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<div><div><div><div id="pdf-container" style="width: 782px"> <div id="pf1" data-page-no="1"> <div> <div> <div> </div> <div> </div> <div> </div> <div> </div> <div>SUMMARY </div> <div>October 3, 2024 </div> <div> </div> <div>
2024COA107<span> </span> </div> <div> </div> <div>No. 23CA0792 & 23CA2021, <span>In re Marriage of Pawelec</span><span> </span><span>â</span> </div> <div>Family Law <span>â</span><span> </span><span>Motion to Modify Arbitratorâs Award â</span> De Novo </div> <div>Hearing <span>â</span> Fees and Costs<span> </span> </div> <div>Section 14-<span>10</span>-128.5(2), C.R.S. 2024, allows a party who has </div> <div>previously consented to arbitration of disputed paren<span></span>ting matters to </div> <div>âmove the court to modify the arbitratorâs award pursuant t<span></span>o a de </div> <div>novo hearing.â If the court grants the motion and âsubstan<span></span>ti<span>ally </span> </div> <div>upholdsâ the arbitratorâs decision, the party <span>who</span><span> requested the de </span> </div> <div>novo hearing âshall be ordered to pay the fees and costs of <span></span>the other </div> <div>party . . . incurred in responding toâ the motion âunless t<span></span>he court </div> <div>finds that it would be manifestly unjust.â<span> <span>Id</span></span><span>. </span> </div> <div>A division of the court of appeals holds that a court </div> <div>âsubstantially upholdsâ the arbitratorâs decision if it reaches a </div> <div>substantially similar outcome, regardless of whether the <span></span>courtâs </div> <div>reasoning differs from the arbitratorâs.<span> </span> </div> </div> <div> <div>The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions </div> <div>constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by </div> <div>the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be </div> <div>cited or <span>relied upon as they are not the official language of the division. </span> </div> <div>Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion </div> <div>should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion. </div> </div> </div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf2" data-page-no="2"> <div><div> <div> </div> <div> </div> <div>The division also holds that âfees and costs . . . incurred in </div> <div>responding toâ the motion for <span>a <span>de novo hearing (1) do not <span></span>include </span></span> </div> <div>fees and costs incurred before the motion for <span>a </span>de novo hearing is </div> <div>filed but (2) do include fees and costs incurred in preparing <span></span>for and </div> <div>attending the de novo hearing after the motion is granted.</div> </div></div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf3" data-page-no="3"> <div> <img alt="" src="https://icbg.s3.amazonaws.com/media/MM8/aHR/MM8aHRBSiyySMI1WP7xTUBklbiEO3huPaIhEogBen76gc%3D?AWSAccessKeyId=ASIA5PHC3MTPS6UWKBZO&Expires=1728536585&Signature=%2BsUC5NVTcH8mDHk%2FuEWbz0nYgJ8%3D&x-amz-security-token=IQoJb3JpZ2luX2VjEBQaCXVzLWVhc3QtMSJGMEQCIFtfD2Ez3JMDb4MbnsKue0sSlWceRGAVSolTbgmrm9VJAiA3JPi4P6S9extweDDPns%2Bd5h%2FYlzrI5Hw5Lx32j2zGGCqyBQhtEAAaDDkyNjA0MTIwMzkzNSIM4TgBc5ht0DC2AJY%2FKo8F7qSALm9PItWg%2BCzJYMsqcR%2BY63pXgo6JCCEGS1plO0dn3TawAeo5fsJJAP9e6YZerRshoIe27gzpWWY53NzdxGt6ZO3l%2FuM4TEYyP935rQdKgnR03XSk9vuaQ45OGVgNCUAyJ38AX8FNnhn0LJXaZjnSmleqm27mI%2BEs%2FKkfXA8KEjZmpUejdDqf7Ya108h6%2BwNsPDDBuNNM3Ht3sbOd11BYlx1lLWV4a8H7u94Bow68BMB8VIiC7mwbPxnS0fBg9w71z09vGd7JQElHJuBcKc9GwdOF0KPZ8Gs%2BpIL4glv7ikLuzynlkUR5VRT3DezH3dlyLz%2Bgh%2BN5S7KKQEF63TwbeLiggOzlQJPc0oQpVWgtY8pZ0u5o7XmTOJQ%2BNGIw1DvRh7NUKgBuBwfZQZDkVRJ1Wfm4PawOjOBGet1w82qp0b%2BLa2NuqCjLW7%2Fyl%2FadKPfdARcP8ltQXsk4LDt59oZBYulpcwcm3egPXLCJIrPtNyvXm0lUB8QsYqbSEXiG2NybT0l%2FD%2FUj9S0aCWGFbgAi0jVa4JUI36uRpKfl%2ByF%2F1c6Op19SBu3RtFJeiedbMYn85UYYm5cfOobB4gmL8Q33m%2FgClUBeY%2BXaK7prVtXr8nKceJz8Wsi%2B0vzEyGlTrKkGE3Ec%2F9I%2FCsvSRZCvhk7KZE7Q9iqdQ19gPXDwS3%2FM7RqKlEe0I9U3DJUdP3r7LmfExhdTzHQ7EwtScIoDy7PtWYWQhxT7OZcrOYuTUukm8AtlRBPL2McaEFfbk50WeNjYi%2FtMl8ukSvrZzaGtzmXEeOLWsRH6aWk8jcnutFMP%2BnM2l2Ff%2FOFPj4CnUxfi5dKriCupfngdNmm1jxhz6Ek5xZ0F3xY5TmHZ9%2BxFazCMnJ24BjqyAdBrXXeffGhNbbjae78%2BtzJVgxPmy8XeQL3C8jx3eNyZJ7cnKKMib%2BC3qodL9uDu%2F5F21Qgn8gwklrISpeRjnm3th7sIc6FGJGEQ%2BJuJr90anXl2WRB1z2p0QYa342p%2B6VBvG%2ByGf7FJ356zmyz8aLCNduYJCzja8a5QuZ6iarOCgSbX3YtbGUDvUjJR0bY8g2V%2B67gGtpTb%2BUjYAIquI1CllkC5nEi6LbN4PyAL326%2BSFE%3D"><div> <div> </div> <div> </div> <div>COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS <span>2024COA107</span> </div> <div> </div> <div> </div> <div>Court of Appeals Nos. 23CA0792 & 23CA2021 </div> <div>Eagle County District Court No. 22DR93<span> </span> </div> <div>Honorable Rachel J. Olguin-<span>Fresquez, Judge</span> </div> <div> </div> <div> </div> <div>In re the Marriage of </div> <div> </div> <div>Christopher Paul Pawelec, </div> <div> </div> <div>Appellee, </div> <div> </div> <div>and </div> <div> </div> <div>Katarzyna Julia Pawelec,<span> </span> </div> <div> </div> <div>Appellant. </div> <div> </div> <div> </div> <div>JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART<span>, <span>REVERSED IN PART,</span> </span> </div> <div>AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS </div> <div> </div> <div>Division V </div> <div>Opinion by JUDGE LUM </div> <div>Harris and Taubman*, JJ., concur </div> <div> </div> <div>Announced October 3, 2024 </div> <div> </div> <div> </div> <div>Howard & Associates, LLC, Kara Noack, Vail, Colorado, for Appellee </div> <div> </div> <div>Courtney Holm & Associates, AAL PC, Courtney Autumn Holm, Edwards, </div> <div>Colorado, for Appellant </div> <div> </div> <div> </div> <div>*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. </div> <div>VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2024.</div> </div> </div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf4" data-page-no="4"> <div><div> <div> </div> <div>1 </div> <div>¶ 1<span> </span><span>In these consolidated appeals, Katarzyna Julia Pawelec </span> </div> <div>(mother) appeals the trial court<span>â</span>s permanent orders entered in </div> <div>connection with the dissolution of her marriage to C<span></span>hristopher Paul </div> <div>Pawelec (father). </div> <div>¶ 2<span> </span><span>Mother<span>â</span><span>s appeal involves the application of an unusual </span></span> </div> <div>statutory procedure. Section 14-<span>10</span>-128.5(2), C.R.S. 2024, allows a </div> <div>party who has previously consented to arbitration of disp<span></span>uted </div> <div>parenting matters to <span>â</span>move the court to modify the arbitrator<span>â</span><span>s </span> </div> <div>award pursuant to a de novo hearing.<span>â</span><span> </span>If, after the hearing, the </div> <div>court substantially upholds the arbitrator<span>â</span>s decision, the <span></span>party <span>who</span> </div> <div>requested the de novo hearing <span>â</span>shall be ordered to pay the fees an<span></span>d </div> <div>costs of the other party . . . incurred in responding to<span>â</span> <span>th</span>e motion<span>, </span> </div> <div>unless the court finds that the award of fees would be manifestly<span></span> </div> <div>unjust. <span>Id. </span> </div> <div>¶ 3<span> </span><span>Mother<span>â</span><span>s contentions require us to examine, for the first time, </span></span> </div> <div>(1) whether a court <span>â</span>substantially upholds<span>â</span> the arbitrator<span>â</span>s decision </div> <div>if it reaches a substantially similar outcome but its reasoning </div> <div>differs <span>from the arbitratorâs </span>and (2) the appropriate scope of the f<span></span>ees </div> <div>and costs awarded under the statute. </div> </div></div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf5" data-page-no="5"> <div><div> <div> </div> <div>2 </div> <div>¶ 4<span> </span><span>We answer the first question in the affirmative. And we </span> </div> <div>conclude that <span>â</span>fees and costs . . . incurred in responding<span>â</span> to the </div> <div>motion for <span>a </span>de novo hearing include the fees and costs incurred in </div> <div>preparing for and attending the de novo hearing; however, they <span></span><span>do </span> </div> <div>not include fees and costs incurred before the motion f<span></span>or a de novo </div> <div>hearing <span>is</span> filed. </div> <div>¶ 5<span> </span><span>Mother also raises contentions regarding jurisdiction, due </span> </div> <div>process, parenting time, child support, notice, and the form of the </div> <div>decree of dissolution of marriage. Both parties request appellate </div> <div>attorney fees. </div> <div>¶ 6<span> </span><span>We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for proceeding<span></span>s </span> </div> <div>consistent with this opinion. </div> <div>I.<span> <span>Background </span></span> </div> <div>¶ 7<span> </span><span>The parties married in 2017 and are the parents of one minor </span> </div> <div>child, S.P. </div> <div>¶ 8<span> </span><span>After five years of marriage, father petitioned for dissolution. </span> </div> <div>The parties entered into a separation agreement regarding pro<span></span>perty </div> <div>division and agreed to arbitrate the remaining unresolved issues of </div> <div>parenting time<span>, </span>decision-making, child support, and spousal </div> </div></div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf6" data-page-no="6"> <div><div> <div> </div> <div>3 </div> <div>maintenance.<span> <span>During the arbitration, mother did not raise any </span></span> </div> <div>allegations of domestic violence. </div> <div>¶ 9<span> </span><span>The arbitrator awarded the parties joint decision-making and </span> </div> <div>named father, who planned to move from Colorado to N<span></span>orth </div> <div>Carolina following the dissolution, as the primary residential </div> <div>parent<span>. <span>The arbitrator also entered orders concerning child su<span></span>pport </span></span> </div> <div>and spousal maintenance. </div> <div>¶ 10<span> </span><span>Mother moved for a de novo hearing to modify the arbitrator<span>â</span><span>s </span></span> </div> <div>award as to parenting time under section 14-<span>10</span><span>-128.5.</span><span> </span>In her </div> <div>motion, she alleged that father had engaged in a <span>â</span>recurring patte<span></span>rn </div> <div>of control and abuse, both emotional and physical,<span>â</span> which led her </div> <div>to <span>â</span>withhold[] pertinent information<span>â</span> from the arbitrator<span>. </span>After a </div> <div>case management conference, the trial court granted mothe<span></span>r<span>â</span><span>s </span> </div> <div>motion and set a one-day hearing. </div> <div>¶ 11<span> </span><span>The de novo hearing took place in February 2023. After the </span> </div> <div>hearing, the trial court entered an oral order awarding the parties </div> <div>joint decision-making, based on their agreement to that at the </div> <div>hearing, and finding that it was in the child<span>â</span>s best interests to </div> <div>reside primarily with father when he relocated to North C<span></span>arolina </div> </div></div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf7" data-page-no="7"> <div><div> <div> </div> <div>4 </div> <div>(oral parenting time order)<span>. </span>Mother moved for reconsideration, </div> <div>which the court denied in a written, signed order. </div> <div>¶ 12<span> </span><span>Because the trial court upheld the arbitrator<span>â</span>s parenting t<span></span>ime </span> </div> <div>decision<span>, <span>father moved for attorney fees and costs under section 14-</span></span> </div> <div>10<span>-128.5(2). The court granted father<span>â</span>s motion. </span> </div> <div>¶ 13<span> </span><span>Mother appealed the oral parenting time order, the denial of<span></span> </span> </div> <div>the motion to reconsider, and the attorney fees order in Case No. </div> <div>23CA0792 (the first appeal). </div> <div>¶ 14<span> </span><span>Some months later, father filed proposed written orders </span> </div> <div>concerning parental responsibilities, child support, and spo<span></span>usal </div> <div>maintenance, along with <span>a </span>transcript of the oral parenting <span></span>time </div> <div>order and a proposed decree of dissolution of marriage.<span></span> The trial </div> <div>court signed father<span>â</span>s proposed orders between October 5 and </div> <div>October 9, 2023 (October 2023 orders)<span>. </span>Mother separately appealed </div> <div>those orders in Case No. 23CA2021 (the second appeal). We </div> <div>consolidated the appeals and now address mother<span>â</span>s contentions </div> <div>together. </div> <div>¶ 15<span> </span><span>We first consider mother<span>â</span>s threshold contentions that the <span></span>trial </span> </div> <div>court lacked jurisdiction to enter the October 2023 orders an<span></span>d </div> <div>violated her due process rights at the de novo hearing. <span></span>We then </div> </div></div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf8" data-page-no="8"> <div><div> <div> </div> <div>5 </div> <div>address mother<span>â</span>s substantive arguments relating to the parenting<span></span> </div> <div>time, attorney fees, and child support orders. Finally, we consider </div> <div>mother<span>â</span><span>s miscellaneous contentions related to the October <span></span>2023 </span> </div> <div>orders and the parties<span>â</span> requests for appellate attorney fees. </div> <div>II.<span> <span>Jurisdiction </span></span> </div> <div>¶ 16<span> </span><span>Mo<span>ther contends that the trial court lacked jurisdicti<span></span>on to </span></span> </div> <div>enter the October 2023 orders because, at that time, mother<span>â</span><span>s </span>first </div> <div>appeal was pending. Reviewing the question de novo, <span>see <span>McDonald </span></span> </div> <div>v. Zions First Nat<span>â</span>l Bank, N.A.<span>,2015 COA 29, ¶ 33, we disagre<span></span>e. </span> </div> <div>A.<span> <span>Applicable Law </span></span> </div> <div>¶ 17<span> </span><span>When a party files a notice of appeal from a final judgment,<span></span> </span> </div> <div>the trial court is divested of jurisdiction <span>â</span>with regard to t<span></span>he </div> <div>substantive issues that are the subject of the appeal.<span>â</span><span> </span><span>Molitor v.<span></span> </span> </div> <div>Anderson<span>,
