 389 U.S. </span></span> </div> <div>347, 361 (1967) (Harlan J., concurring))<span>. </span>The <span>ââ<span>seizure</span><span>â</span></span> of property </div> <div>occurs when there is some meaningful interference with an </div> <div>individual<span>â</span><span>s possessory interests in that property.<span>â</span> <span>Id. </span>(quoting </span> </div> <div>United States v. Jacobsen<span>,466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)). <span>â</span>[T]o deter </span> </div> <div>police misconduct<span>â</span> and discourage illegal searches<span>, <span>â</span></span>the </div> <div>exclusionary rule requires courts to suppress evidence at <span></span>trial if the </div> <div>government acquired it in violation of constitutional <span></span>protections.<span>â</span> </div> </div> <div><div>7</div></div> <div> <div> </div> <div>Id. <span>at <span>¶ </span>62. </span> </div> <div>¶ 38<span> </span><span>A <span>warrant is generally required before cell phone data can be </span></span> </div> <div>searched. <span>See</span> <span>Riley v. California</span>,
573 U.S. 373, 386, 393-<span>98,</span> <span></span><span>401<span>-</span></span> </div> <div>403 (2014) (recognizing the ubiquity of cell phones, their immense </div> <div>storage capacity, and their potential to store deeply personal </div> <div>information)<span>. <span>Our state supreme court has also <span>â</span>acknowledged the </span></span> </div> <div>special protections applicable to cell phone searches.<span>â</span><span> </span><span>People v. </span> </div> <div> </div> </div> <div><div>7</div></div> <div> <div> <span>The exclusionary rule â</span>applies both to illegally obtained evidence </div> <div>and to derivative evidence <span>â</span> often called <span>â</span>fruit of the poisonou<span></span>s </div> <div>tree.<span>ââ <span>People v. Dominguez-Castor<span>,
2020 COA 1, ¶ 19 (quoting </span></span></span> </div> <div>People v. Schoondermark<span>,
759 P.2d 715, 718 (Colo. 1988)). </span> </div> </div> <a href="#pf17" data-dest-detail='[23,"XYZ",69,137,null]'><div style="border-style:none;position:absolute;left:659.026667px;bottom:499.981667px;width:10.080000px;height:32.860000px;background-color:rgba(255,255,255,0.000001);"></div></a> </div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf18" data-page-no="18"> <div><div> <div>21 </div> <div>Davis<span>,2019 CO 24, ¶ 19; <span>see also <span>Coke</span></span>, ¶ 38 (warrant to search a </span> </div> <div>cell phone that <span>â</span>permitted the officers to search all texts, videos, </div> <div>pictures, contact lists, phone records, and any data <span></span>that showed </div> <div>ownership or possession<span>â</span> violated the Fourth Amendment<span>â</span><span>s </span> </div> <div>particularity requirement). Indeed, <span>â</span>the general trend of caselaw </div> <div>provides cell phones with more protection, not less.<span>â</span> <span>Davis</span>, <span></span>¶ 17. </div> <div>¶ 39<span> </span><span>Preserved errors concerning the admission of evidence in </span> </div> <div>violation of the Fourth Amendment implicate <span>â</span>trial errors of </div> <div>constitutional dimension,<span>â</span> and thus we review any such error for </div> <div>âconstitutional harmless error.â <span>Hagos v. People<span>,
2012 CO 63, ¶ 11.</span> <span> </span></span> </div> <div>â<span>These errors require reversal unless the reviewing court <span></span>is <span>â</span>able to </span> </div> <div>declare a belief that [the error] was harmless beyond a reason<span></span>able </div> <div>doubt.<span>ââ</span><span> <span>Id.</span> (alteration in original) (quoting <span>Chapman v. Ca<span></span>lifornia<span>, </span></span></span> </div> <div>
386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)). </div> <div>C.<span> <span>Analysis </span></span> </div> <div>1.<span> <span>The Independent Source Doctrine </span></span> </div> <div>¶ 40<span> </span><span>The independent source doctrine is an exception to the </span> </div> <div>exclusionary rule <span>and allows â</span>unconstitutionally obtained evid<span></span>ence </div> <div>[to] be admitted if the prosecution can establish that<span></span> it was also </div> <div>discovered by means independent of the illegality.<span>â</span> <span>People v. </span> </div> </div></div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf19" data-page-no="19"> <div><div> <div>22 </div> <div>Dominguez-Castor<span>, <span>2020 COA 1, ¶ 20 (quoting <span>People v. Arapu</span>, 2012 </span></span> </div> <div>CO 42, ¶ 29)<span>; </span><span>see also People v. Thompson</span>,
2021 CO 15, ¶ 21.<span> </span>The </div> <div>doctrine may apply to <span>â</span>evidence seized under a valid warrant<span></span> issued </div> <div>after the evidence was first discovered during execution of <span></span>an </div> <div>invalid warrant . . . if the prosecution shows that the second </div> <div>warrant was truly independent of information obtained fr<span></span>om the </div> <div>initial search.<span>â</span><span> </span><span>Dominguez-Castor</span><span>, </span>¶ <span>22<span>. </span></span> The decision to seek an </div> <div>additional warrant because of a suppression order<span>âs consequenc<span></span>es<span> </span></span> </div> <div>does not, <span>on</span> its own, violate the independent source doctrine.<span></span> </div> <div>People v. George<span>,
2017 COA 75, ¶ <span>55</span><span>. </span> </span> </div> <div>¶ 41<span> </span><span>A second warrant meets the criteria of the independent source </span> </div> <div>doctrine if the prosecution proves, by a preponderance of the </div> <div>evidence, that <span>â</span>(1) the decision to seek the warrant was not </div> <div>prompted by what was observed during the initial unlawf<span></span>ul search, </div> <div>and (2) no information obtained during the initial search wa<span></span>s relied </div> <div>upon by the magistrate in issuing the warrant.<span>â</span><span> </span><span>Dominguez-Cast<span></span>or<span>, </span></span> </div> <div>¶ <span>21</span><span>; </span><span>see also Thompson</span>, ¶ 22. It is a question of fact for the </div> <div>district court <span>â</span>[w]hether the police would have pursued a second </div> <div>search even absent what they discovered during an earlier unlawf<span></span>ul </div> </div></div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf1a" data-page-no="1a"> <div><div> <div>23 </div> <div>search . . . . <span>We</span> will not disturb the court<span>â</span>s finding if it has rec<span></span>ord </div> <div>support.<span>â</span><span> </span><span>Dominguez-Castor</span><span>, ¶ 34. </span> </div> <div>¶ 42<span> </span><span>The reasoning behind the independent source doctrine, </span> </div> <div>articulated in <span>Nix v. Williams</span>, is that </div> <div>the interest of society in deterring unlawful </div> <div>police conduct and the public interest in </div> <div>having juries receive all probative evidence of a </div> <div>crime are properly balanced by putting the </div> <div>police <span>in the same, not a worse, position that </span> </div> <div>they would have been in if no police error or </div> <div>misconduct had occurred<span>. <span>When the </span></span> </div> <div>challenged evidence has an independent </div> <div>source, exclusion of such evidence would put </div> <div>the police in a worse position than they would </div> <div>have been in absent any error or violation. </div> <div>467 U.S. 431, 4<span>43</span> (1984) (emphasis added) (citations and footnote </div> <div>omitted). Put another way, <span>â</span>while the government should not pr<span></span>ofit </div> <div>from its illegal activity, neither should it be placed in a worse </div> <div>position than it would otherwise have occupied.<span>â</span><span> </span><span>Murray v. Unit<span></span>ed </span> </div> <div>States<span>,
487 U.S. 533, 542 (1988). </span> </div> <div>¶ 43<span> <span>The district court deemed Hollowayâs testimony â<span> averring </span></span></span> </div> <div>that the information from the first suppressed search did not <span></span>inform </div> <div>the second warrant application or the decision to seek t<span></span>he second </div> <div>warrant <span>â</span> credible. <span>See Dominguez-Castor</span>, ¶ 21. We may not </div> <div>disturb this credibility determination. <span>See Seymo<span>ur</span></span>, ¶ 20. Nor does </div> </div></div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf1b" data-page-no="1b"> <div><div> <div>24 </div> <div>the second warrant reference information learned during t<span></span>he first </div> <div>search on which <span>a </span>judicial officer could have improperly relied. <span>See </span> </div> <div>Dominguez-Castor<span>, ¶ 21. </span> </div> <div>¶ 44<span> </span><span>But <span>dâEstree </span>challenges the independence of the second </span> </div> <div>warrant because he argues it sought information that police had </div> <div>discovered during the first search and knew existed<span>. T</span>herefore, he </div> <div>contends the second warrant relied on information illegally o<span></span>btained </div> <div>in the first search<span>. For example, dâEstree points to the second </span> </div> <div>warrantâs request for information on any âsearch terms that<span></span> the </div> <div>user entered into any internet search engineâ as problematic. <span></span> </div> <div>DâEstree argues <span>that the object of this request was to gather his </span> </div> <div>kn<span>own internet search history (which was introduced at <span></span>trial), and </span> </div> <div>improperly relied on information gathered in the first search. </div> <div>¶ 45<span> </span><span>But the first warrant request, while not as specific, requested </span> </div> <div>such information when it sought âweb activity (name of web sit<span></span>e or </div> <div>application visited or accessed), domain accessed, data connecti<span></span>ons </div> <div>(to include Internet Service Providers (ISPs), Internet protoc<span></span>ol (IP) </div> <div>addresses, [and] (IP) Session data.â The second warrantâs request </div> <div>with additional specificity does not necessarily show that <span></span>the </div> <div>second warrant relied on information improperly gained fr<span></span>om the </div> </div></div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf1c" data-page-no="1c"> <div><div> <div>25 </div> <div>first search. <span>See id.</span> <span>at</span> ¶ 14 & n.2 <span>(second warrant contained âm<span></span>uch </span> </div> <div>more information than the firstâ in light of<span> </span>policeâs increased </div> <div>training on search warrants for cell phones). </div> <div>¶ 46<span> </span><span>As a result, the second warrant itself meets the criteria </span> </div> <div>detailed in <span>Dominguez-Castor </span>for the independent source doctrine </div> <div>exception<span>. <span> Had police relied on the second warrant alone to retrieve </span></span> </div> <div>the contents of dâEstreeâs cell<span> phone, that would have been </span> </div> <div>permissible and the extracted evidence would have been prope<span></span>rly </div> <div>admitted at trial. But police used illegally obtained information </div> <div>from the first warrant <span>â</span> the PIN code <span>â</span> in <span>executing</span> the second </div> <div>warrant. </div> <div>2.<span> <span>The Use of the PIN Code </span></span> </div> <div>¶ 47<span> </span><span>The PIN code was discovered during the execution of the first, </span> </div> <div>unlawful general warrant. Police then used this illegally obtained </div> <div>information to <span>expedite</span> the execution of the second warrant. By </div> <div>using the illegally obtained PIN code, police extracted a crucial </div> <div>benefit <span>â</span> guaranteed access to the phone<span>â</span>s contents ahead of the </div> <div>forthcoming December 2021 trial. This conduct placed the </div> <div>government in a better position than before the illegal search </div> <div>occurred<span>. <span>See Murray<span>, 487 U.S. at 542; </span><span>Nix</span></span>, <span>467<span> U.S. at 443. So </span></span></span> </div> </div></div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf1d" data-page-no="1d"> <div> <img alt="" src="https://icbg.s3.amazonaws.com/media/MM%2B/ua3/MM%2Bua3MxJTRbWtsh8MG8egWFOKEyWp9uEWUm7FEkRnsaA%3D?AWSAccessKeyId=ASIA5PHC3MTPTCGXON2M&Expires=1728061407&Signature=ZHTssQf%2B4Lig2EzWlDtZuWXlwBY%3D&x-amz-security-token=IQoJb3JpZ2luX2VjEJD%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2FwEaCXVzLWVhc3QtMSJGMEQCIGu1GFJEr5iCtVwEWS8%2FYmPE84Pm%2FFzYhGTa%2FGzTkZFfAiBYlQ81xdSGIng%2BcUDaidgy1WsHp67%2BHFXr7cayiQr96Cq7BQjZ%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F8BEAAaDDkyNjA0MTIwMzkzNSIMzvHNB8Hg%2FeYy74gxKo8Fw1BGlk0k2WAcVHzkDVLWXPPu7fXyai8%2FVmcJBP1B5%2FTcuoMPfiVAFsQXGJqr%2FQRvzqadIlgJbk3dYbNpShnr6eB2pCbH%2B4Hvv5E2ujgQ9UBciItlHCuWJlFY97UBrh6RPtR9yJaP2VPKmSF1TdBpSJzRU%2B9gh81G7dW1rAkUWZAOdu95nRvpZ0tYuIK0Mp6NzVSIBTyZE1edYT6%2BXT29YfEkafGlpVxfWtZMLX5DD%2F7d0450E%2Bw18%2Bo4rdUK9eBKUq7P3U54X1uLBq4tOOHz%2BTzN3pD%2BbkWgzjHRavawXN1JV2qncvKPq5tVoQbu%2BQwdSh%2BasKUPanR0wK7aI4eAWfjc9tm6Z94lArU4jTlxQCLAyDIYxyAJ9%2FokHkslhkIMonM612e95l%2FLFLlchEAlw5bSvnG4LW8buJtYxr4awsWEhvs5HHA9HHCQRI5ybJf%2FmeRGulWrsyvokEpMenBxE07Cy8RFjTgBvfZdfuyRq7mGbmVOdRueh7W3gznC7QW42speX%2B3ozW1ja1TDOn0lmTg%2B2hhethq2eJCnehZG5Pzsn42QfTDlMGu7UZKkZIROfvjxGjUGBFnoAKoYW8wrlZ6TbIKKAMRpiwIRDvYUNR9q4lIrzhBgdchRPLiz5b3LfpIHNYdRiqoppy%2F2%2FoPGVm8HEorgPTA2UG1SswU%2FTqwwMNSu%2FvbUSFGTx5PyDiGleLr%2B5bvGcuM%2BNP5pK1sw7ud6vZjmS%2Bo%2Fdg8mIJnA4g%2B8SxqVUN8J7gGZN3P7Ngqf4XuSu8SztIWSJrnFZ0oTF9%2FaIlPOkxPn5oDneJIBv0%2FW5efbsMvKTSzczqYLaQVAgqODa5AdE%2F%2BjpAkKSxZ6f9iAsOOj9awAHeJYxMO6VjDbnoC4BjqyAQJfem%2FyGQaRJDk1pn1lXABxVoqjZKcAUffRwrjy8yzqFYASw54B6ED%2FlPyyRZ5mz5zl%2BO4ad2UMibLl4n5RQVi5vjlO5SCd%2FhYZ9V%2Bj9fbbKOQFGLyZ48q9PCyOpuLdtM%2Bl2Cj1wT%2FuGQ7JB%2BdM4cGXUyPFmmXSiOZCwWgIz02zq3D%2Bo%2Fzzdh9foPH3VQRAXq%2F4iiXx7ge0dbFIqupgdip3EgfQKEViiGFEbNE7qXrwz80%3D"><div> <div>26 </div> <div>while the second warrant was not infirm, the execution <span></span>of that </div> <div>warrant most certainly was. </div> <div>¶ 48<span> </span><span>A summary of the key dates relating to both warrants follows: </span> </div> <div> </div> <div>Key Warrant Events </div> <div>¶ 49<span> </span><span>Police and the prosecution had months to submit another </span> </div> <div>warrant application after the first warrant was invalidated, and </div> <div>could have done so, but they did not request a second warrant until </div> <div>about two months before trial. The first brute force attack took </div> <div>three months, and Fink testified that a brute force attack could </div> <div>have taken up to eleven years, so there was no guarantee that </div> </div> <div> <div>Nov. 20, </div> <div>2019: </div> <div>First </div> <div>warrant </div> <div>signed</div> <div>Dec. 18, </div> <div>2019: No </div> <div>download </div> <div>possible </div> <div>without PIN </div> <div>code</div> <div>Feb. 17, </div> <div>2020: </div> <div>Phone </div> <div>unlocked </div> <div>using </div> <div>USSS-</div> <div>provided </div> <div>PIN code, </div> <div>data </div> <div>extracted</div> <div>May 12, </div> <div>2021: </div> <div>Evidence </div> <div>suppressed</div> <div>Oct. 11, </div> <div>2021: </div> <div>Second </div> <div>warrant </div> <div>signed</div> <div>Oct. 19, 2021: </div> <div>Brute force </div> <div>abandoned and </div> <div>second </div> <div>extraction using</div> <div>PIN code</div> <div>Nov. 23, </div> <div>2021: </div> <div>Court </div> <div>permits </div> <div>phone </div> <div>evidence's </div> <div>admission</div> <div>Dec. 14 -</div> <div>17, 2021: </div> <div>Trial</div> </div> </div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf1e" data-page-no="1e"> <div> <img alt="" src="https://icbg.s3.amazonaws.com/media/MMX/n%2Be/MMXn%2BekQ817y/lXyeovZwcgeMWibwHo7dUSO3Lu0a7r74%3D?AWSAccessKeyId=ASIA5PHC3MTPTCGXON2M&Expires=1728061407&Signature=i7I0KGk%2FQ0qr%2F4kN5kothv45lCA%3D&x-amz-security-token=IQoJb3JpZ2luX2VjEJD%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2FwEaCXVzLWVhc3QtMSJGMEQCIGu1GFJEr5iCtVwEWS8%2FYmPE84Pm%2FFzYhGTa%2FGzTkZFfAiBYlQ81xdSGIng%2BcUDaidgy1WsHp67%2BHFXr7cayiQr96Cq7BQjZ%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F8BEAAaDDkyNjA0MTIwMzkzNSIMzvHNB8Hg%2FeYy74gxKo8Fw1BGlk0k2WAcVHzkDVLWXPPu7fXyai8%2FVmcJBP1B5%2FTcuoMPfiVAFsQXGJqr%2FQRvzqadIlgJbk3dYbNpShnr6eB2pCbH%2B4Hvv5E2ujgQ9UBciItlHCuWJlFY97UBrh6RPtR9yJaP2VPKmSF1TdBpSJzRU%2B9gh81G7dW1rAkUWZAOdu95nRvpZ0tYuIK0Mp6NzVSIBTyZE1edYT6%2BXT29YfEkafGlpVxfWtZMLX5DD%2F7d0450E%2Bw18%2Bo4rdUK9eBKUq7P3U54X1uLBq4tOOHz%2BTzN3pD%2BbkWgzjHRavawXN1JV2qncvKPq5tVoQbu%2BQwdSh%2BasKUPanR0wK7aI4eAWfjc9tm6Z94lArU4jTlxQCLAyDIYxyAJ9%2FokHkslhkIMonM612e95l%2FLFLlchEAlw5bSvnG4LW8buJtYxr4awsWEhvs5HHA9HHCQRI5ybJf%2FmeRGulWrsyvokEpMenBxE07Cy8RFjTgBvfZdfuyRq7mGbmVOdRueh7W3gznC7QW42speX%2B3ozW1ja1TDOn0lmTg%2B2hhethq2eJCnehZG5Pzsn42QfTDlMGu7UZKkZIROfvjxGjUGBFnoAKoYW8wrlZ6TbIKKAMRpiwIRDvYUNR9q4lIrzhBgdchRPLiz5b3LfpIHNYdRiqoppy%2F2%2FoPGVm8HEorgPTA2UG1SswU%2FTqwwMNSu%2FvbUSFGTx5PyDiGleLr%2B5bvGcuM%2BNP5pK1sw7ud6vZjmS%2Bo%2Fdg8mIJnA4g%2B8SxqVUN8J7gGZN3P7Ngqf4XuSu8SztIWSJrnFZ0oTF9%2FaIlPOkxPn5oDneJIBv0%2FW5efbsMvKTSzczqYLaQVAgqODa5AdE%2F%2BjpAkKSxZ6f9iAsOOj9awAHeJYxMO6VjDbnoC4BjqyAQJfem%2FyGQaRJDk1pn1lXABxVoqjZKcAUffRwrjy8yzqFYASw54B6ED%2FlPyyRZ5mz5zl%2BO4ad2UMibLl4n5RQVi5vjlO5SCd%2FhYZ9V%2Bj9fbbKOQFGLyZ48q9PCyOpuLdtM%2Bl2Cj1wT%2FuGQ7JB%2BdM4cGXUyPFmmXSiOZCwWgIz02zq3D%2Bo%2Fzzdh9foPH3VQRAXq%2F4iiXx7ge0dbFIqupgdip3EgfQKEViiGFEbNE7qXrwz80%3D"><div> <div>27 </div> <div>police would have gained access to the phone in time for trial </div> <div>without<span> relying on the illegally obtained shortcut (the PIN code).</span> </div> </div> <div><div>8</div></div> <div> <div> <span> </span> </div> <div>¶ 50<span> </span><span>As the United States Supreme Court held in<span> Silverthorne </span></span> </div> <div>Lumber Co. v. United States<span>,251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920), which </span> </div> <div>originated <span>the independent source doctrine, â[t]</span>he essence of a </div> <div>provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain <span></span>way is </div> <div>that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used b<span></span>efore the </div> <div>Court <span>but that it shall not be used at a<span></span>ll<span>.</span><span>â </span> <span>(Emphasis added.) </span></span> </div> <div>¶ 51<span> </span><span>The second warrant authorized police to acquire the PIN code </span> </div> <div>via brute force attack; evidence on the phone so acquired would </div> <div>have presumably met the independent source doctrine<span>. <span>S<span>ee </span></span></span> </div> <div>Dominguez-Castor<span>, ¶ <span>21<span>. </span></span>However, police abandoned the brute force </span> </div> <div>attack and, instead, took a different (and shorter) route to the </div> <div>encrypted information using illegally obtained information (the PI<span></span>N </div> <div>code) to <span>execute</span> the second warrant. Law enforcement may not use </div> <div>information obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment<span>. </span><span>See </span> </div> <div> </div> </div> <div><div>8</div></div> <div> <div> If the prosecution had pursued the second warrant imme<span></span>diately </div> <div>after the information obtained with the first warrant was </div> <div>suppressed in May 2021, even if it took three months (as it<span></span> had </div> <div>before) to unlock the phone, there may have been substantially less </div> <div>incentive to use the PIN code <span>to expedite access to the phoneâs </span> </div> <div>contents before the December 14, 2021, trial start date<span>. </span> </div> </div> <a href="#pf1e" data-dest-detail='[30,"XYZ",69,170,null]'><div style="border-style:none;position:absolute;left:644.345000px;bottom:835.986111px;width:10.080000px;height:32.880000px;background-color:rgba(255,255,255,0.000001);"></div></a> </div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf1f" data-page-no="1f"> <div><div> <div>28 </div> <div>Silverthorne<span>,</span><span> <span>251 U.S. at392<span>. </span>With this framework in mind, we </span></span> </div> <div>proceed to address <span>the district courtâs other grounds for a<span></span>dmitting </span> </div> <div>the evidence. </div> <div>3.<span> <span>Whether a Brute Force Attack Constitutes a Search </span></span> </div> <div>¶ 52<span> </span><span>The district court also found that the use of a brute force </span> </div> <div>attack to discover a PIN <span>code and access dâEstreeâs cell phone data </span> </div> <div>did not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment <span></span>because </div> <div>it was a âmeansâ to execute a warrant rather than a search. <span></span> <span>It </span> </div> <div>analogized the issue as akin to when police execute a warrant<span></span> to </div> <div>search a locked house <span>â</span> whether police choose to enter through </div> <div>the door or a window is irrelevant. </div> <div>¶ 53<span> </span><span>Case law supports this general concept <span>â</span> most notably, as </span> </div> <div>pointed out by the district court and the People on appeal, in <span>Dalia<span></span> </span> </div> <div>v. U<span>nited States<span>,