795 P.2d 266, 268 (Colo. 1990). But whe<span></span>n a party files a </span> </div> <div>premature notice of appeal <span>â</span> an appeal from a judgment that <span></span>isn<span>â</span><span>t </span> </div> <div>final <span>â</span> the trial court doesn<span>â</span>t lose jurisdiction. <span>Musick v. Wozni<span></span>cki<span>, </span></span> </div> <div>
136 P.3d 244, 246 (Colo. 2006). A final judgment is one that<span></span> <span>â</span>ends </div> <div>the proceeding in which it is entered and leaves nothing further to </div> <div>be done regarding the rights of the parties.<span>â</span> <span>In re Marria<span></span>ge of Salby<span>, </span></span> </div> <div>
126 P.3d 291, 294 (Colo. App. 2005). </div> </div></div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf9" data-page-no="9"> <div> <img alt="" src="https://icbg.s3.amazonaws.com/media/MMX/n%2Be/MMXn%2BekQ817y/lXyeovZwcgeMWibwHo7dUSO3Lu0a7r74%3D?AWSAccessKeyId=ASIA5PHC3MTPS6UWKBZO&Expires=1728536585&Signature=iaZBHGRiWA%2FQVmIRmgk5srUzKXk%3D&x-amz-security-token=IQoJb3JpZ2luX2VjEBQaCXVzLWVhc3QtMSJGMEQCIFtfD2Ez3JMDb4MbnsKue0sSlWceRGAVSolTbgmrm9VJAiA3JPi4P6S9extweDDPns%2Bd5h%2FYlzrI5Hw5Lx32j2zGGCqyBQhtEAAaDDkyNjA0MTIwMzkzNSIM4TgBc5ht0DC2AJY%2FKo8F7qSALm9PItWg%2BCzJYMsqcR%2BY63pXgo6JCCEGS1plO0dn3TawAeo5fsJJAP9e6YZerRshoIe27gzpWWY53NzdxGt6ZO3l%2FuM4TEYyP935rQdKgnR03XSk9vuaQ45OGVgNCUAyJ38AX8FNnhn0LJXaZjnSmleqm27mI%2BEs%2FKkfXA8KEjZmpUejdDqf7Ya108h6%2BwNsPDDBuNNM3Ht3sbOd11BYlx1lLWV4a8H7u94Bow68BMB8VIiC7mwbPxnS0fBg9w71z09vGd7JQElHJuBcKc9GwdOF0KPZ8Gs%2BpIL4glv7ikLuzynlkUR5VRT3DezH3dlyLz%2Bgh%2BN5S7KKQEF63TwbeLiggOzlQJPc0oQpVWgtY8pZ0u5o7XmTOJQ%2BNGIw1DvRh7NUKgBuBwfZQZDkVRJ1Wfm4PawOjOBGet1w82qp0b%2BLa2NuqCjLW7%2Fyl%2FadKPfdARcP8ltQXsk4LDt59oZBYulpcwcm3egPXLCJIrPtNyvXm0lUB8QsYqbSEXiG2NybT0l%2FD%2FUj9S0aCWGFbgAi0jVa4JUI36uRpKfl%2ByF%2F1c6Op19SBu3RtFJeiedbMYn85UYYm5cfOobB4gmL8Q33m%2FgClUBeY%2BXaK7prVtXr8nKceJz8Wsi%2B0vzEyGlTrKkGE3Ec%2F9I%2FCsvSRZCvhk7KZE7Q9iqdQ19gPXDwS3%2FM7RqKlEe0I9U3DJUdP3r7LmfExhdTzHQ7EwtScIoDy7PtWYWQhxT7OZcrOYuTUukm8AtlRBPL2McaEFfbk50WeNjYi%2FtMl8ukSvrZzaGtzmXEeOLWsRH6aWk8jcnutFMP%2BnM2l2Ff%2FOFPj4CnUxfi5dKriCupfngdNmm1jxhz6Ek5xZ0F3xY5TmHZ9%2BxFazCMnJ24BjqyAdBrXXeffGhNbbjae78%2BtzJVgxPmy8XeQL3C8jx3eNyZJ7cnKKMib%2BC3qodL9uDu%2F5F21Qgn8gwklrISpeRjnm3th7sIc6FGJGEQ%2BJuJr90anXl2WRB1z2p0QYa342p%2B6VBvG%2ByGf7FJ356zmyz8aLCNduYJCzja8a5QuZ6iarOCgSbX3YtbGUDvUjJR0bY8g2V%2B67gGtpTb%2BUjYAIquI1CllkC5nEi6LbN4PyAL326%2BSFE%3D"><div> <div> </div> <div>6 </div> <div>B.<span> <span>Analysis </span></span> </div> <div>¶ 18<span> </span><span>The parties<span>â</span> dissolution of marriage action involved issues </span> </div> <div>pertaining to property division, spousal maintenance, child sup<span></span>port, </div> <div>parenting time, and decision-making. When mother filed her first </div> <div>appeal, the trial court had entered the following relevant orders:<span></span> </div> <div>â¢<span> <span>the oral parenting time order; </span></span> </div> <div>â¢<span> <span>the order denying mother<span>â</span>s motion to reconsider; </span></span> </div> <div>â¢<span> <span>the order granting father<span>â</span>s request for attorney fees under </span></span> </div> <div>section 14-<span>10</span>-128.5; and </div> <div>â¢<span> </span><span>an<span> order (1) confirming the arbitrator<span>â</span>s award of spousal </span></span> </div> <div>maintenance; (2) adopting the parties<span>â</span> stipulation as to their </div> <div>incomes for purposes of calculating child support; and (3) </div> <div>implicitly adopting the parties<span>â</span> stipulation that the </div> <div>separation agreement regarding property division <span>â</span>shall be </div> <div>adopted into a Decree of Dissolution of Marriage.<span>â</span> </div> </div> <div><div>1</div></div> <div> <div> <span> </span> </div> <div> </div> </div> <div><div>1</div></div> <div> <div> We note that, while the October 2023 dissolution decree has a </div> <div>checked box indicating that the court entered <span>â</span>permanent orders<span>â</span> </div> <div>â<span> meaning the orders that were issued after arbitrati<span></span>on and after </span> </div> <div>the de novo hearing <span>â</span> it did not check the box incorporating the </div> <div>property division separation agreement into the decree. This </div> <div>appears to be a clerical error. </div> </div> <a href="#pf9" data-dest-detail='[9,"XYZ",69,170,null]'><div style="border-style:none;position:absolute;left:593.144444px;bottom:288.688333px;width:10.080000px;height:32.860000px;background-color:rgba(255,255,255,0.000001);"></div></a> </div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pfa" data-page-no="a"> <div><div> <div> </div> <div>7 </div> <div>¶ 19<span> </span><span>But those orders weren<span>â</span>t sufficient to completely determine the </span> </div> <div>rights of the parties: the trial court hadn<span>â</span><span>t </span>entered a written </div> <div>parenting time order, orders regarding child support, or a decre<span></span>e of </div> <div>dissolution of marriage. Accordingly, mother<span>â</span>s first notice of appeal </div> <div>was premature because the judgment wasn<span>â</span>t final when she filed it.<span> </span> </div> <div>See Salby<span>, 126 P.3d <span>at</span> <span>29</span>5 (holding that a parenting time order </span> </div> <div>wasn<span>â</span><span>t appealable until the court had entered the decree of </span> </div> <div>dissolution of marriage and permanent orders regarding financial </div> <div>matters). </div> <div>¶ 20<span> </span><span>For this reason, we conclude that the trial court had </span> </div> <div>jurisdiction to enter the October 2023 orders. <span>See Musick</span>, 136 P.3<span></span>d </div> <div>at 246. And because those orders rendered the judgment f<span></span>inal, we </div> <div>have jurisdiction to consider the contentions raised in mother<span>â</span>s first </div> <div>appeal. <span>See i<span>d.</span></span> at 246-<span>47.</span> </div> <div>III.<span> <span>Procedural Due Process </span></span> </div> <div>¶ 21<span> </span><span>Mother contends that the trial court violated her procedu<span></span>ral </span> </div> <div>due process rights at the de novo hearing by not allowing her to </div> <div>present additional evidence beyond her allotted time.<span> </span>We disagree. </div> </div></div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pfb" data-page-no="b"> <div><div> <div> </div> <div>8 </div> <div>A.<span> <span>Additional Facts </span></span> </div> <div>¶ 22<span> </span><span>On November 29, 2022, the trial court held a case </span> </div> <div>management conference to discuss mother<span>â</span>s motion for a de no<span></span>vo </div> <div>hearing<span>. <span>Mother was unrepresented at the time. The court asked </span></span> </div> <div>father<span>â</span><span>s counsel how much time would be required. Father<span>â</span><span>s </span></span> </div> <div>counsel asked for a full day to <span>â</span>err on the side of caution.<span>â</span><span> </span>Mother </div> <div>didn<span>â</span><span>t object or ask for additional time. The court t<span></span>hen asked both </span> </div> <div>parties if there were any questions, to which mother replied, <span>â</span><span>No.<span>â</span></span><span> </span> </div> <div>The court set a one-day hearing for February 7, 2023. <span></span> On </div> <div>December 8, 2022, mother<span>â</span>s counsel entered his appearance. He </div> <div>didn<span>â</span><span>t seek a continuance or request more time for the <span></span>hearing. </span> </div> <div>¶ 23<span> </span><span>Seven days before the hearing, the parties submitted a joint<span></span> </span> </div> <div>trial management certificate in which they acknowledged that<span></span> the </div> <div>hearing was scheduled for one day and estimated the amount of </div> <div>time they would need for each witness<span>. </span>Mother and father each </div> <div>estimated approximately three and a half hours for their r<span></span>espective </div> <div>witnesses, each reserving any necessary time for cross-examination<span>. </span> </div> <div>Again, mother<span>â</span>s counsel didn<span>â</span>t request more time. </div> <div>¶ 24<span> </span><span>Each party was given approximately equal time at the hearing, </span> </div> <div>with mother presenting her case first<span>. </span>Mother testified, as did </div> </div></div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pfc" data-page-no="c"> <div><div> <div> </div> <div>9 </div> <div>maternal grandmother and mother<span>â</span>s domestic violence expert </div> <div>witness<span>. <span>Father testified about his parenting and his planned move </span></span> </div> <div>to North Carolina<span>. </span>He also called multiple family members, friends, </div> <div>and neighbors to testify on his behalf. </div> <div>¶ 25<span> </span><span>During the hearing, the court informed mother<span>â</span>s counsel that </span> </div> <div>his time was up and asked if he had more witnesses. <span></span>Mother<span>â</span><span>s </span> </div> <div>counsel said, <span>â</span>[W]ell, I have four but I can get away wit<span></span>h calling </div> <div>two.<span>â</span><span> <span>After the court indicated that it was unlikely they would hav<span></span>e </span></span> </div> <div>time for the witnesses, mother<span>â</span>s counsel responded, <span>â</span>Certainly, </div> <div>Your Honor.<span>â</span><span> </span>He didn<span>â</span>t object, request a continuance, or ask for t<span></span>he </div> <div>hearing to continue to a second day. </div> <div>¶ 26<span> </span><span>Later, mother<span>â</span>s counsel said, <span>â</span>I have a couple other witnesses I </span> </div> <div>was hoping to get in. Is that not going to happen?<span>â</span><span> </span>After the court </div> <div>said that it wouldn<span>â</span>t, mother<span>â</span>s counsel replied, <span>â</span>Thanks. I just <span></span>don<span>â</span><span>t </span> </div> <div>want them sitting around for no reason.<span>â</span> </div> <div>¶ 27<span> </span><span>Finally, at the very end of the hearing, mother<span>â</span>s counsel </span> </div> <div>informed the court that </div> <div>[t]here<span>â</span><span>s a material witness that this court has </span> </div> <div>not heard from that . . . would dispute a lot of </div> <div>what [father] said and would support what </div> <div>[mother<span>] <span>has testified. I don<span>â</span>t know if the </span></span> </div> <div>Court needs that information in order to </div> </div></div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pfd" data-page-no="d"> <div><div> <div> </div> <div>10 </div> <div>render a decision. . . . [B]ut it is . . . </div> <div>information that would describe what was </div> <div>witnessed in terms of [father<span>â</span>s] behavior </div> <div>toward [mother] in public. </div> <div>¶ 28<span> </span><span>The court replied that it wasn<span>â</span>t inclined to increase mother<span>â</span><span>s </span></span> </div> <div>time when presentation of witnesses was <span>â</span>within [mother<span>â</span>s] </div> <div>planning<span>â</span><span> and time had run out.<span> </span></span>Mother<span>â</span><span>s counsel did not further </span> </div> <div>attempt to identify the <span>âmaterial </span><span>witness<span>â</span></span> or explain the witness<span>â</span><span>s </span> </div> <div>testimony or its importance. </div> <div>B.<span> <span>Standard of Review and Legal Principles </span></span> </div> <div>¶ 29<span> </span><span>A meaningful opportunity to be heard is an inherent element </span> </div> <div>of due process. <span>In re Marriage of Hatton</span>,160 P.3d 326, <span>329</span> (Colo. </div> <div>App. 2007). Parties are entitled to sufficient time in which <span></span>to </div> <div>orderly present their cases<span>. </span><span>Salby</span>, 126 P.3d <span>at</span> <span>302</span>. </div> <div>¶ 30<span> </span><span>The trial court<span>â</span>s interest in administrative efficiency may not </span> </div> <div>take precedence over a party<span>â</span>s right to due process. <span>Hatt<span></span>on<span>, 160 </span></span> </div> <div>P.3d at 329. But the court may set a time limit on a h<span></span>earing from </div> <div>the outset and monitor the parties<span>â</span> use of their time during the </div> <div>hearing. <span>See Maloney v. Brassfield</span>,