441 U.S. 238(1979). There, a defendant </span></span> </div> <div>challenged a wiretap order granting the government <span></span>the authority to </div> <div>âi<span>ntercept all oral communications taking place in petitioner<span>â</span>s office<span>â </span></span> </div> <div>through electronic surveillance. <span>Id. </span>at 241-42. The defendant </div> <div>argued that the order violated the Fourth Amendment beca<span></span>use it </div> <div>did not specify the means used to execute the warrant<span></span> (i.e., by </div> <div>covert entry into the office)<span>. </span><span>Id. </span>at 256-58. The Supreme Court hel<span></span>d </div> </div></div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf20" data-page-no="20"> <div><div> <div>29 </div> <div>that â[n]<span>othing in the language of the Constitution or in this Court</span><span>â</span><span>s </span> </div> <div>decisions interpreting that language suggests that . . . <span></span>search </div> <div>warrants also must include a specification of the precise mann<span></span>er in </div> <div>which they are to be executed.â <span>Id. <span>at 257. Instead, the means of </span></span> </div> <div>executing a warrant are âgenerally l<span>eft to the discretion of t<span></span>he </span> </div> <div>executing officers . . . subject of course to the general Fourth </div> <div>Amendment protection . . . [<span>, </span>and] the manner in which a warrant is </div> <div>executed is subject to later judicial review as to its reas<span></span>onableness.â </div> <div>Id. <span>at 257-58. </span> </div> <div>¶ 54<span> </span><span>But the means versus search distinction does not neatly fit<span></span> </span> </div> <div>here. As the United States Supreme Court aptly recognized in <span>Riley </span> </div> <div>v. California<span>, analogizing the digital world and processes t<span></span>o the </span> </div> <div>physical world is difficult and unhelpful, and â[a]n analog<span></span>ue test </div> <div>would <span>â</span>keep defendants and judges guessing for years t<span></span>o come.<span>â<span>â </span></span> </div> <div>573 U.S. at 401 (citation omitted).<span> </span>The use of a brute force attack </div> <div>to access a phone, <span>or any other means to obtain a phoneâs </span>PIN code </div> <div>without a defendantâs cooperation or consent, is f<span>undamentally </span> </div> <div>different from entry into a home with a warrant because a search </div> <div>for the PIN <span>code itself, just like a search of a cell phoneâs cont<span></span>ents, </span> </div> <div>is protected by the Fourth Amendment. <span>See Davis</span>, ¶ 19; <span>Coke</span><span>, </span> </div> </div></div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf21" data-page-no="21"> <div> <img alt="" src="https://icbg.s3.amazonaws.com/media/MMX/n%2Be/MMXn%2BekQ817y/lXyeovZwcgeMWibwHo7dUSO3Lu0a7r74%3D?AWSAccessKeyId=ASIA5PHC3MTPTCGXON2M&Expires=1728061407&Signature=i7I0KGk%2FQ0qr%2F4kN5kothv45lCA%3D&x-amz-security-token=IQoJb3JpZ2luX2VjEJD%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2FwEaCXVzLWVhc3QtMSJGMEQCIGu1GFJEr5iCtVwEWS8%2FYmPE84Pm%2FFzYhGTa%2FGzTkZFfAiBYlQ81xdSGIng%2BcUDaidgy1WsHp67%2BHFXr7cayiQr96Cq7BQjZ%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F8BEAAaDDkyNjA0MTIwMzkzNSIMzvHNB8Hg%2FeYy74gxKo8Fw1BGlk0k2WAcVHzkDVLWXPPu7fXyai8%2FVmcJBP1B5%2FTcuoMPfiVAFsQXGJqr%2FQRvzqadIlgJbk3dYbNpShnr6eB2pCbH%2B4Hvv5E2ujgQ9UBciItlHCuWJlFY97UBrh6RPtR9yJaP2VPKmSF1TdBpSJzRU%2B9gh81G7dW1rAkUWZAOdu95nRvpZ0tYuIK0Mp6NzVSIBTyZE1edYT6%2BXT29YfEkafGlpVxfWtZMLX5DD%2F7d0450E%2Bw18%2Bo4rdUK9eBKUq7P3U54X1uLBq4tOOHz%2BTzN3pD%2BbkWgzjHRavawXN1JV2qncvKPq5tVoQbu%2BQwdSh%2BasKUPanR0wK7aI4eAWfjc9tm6Z94lArU4jTlxQCLAyDIYxyAJ9%2FokHkslhkIMonM612e95l%2FLFLlchEAlw5bSvnG4LW8buJtYxr4awsWEhvs5HHA9HHCQRI5ybJf%2FmeRGulWrsyvokEpMenBxE07Cy8RFjTgBvfZdfuyRq7mGbmVOdRueh7W3gznC7QW42speX%2B3ozW1ja1TDOn0lmTg%2B2hhethq2eJCnehZG5Pzsn42QfTDlMGu7UZKkZIROfvjxGjUGBFnoAKoYW8wrlZ6TbIKKAMRpiwIRDvYUNR9q4lIrzhBgdchRPLiz5b3LfpIHNYdRiqoppy%2F2%2FoPGVm8HEorgPTA2UG1SswU%2FTqwwMNSu%2FvbUSFGTx5PyDiGleLr%2B5bvGcuM%2BNP5pK1sw7ud6vZjmS%2Bo%2Fdg8mIJnA4g%2B8SxqVUN8J7gGZN3P7Ngqf4XuSu8SztIWSJrnFZ0oTF9%2FaIlPOkxPn5oDneJIBv0%2FW5efbsMvKTSzczqYLaQVAgqODa5AdE%2F%2BjpAkKSxZ6f9iAsOOj9awAHeJYxMO6VjDbnoC4BjqyAQJfem%2FyGQaRJDk1pn1lXABxVoqjZKcAUffRwrjy8yzqFYASw54B6ED%2FlPyyRZ5mz5zl%2BO4ad2UMibLl4n5RQVi5vjlO5SCd%2FhYZ9V%2Bj9fbbKOQFGLyZ48q9PCyOpuLdtM%2Bl2Cj1wT%2FuGQ7JB%2BdM4cGXUyPFmmXSiOZCwWgIz02zq3D%2Bo%2Fzzdh9foPH3VQRAXq%2F4iiXx7ge0dbFIqupgdip3EgfQKEViiGFEbNE7qXrwz80%3D"><div> <div>30 </div> <div>¶ <span>38</span><span>; </span><span>Riley</span><span>, <span>573</span></span> U.S. <span>at</span> 386, 393-98, 401-<span>03</span> (recognizing that cell </div> <div>phones hold âthe privacies of lifeâ<span> (quoting <span>Boyd v. United Stat<span></span>es<span>, </span></span></span> </div> <div>116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886))<span>).</span><span> </span> </div> <div>¶ 55<span> </span><span>While the protections the Fourth Amendment affords to </span> </div> <div>passwords and PIN codes allowing access to cell phones are less </div> <div>clearly defined than those it affor<span>ds</span> t<span>o </span>physical spaces and the </div> <div>personal data cell phones contain,</div> </div> <div><div>9</div></div> <div> <div> existing Fourth Amendment </div> <div>principles, coupled with the recognition of the special <span></span>protections </div> <div>afforded cell phones, support concluding that obtaining <span></span>a cell phone </div> <div>PIN code without consent requires a warrant. <span>See United Stat<span></span>es v. </span> </div> <div>Booker<span>,<span> <span>
561 F. Supp. 3d 924, 9<span>29</span></span></span>-<span>32 <span>(S.D. Cal. 2021) (holding, in </span></span></span> </div> <div>part, that requiring defendant to involuntarily enter <span></span>his PIN code </div> <div>while law enforcement watched and recorded it, before police </div> <div>sought a warrant to search the phone using software that<span></span> required </div> <div>the PIN code, violated the Fourth Amendment).<span> </span> </div> <div> </div> </div> <div><div>9</div></div> <div> <div> The issues in this case are distinct from those in the Fifth </div> <div>Amendment context centering on whether a defendant can be </div> <div>compelled to provide a cell phone PIN code or unlock a device. <span></span> <span>See, </span> </div> <div>e.g.<span>, <span>Seo v. State</span>,
148 N.E.3d 952, 962 (Ind. 2020) (holding that </span> </div> <div>forcing a defendant to â<span>unlock her iPhone for law enforcement </span> </div> <div>would violate her Fifth Amendment right against self-</div> <div>incrimination<span>â). The Fifth Amendment is not at issue in this case. <span> </span></span> </div> </div> <a href="#pf21" data-dest-detail='[33,"XYZ",69,187,null]'><div style="border-style:none;position:absolute;left:389.658333px;bottom:625.983333px;width:10.080000px;height:32.870000px;background-color:rgba(255,255,255,0.000001);"></div></a> </div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf22" data-page-no="22"> <div><div> <div>31 </div> <div>¶ 56<span> <span>Courts use âa two<span>-prong test to determine if a claimed privacy </span></span></span> </div> <div>interest warrants constitutional protection: (1) whether the </div> <div>individual âexhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacyâ </div> <div>and (2) whether, objectively, âthe expectation [is] one that<span></span> so<span>ciety is </span> </div> <div>prepared to recognize as âreasonable.ââ <span>Seymour</span><span>, ¶ 22 (quoting </span> </div> <div>People v. Gutierrez<span>,222 P.3d 925, 932 (Colo. 2009), in turn citing<span></span> </span> </div> <div>Katz<span>, 389 U.S. at 361). </span> </div> <div>¶ 57<span> </span><span>Turning to the subjective expectation of privacy prong, there is </span> </div> <div>no evidence that dâEstree exhibited anything other than an </div> <div>expectation that his PIN code would remain private. This is </div> <div>evidenced by the very fact that police had to use specialized </div> <div>software to break into the phone because dâEstree did not <span></span>provide </div> <div>the PIN code. On this point, <span>Davis</span>,
2019 CO 24, provides some </div> <div>insight. There, the Colorado Supreme Court held that an individual </div> <div>who voluntarily gave his phoneâs <span>PIN code to law enforcement </span><span>â</span><span> </span> </div> <div>even for a limited purpose <span>â</span> <span>â</span>had no legitimate expectation of </div> <div>privacy in the digits of his passcode<span>â and â</span>law enforcement<span>â</span><span>s </span>[later] </div> <div>use of that passcode was not a search protected by the Fourth </div> <div>Amendment.<span>â <span>Id. <span>at <span>¶¶</span> <span>30</span>-32. It stands to reason, therefore, t<span></span>hat </span></span></span> </div> <div>when an individual does <span>not </span>voluntarily share <span>a </span>PIN code with </div> </div></div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf23" data-page-no="23"> <div><div> <div>32 </div> <div>police, he is exhibiting a subjective expectation that his PIN code </div> <div>will remain private <span>â</span> particularly when a phone<span>âs</span> PIN code i<span></span>s the </div> <div>key to unlocking a wealth of private information. </div> <div>¶ 58<span> </span><span>As for the second, objective prong, it is clear that society </span> </div> <div>recognizes as reasonable the expectation <span>that oneâs </span>PIN code is </div> <div>private. Indeed, keeping a PIN code private is an indisputably </div> <div>important part of how passwords function. <span>See Booker</span><span>, </span>561 F. </div> <div>Supp. 3d <span>at 931 (âT</span>here can be no question that a passcode ent<span></span>ered </div> <div>into a cell phone, which is designed to keep the contents of t<span></span>he </div> <div>phone hidden from others, is generally considered by <span></span>society to be </div> <div>something private that should be free from warrantless intru<span></span>sion by </div> <div>the government.<span>â); <span>see also </span></span>Jay E. Grenig, <span>Electronic Discovery a<span></span>nd </span> </div> <div>Records and Information Management Guide<span> § 3:7, Westlaw </span> </div> <div>(database updated Oct. 2023) <span>(â</span>It is essential to use passwor<span></span>ds and </div> <div>to keep them safe. . . . No one else should be told a passwor<span></span>d.<span> </span>Any </div> <div>compromised password should be changed immediately.<span>â);</span><span> Da<span></span>vis<span>, ¶ </span></span> </div> <div>30 (society would not deem a subjective expectation of pri<span></span>vacy to be </div> <div>objectively reasonable <span>if</span> a defendant shared the PIN code with law </div> <div>enforcement). </div> </div></div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf24" data-page-no="24"> <div><div> <div>33 </div> <div>¶ 59<span> </span><span>The People <span>contend that dâEstreeâs </span>PIN <span>code â</span>had no </span> </div> <div>meaningful existence other than to protect the contents of his </div> <div>cellphone <span>â</span> it was just a series of numbers that provided no </div> <div>independent information about his thoughts or life<span>.â </span>This is true in </div> <div>the most literal sense of what a PIN code is. But this </div> <div>characterization of a PIN code ignores the importance of what <span></span>a </div> <div>phoneâs <span>PIN code protects </span><span>â</span><span> namely, the wealth of private </span> </div> <div>information cell phones store.<span> <span>See Riley</span></span>, 573 U.S. at 393-94, 40<span></span>1-</div> <div>03<span>.<span> </span></span> </div> <div>¶ 60<span> <span>Because dâEstree has a cognizable right to<span> the privacy of his </span></span></span> </div> <div>cell phone PIN code that warrants constitutional protection <span></span>under </div> <div>the subjective and objective prongs of the <span>Katz </span>test, we conclude <span>a </span> </div> <div>brute force attack to discover dâEstreeâs <span>PIN code constitutes a </span> </div> <div>search under the Fourth Amendment. The second warrant allowed </div> <div>police to obtain â[p]asswords, encryption keys, codes, and/or ot<span></span>her </div> <div>devices or information that may be necessary to access the de<span></span>vice </div> <div>and its contents.â <span>A brute force attack was therefore authorized. </span> </div> <div>But the use of the PIN code discovered while executing the first,<span></span> </div> <div>invalid warrant was not authorized<span>. </span> T<span>he district courtâs âmeansâ </span> </div> <div>rationale therefore cannot save the execution of the second w<span></span>arrant </div> </div></div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf25" data-page-no="25"> <div><div> <div>34 </div> <div>using the PIN code discovered while executing the first, unlawful </div> <div>warrant.<span> <span>See Riley<span>, 573 U.S. <span>at</span> 400</span></span>; </span><span>Dominguez-Castor</span><span>, ¶<span> <span>19.</span> </span></span> </div> <div>4.<span> <span>The Inevitable Discovery Rule </span></span> </div> <div>¶ 61<span> <span>â<span>Under the inevitable discovery rule, evidence initially </span></span></span> </div> <div>discovered in an unconstitutional manner may be received if <span></span>that </div> <div>same evidence inevitably would have been obtained lawfully.<span>â</span><span> </span> </div> <div>People v. Schoondermark<span>,759 P.2d 715, 718 (Colo. 1988)<span>. <span>â</span></span>The </span> </div> <div>ability to obtain a lawful search warrant after an illegal <span></span>search has </div> <div>occurred does not satisfy the inevitable discovery excepti<span></span>on </div> <div>requirements.<span>â</span><span> <span>People v. Nelson<span>,
2012 COA 37, ¶ 52; </span>see also </span></span> </div> <div>People v. Diaz<span>,
53 P.3d 1171, 1176 (Colo. 2002)<span>. </span> </span> </div> <div>The Government cannot later initiate a lawful </div> <div>avenue of obtaining the evidence and then </div> <div>claim that it should be admitted because its </div> <div>discovery was inevitable. . . . Because a valid </div> <div>search warrant nearly always can be obtained </div> <div>after the search has occurred, a contrary </div> <div>holding would practically destroy the </div> <div>requirement that a warrant for the search <span>. . .</span> </div> <div>be obtained <span>before</span> the search takes place. </div> <div>People v. Burola<span>,
848 P.2d 958, 963-64 (Colo. 1993) (quoting </span>Unit<span></span>ed </div> <div>States v. Satterfield<span>,
743 F.2d 827, 846 (11th Cir. 1984))<span>. </span>As a </span> </div> <div>result, <span>â</span>[t]he prosecution must affirmatively show that the lawf<span></span>ul </div> <div>means of discovering this evidence was already initiated when the </div> </div></div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf26" data-page-no="26"> <div> <img alt="" src="https://icbg.s3.amazonaws.com/media/MM9/Zgu/MM9ZguMTW/pwsU7Hj38Z0aT83wGmUtrM/47S7PRRijEBs%3D?AWSAccessKeyId=ASIA5PHC3MTPTCGXON2M&Expires=1728061407&Signature=jYewIYtJVXKXrUNQW%2Fn%2FapTel%2Bg%3D&x-amz-security-token=IQoJb3JpZ2luX2VjEJD%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2FwEaCXVzLWVhc3QtMSJGMEQCIGu1GFJEr5iCtVwEWS8%2FYmPE84Pm%2FFzYhGTa%2FGzTkZFfAiBYlQ81xdSGIng%2BcUDaidgy1WsHp67%2BHFXr7cayiQr96Cq7BQjZ%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F8BEAAaDDkyNjA0MTIwMzkzNSIMzvHNB8Hg%2FeYy74gxKo8Fw1BGlk0k2WAcVHzkDVLWXPPu7fXyai8%2FVmcJBP1B5%2FTcuoMPfiVAFsQXGJqr%2FQRvzqadIlgJbk3dYbNpShnr6eB2pCbH%2B4Hvv5E2ujgQ9UBciItlHCuWJlFY97UBrh6RPtR9yJaP2VPKmSF1TdBpSJzRU%2B9gh81G7dW1rAkUWZAOdu95nRvpZ0tYuIK0Mp6NzVSIBTyZE1edYT6%2BXT29YfEkafGlpVxfWtZMLX5DD%2F7d0450E%2Bw18%2Bo4rdUK9eBKUq7P3U54X1uLBq4tOOHz%2BTzN3pD%2BbkWgzjHRavawXN1JV2qncvKPq5tVoQbu%2BQwdSh%2BasKUPanR0wK7aI4eAWfjc9tm6Z94lArU4jTlxQCLAyDIYxyAJ9%2FokHkslhkIMonM612e95l%2FLFLlchEAlw5bSvnG4LW8buJtYxr4awsWEhvs5HHA9HHCQRI5ybJf%2FmeRGulWrsyvokEpMenBxE07Cy8RFjTgBvfZdfuyRq7mGbmVOdRueh7W3gznC7QW42speX%2B3ozW1ja1TDOn0lmTg%2B2hhethq2eJCnehZG5Pzsn42QfTDlMGu7UZKkZIROfvjxGjUGBFnoAKoYW8wrlZ6TbIKKAMRpiwIRDvYUNR9q4lIrzhBgdchRPLiz5b3LfpIHNYdRiqoppy%2F2%2FoPGVm8HEorgPTA2UG1SswU%2FTqwwMNSu%2FvbUSFGTx5PyDiGleLr%2B5bvGcuM%2BNP5pK1sw7ud6vZjmS%2Bo%2Fdg8mIJnA4g%2B8SxqVUN8J7gGZN3P7Ngqf4XuSu8SztIWSJrnFZ0oTF9%2FaIlPOkxPn5oDneJIBv0%2FW5efbsMvKTSzczqYLaQVAgqODa5AdE%2F%2BjpAkKSxZ6f9iAsOOj9awAHeJYxMO6VjDbnoC4BjqyAQJfem%2FyGQaRJDk1pn1lXABxVoqjZKcAUffRwrjy8yzqFYASw54B6ED%2FlPyyRZ5mz5zl%2BO4ad2UMibLl4n5RQVi5vjlO5SCd%2FhYZ9V%2Bj9fbbKOQFGLyZ48q9PCyOpuLdtM%2Bl2Cj1wT%2FuGQ7JB%2BdM4cGXUyPFmmXSiOZCwWgIz02zq3D%2Bo%2Fzzdh9foPH3VQRAXq%2F4iiXx7ge0dbFIqupgdip3EgfQKEViiGFEbNE7qXrwz80%3D"><div> <div>35 </div> <div>evidence was obtained illegally.<span>â</span><span> </span><span>People v. Dyer</span>,2019 COA 161, </div> <div>¶ <span>38.</span> </div> </div> <div><div>10</div></div> <div> <div> </div> <div>¶ 62<span> </span><span>As<span> with the independent source doctrine, this requirement </span></span> </div> <div>effectuates the policy underlying the inevitable discovery doctrine <span>â</span> </div> <div>the exception should place the government in the <span>same</span> position (no </div> <div>better, no worse) than it would have occupied if no illegality had </div> <div>occurred. <span>See Nix</span>, 467 U.S. <span>at</span> 443-44 (the independent sou<span></span>rce </div> <div>doctrine<span>â</span><span>s </span><span>â</span><span>rationale is wholly consistent with and justifies our </span> </div> <div>adoption of the ultimate or inevitable discovery exception t<span></span>o the </div> <div>exclusionary rule<span>â</span>). Thus, if two searches <span>â</span> one lawful and one </div> <div>unlawful <span>â</span> began at the same time and would procure the sam<span>e </span> </div> <div>evidence, suppressing the resulting evidence would place the </div> <div>prosecution in a worse position because the police would have </div> <div>inevitably obtained that evidence even if no misconduct had taken </div> <div>place. <span>Id<span>.</span></span> </div> <div>¶ 63<span> </span><span>While it is true, as the district court noted, that the PIN code </span> </div> <div>would have eventually been discovered by police software <span>â</span> months </div> <div> </div> </div> <div><div>10</div></div> <div> <div> Some courts, including the Tenth Circuit, do not require t<span></span>he </div> <div>lawful means of discovering the evidence to have been initiated </div> <div>before the unlawful search or seizure. <span> See, e.g.</span><span>, </span><span>United States v. </span> </div> <div>Christy<span>,