251 P.3d 1097, 1102-05 (Colo. </div> <div>App. 2010); CRE 611(a) (<span>â</span>The court shall exercise reasonable </div> <div>control over the mode and order of interrogating wit<span></span>nesses and </div> </div></div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pfe" data-page-no="e"> <div><div> <div> </div> <div>11 </div> <div>presenting evidence so as to . . . avoid needless consumption of </div> <div>time . . . .<span>â</span>). </div> <div>¶ 31<span> </span><span>Because due process is implicated, we apply a heightened level </span> </div> <div>of scrutiny to determine whether the trial court<span>â</span>s time limits </div> <div>constituted an abuse of discretion at two levels: whether t<span></span>he limits </div> <div>were inadequate for the nature of the proceeding at the <span></span>outset, and </div> <div>if not, whether they became inadequate because of development<span></span>s </div> <div>during the proceeding. <span>See Maloney</span>,251 P.3d at 1102. A court </div> <div>abuses its discretion when it acts in a manifestly arbitrary, unf<span></span>air, </div> <div>or unreasonable manner, or when it misconstrues or misapplies the </div> <div>law. <span>See In re Marriage of Fabos</span>,
2022 COA 66, ¶ <span>16</span>. </div> <div>C.<span> <span>Analysis </span></span> </div> <div>¶ 32<span> </span><span>The trial court did not abuse its discretion in setting the t<span></span>ime </span> </div> <div>limits or <span>by</span> <span>denying motherâs counselâs </span>request for additional time<span>. </span> </div> <div>The parties had a little over three and <span>a </span>half hours each to present </div> <div>evidence about a single issue: the best interests of the child </div> </div></div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pff" data-page-no="f"> <div> <img alt="" src="https://icbg.s3.amazonaws.com/media/MMX/n%2Be/MMXn%2BekQ817y/lXyeovZwcgeMWibwHo7dUSO3Lu0a7r74%3D?AWSAccessKeyId=ASIA5PHC3MTPS6UWKBZO&Expires=1728536585&Signature=iaZBHGRiWA%2FQVmIRmgk5srUzKXk%3D&x-amz-security-token=IQoJb3JpZ2luX2VjEBQaCXVzLWVhc3QtMSJGMEQCIFtfD2Ez3JMDb4MbnsKue0sSlWceRGAVSolTbgmrm9VJAiA3JPi4P6S9extweDDPns%2Bd5h%2FYlzrI5Hw5Lx32j2zGGCqyBQhtEAAaDDkyNjA0MTIwMzkzNSIM4TgBc5ht0DC2AJY%2FKo8F7qSALm9PItWg%2BCzJYMsqcR%2BY63pXgo6JCCEGS1plO0dn3TawAeo5fsJJAP9e6YZerRshoIe27gzpWWY53NzdxGt6ZO3l%2FuM4TEYyP935rQdKgnR03XSk9vuaQ45OGVgNCUAyJ38AX8FNnhn0LJXaZjnSmleqm27mI%2BEs%2FKkfXA8KEjZmpUejdDqf7Ya108h6%2BwNsPDDBuNNM3Ht3sbOd11BYlx1lLWV4a8H7u94Bow68BMB8VIiC7mwbPxnS0fBg9w71z09vGd7JQElHJuBcKc9GwdOF0KPZ8Gs%2BpIL4glv7ikLuzynlkUR5VRT3DezH3dlyLz%2Bgh%2BN5S7KKQEF63TwbeLiggOzlQJPc0oQpVWgtY8pZ0u5o7XmTOJQ%2BNGIw1DvRh7NUKgBuBwfZQZDkVRJ1Wfm4PawOjOBGet1w82qp0b%2BLa2NuqCjLW7%2Fyl%2FadKPfdARcP8ltQXsk4LDt59oZBYulpcwcm3egPXLCJIrPtNyvXm0lUB8QsYqbSEXiG2NybT0l%2FD%2FUj9S0aCWGFbgAi0jVa4JUI36uRpKfl%2ByF%2F1c6Op19SBu3RtFJeiedbMYn85UYYm5cfOobB4gmL8Q33m%2FgClUBeY%2BXaK7prVtXr8nKceJz8Wsi%2B0vzEyGlTrKkGE3Ec%2F9I%2FCsvSRZCvhk7KZE7Q9iqdQ19gPXDwS3%2FM7RqKlEe0I9U3DJUdP3r7LmfExhdTzHQ7EwtScIoDy7PtWYWQhxT7OZcrOYuTUukm8AtlRBPL2McaEFfbk50WeNjYi%2FtMl8ukSvrZzaGtzmXEeOLWsRH6aWk8jcnutFMP%2BnM2l2Ff%2FOFPj4CnUxfi5dKriCupfngdNmm1jxhz6Ek5xZ0F3xY5TmHZ9%2BxFazCMnJ24BjqyAdBrXXeffGhNbbjae78%2BtzJVgxPmy8XeQL3C8jx3eNyZJ7cnKKMib%2BC3qodL9uDu%2F5F21Qgn8gwklrISpeRjnm3th7sIc6FGJGEQ%2BJuJr90anXl2WRB1z2p0QYa342p%2B6VBvG%2ByGf7FJ356zmyz8aLCNduYJCzja8a5QuZ6iarOCgSbX3YtbGUDvUjJR0bY8g2V%2B67gGtpTb%2BUjYAIquI1CllkC5nEi6LbN4PyAL326%2BSFE%3D"><div> <div> </div> <div>12 </div> <div>pertaining to parenting time.</div> </div> <div><div>2</div></div> <div> <div> <span>Cf. In re Marriage of Yates<span>, 148 P.3d </span></span> </div> <div>304, 309-10 (Colo. App. 2006) (determining that a three-day </div> <div>hearing was sufficient to present all issues <span>â</span> property division, </div> <div>maintenance, parenting time, decision-making, and child </div> <div>support <span>â</span> because both parties agreed to the time limits, </div> <div>husband<span>â</span><span>s attorney did not object or suggest more time was nee<span></span>ded </span> </div> <div>until the end of the hearing, and the parties were reminded <span></span>of the </div> <div>time limits throughout the hearing). Here, mother<span>âs counsel</span> was </div> <div>permitted to make his own strategic decisions concerning witness </div> <div>presentation, and he opted to present <span>motherâs</span> testimony, </div> <div>grandmother<span>â</span><span>s testimony, and lengthy testimony from a domestic </span> </div> <div>violence expert. H<span>e </span>also extensively cross-examined father<span>â</span><span>s </span> </div> <div>witnesses. <span>See Maloney</span>,251 P.3d at 1104(noting<span>, in the divisionâs </span> </div> <div>consideration of whether the allocated length of time was adequate,<span></span> </div> <div>that parties are permitted to make strategic decisions).<span></span> For this </div> <div>reason, we reject mother<span>â</span><span>s </span>comparison to <span>In re Marria<span></span>ge of Goellner<span>, </span></span> </div> <div> </div> </div> <div><div>2</div></div> <div> <div> The parties originally disputed the allocation of decision-making </div> <div>responsibility along with parenting time. As best we <span></span>can discern, </div> <div>the parties agreed to joint decision-making at the hearing, and the </div> <div>court ordered joint decision-making based on their agreement. </div> <div>Mother doesnât appeal the allocation of decision<span>-making auth<span></span>ority. </span> </div> </div> <a href="#pff" data-dest-detail='[15,"XYZ",69,154,null]'><div style="border-style:none;position:absolute;left:340.630000px;bottom:877.986667px;width:10.080000px;height:32.880000px;background-color:rgba(255,255,255,0.000001);"></div></a> </div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf10" data-page-no="10"> <div><div> <div> </div> <div>13 </div> <div>770 P.2d 1387(Colo. App. 1989)<span>. </span>In that case, a division of this </div> <div>court concluded that the trial court abused its discre<span></span>tion by not </div> <div>granting wife additional time where husband presented his <span></span>case </div> <div>first, and, after cross-examination, wife had only thirty minutes to </div> <div>present her case-<span>in</span><span>-chief</span><span>. </span><span>Id.</span> at 1388-89. This case was markedly </div> <div>different. </div> <div>¶ 33<span> </span><span>Moreover, as the trial court pointed out, the parties were well </span> </div> <div>aware of the time constraints before the hearing, and it <span></span>was mother </div> <div>and her counsel<span>â</span>s responsibility <span>â</span>to make sure [she] got the most </div> <div>important evidence before the Court during [her] allotted t<span></span>ime </div> <div>frame.<span>â</span><span> <span>See Maloney<span>,
251 P.3d at 1103(considering whether time </span></span></span> </div> <div>constraints result in unfair surprise). The trial court <span></span>also </div> <div>demonstrated flexibility, permitting mother<span>â</span>s witnesses to go <span>â</span>a little </div> <div>over<span>â</span><span> in the morning and finishing the hearing after six in the </span> </div> <div>evening. <span>See id.</span> at 1104-05 (considering trial court<span>â</span>s flexibility). </div> <div>¶ 34<span> </span><span>Finally, mother failed to adequately identify the evidence that </span> </div> <div>was in danger of being excluded if the trial court didn<span>â</span>t grant her </div> <div>more time. <span>See</span> <span>i<span>d.</span></span> at 1105 (rejecting party<span>â</span>s claim that he was </div> <div>prejudiced by inability to present additional evidence i<span></span>n part </div> <div>because the party didn<span>â</span>t make an adequate and timely offer of </div> </div></div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf11" data-page-no="11"> <div><div> <div> </div> <div>14 </div> <div>proof); <span>see also</span> CRE 103(a)(2). The first two times the court </div> <div>mentioned time constraints during the hearing, mother<span>âs counsel</span> </div> <div>said that he had other witnesses to present but didn<span>â</span>t detail their </div> <div>prospective testimony. The third time <span>â</span> at the end of the </div> <div>hearing <span>â</span> mother<span>âs counsel</span> said only that he wanted to present<span></span> </div> <div>information from a single witness who would <span>â<span>dispute</span><span>â</span></span> fath<span></span>er<span>â</span><span>s </span> </div> <div>testimony, <span>â</span><span>corroborat[e]<span>â</span></span> mother<span>â</span>s testimony, and <span>â</span>describe what<span></span> </div> <div>was witnessed in terms of [father<span>â</span>s] behavior toward [mother] in </div> <div>public.<span>â</span><span> </span>Mother<span>âs counsel<span> </span>didnât explain what parts of the partiesâ </span> </div> <div>testimony would be âdisputedâ or âcorroboratedâ or describe<span> in any </span> </div> <div>detail the behavior about which the witness would testify.<span></span> </div> <div>¶ 35<span> </span><span>This isn<span>â</span>t sufficient to <span>â</span>aid [the] trial court in addressing </span> </div> <div>[mother<span>â</span><span>s] request[] to depart from [the] previously set time limit<span></span>[].<span>â</span><span> </span></span> </div> <div>Maloney<span>, <span>251</span><span> P.3d at 1105.</span> <span>And mother<span>â</span><span>s </span><span>counselâs</span> request for </span></span> </div> <div>more time to present specific witnesses in the motion for </div> <div>reconsideration was both insufficiently detailed and untimely. <span></span> <span>See </span> </div> <div>id.<span> (holding that submission of pretrial disclosures as an <span></span>exhibit to </span> </div> <div>a motion for a new trial was an untimely and overly general proff<span></span>er). </div> <div>¶ 36<span> </span><span>We aren<span>â</span>t persuaded otherwise by mother<span>â</span>s arguments to the </span> </div> <div>contrary. She contends that the time for the hearing was </div> </div></div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf12" data-page-no="12"> <div><div> <div> </div> <div>15 </div> <div>inadequate from the outset and that the court should have known </div> <div>of the inadequacy before trial because (1) the partie<span></span>s mediated for </div> <div>four days and participated in a full day of arbitration;<span></span> (2) mother </div> <div>didn<span>â</span><span>t have any input into the length of the hearing; <span></span>and (3) the </span> </div> <div>parties estimated they would each need around half a day for t<span></span>heir </div> <div>direct examinations. We disagree. The time it took to me<span></span>diate isn<span>â</span><span>t </span> </div> <div>relevant to whether mother had a reasonable opportunity t<span></span>o present </div> <div>her case at trial. And while mother wasn<span>â</span>t represented at the <span></span>case </div> <div>management conference where the court set the one-day hearing, </div> <div>mother<span>â</span><span>s counsel entered his appearance just nine days later an<span></span>d </span> </div> <div>didn<span>â</span><span>t request additional time<span>. </span></span>Mother<span>âs counsel<span> also didn</span><span>â</span><span>t ask for </span></span> </div> <div>more time after submitting mother<span>â</span>s witness list or his estimate that </div> <div>he would need most of <span>motherâs</span> three and a half hours for direct </div> <div>examination. </div> <div>¶ 37<span> </span><span>We also reject mother<span>â</span>s contention that she was prejudiced by </span> </div> <div>the hearing<span>â</span>s length because she was unable to present eviden<span></span>ce </div> <div>concerning her interaction and relationship with S.P. and her </div> <div>attention to S.P.