739 F.3d 534, 540-41 (10th Cir. 2014). </span> </div> </div> <a href="#pf26" data-dest-detail='[38,"XYZ",69,137,null]'><div style="border-style:none;position:absolute;left:133.489444px;bottom:835.986111px;width:15.660000px;height:32.870000px;background-color:rgba(255,255,255,0.000001);"></div></a> </div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf27" data-page-no="27"> <div> <img alt="" src="https://icbg.s3.amazonaws.com/media/MMX/n%2Be/MMXn%2BekQ817y/lXyeovZwcgeMWibwHo7dUSO3Lu0a7r74%3D?AWSAccessKeyId=ASIA5PHC3MTPTCGXON2M&Expires=1728061407&Signature=i7I0KGk%2FQ0qr%2F4kN5kothv45lCA%3D&x-amz-security-token=IQoJb3JpZ2luX2VjEJD%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2FwEaCXVzLWVhc3QtMSJGMEQCIGu1GFJEr5iCtVwEWS8%2FYmPE84Pm%2FFzYhGTa%2FGzTkZFfAiBYlQ81xdSGIng%2BcUDaidgy1WsHp67%2BHFXr7cayiQr96Cq7BQjZ%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F8BEAAaDDkyNjA0MTIwMzkzNSIMzvHNB8Hg%2FeYy74gxKo8Fw1BGlk0k2WAcVHzkDVLWXPPu7fXyai8%2FVmcJBP1B5%2FTcuoMPfiVAFsQXGJqr%2FQRvzqadIlgJbk3dYbNpShnr6eB2pCbH%2B4Hvv5E2ujgQ9UBciItlHCuWJlFY97UBrh6RPtR9yJaP2VPKmSF1TdBpSJzRU%2B9gh81G7dW1rAkUWZAOdu95nRvpZ0tYuIK0Mp6NzVSIBTyZE1edYT6%2BXT29YfEkafGlpVxfWtZMLX5DD%2F7d0450E%2Bw18%2Bo4rdUK9eBKUq7P3U54X1uLBq4tOOHz%2BTzN3pD%2BbkWgzjHRavawXN1JV2qncvKPq5tVoQbu%2BQwdSh%2BasKUPanR0wK7aI4eAWfjc9tm6Z94lArU4jTlxQCLAyDIYxyAJ9%2FokHkslhkIMonM612e95l%2FLFLlchEAlw5bSvnG4LW8buJtYxr4awsWEhvs5HHA9HHCQRI5ybJf%2FmeRGulWrsyvokEpMenBxE07Cy8RFjTgBvfZdfuyRq7mGbmVOdRueh7W3gznC7QW42speX%2B3ozW1ja1TDOn0lmTg%2B2hhethq2eJCnehZG5Pzsn42QfTDlMGu7UZKkZIROfvjxGjUGBFnoAKoYW8wrlZ6TbIKKAMRpiwIRDvYUNR9q4lIrzhBgdchRPLiz5b3LfpIHNYdRiqoppy%2F2%2FoPGVm8HEorgPTA2UG1SswU%2FTqwwMNSu%2FvbUSFGTx5PyDiGleLr%2B5bvGcuM%2BNP5pK1sw7ud6vZjmS%2Bo%2Fdg8mIJnA4g%2B8SxqVUN8J7gGZN3P7Ngqf4XuSu8SztIWSJrnFZ0oTF9%2FaIlPOkxPn5oDneJIBv0%2FW5efbsMvKTSzczqYLaQVAgqODa5AdE%2F%2BjpAkKSxZ6f9iAsOOj9awAHeJYxMO6VjDbnoC4BjqyAQJfem%2FyGQaRJDk1pn1lXABxVoqjZKcAUffRwrjy8yzqFYASw54B6ED%2FlPyyRZ5mz5zl%2BO4ad2UMibLl4n5RQVi5vjlO5SCd%2FhYZ9V%2Bj9fbbKOQFGLyZ48q9PCyOpuLdtM%2Bl2Cj1wT%2FuGQ7JB%2BdM4cGXUyPFmmXSiOZCwWgIz02zq3D%2Bo%2Fzzdh9foPH3VQRAXq%2F4iiXx7ge0dbFIqupgdip3EgfQKEViiGFEbNE7qXrwz80%3D"><div> <div>36 </div> <div>or years later <span>â</span> focusing on the word <span>â</span><span>inevitable<span>â</span></span> in such a mann<span></span>er </div> <div>ignores the requirements of the rule and undermines its purpos<span></span>e, </div> <div>and the exclusionary rule more broadly.</div> </div> <div><div>11</div></div> <div> <div> While police here </div> <div>initiated a <span>lawful</span> means to obtain the PIN code <span>â</span> via the brute </div> <div>force attack that the second warrant authorized <span>â</span> that means was </div> <div>abandoned in favor of a shortcut (using the illegally obtained PIN </div> <div>code), thus violating a key requirement of the inevitable discov<span></span>ery </div> <div>rule under Colorado precedent<span>. </span><span>See Dyer</span>, ¶ 38<span>; </span><span>Nelson</span>, ¶ 52.<span> </span>And </div> <div>regardless, the soon-abandoned lawful means was initiated well </div> <div>after the PIN code was first illegally obtained. <span>See Dyer</span>, ¶ 38<span>. </span> </div> <div>Simply because police software would have <span>eventually</span> discovered </div> <div>the PIN code (perhaps years <span>after dâEstreeâs trial date) </span>does not </div> <div>render it admissible.<span> </span> </div> <div>¶ 64<span> </span><span>Even if we assume the second brute force attack would ha<span></span>ve </span> </div> <div>yielded a PIN code in three <span>or</span> so months (the time the first brute </div> <div> </div> </div> <div><div>11</div></div> <div> <div> Merriam-Webster<span>â</span>s Dictionary defines <span>â</span><span>inevitable<span>â</span></span> as <span>â</span>incapa<span></span>ble of </div> <div>being avoided or evaded.<span>â</span><span> </span>Merriam-Webster Dictionary, </div> <div>https://perma.cc/B3BN-X46N. Black<span>â</span>s Law Dictionary defines </div> <div>â<span>inevitable</span>â<span> within the context of the inevitable discovery <span></span>rule. In </span> </div> <div>that definition, it notes that <span>â[t]</span>he inevitable discovery of evidence </div> <div>by law enforcement is a discovery that would naturally and <span></span>lawfully </div> <div>occur in the course of an investigation.<span>â</span><span> </span><span>Black<span>â</span></span>s Law Dictionary </div> <div>925 (12th ed. 2024)<span>. </span> </div> </div> <a href="#pf27" data-dest-detail='[39,"XYZ",69,203,null]'><div style="border-style:none;position:absolute;left:439.376667px;bottom:794.011111px;width:15.670000px;height:32.870000px;background-color:rgba(255,255,255,0.000001);"></div></a> </div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf28" data-page-no="28"> <div><div> <div>37 </div> <div>force attack took using the first, unlawful warrant), the information </div> <div>would likely have come <span>after </span>the scheduled December 14, 202<span></span>1, </div> <div>trial. We are not prepared to speculate that the dist<span></span>rict court would </div> <div>have granted a trial continuance whe<span>n </span>the prosecution waited so </div> <div>close to the trial date to seek a second warrant. <span> See People v. Syrie</span><span>, </span> </div> <div>101 P.3d 219, 223 (Colo. 2004) (inevitable discovery<span></span> exception </div> <div>cannot be met through <span>â</span>speculation about possible series of </div> <div>eventsâ). <span> Recall that police asked the court for the second warrant<span></span> </span> </div> <div>in October 2021 <span>â</span> almost five months after the May 12, 202<span></span>1, </div> <div>suppression ruling <span>â</span> <span>knowing that dâEstreeâs</span> trial was in Decem<span></span>ber </div> <div>2021 and his speedy trial clock was ticking<span>. </span> </div> <div>¶ 65<span> </span><span>To admit evidence under the inevitable discovery doctrine </span> </div> <div>â<span>requires an affirmative showing of a reasonable probability <span></span>that the </span> </div> <div>evidence <span>would inevitably be discovered through law<span></span>ful means </span> </div> <div>already initiated when the seizure was made<span>.<span>â</span><span> </span></span><span>I<span>d.</span></span><span> (emphasis </span> </div> <div>added)<span>; <span>see also Burola<span>, 848 P.2d <span>at</span> <span>963 (â</span></span></span></span>[I]<span>f <span>evidence is obtained </span></span> </div> <div>by illegal conduct, the illegality can be cured only if the poli<span></span>ce </div> <div>possessed and were pursuing a lawful means of discovery <span></span>at the </div> <div>time the illegality occurred.â)<span>. A lawful means was initiated </span><span>â</span><span> the </span> </div> <div>brute force attack authorized by the second warrant <span>â</span> but that </div> </div></div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf29" data-page-no="29"> <div><div> <div>38 </div> <div>means was abandoned in favor of using the proverbial f<span></span>ruit of the </div> <div>first, poisoned warrant <span>â</span> the known PIN code. </div> <div>¶ 66<span> </span><span>The primary rationale for the inevitable discovery rule as an </span> </div> <div>exception to the exclusionary rule would be undermined by allowing </div> <div>admission of any evidence that would have been eventually </div> <div>discovered, where <span>a </span>lawful means to obtain the evidence was </div> <div>initiated but abandoned in favor of a tainted shortcut. <span>See <span>Ni</span><span>x</span></span>, 467 </div> <div>U.S. <span>at</span> <span>442</span><span>-<span>43</span></span><span>; </span><span>see</span><span> </span><span>also</span> <span>Casillas v. People</span>, 2018 <span></span>CO 78M, ¶¶ <span>21</span>-22, </div> <div>36<span>.</span><span> <span> </span></span> </div> <div>¶ 67<span> </span><span>We recognize that the exclusionary rule<span>âs deterrence rationale </span></span> </div> <div>is not served when the challenged evidence would <span>â</span>ultimately or </div> <div>inevitably<span>â</span><span> be discovered by lawful means. <span>Nix</span>, 467 U.S.<span></span> <span>at</span> <span>444</span> <span>(â</span>If </span> </div> <div>the prosecution can establish <span>. . .</span> that the information ultimately or </div> <div>inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means . . . t<span></span>hen the </div> <div>deterrence rationale has so little basis that the evidence should b<span></span>e </div> <div>received<span>.â)</span><span>. <span>As the <span>Nix </span>court reasoned, <span>â</span>when an officer is aware </span></span> </div> <div>that the evidence will inevitably be discovered, he will try t<span></span>o avoid </div> <div>engaging in any questionable practice . . . [as] there will be little <span></span>to </div> <div>gain from taking any dubious <span>â</span><span>shortcuts<span>â</span></span> to obtain the evidence.<span>â</span><span> </span> </div> <div>Id.<span> at 445-<span>46</span><span>; </span><span>see also People v. Briggs</span>,709 P.2d 911, 923 (Colo. </span> </div> </div></div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf2a" data-page-no="2a"> <div><div> <div>39 </div> <div>1985)<span>. <span>But here, the opposite occurred </span></span><span>â</span><span> police took a shortcut, </span> </div> <div>presumably because they were not confident that the second <span></span>brute </div> <div>force attack would crack the cell phone in time to put its </div> <div>incriminating contents to use at the December 2021 t<span></span>rial. </div> <div>¶ 68<span> </span><span>To rule that use of the PIN code was permissible in this </span> </div> <div>context would provide an incentive for police to engage in such </div> <div>shortcuts in the future. <span>See Casillas</span>, ¶¶ 34-<span>36</span>. Although there is a </div> <div>reasonable probability that police software would have <span>eventua<span></span>lly<span> </span></span> </div> <div>produced d<span>â</span><span>Estree<span>â</span></span><span>s </span>PIN code<span>, </span>by Fink<span>â</span><span>s </span>own estimates and prior </div> <div>brute force attack<span>, </span>we can only speculate whether this would have </div> <div>occurred before the December 2021 trial<span>. </span><span>See Syrie</span>, 101 P.3d at </div> <div>223.<span> <span> </span></span> </div> <div>D.<span> <span>Prejudice and Next Steps </span></span> </div> <div>¶ 69<span> </span><span>In their brief, the People <span>â</span>concede that if this Court wh<span></span>ere [sic] </span> </div> <div>to find that the trial court erred in denying all of <span>[dâE]streeâs</span> </div> <div>preserved suppression claims, under the facts of this case, t<span></span>he </div> <div>errors could not be harmless.<span>â</span><span> </span>We agree. </div> <div>¶ 70<span> </span><span>The admission of the evidence gathered from d<span>â</span><span>Estree<span>â</span></span>s cell </span> </div> <div>phone undoubtedly prejudiced him at trial. Photos of d<span>â</span>Estree </div> <div>holding a handgun that matched the description of the homicide </div> </div></div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf2b" data-page-no="2b"> <div><div> <div>40 </div> <div>weapon, text messages admitting that he expected to go to prison<span>, </span> </div> <div>and the incriminating internet search history were impactful pieces </div> <div>of evidence against d<span>â</span>Estree. Further, the prosecut<span>or</span> referred t<span></span>o </div> <div>this evidence several times in closing argument, pointing <span>to</span> <span>it</span> to </div> <div>help convince the jurors that, regardless of what they thought of </div> <div>Lucero<span>â</span><span>s <span>credibility, they could rely on the evidence taken f<span></span>rom </span></span> </div> <div>dâEstreeâs <span>cell phone <span>to</span> corroborate her testimony<span>. </span>And the </span> </div> <div>prosecution noted in its motion for reconsideration after the first </div> <div>warrant<span>â</span><span>s suppression that it considered the <span>â</span>evidence collected </span> </div> <div>from the cell phone belonging to the defendant [to be] <span>of</span> critical </div> <div>importance to the prosecution of this case.<span>â</span><span> </span><span> </span> </div> <div>¶ 71<span> </span><span>We cannot find that the improper admission of this critical </span> </div> <div>evidence against d<span>â</span>Estree was harmless beyond a reasonable do<span></span>ubt<span>. </span> </div> <div>Furthermore, these errors likely impacted every one of his </div> <div>convictions<span>. <span> The </span></span><span>prosecutionâs</span><span> trial evidence supporting each of </span> </div> <div>d<span>â</span><span>Estree<span>â</span><span>s convictions, especially Lucero</span><span>â</span><span>s testimony, benefite<span></span>d from </span></span> </div> <div>this improperly admitted digital evidence for corroborati<span>on</span>. Th<span></span>us, </div> </div></div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf2c" data-page-no="2c"> <div> <img alt="" src="https://icbg.s3.amazonaws.com/media/MMX/n%2Be/MMXn%2BekQ817y/lXyeovZwcgeMWibwHo7dUSO3Lu0a7r74%3D?AWSAccessKeyId=ASIA5PHC3MTPTCGXON2M&Expires=1728061407&Signature=i7I0KGk%2FQ0qr%2F4kN5kothv45lCA%3D&x-amz-security-token=IQoJb3JpZ2luX2VjEJD%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2FwEaCXVzLWVhc3QtMSJGMEQCIGu1GFJEr5iCtVwEWS8%2FYmPE84Pm%2FFzYhGTa%2FGzTkZFfAiBYlQ81xdSGIng%2BcUDaidgy1WsHp67%2BHFXr7cayiQr96Cq7BQjZ%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F8BEAAaDDkyNjA0MTIwMzkzNSIMzvHNB8Hg%2FeYy74gxKo8Fw1BGlk0k2WAcVHzkDVLWXPPu7fXyai8%2FVmcJBP1B5%2FTcuoMPfiVAFsQXGJqr%2FQRvzqadIlgJbk3dYbNpShnr6eB2pCbH%2B4Hvv5E2ujgQ9UBciItlHCuWJlFY97UBrh6RPtR9yJaP2VPKmSF1TdBpSJzRU%2B9gh81G7dW1rAkUWZAOdu95nRvpZ0tYuIK0Mp6NzVSIBTyZE1edYT6%2BXT29YfEkafGlpVxfWtZMLX5DD%2F7d0450E%2Bw18%2Bo4rdUK9eBKUq7P3U54X1uLBq4tOOHz%2BTzN3pD%2BbkWgzjHRavawXN1JV2qncvKPq5tVoQbu%2BQwdSh%2BasKUPanR0wK7aI4eAWfjc9tm6Z94lArU4jTlxQCLAyDIYxyAJ9%2FokHkslhkIMonM612e95l%2FLFLlchEAlw5bSvnG4LW8buJtYxr4awsWEhvs5HHA9HHCQRI5ybJf%2FmeRGulWrsyvokEpMenBxE07Cy8RFjTgBvfZdfuyRq7mGbmVOdRueh7W3gznC7QW42speX%2B3ozW1ja1TDOn0lmTg%2B2hhethq2eJCnehZG5Pzsn42QfTDlMGu7UZKkZIROfvjxGjUGBFnoAKoYW8wrlZ6TbIKKAMRpiwIRDvYUNR9q4lIrzhBgdchRPLiz5b3LfpIHNYdRiqoppy%2F2%2FoPGVm8HEorgPTA2UG1SswU%2FTqwwMNSu%2FvbUSFGTx5PyDiGleLr%2B5bvGcuM%2BNP5pK1sw7ud6vZjmS%2Bo%2Fdg8mIJnA4g%2B8SxqVUN8J7gGZN3P7Ngqf4XuSu8SztIWSJrnFZ0oTF9%2FaIlPOkxPn5oDneJIBv0%2FW5efbsMvKTSzczqYLaQVAgqODa5AdE%2F%2BjpAkKSxZ6f9iAsOOj9awAHeJYxMO6VjDbnoC4BjqyAQJfem%2FyGQaRJDk1pn1lXABxVoqjZKcAUffRwrjy8yzqFYASw54B6ED%2FlPyyRZ5mz5zl%2BO4ad2UMibLl4n5RQVi5vjlO5SCd%2FhYZ9V%2Bj9fbbKOQFGLyZ48q9PCyOpuLdtM%2Bl2Cj1wT%2FuGQ7JB%2BdM4cGXUyPFmmXSiOZCwWgIz02zq3D%2Bo%2Fzzdh9foPH3VQRAXq%2F4iiXx7ge0dbFIqupgdip3EgfQKEViiGFEbNE7qXrwz80%3D"><div> <div>41 </div> <div>these errors require reversal of each of his convictions.</div> </div> <div><div>12</div></div> <div> <div> <span>See </span> </div> <div>Hagos<span>, ¶ 11;<span> see also People v. Folsom</span>,2017 COA 146M, ¶¶ <span>17</span>-23 </span> </div> <div>(admission of videos extracted from iPod was not harmless an<span></span>d </div> <div>required reversal). </div> <div>¶ 72<span> </span><span>In the light most favorable to the prosecution, however, </span> </div> <div>considering both the properly admitted evidence through witness </div> <div>testimony and the policeâs <span>investigation, in addition to the </span> </div> <div>improperly admitted cell phone evidence, we cannot say w<span></span>ith </div> <div>certainty that there was insufficient evidence to convict <span></span>dâEstree of </div> <div>some or all of the charged crimes. And because this reversal is </div> <div>predicated on the receipt of improperly admitted evidence, <span></span>the </div> <div>prosecution is entitled to a retrial of all of dâEstreeâs charge<span></span>s on </div> <div>remand. <span>See People v. Marciano</span>,
2014 COA 92M-2, ¶¶ 42-<span>49</span><span>; <span>see </span></span> </div> <div>also People v. Sisneros<span>,
606 P.2d 1317, 1319 (Colo. App. <span></span>1980)<span> </span></span> </div> <div>(â[W]<span>here reversal is predicated upon trial error consisting of t<span></span>he </span> </div> <div>reception of inadmissible evidence, remand for a new trial <span></span>is proper, </div> <div> </div> </div> <div><div>12</div></div> <div> <div> The People do not address whether any of d<span>â</span><span>Estree<span>â</span></span>s convictions </div> <div>may have been <span>un</span>affected by the admission of the digital evidence </div> <div>were we to find the execution of the second warrant was infirm, </div> <div>while d<span>â</span>Estree contends that every one of his convictions mu<span></span>st be </div> <div>reversed<span>. <span> </span></span> </div> </div> <a href="#pf2c" data-dest-detail='[44,"XYZ",69,154,null]'><div style="border-style:none;position:absolute;left:567.448333px;bottom:877.986667px;width:15.660000px;height:32.880000px;background-color:rgba(255,255,255,0.000001);"></div></a> </div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf2d" data-page-no="2d"> <div><div> <div>42 </div> <div>and an appellate court should not review the remain<span></span>ing evidence in </div> <div>order to determine whether it is sufficient to sustain <span></span>the </div> <div>conviction<span>.â) (citations omitted). <span> </span></span> </div> <div>III.<span> <span>Disposition </span></span> </div> <div>¶ 73<span> </span><span>We reverse d<span>â</span><span>Estree<span>â</span></span>s convictions and remand the case to the </span> </div> <div>district court for a new trial. </div> <div>JUDGE SULLIVAN concurs<span>. </span> </div> <div>JUDGE GROVE specially concurs. </div> </div></div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf2e" data-page-no="2e"> <div><div> <div>43 </div> <div>JUDGE GROVE, specially concurring<span>. </span> </div> <div>¶ 74<span> <span>I agree with the majorityâs reasoning and its conclusion that </span></span> </div> <div>dâEstreeâs convictions must be reversed. I write separately<span></span> to urge </div> <div>the Colorado Supreme Court to revisit two aspects of<span></span> its inevitable </div> <div>discovery jurisprudence that I believe have drifted away from the </div> <div>United States Supreme Courtâs articulation of the rule.<span> </span> </div> <div>¶ 75<span> </span><span>First, since the doctrine was first applied in this state, </span> </div> <div>Coloradoâs version of the inevitable discovery rule has requi<span></span>red the </div> <div>prosecution to show that (1) âthe police were pursuing<span></span> an </div> <div>independent investigation at the time the illegality occurred,â and </div> <div>(2<span>) there was â<span>a reasonable probability<span> that the evidence would have </span></span></span> </div> <div>been discovered in the absence of police misconduct.<span>â </span> <span>People v. </span> </div> <div>Breidenbach<span>,875 P.2d 879, 889 (Colo. 1994) (emphasis a<span></span>dded). My </span> </div> <div>concern in this case is with the second element of this test, which </div> <div>not only makes little semantic sense but also materially diverge<span></span>s </div> <div>from the standard set forth in <span>Nix v. Williams</span>, 467 U.S. <span></span>431 (1984). </div> <div>¶ 76<span> <span>Breidenbach<span>âs âreasonable probabilityâ approach tracked t<span></span>he </span></span></span> </div> <div>Fifth Circuit Court of Appealsâ holding in <span>United Stat<span></span>es v. Cherry<span>, </span></span> </div> <div>