<span>â</span>s mental, emotional, and physical needs <span>â</span> </div> <div>evidence that the trial court remarked was missing. Mother didn<span>â</span><span>t </span> </div> <div>timely raise her inability to present this evidence. At <span></span>the end of the </div> </div></div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf13" data-page-no="13"> <div><div> <div> </div> <div>16 </div> <div>hearing, when mother<span>âs counsel</span> asked to present one more </div> <div>â<span>material witness,</span>â<span> he said that the witness would testify about </span> </div> <div>father<span>â</span><span>s behavior toward mother, not mother<span>â</span>s relationshi<span></span>p with S.P<span>. </span></span> </div> <div>Moreover, mother herself could have testified about these topics but </div> <div>didn<span>â</span><span>t do so. <span>See id.</span> at 1104 (<span>â</span>[T]rial courts should allow the pa<span></span>rties </span> </div> <div>maximum latitude in presenting their cases within the allotted </div> <div>time.<span>â</span><span>).</span><span> </span> </div> <div>¶ 38<span> </span><span>Finally, we reject as unpreserved mother<span>â</span>s argument, to the </span> </div> <div>extent she makes it, that she should have had more time t<span></span>o present </div> <div>her case because maternal grandmother testified through an </div> <div>interpreter. <span>See Berra v. Springer & Steinberg, P.C.</span>,251 P.3d 56<span></span>7, </div> <div>570 (Colo. App. 2010) (holding that to preserve an issue for appeal, </div> <div>the issue must be brought to the trial court<span>â</span>s attention so that <span></span>the </div> <div>court has an opportunity to rule on it). </div> <div>¶ 39<span> </span><span>For these reasons, we perceive no error in the length of the </span> </div> <div>hearing set by the court or the court<span>â</span><span>s </span>denial of mother<span>âs request for</span> </div> <div>additional time. </div> <div>IV.<span> </span><span>Parenting Time </span> </div> <div>¶ 40<span> </span><span>Mother contends that the trial court erred by (1) not </span> </div> <div>considering whether the harm S.P. would suffer from moving t<span></span>o </div> </div></div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf14" data-page-no="14"> <div><div> <div> </div> <div>17 </div> <div>North Carolina with father was outweighed by the advantage of t<span></span>he </div> <div>move; and (2) not finding that father committed domestic vi<span></span>olence, </div> <div>and, therefore, not addressing other required domestic violen<span></span>ce </div> <div>considerations. </div> <div>¶ 41<span> </span><span>Initially, we note that only the oral parenting time order </span> </div> <div>contains the trial court<span>â</span>s findings of fact and conclusions of law. <span></span> </div> <div>The written parenting time order provides for joint decision-making </div> <div>and contains a parenting time schedule that parallels the schedule </div> <div>in the oral order. We therefore consider the orders togethe<span></span>r. <span>See </span> </div> <div>Friends of Denver Parks, Inc. v. City <span>& </span>Cnty. of Denver<span>, 2013 COA </span> </div> <div>177, ¶ 35 (<span>â</span>Oral findings and conclusions that are contained <span></span>in a </div> <div>transcript are adequate if they are <span>â</span>sufficiently comprehensive to </div> <div>provide a basis for review.<span>ââ</span> (quoting <span>Hipps v. Hennig</span>, 447 P.<span></span>2d 700, </div> <div>703 (Colo. 1968))). However, in the event of a conflict,<span></span> the written </div> </div></div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf15" data-page-no="15"> <div> <img alt="" src="https://icbg.s3.amazonaws.com/media/MMX/n%2Be/MMXn%2BekQ817y/lXyeovZwcgeMWibwHo7dUSO3Lu0a7r74%3D?AWSAccessKeyId=ASIA5PHC3MTPS6UWKBZO&Expires=1728536585&Signature=iaZBHGRiWA%2FQVmIRmgk5srUzKXk%3D&x-amz-security-token=IQoJb3JpZ2luX2VjEBQaCXVzLWVhc3QtMSJGMEQCIFtfD2Ez3JMDb4MbnsKue0sSlWceRGAVSolTbgmrm9VJAiA3JPi4P6S9extweDDPns%2Bd5h%2FYlzrI5Hw5Lx32j2zGGCqyBQhtEAAaDDkyNjA0MTIwMzkzNSIM4TgBc5ht0DC2AJY%2FKo8F7qSALm9PItWg%2BCzJYMsqcR%2BY63pXgo6JCCEGS1plO0dn3TawAeo5fsJJAP9e6YZerRshoIe27gzpWWY53NzdxGt6ZO3l%2FuM4TEYyP935rQdKgnR03XSk9vuaQ45OGVgNCUAyJ38AX8FNnhn0LJXaZjnSmleqm27mI%2BEs%2FKkfXA8KEjZmpUejdDqf7Ya108h6%2BwNsPDDBuNNM3Ht3sbOd11BYlx1lLWV4a8H7u94Bow68BMB8VIiC7mwbPxnS0fBg9w71z09vGd7JQElHJuBcKc9GwdOF0KPZ8Gs%2BpIL4glv7ikLuzynlkUR5VRT3DezH3dlyLz%2Bgh%2BN5S7KKQEF63TwbeLiggOzlQJPc0oQpVWgtY8pZ0u5o7XmTOJQ%2BNGIw1DvRh7NUKgBuBwfZQZDkVRJ1Wfm4PawOjOBGet1w82qp0b%2BLa2NuqCjLW7%2Fyl%2FadKPfdARcP8ltQXsk4LDt59oZBYulpcwcm3egPXLCJIrPtNyvXm0lUB8QsYqbSEXiG2NybT0l%2FD%2FUj9S0aCWGFbgAi0jVa4JUI36uRpKfl%2ByF%2F1c6Op19SBu3RtFJeiedbMYn85UYYm5cfOobB4gmL8Q33m%2FgClUBeY%2BXaK7prVtXr8nKceJz8Wsi%2B0vzEyGlTrKkGE3Ec%2F9I%2FCsvSRZCvhk7KZE7Q9iqdQ19gPXDwS3%2FM7RqKlEe0I9U3DJUdP3r7LmfExhdTzHQ7EwtScIoDy7PtWYWQhxT7OZcrOYuTUukm8AtlRBPL2McaEFfbk50WeNjYi%2FtMl8ukSvrZzaGtzmXEeOLWsRH6aWk8jcnutFMP%2BnM2l2Ff%2FOFPj4CnUxfi5dKriCupfngdNmm1jxhz6Ek5xZ0F3xY5TmHZ9%2BxFazCMnJ24BjqyAdBrXXeffGhNbbjae78%2BtzJVgxPmy8XeQL3C8jx3eNyZJ7cnKKMib%2BC3qodL9uDu%2F5F21Qgn8gwklrISpeRjnm3th7sIc6FGJGEQ%2BJuJr90anXl2WRB1z2p0QYa342p%2B6VBvG%2ByGf7FJ356zmyz8aLCNduYJCzja8a5QuZ6iarOCgSbX3YtbGUDvUjJR0bY8g2V%2B67gGtpTb%2BUjYAIquI1CllkC5nEi6LbN4PyAL326%2BSFE%3D"><div> <div> </div> <div>18 </div> <div>order prevails over the oral order<span>. </span><span>See Reed v. Indus. Claim Appeals </span> </div> <div>Off.<span>,13 P.3d 810, 813 (Colo. App. 2000).</span> </div> </div> <div><div>3</div></div> <div> <div> </div> <div>A.<span> <span>Best Interests of the Child </span></span> </div> <div>¶ 42<span> </span><span>Mother argues that the trial court erred by not considering </span> </div> <div>whether the harm S.P. would suffer from moving to North <span></span>Carolina </div> <div>with father was outweighed by the advantage of the move<span>. </span>We </div> <div>discern no basis for reversal. </div> <div>1.<span> <span>Legal Principles and Standard of Review </span></span> </div> <div>¶ 43<span> </span><span>When allocating parenting time, the court must focus on the </span> </div> <div>child<span>â</span><span>s best interests, giving paramount consideration to t<span></span>he child<span>â</span><span>s </span></span> </div> <div>safety and physical, mental, and emotional conditions and nee<span></span>ds. </div> <div>See<span> § <span>14<span>-<span>10</span></span></span>-123.4(1)(a), C.R.S. 2024; § <span>14</span><span>-<span>10</span></span>-124(1.5), (1.7), C.R.S. </span> </div> <div>2024<span>; <span>see also</span><span> <span>In re Parental Responsibilities Co<span></span>ncerning M.W.<span>, 2012 </span></span></span></span> </div> <div>COA 162, ¶ 16. In making this determination, the court must </div> <div>consider all relevant factors, including, as pertinent here, (1) the </div> <div> </div> </div> <div><div>3</div></div> <div> <div> In her reply brief in the second appeal, mother argues for the first </div> <div>time that father did not properly serve her with the proposed </div> <div>written parenting time order, implying that she wants to object t<span></span>o it.<span> </span> </div> <div>We don<span>â</span>t consider this contention because it was raised fo<span></span>r the first </div> <div>time on reply. <span>See Jenkins v. Haymore</span><span>, </span>
208 P.3d 265, 269 (Colo. </div> <div>App. 2007)<span>. </span> And in any event, as best we can discern, mother </div> <div>doesn<span>â</span><span>t argue that any specific provision <span>in</span> the written parenting </span> </div> <div>time order is inconsistent with the oral parenting time order. </div> </div> <a href="#pf15" data-dest-detail='[21,"XYZ",69,203,null]'><div style="border-style:none;position:absolute;left:444.730556px;bottom:835.973333px;width:10.080000px;height:32.880000px;background-color:rgba(255,255,255,0.000001);"></div></a> </div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf16" data-page-no="16"> <div><div> <div> </div> <div>19 </div> <div>wishes of the child<span>â</span>s parents as to parenting time; (2) the <span></span>interaction </div> <div>and interrelationship of the child with his or her parents and any </div> <div>other person who may significantly affect the child<span>â</span>s best interests; </div> <div>(3<span>) <span>any report of domestic violence; (4) the child</span></span><span>â</span><span>s adjustment to his </span> </div> <div>or her home, school, and community; (5) the ability of the parties t<span></span>o </div> <div>encourage the sharing of love, affection, and contact between t<span></span>he </div> <div>child and the other party; (6) whether the past pattern of </div> <div>involvement of the parties with the child reflects a system of val<span></span>ues, </div> <div>time commitment, and mutual support; (7) the physical proximity of<span></span> </div> <div>the parties to each other as it relates to the practical considerations </div> <div>of parenting time; and (8) the ability of each party to place the </div> <div>needs of the child ahead of his or her own needs.<span> </span>§ <span>14<span>-<span>10</span></span></span>-</div> <div>124(1.5)(a). </div> <div>¶ 44<span> </span><span>The court is not required to make findings on all statutory </span> </div> <div>factors. <span>In re Custody of C.J.S.</span>,37 P.3d 479, 482 (Colo. Ap<span></span>p. 2001). </div> <div>Findings must be sufficiently explicit, however, to give the <span></span>reviewing </div> <div>court a clear understanding of the basis of the order. <span>In re Ma<span></span>rriage </span> </div> <div>of Lester<span>,
791 P.2d 1244, 1246 (Colo. App. 1990). </span> </div> <div>¶ 45<span> </span><span>We review a court<span>â</span>s parenting time determination for an abuse </span> </div> <div>of discretion. <span>In re Marriage of Badawiyeh</span>,
2023 COA 4, ¶ 9. <span>A </span> </div> </div></div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf17" data-page-no="17"> <div><div> <div> </div> <div>20 </div> <div>court abuses its discretion if its decision is manifestly arbitrary<span>, </span> </div> <div>unreasonable, or unfair, or if it misapplied the law. <span>Id.</span> </div> <div>2.<span> <span>The Trial Court<span>â</span>s Best Interests Findings </span></span> </div> <div>¶ 46<span> </span><span>In its oral parenting time order, the trial court made the </span> </div> <div>following findings: </div> <div>â¢<span> <span>Each parent believed he or she was better equipped to meet </span></span> </div> <div>S.P.<span>â</span><span>s <span>best interests. </span></span> </div> <div>â¢<span> <span>Each parent would continue to allow and foster the </span></span> </div> <div>relationship between S.P. and the other parent. </div> <div>â¢<span> <span>There were no credible reports of domestic violence. </span></span> </div> <div>â¢<span> <span>S.P. appeared to be well cared for and comfortable in <span></span>both </span></span> </div> <div>parents<span>â</span><span> homes. </span> </div> <div>â¢<span> <span>Mother had criticized or made disparaging remarks about </span></span> </div> <div>father to S.P. and had not acknowledged, apologized for, or </div> <div>changed her behavior. </div> <div>â¢<span> <span>Father had <span>âminimiz[</span><span>ed</span></span></span><span>]â</span><span> mother<span>â</span>s home, disparag<span>ed</span> </span> </div> <div>mother<span>â</span><span>s current partner, and criticized mother to S.P.; </span> </div> <div>however, father had apologized for his comments and </div> <div>recognized that they were unhelpful and unfair. </div> </div></div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf18" data-page-no="18"> <div><div> <div> </div> <div>21 </div> <div>â¢<span> <span>Since the separation, both parents had been <span>â</span>sharing 50/50 </span></span> </div> <div>responsibility<span>â</span><span> for S.P. and allowed her to communicate via </span> </div> <div>video call with the other parent and family members. </div> <div>â¢<span> <span>Both parents had been <span>â</span>involved with [S.P.<span>â</span>s] schooling </span></span> </div> <div>[and] the establishment of her values.<span>â</span><span> </span>They both </div> <div>â<span>appear[ed] to be conscientious to her needs and the ability </span> </div> <div>to<span> . . . encourage mutual support.<span>â</span> </span> </div> <div>â¢<span> <span>Father had been responsible for taking S.P. to the doctor </span></span> </div> <div>and dentist and paying for and enrolling S.P. in preschool. </div> <div>â¢<span> <span>Father volunteered at S.P.<span>â</span>s school. </span></span> </div> <div>â¢<span> <span>Mother did not testify <span>or </span>offer other evidence regarding her </span></span> </div> <div>current involvement in S.P.<span>â</span>s health or schooling. </div> <div>â¢<span> <span>Most of the <span>â</span>real decision making and caretaking<span>â</span> was </span></span> </div> <div>father<span>â</span><span>s responsibility. </span> </div> <div>¶ 47<span> </span><span>Based on these findings, the trial court determined that<span></span> it was </span> </div> <div>in S.P.<span>â</span>s best interests to live primarily with father in No<span></span>rth </div> <div>Carolina. </div> <div>3.<span> <span>Analysis </span></span> </div> <div>¶ 48<span> </span><span>We<span> disagree with mother<span>â</span><span>s </span>premise that the trial court was </span></span> </div> <div>required to explicitly consider whether the harm likely to be caused </div> </div></div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf19" data-page-no="19"> <div><div> <div> </div> <div>22 </div> <div>to S.P. by moving to North Carolina was outweighed by t<span></span>he </div> <div>advantage of the move<span>. </span>While a court is required to make that </div> <div>consideration in determining <span>whether to modify</span> <span>a <span>â</span></span>custody dec<span></span>ree or </div> <div>a decree allocating decision-making responsibility,<span>â</span> it isn<span>â</span>t<span></span> required </div> <div>to do so in an initial allocation of parental responsibilit<span></span>ies (APR)<span>. </span> </div> <div>§ <span>14<span>-<span>10</span></span></span>-131(2), C.R.S. 2024<span>. </span> <span>Compare</span> § <span>14<span>-<span>10</span></span></span>-131(2)(c) (<span>â</span>The court </div> <div>shall not modify a custody decree . . . unless . . . the harm likely to </div> <div>be caused by a change of environment is outweighed by the </div> <div>advantage of <span>a </span>change to the child.<span>â</span>), <span>with</span> § <span>14<span>-<span>10</span></span></span>-124(1.5)(a) </div> <div>(requiring only consideration of factors such as the child<span>â</span><span>s </span> </div> <div>â<span>adjustment to [the] home, school, and community</span>â<span> and </span>â<span>[t]he </span> </div> <div>physical proximity of the parties to each other<span>â</span> in initial <span>APR<span>).<span></span><span> </span></span></span> </div> <div>¶ 49<span> </span><span>We aren<span>â</span>t persuaded otherwise by <span>In re Marriage of Ga<span></span>rst<span>, on </span></span></span> </div> <div>which mother relies, because that case concerned a modification <span></span>of </div> <div>an existing APR order as a result of one parent<span>â</span>s relocation. 955 </div> <div>P.2d 1056, 1059 (Colo. App. 1998). At most<span>, </span><span>Garst</span> stands for the </div> <div>proposition that the best interests standard that applies in <span></span>initial </div> <div>APR determinations also applies to modifications. It doesn<span>â</span>t stand </div> <div>for the principle that a factor specific to modifications must be </div> <div>considered in an initial APR. </div> </div></div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf1a" data-page-no="1a"> <div><div> <div> </div> <div>23 </div> <div>¶ 50<span> </span><span>Moreover, the record reflects that the court consider<span>ed</span> </span> </div> <div>evidence <span>of</span> the best interests factors pertaining to father<span>â</span><span>s </span>plann<span></span>ed </div> <div>move: the physical proximity of the parents to one another; <span></span>S.P.<span>â</span><span>s </span> </div> <div>attachment to her home, school, and community; and t<span></span>he presence </div> <div>or absence of a community (extended family and friends) for S.P. in </div> <div>each location. <span>See</span> § <span>14</span><span>-<span>10</span></span>-124(1.5)(a)(IV), (VIII).<span> </span>The trial court </div> <div>explicitly referenced testimony from each of the parties and their </div> <div>family members about (1) S.P.<span>â</span>s community and family members in </div> <div>Colorado versus North Carolina; (2) S.P.<span>â</span>s adjustment to changing </div> <div>preschools in Colorado; and (3) S.P.<span>â</span>s educational options in <span></span>North </div> <div>Carolina. </div> <div>¶ 51<span> </span><span>We acknowledge that the court<span>â</span>s findings <span>on</span> these factors were </span> </div> <div>thin<span>: <span>it noted only that, because of S.P.<span>â</span>s age, she would be </span></span> </div> <div>transitioning from preschool to kindergarten no matter wh<span></span>ere she </div> <div>lived. However, the court did not need to make findings on every </div> <div>statutorily enumerated factor so long as (1) there is <span>â</span>some </div> <div>indication in the record that the trial court considered<span>â</span> the </div> <div>pertinent factors<span>, </span><span>Garst</span>, 955 P.2d at 1058; and (2) the court made </div> <div>sufficient findings to explain its parenting time allocation and it<span></span>s </div> <div>determination that allowing father to be the primary parent<span></span> was in </div> </div></div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf1b" data-page-no="1b"> <div><div> <div> </div> <div>24 </div> <div>S.P.<span>â</span><span>s best interests, <span>see <span>In re Marriage of Collins</span></span>,2023 COA 116M, </span> </div> <div>¶ <span>12.</span> </div> <div>¶ 52<span> </span><span>Ultimately, while the court considered the evidence relevant to </span> </div> <div>the move<span>, </span>it concluded that S.P.<span>â</span>s best interests were served by </div> <div>moving with father to North Carolina because father was <span>â</span>in a </div> <div>position of primary caregiver/caretaker,<span>â</span> and <span>â</span>while [m]other has </div> <div>engaged well and also co-parented, much of the real decision-</div> <div>making and caretaking has fallen on [father].<span>â</span><span> </span>These findings are </div> <div>supported by the record, and we may not reweigh the co<span></span>urt<span>â</span><span>s </span> </div> <div>resolution of conflicting evidence. <span>See i<span>d.</span></span><span> </span>Accordingly, we perceive </div> <div>no abuse of discretion in the court<span>â</span>s consideration and resolution <span></span>of </div> <div>the best interests factors. </div> <div>B.<span> <span>Domestic Violence Allegations </span></span> </div> <div>¶ 53<span> </span><span>Mother also contends that the trial court erred <span>by</span> not finding<span></span> </span> </div> <div>that father committed an act of domestic violence<span>. </span>And she argues </div> <div>that, because domestic violence occurred, the trial court erred <span>by</span> </div> <div>not considering additional best interests factors under section 1<span></span>4-</div> <div>10<span>-124(4). We again discern no reversible error. </span> </div> </div></div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf1c" data-page-no="1c"> <div><div> <div> </div> <div>25 </div> <div>1.<span> <span>Legal Principles and Standard of Review </span></span> </div> <div>¶ 54<span> </span><span>Domestic violence <span>â</span>means an act of violence or a threatened </span> </div> <div>act of violence upon a person with whom the actor is or has <span></span>been </div> <div>involved in an intimate relationship.<span>â</span><span> </span>§ <span>14<span>-<span>10</span></span></span>-124(1.3)(b). </div> <div>¶ 55<span> </span><span>We review a trial court<span>â</span>s factual findings for clear error. <span>Gagne </span></span> </div> <div>v. Gagne<span>, <span>2019 COA 42, ¶ 17.</span> <span>â</span><span>A court<span>â</span>s finding of fact is clearly </span></span> </div> <div>erroneous if there is no support for it in the record.<span>â</span><span> </span><span>Id.</span> We review </div> <div>the trial court<span>â</span>s application of the law de novo. <span>Id</span>. </div> <div>¶ 56<span> </span><span>An error is only reversible if it affects the substantial rights of </span> </div> <div>the parties. C.R.C.P. 61. An error affects a party<span>â</span>s substantial </div> <div>rights if <span>â</span>it can be said with fair assurance that the error </div> <div>substantially influenced the outcome of the case or impaired t<span></span>he </div> <div>basic fairness of the trial itself.<span>â</span><span> </span><span>Bly v. Story</span>,
241 P.3d 529, 535 </div> <div>(Colo. 2010) (quoting <span>Banek v. Thomas</span>,
733 P.2d 1171, 11<span></span>78 (Colo. </div> <div>1986)<span>).</span><span> </span> </div> <div>2.<span> <span>Physical Domestic Violence Incident </span></span> </div> <div>¶ 57<span> </span><span>At the hearing, mother testified that, in September 2022, she </span> </div> <div>and father agreed that she could retrieve her property f<span></span>rom father<span>â</span><span>s </span> </div> <div>home while he was away with S.P<span>. </span>However, father returned home </div> <div>with S.P. while mother was still packing. Father took S.P., <span></span>who was </div> </div></div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf1d" data-page-no="1d"> <div><div> <div> </div> <div>26 </div> <div>upset that she couldnât go outside, <span>to an upstairs bedroom<span>. </span>When </span> </div> <div>mother went upstairs, father <span>â</span>went crazy on [mother]<span>â</span> and told her </div> <div>to leave<span>. </span>Instead, mother, who said she could hear S.P. <span></span>screaming, </div> <div>tried to enter the bedroom while father blocked the door. Mother </div> <div>opened the door, causing father to trip, and he beca<span></span>me <span>â</span>really </div> <div>upset.<span>â</span><span> <span>Father then grabbed <span>motherâs </span>arms, <span>â</span></span></span>move[d]<span>â</span><span> her next to </span> </div> <div>the stairs, and yelled and swore at her, causing her to lose her </div> <div>balance and fall down the stairs<span>. </span> Mother testified that father </div> <div>bruised her when he moved her to the stairs, and she introduced an </div> <div>exhibit showing the bruises<span>. </span>Father was not examined about th<span>e </span> </div> <div>incident. </div> <div>¶ 58<span> </span><span>In its oral order, the trial court found that, while it was </span> </div> <div>concerned about the incident and did not condone fath<span></span>er<span>â</span><span>s </span> </div> <div>behavior, mother was <span>â</span>trying to gain entrance<span>â</span> into a part of the </div> <div>home in which she was no longer living, and father<span>â</span><span>s </span>actions <span>â</span>[were] </div> <div>simply to move her from the [bedroom] door.<span>â</span><span> </span>The court also noted </div> <div>that mother herself described the fall as losing her balance<span>. </span>Finally, </div> <div>the court observed that the police were not called and that no </div> <div>charges were filed related to the incident<span>. <span>It</span></span> concluded that there </div> <div>was no <span>â</span>substantial evidence<span>â</span> of domestic violence. </div> </div></div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf1e" data-page-no="1e"> <div><div> <div> </div> <div>27 </div> <div>¶ 59<span> </span><span>Even assuming that the court erred by not characterizing the </span> </div> <div>incident as domestic violence<span>, </span>we aren<span>â</span>t persuaded that the error </div> <div>affected mother<span>â</span><span>s </span>substantial rights. </div> <div>¶ 60<span> </span><span>If<span> the court had found domestic violence, it would have been </span></span> </div> <div>required to (1) consider the statutory <span>â</span>best interests<span>â</span> factors in light<span></span> </div> <div>of that finding; (2) consider, <span>â</span>as the primary concern, t<span></span>he safety and </div> <div>well-being of the child and the abused party<span>â</span>; and (3) <span>â</span>consider </div> <div>conditions on parenting time that ensure the safety of t<span></span>he child and </div> <div>abused party.