759 F.2d 1196(5th Cir. 1985), which applied pre-existing circuit </div> <div>precedent to define the scope of the inevitable discovery rule base<span></span>d </div> </div></div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf2f" data-page-no="2f"> <div> <img alt="" src="https://icbg.s3.amazonaws.com/media/MMX/n%2Be/MMXn%2BekQ817y/lXyeovZwcgeMWibwHo7dUSO3Lu0a7r74%3D?AWSAccessKeyId=ASIA5PHC3MTPTCGXON2M&Expires=1728061407&Signature=i7I0KGk%2FQ0qr%2F4kN5kothv45lCA%3D&x-amz-security-token=IQoJb3JpZ2luX2VjEJD%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2FwEaCXVzLWVhc3QtMSJGMEQCIGu1GFJEr5iCtVwEWS8%2FYmPE84Pm%2FFzYhGTa%2FGzTkZFfAiBYlQ81xdSGIng%2BcUDaidgy1WsHp67%2BHFXr7cayiQr96Cq7BQjZ%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F8BEAAaDDkyNjA0MTIwMzkzNSIMzvHNB8Hg%2FeYy74gxKo8Fw1BGlk0k2WAcVHzkDVLWXPPu7fXyai8%2FVmcJBP1B5%2FTcuoMPfiVAFsQXGJqr%2FQRvzqadIlgJbk3dYbNpShnr6eB2pCbH%2B4Hvv5E2ujgQ9UBciItlHCuWJlFY97UBrh6RPtR9yJaP2VPKmSF1TdBpSJzRU%2B9gh81G7dW1rAkUWZAOdu95nRvpZ0tYuIK0Mp6NzVSIBTyZE1edYT6%2BXT29YfEkafGlpVxfWtZMLX5DD%2F7d0450E%2Bw18%2Bo4rdUK9eBKUq7P3U54X1uLBq4tOOHz%2BTzN3pD%2BbkWgzjHRavawXN1JV2qncvKPq5tVoQbu%2BQwdSh%2BasKUPanR0wK7aI4eAWfjc9tm6Z94lArU4jTlxQCLAyDIYxyAJ9%2FokHkslhkIMonM612e95l%2FLFLlchEAlw5bSvnG4LW8buJtYxr4awsWEhvs5HHA9HHCQRI5ybJf%2FmeRGulWrsyvokEpMenBxE07Cy8RFjTgBvfZdfuyRq7mGbmVOdRueh7W3gznC7QW42speX%2B3ozW1ja1TDOn0lmTg%2B2hhethq2eJCnehZG5Pzsn42QfTDlMGu7UZKkZIROfvjxGjUGBFnoAKoYW8wrlZ6TbIKKAMRpiwIRDvYUNR9q4lIrzhBgdchRPLiz5b3LfpIHNYdRiqoppy%2F2%2FoPGVm8HEorgPTA2UG1SswU%2FTqwwMNSu%2FvbUSFGTx5PyDiGleLr%2B5bvGcuM%2BNP5pK1sw7ud6vZjmS%2Bo%2Fdg8mIJnA4g%2B8SxqVUN8J7gGZN3P7Ngqf4XuSu8SztIWSJrnFZ0oTF9%2FaIlPOkxPn5oDneJIBv0%2FW5efbsMvKTSzczqYLaQVAgqODa5AdE%2F%2BjpAkKSxZ6f9iAsOOj9awAHeJYxMO6VjDbnoC4BjqyAQJfem%2FyGQaRJDk1pn1lXABxVoqjZKcAUffRwrjy8yzqFYASw54B6ED%2FlPyyRZ5mz5zl%2BO4ad2UMibLl4n5RQVi5vjlO5SCd%2FhYZ9V%2Bj9fbbKOQFGLyZ48q9PCyOpuLdtM%2Bl2Cj1wT%2FuGQ7JB%2BdM4cGXUyPFmmXSiOZCwWgIz02zq3D%2Bo%2Fzzdh9foPH3VQRAXq%2F4iiXx7ge0dbFIqupgdip3EgfQKEViiGFEbNE7qXrwz80%3D"><div> <div>44 </div> <div>on its conclusion that the <span>Nix <span>court had made âno attempt</span></span> . . .<span></span> to </div> <div>define the contours of that exception.â <span>Id. <span>at 1204. But howeve<span></span>r </span></span> </div> <div>thin the analysis in <span>Nix </span>may have been, it still clearly held that<span></span> the </div> <div>inevitable discovery rule only applies if the prosecution </div> <div>âestablish[es] <span>by a preponderance of the evidence<span> that the </span></span> </div> <div>information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovere<span></span>d by </div> <div>lawful means.â <span>Nix</span><span>, 467 U.S.<span> </span>at 444 (emphasis added).</span> </div> </div> <div><div>1</div></div> <div> <div> <span>The </span> </div> <div>preponderance standard is different from âreasonable pro<span></span>bability,â </div> <div>and, importantly for this case, it also places a heavier burd<span></span>en on </div> <div>the prosecution. <span>See United States v. Zava<span></span>la<span>,541 F.3d 562, 579 n.7 </span></span> </div> <div>(5th Cir. 2008) (acknowledging that the Fifth Circuitâs applicati<span></span>on of </div> <div>the âreasonable probabilityâ test rather than a preponderance </div> <div>standard in the context of the inevitable discovery rule âis mo<span></span>re </div> <div>favorable to the Government than <span>the test in other circuitsâ); <span>cf. Mi<span></span>le </span></span> </div> <div>High Cab, Inc. v. Colo. Pub. Utils. Commân<span>,
2013 CO 26, ¶ 15 </span> </div> <div> </div> </div> <div><div>1</div></div> <div> <div> I recognize the linguistic difficulties in measuring inevitability in </div> <div>terms of probability. <span>See, e.g.</span><span>,</span><span> United States v. Cabassa</span>, 62 F.3d </div> <div>470, 474 (2d Cir. 1995) (recognizing the âsemantic puzzleâ c<span></span>reated </div> <div>by <span>âusing the preponderance of the evidence standard</span> to prove </div> <div>inevitabilityâ). But that standard is dictated by the holding in <span>Nix v. </span> </div> <div>Williams<span>,
467 U.S. 431(1984), and has generally pro<span></span>ved workable </span> </div> <div>in the context of suppression rulings. </div> </div> <a href="#pf2f" data-dest-detail='[47,"XYZ",69,187,null]'><div style="border-style:none;position:absolute;left:570.655556px;bottom:625.932222px;width:10.080000px;height:32.880000px;background-color:rgba(255,255,255,0.000001);"></div></a> </div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf30" data-page-no="30"> <div> <img alt="" src="https://icbg.s3.amazonaws.com/media/MM9/Zgu/MM9ZguMTW/pwsU7Hj38Z0aT83wGmUtrM/47S7PRRijEBs%3D?AWSAccessKeyId=ASIA5PHC3MTPTCGXON2M&Expires=1728061407&Signature=jYewIYtJVXKXrUNQW%2Fn%2FapTel%2Bg%3D&x-amz-security-token=IQoJb3JpZ2luX2VjEJD%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2FwEaCXVzLWVhc3QtMSJGMEQCIGu1GFJEr5iCtVwEWS8%2FYmPE84Pm%2FFzYhGTa%2FGzTkZFfAiBYlQ81xdSGIng%2BcUDaidgy1WsHp67%2BHFXr7cayiQr96Cq7BQjZ%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F8BEAAaDDkyNjA0MTIwMzkzNSIMzvHNB8Hg%2FeYy74gxKo8Fw1BGlk0k2WAcVHzkDVLWXPPu7fXyai8%2FVmcJBP1B5%2FTcuoMPfiVAFsQXGJqr%2FQRvzqadIlgJbk3dYbNpShnr6eB2pCbH%2B4Hvv5E2ujgQ9UBciItlHCuWJlFY97UBrh6RPtR9yJaP2VPKmSF1TdBpSJzRU%2B9gh81G7dW1rAkUWZAOdu95nRvpZ0tYuIK0Mp6NzVSIBTyZE1edYT6%2BXT29YfEkafGlpVxfWtZMLX5DD%2F7d0450E%2Bw18%2Bo4rdUK9eBKUq7P3U54X1uLBq4tOOHz%2BTzN3pD%2BbkWgzjHRavawXN1JV2qncvKPq5tVoQbu%2BQwdSh%2BasKUPanR0wK7aI4eAWfjc9tm6Z94lArU4jTlxQCLAyDIYxyAJ9%2FokHkslhkIMonM612e95l%2FLFLlchEAlw5bSvnG4LW8buJtYxr4awsWEhvs5HHA9HHCQRI5ybJf%2FmeRGulWrsyvokEpMenBxE07Cy8RFjTgBvfZdfuyRq7mGbmVOdRueh7W3gznC7QW42speX%2B3ozW1ja1TDOn0lmTg%2B2hhethq2eJCnehZG5Pzsn42QfTDlMGu7UZKkZIROfvjxGjUGBFnoAKoYW8wrlZ6TbIKKAMRpiwIRDvYUNR9q4lIrzhBgdchRPLiz5b3LfpIHNYdRiqoppy%2F2%2FoPGVm8HEorgPTA2UG1SswU%2FTqwwMNSu%2FvbUSFGTx5PyDiGleLr%2B5bvGcuM%2BNP5pK1sw7ud6vZjmS%2Bo%2Fdg8mIJnA4g%2B8SxqVUN8J7gGZN3P7Ngqf4XuSu8SztIWSJrnFZ0oTF9%2FaIlPOkxPn5oDneJIBv0%2FW5efbsMvKTSzczqYLaQVAgqODa5AdE%2F%2BjpAkKSxZ6f9iAsOOj9awAHeJYxMO6VjDbnoC4BjqyAQJfem%2FyGQaRJDk1pn1lXABxVoqjZKcAUffRwrjy8yzqFYASw54B6ED%2FlPyyRZ5mz5zl%2BO4ad2UMibLl4n5RQVi5vjlO5SCd%2FhYZ9V%2Bj9fbbKOQFGLyZ48q9PCyOpuLdtM%2Bl2Cj1wT%2FuGQ7JB%2BdM4cGXUyPFmmXSiOZCwWgIz02zq3D%2Bo%2Fzzdh9foPH3VQRAXq%2F4iiXx7ge0dbFIqupgdip3EgfQKEViiGFEbNE7qXrwz80%3D"><div> <div>45 </div> <div>(observing that âreasonable probabilityâ is used âto refer to a </div> <div>likelihood of occurrence which, although not insignificant<span></span>, </div> <div>nevertheless need not rise to the level of a preponderance of <span></span>the </div> <div>evidenceâ); <span>Krutsinger v. People<span>,219 P.3d 1054, 1060 <span></span>(Colo. 2009) </span></span> </div> <div>(â[T]he Supreme Court has made abundantly clear that<span></span> it does not </div> <div>intend its use of the term âreasonable probabilityâ to req<span></span>uire a </div> <div>showing that the defendant would more likely than not have </div> <div>received a different result <span>. . . </span><span>.â). As a result, Coloradoâs ve</span>rsion of </div> <div>the inevitable discovery rule appears to be out of step wit<span></span>h Supreme </div> <div>Court precedent.</div> </div> <div><div>2</div></div> <div> <div> </div> <div>¶ 77<span> </span><span>To be sure, in practice it will often make no difference whet<span></span>her </span> </div> <div>the âreasonable probabilityâ or preponderance standard ap<span></span>plies. </div> <div> </div> </div> <div><div>2</div></div> <div> <div> Notably, <span>the Colorado Supreme Courtâs application of<span></span> the </span> </div> <div>âreasonable probabilityâ test in inevitable discovery cases also </div> <div>diverges from its application of a preponderance standa<span></span>rd in the </div> <div>closely related context of the independent source doctrine. <span>See </span> </div> <div>Peo<span>ple v. Thompson<span>,
2021 CO 15, ¶ <span>22 (âWhen, as here, the People </span></span></span> </div> <div>assert the applicability of the independent source doctrine, they </div> <div>bear the burden of proving by a preponderance of the <span></span>evidence the </div> <div>doctrine<span>âs applicability.â).<span> <span>Because the two exceptions share the </span></span></span> </div> <div>same doctrinal underpinnings, <span>see Murray v. United States</span>, 487 </div> <div>U.S. 533, 539 (1988) (observing that <span>â</span>[t]he inevitable discovery </div> <div>doctrine <span>. . . </span>is in reality an extrapolation from the independent </div> <div>source doctrine<span>â), </span>I see no reason why the same standard sh<span></span>ould </div> <div>not apply to both. </div> </div> <a href="#pf30" data-dest-detail='[48,"XYZ",69,285,null]'><div style="border-style:none;position:absolute;left:236.529444px;bottom:500.007222px;width:10.080000px;height:32.870000px;background-color:rgba(255,255,255,0.000001);"></div></a> </div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf31" data-page-no="31"> <div><div> <div>46 </div> <div>But in close cases, the test that the trial court applies may well <span></span>be </div> <div>dispositive. This case provides a perfect example. Given that<span></span> the </div> <div>United States Secret Service took three months to complete a <span></span>brute </div> <div>force attack on the phoneâs PIN code, I believe tha<span>t it was </span> </div> <div>reasonably probable that a second brute force attack woul<span></span>d also be </div> <div>successful within a similar amount of time. But I am far less </div> <div>certain that the prosecution <span>proved</span> <span>by a preponderance o<span></span>f the </span> </div> <div>evidence<span> that cracking the PIN code would be inevitable in any sort </span> </div> <div>of reasonable timeframe. <span>See United States v. Jones</span>,72 F.3d 1324, </div> <div>1334 (7th Cir. 1995) (âInevitable discovery is not an excepti<span></span>on to be </div> <div>invoked casually, and if it is to be prevented from swallowing <span></span>the </div> <div>Fourth Amendment and the exclusionary rule, courts must tak<span></span>e </div> <div>care to hold the government to its burden <span>of proof.