<span>â</span><span> </span>§ <span>14<span>-<span>10</span></span></span>-124(4)(b), (d), (e). Such conditions may </div> <div>include, but are not limited to </div> <div>(I) [a]n order limiting contact between the </div> <div>parties . . . ; </div> <div>(II) [a]n order that requires the exchange of the </div> <div>child for parenting time to occur in a protected </div> <div>setting determined by the court; </div> <div>(III) [a]n order for supervised parenting time; </div> <div>(IV) [a]n order restricting overnight parenting </div> <div>time; </div> <div>(V) [a]n order that restricts the party who has </div> <div>committed domestic violence . . . from </div> <div>possessing or consuming alcohol or controlled </div> <div>substances during parenting time . . . ; </div> <div>(VI) [a]n order directing that the address of the </div> <div>child or of any party remain confidential; [and] </div> </div></div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf1f" data-page-no="1f"> <div><div> <div> </div> <div>28 </div> <div>(VII) [a]n order that imposes any other </div> <div>condition on one or more parties that the court </div> <div>determines is necessary to protect the child, </div> <div>another party, or any other family or </div> <div>household member of a party. </div> <div>§ <span>14<span>-<span>10</span></span></span>-124(4)(e). </div> <div>¶ 61<span> </span><span>Mother doesn<span>â</span><span>t </span>explain, and we can<span>â</span>t discern, how a finding </span> </div> <div>characterizing the incident as domestic violence would have </div> <div>substantially influenced the outcome of the parenting time <span></span>order. </div> <div>While we, like the trial court, recognize the seriousness of d<span></span>omestic </div> <div>violence, the legislature has deemed it a relevant, but<span></span> not </div> <div>necessarily dispositive factor in determining parenting time.<span></span> </div> <div>Rather, a court must consider any finding of domestic violence </div> <div>alongside the myriad other statutory factors when determining <span></span>the </div> <div>all<span>ocation of parenting time in the childâs best interests<span>. </span><span>See Yat<span></span>es<span>, </span></span></span> </div> <div>148 P.3d at 308 (noting that âchild abuse or spousal <span></span>abuseâ are </div> <div>âbut two, albeit important<span>, factors in assessing the best interests of </span> </div> <div>the childâ<span>).<span> <span>Here, the trial court awarded primary parenting time to </span></span></span> </div> <div>father despite its findings and concerns about the physical incident </div> <div>by the stairs. Mother doesn<span>â</span>t explain how a finding that t<span></span>his </div> <div>incident constituted domestic violence would have overcome the </div> <div>trial court<span>â</span>s other findings that it was in S.P.<span>â</span>s best interests to liv<span></span>e </div> </div></div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf20" data-page-no="20"> <div><div> <div> </div> <div>29 </div> <div>primarily with father because father had been S.P.<span>â</span><span>s <span>â</span></span>primary </div> <div>caregiver [and] caretaker.<span>â</span> </div> <div>¶ 62<span> </span><span>Moreover, mother doesn<span>â</span><span>t </span>identify any statutorily enumerated </span> </div> <div>condition that she requested but the court declined to impose </div> <div>because it didn<span>â</span>t find domestic violence. <span>See</span> § <span>14<span>-<span>10</span></span></span>-124(4)(e) </div> <div>(listing potential parenting plan provisions if the court finds </div> <div>domestic violence). For example, mother didn<span>â</span>t request at trial that </div> <div>father<span>â</span><span>s parenting time be supervised or that he not receive </span> </div> <div>overnight time, indicating that mother didn<span>â</span>t think such meas<span></span>ures </div> <div>were necessary for S.P.<span>â</span>s safety. Additionally, mother<span>â</span>s prop<span></span>osed </div> <div>parenting plan <span>â</span> that she be the primary parent with extended </div> <div>parenting time permitted for father during the summers, al<span></span>ong with </div> <div>some school year time <span>â</span> would have generated roughly the same </div> <div>amount of contact between father and mother as the pa<span></span>renting plan </div> <div>entered by the court. </div> <div>¶ 63<span> </span><span>On this record<span>, </span>any error by the trial court in failing to make a </span> </div> <div>finding of domestic violence isn<span>â</span>t reversible. </div> <div>3.<span> <span>Nonphysical Domestic Abuse </span></span> </div> <div>¶ 64<span> </span><span>Mother also argues that the trial court erred by <span>â</span><span>ignoring<span>â</span></span> the </span> </div> <div>evidence she presented, including expert testimony, of incidents of </div> </div></div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf21" data-page-no="21"> <div> <img alt="" src="https://icbg.s3.amazonaws.com/media/MM9/Zgu/MM9ZguMTW/pwsU7Hj38Z0aT83wGmUtrM/47S7PRRijEBs%3D?AWSAccessKeyId=ASIA5PHC3MTPS6UWKBZO&Expires=1728536585&Signature=TVK2qdEoRyUjVwcah8e4X0ElyDs%3D&x-amz-security-token=IQoJb3JpZ2luX2VjEBQaCXVzLWVhc3QtMSJGMEQCIFtfD2Ez3JMDb4MbnsKue0sSlWceRGAVSolTbgmrm9VJAiA3JPi4P6S9extweDDPns%2Bd5h%2FYlzrI5Hw5Lx32j2zGGCqyBQhtEAAaDDkyNjA0MTIwMzkzNSIM4TgBc5ht0DC2AJY%2FKo8F7qSALm9PItWg%2BCzJYMsqcR%2BY63pXgo6JCCEGS1plO0dn3TawAeo5fsJJAP9e6YZerRshoIe27gzpWWY53NzdxGt6ZO3l%2FuM4TEYyP935rQdKgnR03XSk9vuaQ45OGVgNCUAyJ38AX8FNnhn0LJXaZjnSmleqm27mI%2BEs%2FKkfXA8KEjZmpUejdDqf7Ya108h6%2BwNsPDDBuNNM3Ht3sbOd11BYlx1lLWV4a8H7u94Bow68BMB8VIiC7mwbPxnS0fBg9w71z09vGd7JQElHJuBcKc9GwdOF0KPZ8Gs%2BpIL4glv7ikLuzynlkUR5VRT3DezH3dlyLz%2Bgh%2BN5S7KKQEF63TwbeLiggOzlQJPc0oQpVWgtY8pZ0u5o7XmTOJQ%2BNGIw1DvRh7NUKgBuBwfZQZDkVRJ1Wfm4PawOjOBGet1w82qp0b%2BLa2NuqCjLW7%2Fyl%2FadKPfdARcP8ltQXsk4LDt59oZBYulpcwcm3egPXLCJIrPtNyvXm0lUB8QsYqbSEXiG2NybT0l%2FD%2FUj9S0aCWGFbgAi0jVa4JUI36uRpKfl%2ByF%2F1c6Op19SBu3RtFJeiedbMYn85UYYm5cfOobB4gmL8Q33m%2FgClUBeY%2BXaK7prVtXr8nKceJz8Wsi%2B0vzEyGlTrKkGE3Ec%2F9I%2FCsvSRZCvhk7KZE7Q9iqdQ19gPXDwS3%2FM7RqKlEe0I9U3DJUdP3r7LmfExhdTzHQ7EwtScIoDy7PtWYWQhxT7OZcrOYuTUukm8AtlRBPL2McaEFfbk50WeNjYi%2FtMl8ukSvrZzaGtzmXEeOLWsRH6aWk8jcnutFMP%2BnM2l2Ff%2FOFPj4CnUxfi5dKriCupfngdNmm1jxhz6Ek5xZ0F3xY5TmHZ9%2BxFazCMnJ24BjqyAdBrXXeffGhNbbjae78%2BtzJVgxPmy8XeQL3C8jx3eNyZJ7cnKKMib%2BC3qodL9uDu%2F5F21Qgn8gwklrISpeRjnm3th7sIc6FGJGEQ%2BJuJr90anXl2WRB1z2p0QYa342p%2B6VBvG%2ByGf7FJ356zmyz8aLCNduYJCzja8a5QuZ6iarOCgSbX3YtbGUDvUjJR0bY8g2V%2B67gGtpTb%2BUjYAIquI1CllkC5nEi6LbN4PyAL326%2BSFE%3D"><div> <div> </div> <div>30 </div> <div>nonphysical domestic abuse<span>. </span>But the record reflects that the trial </div> <div>court consider<span>ed</span> this evidence and found that mother<span>â</span>s claims that </div> <div>(1) father controlled her financially; (2) father controlled her </div> <div>physical movemen<span>ts</span>; and (3) father attempted to isolate himself, </div> <div>mother, and S.P. from friends and family weren<span>â</span>t credible and were </div> <div>contradicted by other evidence. </div> <div>¶ 65<span> </span><span>As <span>for</span> mother<span>â</span>s expert, the court observed that <span>â</span><span>errors<span>â</span></span> in the </span> </div> <div>expert<span>â</span><span>s report emerged on cross-examination and that t<span></span>he report </span> </div> <div>had limited persuasive value because the expert didn<span>â</span>t observe any </div> <div>of the parties and spoke only with mother and heard <span>âher sideâ</span>; the </div> <div>expert didnât speak<span> with father or S.P<span>. </span>It is the trial court</span><span>â</span><span>s </span> </div> <div>responsibility to judge witness credibility<span>, </span>determine the weight and </div> <div>probative value of the evidence<span>, </span>and resolve evidentiary conflicts, </div> <div>and we may not disturb its findings in this regard. <span>Hatt<span></span>on<span>, 160 </span></span> </div> <div>P.3d <span>at</span> 330<span>; </span><span>Yates</span>, 148 P.3d at 318.</div> </div> <div><div>4</div></div> <div> <div> </div> <div> </div> </div> <div><div>4</div></div> <div> <div> Because of our conclusion, we need not address whether the </div> <div>nonphysical incidents described by mother can be classified as </div> <div>â<span>domestic violence</span>â<span> under section <span>14<span>-<span>10</span></span></span>-124(1.3)(b), C.R.S.<span></span> 2024. </span> </div> </div> <a href="#pf21" data-dest-detail='[33,"XYZ",69,121,null]'><div style="border-style:none;position:absolute;left:406.831667px;bottom:290.004444px;width:10.080000px;height:32.890000px;background-color:rgba(255,255,255,0.000001);"></div></a> </div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf22" data-page-no="22"> <div><div> <div> </div> <div>31 </div> <div>V.<span> <span>Attorney Fees Under Section <span>14<span>-<span>10</span></span></span>-128.5 </span></span> </div> <div>¶ 66<span> </span><span>Mother argues that the trial court erred <span>by</span> granting father </span> </div> <div>attorney fees under section 14-<span>10</span>-128.5. We agree in part<span>. </span> </div> <div>A.<span> <span>Legal Principles and Standard of Review </span></span> </div> <div>¶ 67<span> </span><span>Section 14-<span>10</span>-128.5(2) provides, in relevant part, as follows: </span> </div> <div>In circumstances in which a party moves for a </div> <div>de novo hearing by the court, if the court, in </div> <div>its discretion based on the pleadings filed, </div> <div>grants the motion and the court substantially </div> <div>upholds the decision of the arbitrator, the </div> <div>party that requested the de novo hearing shall </div> <div>be ordered to pay the fees and costs of the </div> <div>other party and the fees of the arbitrator </div> <div>incurred in responding to the application or </div> <div>motion unless the court finds that it would be </div> <div>manifestly unjust. </div> <div>¶ 68<span> <span>â<span>Interpretation of a statute is a question of law that we <span></span>review </span></span></span> </div> <div>de novo.<span>â</span><span> </span><span>In re Marriage of DeZalia</span>,151 P.3d 647, 648 (Colo. App. </div> <div>2006). <span>â</span>In construing a statute, we strive to give effect to <span></span>the intent </div> <div>of the legislature and adopt the statutory construction that<span></span> best </div> <div>effectuates the purposes of the legislative scheme, looking f<span></span>irst to </div> <div>the plain language of the statute.<span>â</span><span> </span><span>In re Marriage of Ci<span></span>esluk<span>, 113 </span></span> </div> <div>P.3d 135, 141 (Colo. 2005). If the meaning of a stat<span></span>ute is clear and </div> <div>unambiguous, courts need not resort to interpretive rules to divine </div> </div></div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf23" data-page-no="23"> <div><div> <div> </div> <div>32 </div> <div>the General Assembly<span>â</span>s intent. <span>In re Marriage of Schmitt</span>, 89 P.3d </div> <div>510, 511 (Colo. App. 2004). </div> <div>B.<span> <span>Meaning of <span>â</span>Substantially Uphold<span>â</span> </span></span> </div> <div>¶ 69<span> </span><span>Mother first argues that the trial court did not substantially </span> </div> <div>uphold the arbitrator<span>â</span>s award because, even though the result <span></span>was </div> <div>similar, <span>â</span>the reasoning behind the result was substant<span></span>ially </div> <div>different.<span>â</span><span> <span>We disagree. </span></span> </div> <div>¶ 70<span> </span><span>The arbitrator ordered that S.P. would primarily reside with </span> </div> <div>father in North Carolina and mother would have parenting time </div> <div>during the majority of school vacations, along with certain </div> <div>alternating holidays during the school year. The trial court </div> <div>substantially upheld that order because it also named father t<span></span>he </div> <div>primary residential parent, giving mother parenting time during <span></span>the </div> <div>majority of school vacations along with some weekend parenting </div> <div>time during the school year.<span> </span><span>See</span> Black<span>â</span>s Law Dictionary 1734-<span>35</span> </div> <div>(1<span>2th ed. 20<span>24</span>) (defining <span>â</span><span>substantial<span>â</span></span> <span>as <span>â</span></span>[c]ontaining the essence </span> </div> <div>of a thing; conveying the right idea even if not the exact details<span>â</span>). <span></span> </div> <div>¶ 71<span> </span><span>We acknowledge that the trial court<span>â</span>s reasoning for allocating </span> </div> <div>parenting time primarily to father differed from the arbitrator<span>â</span>s </div> <div>reasoning. But nothing in the statute distinguishes the result from </div> </div></div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf24" data-page-no="24"> <div><div> <div> </div> <div>33 </div> <div>the reasoning or suggests that both must be the same to trigge<span></span>r <span>a </span> </div> <div>fee award<span>. </span> </div> <div>¶ 72<span> </span><span>In a similar vein, mother argues that, because her reasons for </span> </div> <div>requesting a de novo hearing were not frivolous, the statute </div> <div>punishes her for raising a legitimate concern with the arbitrator<span>â</span><span>s </span> </div> <div>decision<span>. <span>However, the language of the statute doesn<span>â</span>t provide any </span></span> </div> <div>exception to the mandatory fee award simply because the </div> <div>challenging party raises valid concerns with the arbitrator<span>â</span><span>s </span> </div> <div>decision or reasoning<span>. </span> We <span>can<span>â</span></span>t read requirements into the statute </div> <div>that don<span>â</span>t exist.<span> </span><span>See Hobbs v. City of Salida</span>,2024 COA 25, ¶ 20 </div> <div>(We <span>can<span>â</span></span>t <span>â</span>rewrite a statute to achieve a different res<span></span>ult than that </div> <div>dictated by the legislature<span>â</span>s selected language.<span>â</span>). </div> <div>C.<span> <span>Scope of Attorney Fees Awarded </span></span> </div> <div>¶ 73<span> </span><span>Mother next contends that the trial court erred by (1) awarding </span> </div> <div>father fees and costs incurred before mother filed her motion fo<span></span>r <span>a </span> </div> <div>de novo hearing and (2) awarding father fees and costs incurred in </div> <div>preparing for and attending the hearing<span>. </span>We agree with the first </div> <div>contention but reject the second. </div> </div></div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf25" data-page-no="25"> <div><div> <div> </div> <div>34 </div> <div>1.<span> <span>Fees Incurred Before the Motion </span></span> </div> <div>¶ 74<span> </span><span>The plain language of section 14-<span>10</span>-128.5(2) requires mother </span> </div> <div>to pay fatherâs fees incurred in âresponding to the application <span></span>or </div> <div>motionâ for a de novo hearing. <span>Mother filed her motion for <span>a </span>de </span> </div> <div>novo hearing on October 31, 2022<span>. </span><span>Father<span>â</span></span>s request for attorney </div> <div>fees contained billing entries for fees incurred from Septem<span></span>ber 26, </div> <div>2022, through February 9, 2023<span>. </span>The court awarded father all of </div> <div>his requested fees. But any fees or costs incurred before mother </div> <div>filed the motion for a de novo hearing cannot logically <span>be</span> incur<span></span>red </div> <div>in <span>responding</span> to that motion. Accordingly, father is not entitled t<span></span>o </div> <div>recover those fees and costs<span>. </span><span>See</span> § <span>14</span><span>-<span>10</span>-128.5.</span><span> </span>The court </div> <div>therefore erred to the extent it awarded father any fees <span></span>incurred </div> <div>before mother filed the motion for a de novo hearing<span>. </span> </div> <div>2.<span> <span>Fees Incurred in Preparing for and Attending the De<span></span> Novo </span></span> </div> <div>Hearing </div> <div>¶ 75<span> </span><span>We reject mother<span>â</span>s argument that <span>the statuteâs plain</span> language </span> </div> <div>limits the recoverable fees to those incurred in filing the objection t<span></span>o </div> <div>the motion for the de novo hearing and attending the <span>case </span> </div> <div>management conference where the trial court determined whether </div> <div>to grant it<span>. </span>Rather, fees incurred in <span>â</span><span>responding<span>â</span></span> to a motion for a </div> </div></div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf26" data-page-no="26"> <div><div> <div> </div> <div>35 </div> <div>de novo hearing necessarily include fees incurred in preparing for </div> <div>and attending the hearing once the motion <span>is</span> granted. </div> <div>¶ 76<span> </span><span>The surrounding statutory language supports this </span> </div> <div>interpretation. If the legislature were concerned only about the f<span></span>ees </div> <div>incurred in objecting to a motion for a de novo hearing (and not the </div> <div>fees incurred after the hearing was granted), it would have made </div> <div>such fees recoverable even if the court simply denied the <span></span>motion </div> <div>and declined to hold a hearing, thereby leaving the arbitrato<span></span>r<span>â</span><span>s </span> </div> <div>award in place.<span> </span>By making the fees recoverable only if the <span></span>court </div> <div>holds a hearing<span> and substantially upholds the arbitration award, </span> </div> <div>the legislature signaled its intent to award not only the fees </div> <div>incurred in objecting to the motion but also the fees incurred in </div> <div>connection with the hearing itself. </div> <div>D.<span> <span>â<span>Manifestly Unjust</span>â<span> </span></span></span> </div> <div>¶ 77<span> </span><span>Mother also argues that, given the disparity between her </span> </div> <div>income and father<span>â</span>s income, the trial court should have denie<span></span>d the </div> <div>otherwise-mandatory fee award as manifestly unjust. <span></span> <span>See </span>§ <span>14</span><span>-<span>10</span>-</span> </div> <div>128.5(2). </div> <div>¶ 78<span> </span><span>A determination that awarding fees under the statute would be </span> </div> <div>âmanifestly<span> <span>unjustâ is an equitable decision that we review fo<span></span>r an </span></span> </div> </div></div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf27" data-page-no="27"> <div><div> <div> </div> <div>36 </div> <div>abuse of discretion<span>. </span><span>Cf. In re Marriage of Rodrick</span>,176 P.3d 806, </div> <div>815-16 (Colo. App. 2007) (noting that a trial court has b<span></span>road </div> <div>discretion to award attorney fees under section <span>14</span><span>-<span>10</span></span>-119, C.R.S. </div> <div>2024<span>);<span> <span>In re Marriage of Hein<span>,
253 P.3d 636, 637 (Colo. Ap<span></span>p. 2010) </span></span></span></span> </div> <div>(noting that the trial court has discretion to determine whether t<span></span>he </div> <div>presumptive amount of child support is <span>â</span>inequitable, unjust, or </div> <div>inappropriate,<span>â</span><span> thereby justifying <span>a </span>deviation from the child s<span></span>upport </span> </div> <div>guidelines). </div> <div>¶ 79<span> </span><span>The trial court<span>â</span>s attorney fees order granted father all his </span> </div> <div>requested fees without addressing mother<span>â</span>s contention that<span></span> </div> <div>awarding fees would be manifestly unjust. Thus, we are unabl<span></span>e to </div> <div>determine the basis of its decision. <span>See In re Marriage of Rozzi</span>, 190 </div> <div>P.3d 815, 822 (Colo. App. 2008) (A trial court order must contain </div> <div>sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law to enable an </div> <div>appellate court to <span>â</span>determine the grounds upon which it <span></span>rendered </div> <div>its decision.<span>â</span><span>).</span><span> </span>On remand, the court should consider whether the </div> <div>award of fees for the proceedings below is manifestly unjust in light<span></span> </div> <div>of the partiesâ economic circumstances at the time of <span></span>remand, <span>cf. In </span> </div> <div>re Marriage of Wells<span>,
850 P.2d 694, 696 (Colo. 1993) (concl<span></span>uding </span> </div> <div>that a court must consider the partiesâ economic circumstances <span></span>at </div> </div></div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf28" data-page-no="28"> <div> <img alt="" src="https://icbg.s3.amazonaws.com/media/MM9/Zgu/MM9ZguMTW/pwsU7Hj38Z0aT83wGmUtrM/47S7PRRijEBs%3D?AWSAccessKeyId=ASIA5PHC3MTPS6UWKBZO&Expires=1728536585&Signature=TVK2qdEoRyUjVwcah8e4X0ElyDs%3D&x-amz-security-token=IQoJb3JpZ2luX2VjEBQaCXVzLWVhc3QtMSJGMEQCIFtfD2Ez3JMDb4MbnsKue0sSlWceRGAVSolTbgmrm9VJAiA3JPi4P6S9extweDDPns%2Bd5h%2FYlzrI5Hw5Lx32j2zGGCqyBQhtEAAaDDkyNjA0MTIwMzkzNSIM4TgBc5ht0DC2AJY%2FKo8F7qSALm9PItWg%2BCzJYMsqcR%2BY63pXgo6JCCEGS1plO0dn3TawAeo5fsJJAP9e6YZerRshoIe27gzpWWY53NzdxGt6ZO3l%2FuM4TEYyP935rQdKgnR03XSk9vuaQ45OGVgNCUAyJ38AX8FNnhn0LJXaZjnSmleqm27mI%2BEs%2FKkfXA8KEjZmpUejdDqf7Ya108h6%2BwNsPDDBuNNM3Ht3sbOd11BYlx1lLWV4a8H7u94Bow68BMB8VIiC7mwbPxnS0fBg9w71z09vGd7JQElHJuBcKc9GwdOF0KPZ8Gs%2BpIL4glv7ikLuzynlkUR5VRT3DezH3dlyLz%2Bgh%2BN5S7KKQEF63TwbeLiggOzlQJPc0oQpVWgtY8pZ0u5o7XmTOJQ%2BNGIw1DvRh7NUKgBuBwfZQZDkVRJ1Wfm4PawOjOBGet1w82qp0b%2BLa2NuqCjLW7%2Fyl%2FadKPfdARcP8ltQXsk4LDt59oZBYulpcwcm3egPXLCJIrPtNyvXm0lUB8QsYqbSEXiG2NybT0l%2FD%2FUj9S0aCWGFbgAi0jVa4JUI36uRpKfl%2ByF%2F1c6Op19SBu3RtFJeiedbMYn85UYYm5cfOobB4gmL8Q33m%2FgClUBeY%2BXaK7prVtXr8nKceJz8Wsi%2B0vzEyGlTrKkGE3Ec%2F9I%2FCsvSRZCvhk7KZE7Q9iqdQ19gPXDwS3%2FM7RqKlEe0I9U3DJUdP3r7LmfExhdTzHQ7EwtScIoDy7PtWYWQhxT7OZcrOYuTUukm8AtlRBPL2McaEFfbk50WeNjYi%2FtMl8ukSvrZzaGtzmXEeOLWsRH6aWk8jcnutFMP%2BnM2l2Ff%2FOFPj4CnUxfi5dKriCupfngdNmm1jxhz6Ek5xZ0F3xY5TmHZ9%2BxFazCMnJ24BjqyAdBrXXeffGhNbbjae78%2BtzJVgxPmy8XeQL3C8jx3eNyZJ7cnKKMib%2BC3qodL9uDu%2F5F21Qgn8gwklrISpeRjnm3th7sIc6FGJGEQ%2BJuJr90anXl2WRB1z2p0QYa342p%2B6VBvG%2ByGf7FJ356zmyz8aLCNduYJCzja8a5QuZ6iarOCgSbX3YtbGUDvUjJR0bY8g2V%2B67gGtpTb%2BUjYAIquI1CllkC5nEi6LbN4PyAL326%2BSFE%3D"><div> <div> </div> <div>37 </div> <div>the time of remand when dividing property); <span>In re Marriage of </span> </div> <div>Martin<span>,2021 COA 101, ¶ 42 (directing trial court to consi<span></span>der </span> </div> <div>economic circumstances at the time of remand when determining </div> <div>appellate attorney fees under section 14-<span>10</span>-119), and make </div> <div>sufficient findings to enable a reviewing court to determin<span></span>e the </div> <div>basis of its order, <span>see</span> <span>Rozzi</span>, 190 P.3d at 822.</div> </div> <div><div>5</div></div> <div> <div> While a trial court </div> <div>may conclude that an attorney fee award under section 14-<span>10</span>-</div> <div>128.5 is manifestly unjust based on the partiesâ economic </div> <div>circumstances, that determination is not the same as the </div> <div>determination about whether to award attorney fees und<span></span>er section </div> <div>14<span>-<span>10<span>-119<span>. <span> </span></span></span></span></span> </div> <div>VI.<span> </span><span>Child Support </span> </div> <div>¶ 80<span> </span><span>Mother contends that the court erred by entering father<span>â</span><span>s </span></span> </div> <div>proposed child support order without evidence as to (1) the <span></span>number </div> <div> </div> </div> <div><div>5</div></div> <div> <div> To the extent mother argues that the fee award was also unju<span></span>st </div> <div>because she had a legitimate complaint regarding the arbitrat<span></span>orâs </div> <div>reasoning, we decline to address this argument because it isnât<span></span> </div> <div>preserved. <span>Berra v. Springer & Steinberg, P.C.</span>,