â). To t<span></span>he </span> </div> <div>contrary, the only evidence on this point was Agent Finkâs </div> <div>testimony that, if she had not decided to use the illegally <span></span>obtained </div> <div>PIN code after only a week of searching, the brute force attack c<span></span>ould </div> <div>have taken âanywhere from a week to 11 yearsâ to unlock t<span></span>he </div> <div>phone. Fink offered few other details about how quickly the process </div> <div>was likely to proceed or how the software worked. Inf<span></span>ormation of </div> <div>that sort would have helped the court better assess how the search </div> </div></div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf32" data-page-no="32"> <div><div> <div>47 </div> <div>would turn out. For example, if the court had been presented wi<span></span>th </div> <div>evidence that the software attempts easy-<span>to</span>-remember PIN codes </div> <div>(like the one here) first, before moving on to more random numbe<span></span>rs, </div> <div>it might have been able to better forecast the likelihood that </div> <div>execution of the second warrant would have been succes<span></span>sful in the </div> <div>time remaining before trial. </div> <div>¶ 78<span> </span><span>I acknowledge that the prosecution could have sought up to <span></span>a </span> </div> <div>six-month continuance of the trial date if it had tried and failed to </div> <div>discover the PIN code. <span>See </span>§ 18-1-405(6)(g)(I), C.R.S. 2024. But <span></span>in </div> <div>light of Finkâs testimony, it appears that an extension of t<span></span>hat length </div> <div>would have offered little additional certainty and mig<span></span>ht, depending </div> <div>on the overall age of the case, have begun to raise constit<span></span>utional </div> <div>speedy trial concerns. <span>See People v. Nelson</span>,2014 COA 165, ¶¶ <span>21<span></span><span>-</span></span> </div> <div>25. Accordingly, if the district court had been required to hol<span></span>d the </div> <div>prosecution to the burden of proof dictated by <span>Nix</span>, it might well </div> <div>have granted dâEstreeâs motion to suppress.<span> </span> </div> <div>¶ 79<span> </span><span>Second, in my view, parties and trial courts in Colorado wo<span></span>uld </span> </div> <div>be well served by an approach to the inevitable discovery doctrine </div> <div>that explicitly takes deterrence into account. I do not mean t<span></span>o </div> <div>suggest that the prosecution should be required to show an </div> </div></div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf33" data-page-no="33"> <div><div> <div>48 </div> <div>absence of bad faith (indeed, <span>Nix</span> rejected that very argument,<span></span> 467 </div> <div>U.S. at 445), but as Justice Stevens pointed out in his <span>Nix </span> </div> <div>concurrence, the inevitable discovery doctrine would âbe </div> <div>inconsistent with the deterrent purposes of the exclusionary <span></span>ruleâ if </div> <div>it provided law enforcement with an incentive to commit </div> <div>constitutional violations âby permitting the prosecution t<span></span>o avoid the </div> <div>unc<span>ertainties inherent in its search for evidence.â <span>Id.</span><span> at 456 </span></span> </div> <div>(Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). Consistent wit<span></span>h this </div> <div>understanding, some federal circuits have made clear t<span></span>hat the </div> <div>inevitable discovery exception should not apply under </div> <div>circumstances that would undermine the fundamental purpose of </div> <div>the exclusionary rule. <span>See, e.g.</span><span>,</span><span> United States v. Crespo-Rios</span>, <span></span>645 </div> <div>F.3d 37, 42 (1st Cir. 2011) (holding that inevitable discovery sh<span></span>ould </div> <div>apply only where <span>â</span>application of the doctrine in a particular c<span></span>ase </div> <div>will not sully the prophylaxis of the Fourth Amendmentâ<span> (quoting </span> </div> <div>United States v. Hughes<span>,640 F.3d 428, 440 (1st Cir. 2011))); </span>Unit<span></span>ed </div> <div>States v. Vasquez De Reyes<span>,
149 F.3d 192, 195 (3d Cir. 1<span></span>998) </span> </div> <div>(holding that the inevitable discovery rule âpermits the co<span></span>urt <span>to </span> </div> <div>balance the public interest in providing a jury with all relevant<span></span> and </div> </div></div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf34" data-page-no="34"> <div> <img alt="" src="https://icbg.s3.amazonaws.com/media/MM9/Zgu/MM9ZguMTW/pwsU7Hj38Z0aT83wGmUtrM/47S7PRRijEBs%3D?AWSAccessKeyId=ASIA5PHC3MTPTCGXON2M&Expires=1728061408&Signature=wiwc3kj3GAL9fe%2BN39MODfqruH4%3D&x-amz-security-token=IQoJb3JpZ2luX2VjEJD%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2FwEaCXVzLWVhc3QtMSJGMEQCIGu1GFJEr5iCtVwEWS8%2FYmPE84Pm%2FFzYhGTa%2FGzTkZFfAiBYlQ81xdSGIng%2BcUDaidgy1WsHp67%2BHFXr7cayiQr96Cq7BQjZ%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F8BEAAaDDkyNjA0MTIwMzkzNSIMzvHNB8Hg%2FeYy74gxKo8Fw1BGlk0k2WAcVHzkDVLWXPPu7fXyai8%2FVmcJBP1B5%2FTcuoMPfiVAFsQXGJqr%2FQRvzqadIlgJbk3dYbNpShnr6eB2pCbH%2B4Hvv5E2ujgQ9UBciItlHCuWJlFY97UBrh6RPtR9yJaP2VPKmSF1TdBpSJzRU%2B9gh81G7dW1rAkUWZAOdu95nRvpZ0tYuIK0Mp6NzVSIBTyZE1edYT6%2BXT29YfEkafGlpVxfWtZMLX5DD%2F7d0450E%2Bw18%2Bo4rdUK9eBKUq7P3U54X1uLBq4tOOHz%2BTzN3pD%2BbkWgzjHRavawXN1JV2qncvKPq5tVoQbu%2BQwdSh%2BasKUPanR0wK7aI4eAWfjc9tm6Z94lArU4jTlxQCLAyDIYxyAJ9%2FokHkslhkIMonM612e95l%2FLFLlchEAlw5bSvnG4LW8buJtYxr4awsWEhvs5HHA9HHCQRI5ybJf%2FmeRGulWrsyvokEpMenBxE07Cy8RFjTgBvfZdfuyRq7mGbmVOdRueh7W3gznC7QW42speX%2B3ozW1ja1TDOn0lmTg%2B2hhethq2eJCnehZG5Pzsn42QfTDlMGu7UZKkZIROfvjxGjUGBFnoAKoYW8wrlZ6TbIKKAMRpiwIRDvYUNR9q4lIrzhBgdchRPLiz5b3LfpIHNYdRiqoppy%2F2%2FoPGVm8HEorgPTA2UG1SswU%2FTqwwMNSu%2FvbUSFGTx5PyDiGleLr%2B5bvGcuM%2BNP5pK1sw7ud6vZjmS%2Bo%2Fdg8mIJnA4g%2B8SxqVUN8J7gGZN3P7Ngqf4XuSu8SztIWSJrnFZ0oTF9%2FaIlPOkxPn5oDneJIBv0%2FW5efbsMvKTSzczqYLaQVAgqODa5AdE%2F%2BjpAkKSxZ6f9iAsOOj9awAHeJYxMO6VjDbnoC4BjqyAQJfem%2FyGQaRJDk1pn1lXABxVoqjZKcAUffRwrjy8yzqFYASw54B6ED%2FlPyyRZ5mz5zl%2BO4ad2UMibLl4n5RQVi5vjlO5SCd%2FhYZ9V%2Bj9fbbKOQFGLyZ48q9PCyOpuLdtM%2Bl2Cj1wT%2FuGQ7JB%2BdM4cGXUyPFmmXSiOZCwWgIz02zq3D%2Bo%2Fzzdh9foPH3VQRAXq%2F4iiXx7ge0dbFIqupgdip3EgfQKEViiGFEbNE7qXrwz80%3D"><div> <div>49 </div> <div>probative evidence in a criminal proceeding against societyâs </div> <div>interest in deterring unlawful police conductâ).</div> </div> <div><div>3</div></div> <div> <div> </div> <div>¶ 80<span> <span>As the majorityâs analysis makes clear, the circumstances </span></span> </div> <div>before us here seem to be exactly what those cases had in mind. <span></span> </div> <div>With trial fast approaching, and apparently facing a very real </div> <div>possibility that the clock would run out before the prosecuti<span></span>on </div> <div>could <span>collect the important evidence saved in dâEstreeâs cell <span></span>phone, </span> </div> <div>Agent Fink took a shortcut and made a conscious decision <span></span>to open </div> <div>the phone using the PIN code that she knew full well had been </div> <div> </div> </div> <div><div>3</div></div> <div> <div> Notably, several states have rejected the reasoning of <span>Nix </span> </div> <div>altogether and held as a matter of state constitutional law t<span></span>hat the </div> <div>prosecution must demonstrate the absence of bad faith <span></span>for the </div> <div>inevitable discovery rule to apply. <span>See Garnett v. State</span>, 308 A.3d </div> <div>625, 648 <span>(Del. 2023) (â[O]</span>ur holding that the inevitable-discovery </div> <div>exception is compatible with Article I, § 6 [of the Delaware </div> <div>Constitution] assumes that it will be applied only when it<span></span> is clear </div> <div>that <span>â</span>the police have not acted in bad faith to accelerate t<span></span>he </div> <div>discovery of the evidence in question.<span>ââ</span>) (citation omitted); <span>Stat<span></span>e v. </span> </div> <div>Holly<span>,2013 ND 94, ¶ <span>55<span>, </span></span>
833 N.W.2d 15, 33 <span>(â</span>When a shortcut is </span> </div> <div>taken that circumvents the requirements of the Fourth Amen<span></span>dment, </div> <div>the requirements of the inevitable-discovery doctrine have not b<span></span>een </div> <div>met<span>.â); <span>Smith v. State<span>,
948 P.2d 473, 481 (Alaska 1997) (recognizing </span></span></span> </div> <div>the inevitable discovery rule but limiting its application under the </div> <div>Alaska Constitution <span>âwhere the police have intentionally or </span> </div> <div>knowingly violated a suspect<span>âs rightsâ</span>); <span>Commonwealth v. Sbordone</span>, </div> <div>
678 N.E.2d 1184, 1190 (Mass. 1997) (The inevitable discovery rule </div> <div>may apply â<span>as long as the officers did not act in bad faith <span></span>to </span> </div> <div>accelerate the discovery of evidence, and the particular </div> <div>constitutional violation is not so severe as to require <span></span>suppression.<span>â). </span> </div> </div> <a href="#pf34" data-dest-detail='[52,"XYZ",69,400,null]'><div style="border-style:none;position:absolute;left:496.608333px;bottom:836.011667px;width:10.080000px;height:32.860000px;background-color:rgba(255,255,255,0.000001);"></div></a> </div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf35" data-page-no="35"> <div><div> <div>50 </div> <div>illegally obtained. If ever there was a time that called for an a<span></span>dverse </div> <div>consequence, this was it. Otherwise, we would be sanctioning </div> <div>precisely the type of unlawful police conduct that the exclusi<span></span>onary </div> <div>rule was intended to discourage. </div> </div></div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> </div></div></div></div>
Document Info
Docket Number： 22CA0237
Citation Numbers： 2024 COA 106
Filed Date： 10/3/2024
Precedential Status： Precedential
Modified Date： 10/4/2024