251 P.3d 567, <span></span>570 </div> <div>(Colo. App. 2010). While we direct the trial court to <span></span>consider the </div> <div>partiesâ economic <span>circumstances on remand, we express n<span></span>o opinion </span> </div> <div>about what other factors a court may consider when determining<span></span> </div> <div>whether a fee award under section 14-<span>10</span>-128.5, C.R.S. 2024, is </div> <div>âmanifestly unjust.â<span> </span> </div> </div> <a href="#pf28" data-dest-detail='[40,"XYZ",69,219,null]'><div style="border-style:none;position:absolute;left:484.086111px;bottom:667.971111px;width:10.080000px;height:32.880000px;background-color:rgba(255,255,255,0.000001);"></div></a> </div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf29" data-page-no="29"> <div><div> <div> </div> <div>38 </div> <div>of overnights S.P. would have with each parent and (2) fath<span></span>er<span>â</span><span>s </span> </div> <div>expenses for work-related child care and health insurance. <span></span>We </div> <div>agree. </div> <div>¶ 81<span> </span><span>Initially, we disagree with father that mother failed to preserve </span> </div> <div>this contention for review. Mother<span>â</span>s claim didn<span>â</span>t arise until the </div> <div>court entered father<span>â</span>s proposed child support order, and a pa<span></span>rty </div> <div>isn<span>â</span><span>t required to file a post-trial motion in order to appeal<span>. </span><span>See </span></span> </div> <div>C.R.C.P. 59(b).<span> <span>We</span></span> also reject father<span>â</span>s suggestion, to the extent he </div> <div>makes it, that mother waived this contention by failing <span></span>to present </div> <div>evidence on this issue during the de novo hearing. Although <span></span>the </div> <div>parties apparently agreed in advance to leave the issue of child </div> <div>support open pending the result of the de novo hearing, <span></span>the subject </div> <div>of the hearing was strictly limited to parenting time and d<span></span>ecision-</div> <div>making. </div> <div>¶ 82<span> </span><span>The amount of child support due from one parent to the <span></span>other </span> </div> <div>is calculated based on the incomes of the parents and, as relevant </div> <div>here, the number of overnights with each parent and expenditures </div> <div>paid directly by each parent for work-related child care costs and </div> <div>the child<span>â</span>s portion of health insurance premiums<span>. </span>§ <span>14<span>-<span>10</span></span></span><span>-115(8)-</span> </div> <div>(10), C.R.S. 2024<span>. </span> </div> </div></div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf2a" data-page-no="2a"> <div><div> <div> </div> <div>39 </div> <div>¶ 83<span> </span><span>Father submitted a proposed, unsworn child support </span> </div> <div>worksheet indicating that he had 273 overnights or more wit<span></span>h S.P. </div> <div>per year; he paid $1,004 per month in work-related child care; and </div> <div>S.P.<span>â</span><span>s portion of the health insurance premium was $215 pe<span></span>r </span> </div> <div>month<span>. <span>This resulted in a child support payment of $1,043.53 per </span></span> </div> <div>month from mother to father in <span>â</span><span>current<span>â</span></span> child support and a t<span></span>otal </div> <div>of $8,348.24 in child support arrears. Father used these amounts </div> <div>in his proposed support order. </div> <div>¶ 84<span> </span><span>When the court adopted father<span>â</span>s proposed order, it implicitly </span> </div> <div>adopted his overnight and expense figures as its factual findings. </div> <div>Though we defer to a trial court<span>â</span>s factual findings if they are </div> <div>supported by any evidence in the record, <span>In re Marria<span></span>ge of Young<span>, </span></span> </div> <div>2021 COA 96, ¶ 8, we see no such evidence here. While overnights </div> <div>are sometimes calculable from the face of a parenting <span></span>plan, the </div> <div>court<span>â</span><span>s parenting plan in this case was based on S.P.<span>â</span>s school </span> </div> <div>calendar. Without that calendar, we can<span>â</span>t discern whether the </div> <div>number of overnights was correct. And as far as we can tell,<span></span> there </div> <div>isn<span>â</span><span>t any evidence supporting father<span>â</span>s expenses. </span> </div> <div>¶ 85<span> </span><span>Accordingly, we reverse the trial court<span>â</span>s support order and </span> </div> <div>remand the case to the trial court to recalculate child sup<span></span>port. On </div> </div></div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf2b" data-page-no="2b"> <div><div> <div> </div> <div>40 </div> <div>remand, the trial court may take additional evidence as <span></span>necessary </div> <div>to support its calculation. <span>See</span><span> </span><span>In re Marriage of Cora<span></span>k<span>, 2014 COA </span></span> </div> <div>147, ¶ 21 (noting that the trial court has discretion to <span></span>receive </div> <div>additional evidence on remand). </div> <div>VII.<span> </span><span>Miscellaneous Contentions </span> </div> <div>¶ 86<span> </span><span>Finally, mother contends that the trial court erred by </span> </div> <div>(1<span>) checking a box on the decree of dissolution of marriage </span> </div> <div>indicating that mother was represented by counsel even though her </div> <div>counsel withdrew shortly after the de novo hearing and (2) failing to </div> <div>notify mother of the October 2023 orders.<span> </span>We can<span>â</span>t discern how t<span></span>he </div> <div>â<span>check box</span>â<span> error would result in prejudice to mother.<span></span> While failure </span> </div> <div>to receive notice of a <span>courtâs</span> orders could certainly prejudice a </div> <div>party<span>â</span><span>s appellate rights, mother timely appealed the orders. And </span> </div> <div>mother doesn<span>â</span>t otherwise explain how either of these purported </div> <div>errors prejudiced her. Accordingly, we conclude that the <span></span>errors, if </div> <div>any, aren<span>â</span>t reversible because they didn<span>â</span>t affect mother<span>â</span>s substantial </div> <div>rights. <span>See </span>C.R.C.P. 61. </div> <div>VIII.<span> </span><span>Appellate Attorney Fees </span> </div> <div>¶ 87<span> </span><span>Mother requests her appellate attorney fees under section 14-</span> </div> <div>10<span>-<span>119<span> because of the disparity in the parties<span>â</span> incomes. Father </span></span></span> </div> </div></div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf2c" data-page-no="2c"> <div><div> <div> </div> <div>41 </div> <div>opposes her request, arguing that mother <span>â</span>should be financially </div> <div>secure<span>â</span><span> with her income, spousal maintenance payments, and </span> </div> <div>money she received from the property division. </div> <div>¶ 88<span> </span><span>Father requests his appellate attorney fees under both section </span> </div> <div>14<span>-<span>10<span>-128.5 and section 14-</span>10<span>-</span>119<span>.<span> <span>Regarding section 14-</span></span></span></span></span>10<span>-</span> </div> <div>128.5, unless such an award of fees would be manifestly unjust,<span></span> we </div> <div>agree that father is entitled to the fees incurred in successf<span></span>ully </div> <div>defending the trial <span>courtâs parenting time orders on appeal. <span></span> <span>See </span></span> </div> <div>Levy-Wegrzyn v. Ediger<span>,899 P.2d 230, 233 (Colo. App. 1<span></span>994) (When </span> </div> <div>âa party, pursuant to a statute, has been appropriately awar<span></span>ded </div> <div>attorney fees for a stage of the proceeding prior to the appeal, t<span></span>hat </div> <div>party will be entitled to reasonable attorney fees for defen<span></span>ding the </div> <div>appeal.â). <span>Mother opposes f</span>atherâs request, arguing that an <span></span>award </div> <div>of appellate fees to father would be manifestly unjust due to the </div> <div>partiesâ disparate financial circumstances<span>. </span> </div> <div>¶ 89<span> </span><span>Because the district court is in a better position than we are to </span> </div> <div>make findings about the partiesâ financial circumstances, we <span></span>direct </div> <div>the court to consider <span>both partiesâ appellate fee</span> requests on reman<span></span>d </div> </div></div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf2d" data-page-no="2d"> <div> <img alt="" src="https://icbg.s3.amazonaws.com/media/MM9/Zgu/MM9ZguMTW/pwsU7Hj38Z0aT83wGmUtrM/47S7PRRijEBs%3D?AWSAccessKeyId=ASIA5PHC3MTPS6UWKBZO&Expires=1728536585&Signature=TVK2qdEoRyUjVwcah8e4X0ElyDs%3D&x-amz-security-token=IQoJb3JpZ2luX2VjEBQaCXVzLWVhc3QtMSJGMEQCIFtfD2Ez3JMDb4MbnsKue0sSlWceRGAVSolTbgmrm9VJAiA3JPi4P6S9extweDDPns%2Bd5h%2FYlzrI5Hw5Lx32j2zGGCqyBQhtEAAaDDkyNjA0MTIwMzkzNSIM4TgBc5ht0DC2AJY%2FKo8F7qSALm9PItWg%2BCzJYMsqcR%2BY63pXgo6JCCEGS1plO0dn3TawAeo5fsJJAP9e6YZerRshoIe27gzpWWY53NzdxGt6ZO3l%2FuM4TEYyP935rQdKgnR03XSk9vuaQ45OGVgNCUAyJ38AX8FNnhn0LJXaZjnSmleqm27mI%2BEs%2FKkfXA8KEjZmpUejdDqf7Ya108h6%2BwNsPDDBuNNM3Ht3sbOd11BYlx1lLWV4a8H7u94Bow68BMB8VIiC7mwbPxnS0fBg9w71z09vGd7JQElHJuBcKc9GwdOF0KPZ8Gs%2BpIL4glv7ikLuzynlkUR5VRT3DezH3dlyLz%2Bgh%2BN5S7KKQEF63TwbeLiggOzlQJPc0oQpVWgtY8pZ0u5o7XmTOJQ%2BNGIw1DvRh7NUKgBuBwfZQZDkVRJ1Wfm4PawOjOBGet1w82qp0b%2BLa2NuqCjLW7%2Fyl%2FadKPfdARcP8ltQXsk4LDt59oZBYulpcwcm3egPXLCJIrPtNyvXm0lUB8QsYqbSEXiG2NybT0l%2FD%2FUj9S0aCWGFbgAi0jVa4JUI36uRpKfl%2ByF%2F1c6Op19SBu3RtFJeiedbMYn85UYYm5cfOobB4gmL8Q33m%2FgClUBeY%2BXaK7prVtXr8nKceJz8Wsi%2B0vzEyGlTrKkGE3Ec%2F9I%2FCsvSRZCvhk7KZE7Q9iqdQ19gPXDwS3%2FM7RqKlEe0I9U3DJUdP3r7LmfExhdTzHQ7EwtScIoDy7PtWYWQhxT7OZcrOYuTUukm8AtlRBPL2McaEFfbk50WeNjYi%2FtMl8ukSvrZzaGtzmXEeOLWsRH6aWk8jcnutFMP%2BnM2l2Ff%2FOFPj4CnUxfi5dKriCupfngdNmm1jxhz6Ek5xZ0F3xY5TmHZ9%2BxFazCMnJ24BjqyAdBrXXeffGhNbbjae78%2BtzJVgxPmy8XeQL3C8jx3eNyZJ7cnKKMib%2BC3qodL9uDu%2F5F21Qgn8gwklrISpeRjnm3th7sIc6FGJGEQ%2BJuJr90anXl2WRB1z2p0QYa342p%2B6VBvG%2ByGf7FJ356zmyz8aLCNduYJCzja8a5QuZ6iarOCgSbX3YtbGUDvUjJR0bY8g2V%2B67gGtpTb%2BUjYAIquI1CllkC5nEi6LbN4PyAL326%2BSFE%3D"><div> <div> </div> <div>42 </div> <div>based on the partiesâ relative financial circumstances at t<span></span>hat time.</div> </div> <div><div>6</div></div> <div> <div> </div> <div>See<span> C.A.R. 39.1; </span>Martin<span>, ¶ <span>42.</span> </span> </div> <div>¶ 90<span> </span><span>We deny father<span>â</span>s request for appellate attorney fees under </span> </div> <div>section 14-<span>10</span>-119 because father provides no argument about the </div> <div>relative financial resources of both parties to support his <span></span>request. </div> <div>See<span> § <span>14<span>-<span>10</span></span></span>-119 (providing that <span>â</span>[t]he court from time to t<span></span>ime, <span>after </span></span> </div> <div>considering the financial resources of both part<span></span>ies<span>â</span><span> may order one </span> </div> <div>party to pay the attorney fees of the other) (emphasis added)<span>. </span> </div> <div>Instead, father asserts that mother<span>â</span><span>s <span>â</span></span>continued pursuant [sic] <span></span>of </div> <div>litigation and her refusals to accept the carefully considere<span></span>d and </div> <div>reasoned judgments<span>â</span> of the arbitrator and trial court have imp<span></span>osed </div> <div>â<span>burdens and expenses</span>â<span> on him<span>. </span>Essentially, father requests that<span></span> </span> </div> <div>he be awarded his fees as a punishment for mother<span>â</span>s pursuit of </div> <div>these appeals. Although mother<span>â</span>s conduct may be conside<span></span>red to </div> <div>the extent that <span>â</span>it might affect the reasonableness and necessity <span></span>of </div> <div>attorney fees<span>â</span> <span>she</span> incurred, an award of fees under section <span>14</span><span>-<span>10</span>-</span> </div> <div> </div> </div> <div><div>6</div></div> <div> <div> Because neither party raises this issue, we express no opinion </div> <div>about the interaction of competing attorney fee requests un<span></span>der </div> <div>section 14-<span>10</span>-128.5 and section 14-<span>10<span>-<span>119</span></span></span>, C.R.S. 2024. </div> </div> <a href="#pf2d" data-dest-detail='[45,"XYZ",69,121,null]'><div style="border-style:none;position:absolute;left:668.686667px;bottom:877.999444px;width:10.080000px;height:32.870000px;background-color:rgba(255,255,255,0.000001);"></div></a> </div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> <div id="pf2e" data-page-no="2e"> <div><div> <div> </div> <div>43 </div> <div>119 <span>â</span>should not be used as punishment against a party.<span>â</span><span> </span><span>C.J.S.</span>, 37 </div> <div>P.3d <span>at</span> 481. </div> <div>IX.<span> </span><span>Disposition </span> </div> <div>¶ 91<span> </span><span>The judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the </span> </div> <div>case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion<span>. </span> </div> <div>JUDGE HARRIS and JUDGE TAUBMAN concur. </div> </div></div> <div data-data='{"ctm":[1.277778,0.000000,0.000000,1.277778,0.000000,0.000000]}'></div> </div> </div></div></div></div>
Document Info
Docket Number： 23CA0792 & 23CA2021
Citation Numbers： 2024 COA 107
Filed Date： 10/3/2024
Precedential Status： Precedential
Modified Date： 10/10/2024